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  1. Anna Alexandrova (2006). Connecting Economic Models to the Real World: Game Theory and the Fcc Spectrum Auctions. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 36 (2):173-192.
    Can social phenomena be understood by analyzing their parts? Contemporary economic theory often assumes that they can. The methodology of constructing models which trace the behavior of perfectly rational agents in idealized environments rests on the premise that such models, while restricted, help us isolate tendencies, that is, the stable separate effects of economic causes that can be used to explain and predict economic phenomena. In this paper, I question both the claim that models in economics supply claims about tendencies (...)
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  2. David A. Bantz (1982). The Philosophical Basis of Cost-Risk-Benefit Analyses. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1982:227 - 242.
    Analytical techniques for determining the net worth of the consequences of alternative choices are increasingly used to motivate decisions about public projects and policies, especially where risks are prevalent. What information do these techniques provide, and what are the grounds for using them in decision making? It is argued that the apparent similarities of cost-risk-benefit analyses to decision theory are in some ways misleading, and that the true basis of such analyses in welfare economics suggests some inherent limitations to their (...)
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  3. Claus Beisbart & Stephan Hartmann (2010). Welfarist Evaluations of Decision Rules Under Interstate Utility Dependencies. Social Choice and Welfare 34 (2):315-344.
    We provide welfarist evaluations of decision rules for federations of states and consider models, under which the interests of people from different states are stochastically dependent. We concentrate on two welfarist standards; they require that the expected utility for the federation be maximized or that the expected utilities for people from different states be equal. We discuss an analytic result that characterizes the decision rule with maximum expected utility, set up a class of models that display interstate dependencies and run (...)
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  4. Ken Binmore, Interpersonal Comparison of Utility (Pdf 138k).
    ’Tis vain to talk of adding quantities which after the addition will continue to be as distinct as they were before; one man’s happiness will never be another man’s happiness: a gain to one man is no gain to another: you might as well pretend to add 20 apples to 20 pears.
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  5. Ken Binmore, Game Theory and Institutions.
    This short paper begins with a summary of the views of a sympathetic game theorist on the current state of play in what is still called the New Institutional Economics. It continues with a much abbreviated summary of my own attempts to treat justice as a kind of institution in the hope that this will serve as a case study in how game theory can serve as a useful intellectual framework for the study of human institutions.
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  6. Zamora Bonilla & P. Jesús (2006). Science Studies and the Theory of Games. Perspectives on Science 14 (4).
    : Being scientific research a process of social interaction, this process can be studied from a game-theoretic perspective. Some conceptual and formal instruments that can help to understand scientific research as a game are introduced, and it is argued that game theoretic epistemology provides a middle ground for 'rationalist' and 'constructivist' theories of scientific knowledge. In the first part ('The game theoretic logic of scientific discovery'), a description of the essential elements of game of science is made, using an inferentialist (...)
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  7. Lisa J. Carlson & Raymond Dacey (2010). Social Norms and the Traditional Deterrence Game. Synthese 176 (1):105 - 123.
    Bicchieri (The grammar of society: The nature and dynamics of norms, 2006, xi) presents a formal analysis of norms that answers the questions of "when, how, and to what degree" norms affect human behavior in the play of games. The purpose of this paper is to apply a variation of the Bicchieri norms analysis to generate a model of norms-based play of the traditional deterrence game (Zagare and Kilgour, Int Stud Q 37: 1-27, 1993; Morrow, Game theory for political scientists, (...)
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  8. Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa (2012). Giochi di altruismo. L'approccio evoluzionistico alla cooperazione umana. In Matt Ridley (ed.), Le Origini della Virtù. IBL Libri. 7--38.
    This is the introductory essay to the Italian translation of Matt Ridley's "The origins of virtue", surveying the game-theoretic and evolutionary approaches to the emergence and evolution of cooperation and altruism.
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  9. Chambers, Robert & John Quiggin (2000). Uncertainty, Production, Choice, and Agency: The State-Contingent Approach. Cambridge Univ Pr.
    This book demonstrates that the state-contingent approach provides the best way to think about all problems in the economics of uncertainty, including problems ...
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  10. Yu-Lin Chang (2007). Who Should Own Access Rights? A Game-Theoretical Approach to Striking the Optimal Balance in the Debate Over Digital Rights Management. Artificial Intelligence and Law 15 (4):323-356.
    The development of access rights as, perhaps, a replacement for copyright in digital rights management (DRM) systems, draws our attention to the importance of ‚the balance problem’ between information industries and the individual user. The nature of just what this ‚balance’ is, is often mentioned in copyright writings and judgments, but is rarely discussed. In this paper I focus upon elucidating the idea of balance in intellectual property and propose that the balance concept is not only the most feasible way (...)
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  11. Raymond Dacey (1994). Inducing Fair Trade Out of Hegemonic Trade. Synthese 100 (3):497 - 504.
    This paper provides a model of the transition from hegemonic trade to contemporary (or fair) trade. Hegemonic trade is an instance of the two player game called Bully (Poundstone 1992) and Called Bluff (Snyder and Diesing 1977); contemporary trade is an instance of Prisoner's Dilemma (Krugman and Obstfeld 1991). In this paper, I show that a nation under the thumb of a hegemon, called the conciliatory nation, can induce fair trade. Further, I show that to induce fair trade, the conciliatory (...)
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  12. Andy Denis (2006). Modeling Rational Agents: From Interwar Economics to Early Modern Game Theory, Nicola Giocoli, Edward Elgar, 2003, X + 464 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 22 (1):159-166.
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  13. Graham G. Dodds & David W. Shoemaker (2002). Why We Can't All Just Get Along: Human Variety and Game Theory in Hobbes's State of Nature. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):345-374.
  14. Mohammed Dore (1997). On Playing Fair: Professor Binmore on Game Theory and the Social Contract. Theory and Decision 43 (3):219-239.
    This paper critically reviews Ken Binmore’s non- utilitarian and game theoretic solution to the Arrow problem. Binmore’s solution belongs to the same family as Rawls’ maximin criterion and requires the use of Nash bargaining theory, empathetic preferences, and results in evolutionary game theory. Harsanyi has earlier presented a solution that relies on utilitarianism, which requires some exogenous valuation criterion and is therefore incompatible with liberalism. Binmore’s rigorous demonstration of the maximin principle for the first time presents a real alternative to (...)
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  15. Daniel Eggers (2011). Hobbes and Game Theory Revisited: Zero-Sum Games in the State of Nature. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):193-226.
    The aim of this paper is to critically review the game-theoretic discussion of Hobbes and to develop a game-theoretic interpretation that gives due attention both to Hobbes's distinction between “moderates” and “dominators” and to what actually initiates conflict in the state of nature, namely, the competition for vital goods. As can be shown, Hobbes's state of nature contains differently structured situations of choice, the game-theoretic representation of which requires the prisoner's dilemma and the assurance game and the so-called assurance dilemma. (...)
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  16. Jon Elster (2003). Marxism, Functionalism, and Game Theory: A Case for Methodological Individualism. In Derek Matravers & Jonathan E. Pike (eds.), Debates in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology. Routledge, in Association with the Open University.
  17. Alfred Endres (2004). Game Theory and Global Environmental Policy. Poiesis and Praxis 3 (s 1-2):123-139.
    Economists interpret global environmental quality to be a pure public good. Each country should contribute to its provision. However, this is hard to achieve because each government is tempted to take a free ride on the other governments' efforts. Not only has this dilemma been analysed with game theoretical methods but game theory has also been used to think about how to make amends. This paper reviews the game theoretical discussion on how international policy frameworks may be designed to improve (...)
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  18. Leon Felkins, Introduction to Public Choice Theory.
    The social phenomena discussed in this series of essays all center around the problem of individuals in groups faced with the choice of doing what is best for themselves or what is best for the group. Instances of the phenomena are called by many different names: "Volunteer's Dilemma", "Prisoner's Dilemma", "Collective Choice", "Rational Choice", "Social Choice", and "Voter's Paradox" to list just a few. Unfortunately, the academic programs that cover these various manifestations of the "individual vs. group" dilemma do not (...)
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  19. Christian Fuchs & John Collier (2007). A Dynamic Systems View of Economic and Political Theory. Theoria 54 (113):23-52.
    Economic logic impinges on contemporary political theory through both economic reductionism and economic methodology applied to political decision-making (through game theory). The authors argue that the sort of models used are based on mechanistic and linear methodologies that have now been found wanting in physics. They further argue that complexity based self-organization methods are better suited to model the complexities of economy and polity and their interactions with the overall social system.
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  20. David Gauthier (1995). Game Theory and the Social Contract Volume 1: Playing Fair, Binmore Ken. The MIT Press, 1994, Xxii + 364 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 11 (02):391-.
  21. A. Goldman (1996). Simulation and Interpersonal Utility. In L. May, Michael Friedman & A. Clark (eds.), Mind and Morals: Essays on Ethics and Cognitive Science. MIT Press. 709-726.
  22. Robert Grafstein (1983). The Social Scientific Interpretation of Game Theory. Erkenntnis 20 (1):27 - 47.
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  23. Russell Hardin (1982). Comment on Formal Decision Theory and Majority Rule. Ethics 92 (2):207-210.
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  24. Daniel Hausman (2006). Consequentialism and Preference Formation in Economics and Game Theory. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 81 (59):111-.
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  25. Daniel M. Hausman (1995). The Impossibility of Interpersonal Utility Comparisons. Mind 104 (415):473-490.
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  26. Ronald Inglehart (1996). The Diminishing Utility of Economic Growth: From Maximizing Security Toward Maximizing Subjective Well‐Being. Critical Review 10 (4):509-531.
    Abstract Twenty years ago, Tibor Scitovsky questioned the assumption, embedded in neoclassical economics, that human happiness will be augmented if the level of consumption either rises or becomes more uniform over time. Evidence from the 1990?1993 World Values Survey suggests that his doubts were well?founded: although economic gains apparently make a major contribution to subjective well?being as one moves from societies at the subsistence level to those with moderate levels of economic development, further economic growth seems to have little or (...)
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  27. C. Maria Keet (2003). Towards a Resolution of Terrorism Using Game Theory. In Luke Ashworth & Maura Adshead (eds.), Limerick Papers in Politics and Public Administration.
    Both terrorism and game theory are contested concepts within the social sciences, but in this paper, I will show that a rational approach (game theory) towards the emotion-laden idea and practice of terrorism does aid understanding of the “terrorist theatre”. First, an outline will be provided on the type of actors (game players) that are, or may be, involved to a more or lesser extend in (supporting) terrorism. Then several game models will be assessed on their applicability. This includes averting (...)
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  28. Chantale LaCasse & Don Ross (1994). The Microeconomic Interpretation of Games. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:379 - 387.
    This paper is part of a larger project defending of the foundations of microeconomics against recent criticisms by philosophers. Here, we undermine one source of these criticisms, arising from philosophers' disappointment with the performance of microeconomic tools, in particular game theory, when these are applied to normative decision theory. Hollis and Sugden have recently articulated such disappointment in a sophisticated way, and have argued on the basis of it that the economic conception of rationality is inadequate. We argue, however, that (...)
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  29. David Lewis (1984). Devil's Bargains and the Real World. In Douglas Maclean (ed.), The Security Gamble: Deterrence in the Nuclear Age. Rowman and Allenheld. 141-154.
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  30. Christian List (2003). Are Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility Indeterminate? Erkenntnis 58 (2):229 - 260.
    On the orthodox view in economics, interpersonal comparisons of utilityare not empirically meaningful, and ``hence'' impossible. To reassess this view, this paper draws onthe parallels between the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility and the problem of translation of linguisticmeaning, as explored by Quine. I discuss several cases of what the empirical evidence for interpersonal comparisonsof utility might be and show that, even on the strongest of these, interpersonal comparisons are empiricallyunderdetermined and, if we also deny any appropriate truth of (...)
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  31. Hans Lottenbach (1994). Expected Utility and Constrained Maximization: Problems of Compatibility. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 41 (1):37 - 48.
    In recent attempts at deriving morality from rationality expected utility theory has played a major role. In the most prominent such attempt, Gauthier'sMorals by Agreement, a mode of maximizing utility calledconstrained maximization is defended. I want to show that constrained maximization or any similar proposal cannot be coherently supported by expected utility theory. First, I point to an important implication of that theory. Second, I discuss the question of what the place of constrained maximization in utility theory might be. Third, (...)
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  32. Michael Moehler (2009). Why Hobbes' State of Nature is Best Modeled by an Assurance Game. Utilitas 21 (3):297-326.
    In this article, I argue that if one closely follows Hobbes' line of reasoning in Leviathan, in particular his distinction between the second and the third law of nature, and the logic of his contractarian theory, then Hobbes' state of nature is best translated into the language of game theory by an assurance game, and not by a one-shot or iterated prisoner's dilemma game, nor by an assurance dilemma game. Further, I support Hobbes' conclusion that the sovereign must always punish (...)
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  33. Cedric Paternotte (2011). Rational Choice Theory. In I. Jarvie & J. Zamorra-Bonilla (eds.), Chapter 14 of The Sage Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science. Sage Publications. 307.
  34. Gabriella Pigozzi, Collective Decision-Making Without Paradoxes: A Fusion Approach.
    The combination of individual judgments on logically interconnected propositions into a collective decision on the same propositions is called judgment aggregation. Literature in social choice and political theory has claimed that judgment aggregation raises serious concerns. For example, consider a set of premises and a conclusion in which the latter is logically equivalent to the former. When majority voting is applied to some propositions (the premises) it may give a different outcome than majority voting applied to another set of propositions (...)
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  35. John Quiggin (2001). Production Under Uncertainty and Choice Under Uncertainty in the Emergence of Generalized Expected Utility Theory. Theory and Decision 51 (2/4):125-144.
    This paper presents a personal view of the interaction between the analysis of choice under uncertainty and the analysis of production under uncertainty. Interest in the foundations of the theory of choice under uncertainty was stimulated by applications of expected utility theory such as the Sandmo model of production under uncertainty. This interest led to the development of generalized models including rank-dependent expected utility theory. In turn, the development of generalized expected utility models raised the question of whether such models (...)
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  36. Thomas W. Robinson (1970). Game Theory and Politics: Recent Soviet Views. Studies in East European Thought 10 (4):291-315.
  37. W. G. Runciman & Amartya K. Sen (1965). Games, Justice and the General Will. Mind 74 (296):554-562.
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  38. Mark Sagoff (1989). Book Review:Rational Ecology: Environment and Political Economy. John S. Dryzek. [REVIEW] Ethics 100 (1):192-.
  39. Brian Skyrms (2001). The Stag Hunt. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 75 (2):31 - 41.
    If it was a matter of hunting a deer, everyone well realized that he must remain faithful to his post; but if a hare happened to pass within reach of one of them, we cannot doubt that he would have gone off in pursuit of it without scruple..." Rousseau's story of the hunt leaves many questions open. What are the values of a hare and of an individual's share of the deer given a successful hunt? What is the probability that (...)
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  40. Peter Vanderschraaf (2008). Game Theory Meets Threshold Analysis: Reappraising the Paradoxes of Anarchy and Revolution. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):579-617.
    I resolve a previously unnoticed anomaly in the analysis of collective action problems. Some political theorists apply game theory to analyze the paradox of anarchy: War is apparently inevitable in anarchy even though all warring parties prefer peace over war. Others apply tipping threshold analysis to resolve the paradox of revolution: Joining a revolution is apparently always irrational even when an overwhelming majority of the population wish to replace their regime. The usual game theoretic analysis of anarchy yields the conclusion (...)
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  41. Peter Vanderschraaf (1999). Game Theory, Evolution, and Justice. Philosophy and Public Affairs 28 (4):325–358.
    Peter Vanderschraaf. Game Theory, Evolution and Justice.
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  42. Paul Weirich (2001). Ken Binmore, Just Playing: Game Theory and the Social Contract:Just Playing: Game Theory and the Social Contract. Ethics 111 (4):794-797.
  43. Paul Weirich (1984). Interpersonal Utility in Principles of Social Choice. Erkenntnis 21 (3):295 - 317.
    This paper summarizes and rebuts the three standard objections made by social choice theorists against interpersonal utility. The first objection argues that interpersonal utility is measningless. I show that this objection either focuses on irrelevant kinds of meaning or else uses implausible criteria of meaningfulness. The second objection argues that interpersonal utility has no role to play in social choice theory. I show that on the contrary interpersonal utility is useful in formulating goals for social choice. The third objection argues (...)
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