This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
65 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 65
  1. Derek Abbott & Paul C. W. Davies, Order From Disorder: The Role of Noise in Creative Processes. A Special Issue On Game Theory And.
    The importance of applying game theory to the evolution of information in the presence of noise has recently become widely recognized. This Special Issue addresses the theme of spontaneously emergent order in both classical and quantum systems subject to external noise, and includes papers directly related to game theory or the development of supporting techniques. In the following editorial overview we examine the broader context of the subject, including the tension between the destructive and creative aspects of noise, and foreshadow (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Moez Abouda & Alain Chateauneuf (2002). Positivity of Bid-Ask Spreads and Symmetrical Monotone Risk Aversion. Theory and Decision 52 (2):149-170.
    A usual argument in finance refers to no arbitrage opportunities for the positivity of the bid-ask spread. Here we follow the decision theory approach and show that if positivity of the bid-ask spread is identified with strong risk aversion for an expected utility market-maker, this is no longer true for a rank-dependent expected utility one. For such a decision-maker only a very weak form of risk aversion is required, a result which seems more in accordance with his actual behavior. We (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. George Ainslie (2007). Game Theory Can Build Higher Mental Processes From Lower Ones. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):16-18.
    The question of reductionism is an obstacle to unification. Many behavioral scientists who study the more complex or higher mental functions avoid regarding them as selected by motivation. Game-theoretic models in which complex processes grow from the strategic interaction of elementary reward-seeking processes can overcome the mechanical feel of earlier reward-based models. Three examples are briefly described. (Published Online April 27 2007).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Nejat Anbarci (2001). Divide-the-Dollar Game Revisited. Theory and Decision 50 (4):295-303.
    In the Divide-the-Dollar (DD) game, two players simultaneously make demands to divide a dollar. Each player receives his demand if the sum of the demands does not exceed one, a payoff of zero otherwise. Note that, in the latter case, both parties are punished severely. A major setback of DD is that each division of the dollar is a Nash equilibrium outcome. Observe that, when the sum of the two demands x and y exceeds one, it is as if Player (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Horacio Arló-Costa & Cristina Bicchieri (2007). Knowing and Supposing in Games of Perfect Information. Studia Logica 86 (3):353 - 373.
    The paper provides a framework for representing belief-contravening hypotheses in games of perfect information. The resulting t-extended information structures are used to encode the notion that a player has the disposition to behave rationally at a node. We show that there are models where the condition of all players possessing this disposition at all nodes (under their control) is both a necessary and a sufficient for them to play the backward induction solution in centipede games. To obtain this result, we (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Robert Bass, Deciding Where to Meet for Dinner: Simple Problems and Joint Intentionality.
    Certain apparently simple problems of coming to an agreement are surprisingly difficult to analyze in terms of individually rational behavior with a given set of preferences and beliefs. Though initially the solution appears obvious, the reasoning that would be needed to reach the solution on the part of a pair of rational individuals seems baroque and doubtful. This is used to suggest that a more fruitful tack is to analyze the situation in terms of a kind of joint or shared (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Mark Bedau, Financial Markets Can Be at Sub-Optimal Equilibria.
    We use game theory and Santa Fe Artificial Stock Market, an agent-based model of an evolving stock market, to study the optimal frequency for traders to revise their market forecasting rules. We discover two things: There is a unique strategic Nash equilibrium in the game of choosing forecast revision rates, and this equilibrium is sub-optimal in the sense that traders’ earnings are not maximized an the market is inefficient. This strategic equilibrium is due to an analogue of the prisoner’s dilemma; (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Johan Van Benthem, Sujata Ghosh & Fenrong Liu (2008). Modelling Simultaneous Games in Dynamic Logic. Synthese 165 (2):247 - 268.
    We make a proposal for formalizing simultaneous games at the abstraction level of player's powers, combining ideas from dynamic logic of sequential games and concurrent dynamic logic. We prove completeness for a new system of 'concurrent game logic' CDGL with respect to finite non-determined games. We also show how this system raises new mathematical issues, and throws light on branching quantifiers and independence-friendly evaluation games for first-order logic.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Cristina Bicchieri & Gian Aldo Antonelli (1995). Game-Theoretic Axioms for Local Rationality and Bounded Knowledge. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 4 (2):145-167.
    We present an axiomatic approach for a class of finite, extensive form games of perfect information that makes use of notions like rationality at a node and knowledge at a node. We distinguish between the game theorist's and the players' own theory of the game. The latter is a theory that is sufficient for each player to infer a certain sequence of moves, whereas the former is intended as a justification of such a sequence of moves. While in general the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Cristina Bicchieri, Dalla Chiara & Maria Luisa (eds.) (1992). Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction. Cambridge University Press.
    In recent years there has been a great deal of interaction among game theorists, philosophers, and logicians in certain foundational problems concerning rationality, the formalization of knowledge and practical reasoning, and models of learning and deliberation. This unique volume brings together the work of some of the preeminent figures in their respective disciplines, all of whom are engaged in research at the forefront of their fields. Together they offer a conspectus of the interaction of game theory, logic, and epistemology in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.) (1999). The Logic of Strategy. Oxford University Press.
    Edited by three leading figures in the field, this exciting volume presents cutting-edge work in decision theory by a distinguished international roster of contributors. These mostly unpublished papers address a host of crucial areas in the contemporary philosophical study of rationality and knowledge. Topics include causal versus evidential decision theory, game theory, backwards induction, bounded rationality, counterfactual reasoning in games and in general, analyses of the famous common knowledge assumptions in game theory, and evaluations of the normal versus extensive form (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Giacomo Bonanno (2000). Common Belief with the Logic of Individual Belief. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 46 (1):49-52.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Giacomo Bonanno, Wiebe van der Hoek & Michael Wooldridge (eds.) (2008). Logic and the Foundations of Game and Decision Theory. Amsterdam University Press.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Darren Bradley (2013). Decision Theory, Philosophical Perspectives. In Hal Pashler (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Mind. Sage.
    Decision theory is concerned with how agents should act when the consequences of their actions are uncertain. The central principle of contemporary decision theory is that the rational choice is the choice that maximizes subjective expected utility. This entry explains what this means, and discusses the philosophical motivations and consequences of the theory. The entry will consider some of the main problems and paradoxes that decision theory faces, and some of responses that can be given. Finally the entry will briefly (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Ingar Brinck & Peter Gärdenfors (2003). Co–Operation and Communication in Apes and Humans. Mind and Language 18 (5):484–501.
    We trace the difference between the ways in which apes and humans co–operate to differences in communicative abilities, claiming that the pressure for future–directed co–operation was a major force behind the evolution of language. Competitive co–operation concerns goals that are present in the environment and have stable values. It relies on either signalling or joint attention. Future–directed co–operation concerns new goals that lack fixed values. It requires symbolic communication and context–independent representations of means and goals. We analyse these ways of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. John W. Carroll (2000). The Backward Induction Argument. Theory and Decision 48 (1):61-84.
    The backward induction argument purports to show that rational and suitably informed players will defect throughout a finite sequence of prisoner's dilemmas. It is supposed to be a useful argument for predicting how rational players will behave in a variety of interesting decision situations. Here, I lay out a set of assumptions defining a class of finite sequences of prisoner's dilemmas. Given these assumptions, I suggest how it might appear that backward induction succeeds and why it is actually fallacious. Then, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Gustavo Cevolani (2008). Giochi, dilemmi sociali e scelte collettive. In Anthony de Jasay (ed.), Scelta, Contratto, Consenso. Rubbettino/Leonardo Facco. 13--56.
    This is the introductory essay to the Italian translation of Anthony de Jasay's "Choice, contract, and consent. A restatement of liberalism".
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa (forthcoming). L'€™ingranaggio della cooperazione. Teorie dei giochi, cooperazione spontanea e produzione di beni pubblici. In Carlo Lottieri & Daniele Velo Dalbrenta (eds.), La città volontaria. IBL Libri.
    A survey of some game-theoretic accounts of the emergence and evolution of spontaneuous cooperation in social and public-good dilemmas.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Gustavo Cevolani & Roberto Festa (2011). Giochi di anarchia. Beni pubblici, teoria dei giochi e anarco-liberalismo. Nuova Civiltà Delle Macchine 29 (1-2):163-180.
    The paper focuses on Anthony de Jasay's "anarcho-liberalism" as based oon his game-theoretic approach to the problem of public goods provision.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Ho-Chyuan Chen & William S. Neilson (1999). Pure-Strategy Equilibria with Non-Expected Utility Players. Theory and Decision 46 (2):201-212.
    A pure-strategy equilibrium existence theorem is extended to include games with non-expected utility players. It is shown that to guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, the linearity of preferences in the probabilities can be replaced by the weaker requirement of quasiconvexity in the probabilities.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Andrew M. Colman (2003). Beyond Rationality: Rigor Without Mortis in Game Theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):180-192.
    Psychological game theory encompasses formal theories designed to remedy game-theoretic indeterminacy and to predict strategic interaction more accurately. Its theoretical plurality entails second-order indeterminacy, but this seems unavoidable. Orthodox game theory cannot solve payoff-dominance problems, and remedies based on interval-valued beliefs or payoff transformations are inadequate. Evolutionary game theory applies only to repeated interactions, and behavioral ecology is powerless to explain cooperation between genetically unrelated strangers in isolated interactions. Punishment of defectors elucidates cooperation in social dilemmas but leaves punishing behavior (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Andrew M. Colman (2003). Cooperation, Psychological Game Theory, and Limitations of Rationality in Social Interaction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):139-153.
    Rational choice theory enjoys unprecedented popularity and influence in the behavioral and social sciences, but it generates intractable problems when applied to socially interactive decisions. In individual decisions, instrumental rationality is defined in terms of expected utility maximization. This becomes problematic in interactive decisions, when individuals have only partial control over the outcomes, because expected utility maximization is undefined in the absence of assumptions about how the other participants will behave. Game theory therefore incorporates not only rationality but also common (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Ann E. Cudd (1993). Game Theory and the History of Ideas About Rationality: An Introductory Survey. Economics and Philosophy 9 (01):101-.
    Although it may seem from its formalism that game theory must have sprung from the mind of John von Neumann as a corollary of his work on computers or theoretical physics, it should come as no real surprise to philosophers that game theory is the articulation of a historically developing philosophical conception of rationality in thought and action. The history of ideas about rationality is deeply contradictory at many turns. While there are theories of rationality that claim it is fundamentally (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Boudewijn de Bruin (2010). Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory. Springer.
    Contents. Introduction. 1. Preliminaries. 2. Normal Form Games. 3. Extensive Games. 4. Applications of Game Theory. 5. The Methodology of Game Theory. Conclusion. Appendix. Bibliography. Index. Does game theory—the mathematical theory of strategic interaction—provide genuine explanations of human behaviour? Can game theory be used in economic consultancy or other normative contexts? Explaining Games: The Epistemic Programme in Game Theory—the first monograph on the philosophy of game theory—is an attempt to combine insights from epistemic logic and the philosophy of science to (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Kenny Easwaran & B. Monton (2012). Mixed Strategies, Uncountable Times, and Pascal's Wager: A Reply to Robertson. Analysis 72 (4):681-685.
    Pascal’s Wager holds that one has pragmatic reason to believe in God, since that course of action has infinite expected utility. The mixed strategy objection holds that one could just as well follow a course of action that has infinite expected utility but is unlikely to end with one believing in God. Monton (2011. Mixed strategies can’t evade Pascal’s Wager. Analysis 71: 642–45.) has argued that mixed strategies can’t evade Pascal’s Wager, while Robertson (2012. Some mixed strategies can evade Pascal’s (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Jon Elster (2003). Marxism, Functionalism, and Game Theory: A Case for Methodological Individualism. In Derek Matravers & Jonathan E. Pike (eds.), Debates in Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology. Routledge, in Association with the Open University.
  27. Emmanuel J. Genot (2009). The Game of Inquiry: The Interrogative Approach to Inquiry and Belief Revision Theory. Synthese 171 (2):271 - 289.
    I. Levi has advocated a decision-theoretic account of belief revision. We argue that the game-theoretic framework of Interrogative Inquiry Games , proposed by J. Hintikka, can extend and clarify this account. We show that some strategic use of the game rules (or ‘policies’) generate Expansions , Contractions and Revisions , and we give representation results. We then extend the framework to represent explicitly (multiple) sources of answers , and apply it to discuss the Recovery Postulate. We conclude with some (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Emmanuel J. Genot & Justine Jacot (2012). How Can Questions Be Informative Before They Are Answered? Strategic Information in Interrogative Games. Episteme 9 (2):189-204.
    We examine a special case of inquiry games and give an account of the informational import of asking questions. We focus on yes-or-no questions, which always carry information about the questioner's strategy, but never about the state of Nature, and show how strategic information reduces uncertainty through inferences about other players' goals and strategies. This uncertainty cannot always be captured by information structures of classical game theory. We conclude by discussing the connection with Gricean pragmatics and contextual constraints on interpretation.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Gerd Gigerenzer & Thalia Gigerenzer (2005). Is the Ultimatum Game a Three-Body Affair? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):823-824.
    The Ultimatum Game is commonly interpreted as a two-person bargaining game. The third person who donates and may withdraw the money is not included in the theoretical equations, but treated like a neutral measurement instrument. Yet in a cross-cultural analysis it seems necessary to consider the possibility that the thoughts of a player – strategic, altruistic, selfish, or concerned about reputation – are influenced by both an anonymous second player and the non-anonymous experimenter.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Herbert Gintis (2001). The Contribution of Game Theory to Experimental Design in the Behavioral Sciences. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):411-412.
    Methodological practices differ between economics and psychology because economists use game theory as the basis for the design and interpretation of experiments, while psychologists do not. This methodological choice explains the “four key variables” stressed by Hert-wig and Ortmann. Game theory is currently the most rigorous basis for modeling strategic choice.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt & Rouss Hall, Ten Little Treasures of Game Theory and ten Intuitive Contradictions.
    This paper reports laboratory data for games that are played only once. These games span the standard categories: static and dynamic games with complete and incomplete information. For each game, the treasure is a treatment in which behavior conforms nicely to predictions of the Nash equilibrium or relevant refinement. In each case, however, a change in the payoff structure produces a large inconsistency between theoretical predictions and observed behavior. These contradictions are generally consistent with simple intuition based on the interaction (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Randolph C. Grace & Simon Kemp (2005). What Does the Ultimatum Game Mean in the Real World? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (6):824-825.
    The predictive validity of the ultimatum game (UG) for cross-cultural differences in real-world behavior has not yet been established. We discuss results of a recent meta-analysis (Oosterbeek et al 2004), which examined UG behavior across large-scale societies and found that the mean percent offers rejected was positively correlated with social expenditure.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Francesco Guala (2008). Paradigmatic Experiments: The Ultimatum Game From Testing to Measurement Device. Philosophy of Science 75 (5):658-669.
    The Ultimatum Game is one of the most successful experimental designs in the history of the social sciences. In this article I try to explain this success—what makes it a “paradigmatic experiment”—stressing in particular its versatility. Despite the intentions of its inventors, the Ultimatum Game was never a good design to test economic theory, and it is now mostly used as a heuristic tool for the observation of nonstandard preferences or as a “social thermometer” for the observation of culture‐specific norms. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Francesco Guala (2006). Has Game Theory Been Refuted? Journal of Philosophy 103 (5):239-263.
    The answer in a nutshell is: Yes, five years ago, but nobody has noticed. Nobody noticed because the majority of social scientists subscribe to one of the following views: (1) the ‘anomalous’ behaviour observed in standard prisoner’s dilemma or ultimatum game experiments has refuted standard game theory a long time ago; (2) game theory is flexible enough to accommodate any observed choices by ‘refining’ players’ preferences; or (3) it is just a piece of pure mathematics (a tautology). None of these (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Sven Ove Hansson, Decision Theory.
    This text is a non-technical overview of modern decision theory. It is intended for university students with no previous acquaintance with the subject, and was primarily written for the participants of a course on risk analysis at Uppsala University in 1994.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Benoit Hardy-Vallée & Paul Thagard (2008). How to Play the Ultimatum Game: An Engineering Approach to Metanormativity. Philosophical Psychology 21 (2):173 – 192.
    The ultimatum game is a simple bargaining situation where the behavior of people frequently contradicts the optimal strategy according to classical game theory. Thus, according to many scholars, the commonly observed behavior should be considered irrational. We argue that this putative irrationality stems from a wrong conception of metanormativity (the study of norms about the establishment of norms). After discussing different metanormative conceptions, we defend a Quinean, naturalistic approach to the evaluation of norms. After reviewing empirical literature on the ultimatum (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Daniel M. Hausman (2000). Revealed Preference, Belief, and Game Theory. Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):99-115.
    The notion of ‘revealed preference’ is unclear and should be abandoned. Defenders of the theory of revealed preference have misinterpreted legitimate concerns about the testability of economics as the demand that economists eschew reference to (unobservable) subjective states. As attempts to apply revealed-preference theory to game theory illustrate with particular vividness, this demand is mistaken.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Gilbert Laffond, Jean-François Laslier & Michel Le Breton (2000). K–Player Additive Extension of Two-Player Games with an Application to the Borda Electoral Competition Game. Theory and Decision 48 (2):129-137.
    In this note we introduce the notion of K–player additive extension of a symmetric two-player game and prove a result relating the equilibria in mixed strategies in the two games. Then we apply the result to the Borda electoral competition game.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Bernard Linsky (1993). Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality (Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, Decision Theory). Philosophical Books 34 (1):27-28.
  40. Conor Mayo-Wilson, Kevin Zollman & David Danks (2013). Wisdom of the Crowds Vs. Groupthink: Learning in Groups and in Isolation. International Journal of Game Theory 42 (3):695-723.
    We evaluate the asymptotic performance of boundedly-rational strategies in multi-armed bandit problems, where performance is measured in terms of the tendency (in the limit) to play optimal actions in either (i) isolation or (ii) networks of other learners. We show that, for many strategies commonly employed in economics, psychology, and machine learning, performance in isolation and performance in networks are essentially unrelated. Our results suggest that the appropriateness of various, common boundedly-rational strategies depends crucially upon the social context (if any) (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Linda Mealey (2000). Mating Strategies as Game Theory: Changing Rules? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (4):613-613.
    Human behavior can be analyzed using game theory models. Complex games may involve different rules for different players and may allow players to change identity (and therefore, rules) according to complex contingencies. From this perspective, mating behaviors can be viewed as strategic “plays” in a complex “mating game,” with players varying tactics in response to changes in the game's payoff matrix.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. J. Moreh (1994). Randomness, Game Theory and Free Will. Erkenntnis 41 (1):49 - 64.
    Libertarians claim that human behaviour is undetermined and cannot be predicted from knowledge of past history even in principle since it is based on the random movements of quantum mechanics. Determinists on the other hand deny thatmacroscopic phenomena can be activated bysub-microscopic events, and assert that if human action is unpredictable in the way claimed by libertarians, it must be aimless and irrational. This is not true of some types of random behaviour described in this paper. Random behaviour may make (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Cedric Paternotte & Jonathan Grose (2013). Social Norms and Game Theory: Harmony or Discord? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (3):551-587.
    Recent years have witnessed an increased number of game-theoretic approaches to social norms, which apparently share some common vocabulary and methods. We describe three major approaches of this kind (due to Binmore, Bicchieri and Gintis), before comparing them systematically on five crucial themes: generality of the solution, preference transformation, punishment, epistemic conditions and type of explanation. This allows us to show that these theories are, by and large, less compatible than they seem. We then argue that those three theories struggle (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Randy Au Patrick Grim, Robert Rosenberger Nancy Louie, Evan Selinger William Braynen & E. Eason Robb (2008). A Graphic Measure for Game-Theoretic Robustness. Synthese 163 (2).
    Robustness has long been recognized as an important parameter for evaluating game-theoretic results, but talk of ‘robustness’ generally remains vague. What we offer here is a graphic measure for a particular kind of robustness (‘matrix robustness’), using a three-dimensional display of the universe of 2 × 2 game theory. In such a measure specific games appear as specific volumes (Prisoner’s Dilemma, Stag Hunt, etc.), allowing a graphic image of the extent of particular game-theoretic effects in terms of those games. The (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2003). Remarks on the Absentminded Driver. Studia Logica 73 (2):241 - 256.
    Piccione and Rubinstein (1997) present and analyse the sequential decision problem of an “absentminded driver”. The driver's absentmindedness (imperfect recall) leads him to time-inconsistent strategy evaluations. His original evaluation gets replaced by a new one under impact of the information that the circumstances have changed, notwithstanding the fact that this change in circumstances has been expected by him all along. The time inconsistency in strategy evaluation suggests that such an agent might have reason to renege on his adopted strategy. As (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Wlodek Rabinowicz (2001). A Centipede for Intransitive Preferrers. Studia Logica 67 (2):167-178.
    In the standard money pump, an agent with cyclical preferences can avoid exploitation if he shows foresight and solves his sequential decision problem using backward induction (BI). This way out is foreclosed in a modified money pump, which has been presented in Rabinowicz (2000). There, BI will lead the agent to behave in a self-defeating way. The present paper describes another sequential decision problem of this kind, the Centipede for an Intransitive Preferrer, which in some respects is even more striking (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (15 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Don Ross, Game Theory. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Hannes Rusch, A Threshold for Biological Altruism in Public Goods Games Played in Groups Including Kin. MAGKS Discussion Paper Series in Economics.
    Phenomena like meat sharing in hunter-gatherers, altruistic self-sacrifice in intergroup conflicts, and contribution to the production of public goods in laboratory experiments have led to the development of numerous theories trying to explain human prosocial preferences and behavior. Many of these focus on direct and indirect reciprocity, assortment, or (cultural) group selection. Here, I investigate analytically how genetic relatedness changes the incentive structure of that paradigmatic game which is conventionally used to model and experimentally investigate collective action problems: the public (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Hannes Rusch (2013). What Niche Did Human Cooperativeness Evolve In? Ethics and Politics 15 (2):82-100.
    The Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) is widely used to model social interaction between unrelated individuals in the study of the evolution of cooperative behaviour in humans and other species. Many effective mechanisms and promotive scenarios have been studied which allow for small founding groups of cooperative individuals to prevail even when all social interaction is characterised as a PD. Here, a brief critical discussion of the role of the PD as the most prominent tool in cooperation research is presented, followed by (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Frederic Schick (1997). Making Choices: A Recasting of Decision Theory. Cambridge University Press.
    This book is a unique introductory overview of decision theory. It is completely non-technical, without a single formula in the book. Written in a crisp and clear style it succinctly covers the full range of philosophical issues of rationality and decision theory, including game theory, social choice theory, prisoner's dilemma and much else. The book aims to expand the scope and enrich the foundations of decision theory. By addressing such issues as ambivalence, inner conflict, and the constraints imposed upon us (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 65