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  1. Rational updating at the crossroads.Silvia Milano & Andrés Perea - 2024 - Economics and Philosophy 40 (1):190-211.
    In this paper we explore the absentminded driver problem using two different scenarios. In the first scenario we assume that the driver is capable of reasoning about his degree of absentmindedness before he hits the highway. This leads to a Savage-style model where the states are mutually exclusive and the act-state independence is in place. In the second we employ centred possibilities, by modelling the states (i.e. the events about which the driver is uncertain) as the possible final destinations indexed (...)
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  2. An Ultra-Refined Grammar for Interactions: Thoughts on Robert Aumann's Philosophy of Game Theory.Alexander Linsbichler - 2023 - Revue Economique 74 (4):635-650.
    This note identifies and comments on selected crucial traits of Robert Aumann’s philosophy of game theory. In doing so, it aims at carving out and expressing some notions tacitly held by many working game theorists and ideally even at triggering subsequent reflection on the philosophy of game theory in general. According to my reconstruction of Aumann’s position, sophisticated, relatively precise rules of language—an ultra-refined grammar for interactions—constitute the heart of game theory. Consequently, the heart of game theory is devoid, or (...)
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  3. We Should Move on from Signalling-Based Analyses of Biological Deception.Vladimir Krstic - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.
    This paper argues that extant signalling-based analyses cannot explain a range of cases of biological (and psychological) deception, such as those in which the deceiver does not send a signal at all, but that Artiga and Paternotte’s (Philos Stud 175:579–600, 2018) functional and my (Krstić in The analysis of self-deception: rehabilitating the traditionalist account. PhD Dissertation, University of Auckland, 2018: §3; Krstić and Saville in Australas J Philos 97:830–835, 2019) manipulativist analyses can. Therefore, the latter views should be given preference. (...)
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  4. Spieltheorie in philosophischer Sicht.Georg Klaus - 1968 - Berlin,: Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften.
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  5. Do We Perceive Reality?John Klasios - 2022 - arXiv.
    The cognitive scientist Donald Hoffman argues that we don't perceive reality: spacetime, objects, colors, sounds, tastes, and so forth, are all merely an interface that we evolved to track evolutionary fitness rather than to perceive truths about external reality. In this paper, I expound on his argument, then I extend it, primarily, by looking at key ideas in physics that are quite germane to it. Among the topics in physics that I discuss are black holes, the holographic principle, string theory, (...)
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  6. An Institutional Theory of Art Categories.Kiyohiro Sen - 2022 - Debates in Aesthetics 18 (1):31-43.
    It is widely acknowledged that categories play significant roles in the appreciation of artworks. This paper argues that the correct categories of artworks are institutionally established through social processes. Section 1 examines the candidates for determining correct categories and proposes that this question should shift the focus from category membership to appreciative behaviour associated with categories. Section 2 draws on Francesco Guala’s theory of institutions to show that categories of artworks are established as rules-in-equilibrium. Section 3 reviews the explanatory benefits (...)
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  7. Cooperation, fairness and team reasoning.Hein Duijf - 2021 - Economics and Philosophy 37 (3):413-440.
    This paper examines two strands of literature regarding economic models of cooperation. First, payoff transformation theories assume that people may not be exclusively motivated by self-interest, but also care about equality and fairness. Second, team reasoning theorists assume that people might reason from the perspective of the team, rather than an individualistic perspective. Can these two theories be unified? In contrast to the consensus among team reasoning theorists, I argue that team reasoning can be viewed as a particular type of (...)
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  8. Expansion of game refinement theory into continuous movement games with consideration on functional brain measurement: in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of doctor of philosophy.Nathan Nossal - 2015 - Ishikawa: JAIST Press.
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  9. Spielen ist unwahrscheinlich: eine Theorie der ludischen Aktion.Fabian Arlt - 2020 - Wiesbaden: Springer VS. Edited by Hans-Jürgen Arlt.
    Begründet und entfaltet wird ein Begriff des Spiels, der sich um Lockungen und Drohungen des Unerwarteten dreht. Das Autorenduo ordnet seine Theorie der ludischen Aktion in klassische Konzepte des Spiels ein sowie in den aktuellen Diskurs der Game Studies. Die phänomenale Mannigfaltigkeit des Spiels wird in historischer Perspektive skizziert und in systematischer Weise gegliedert. Die Autoren erläutern medientechnische und kommunikative Voraussetzungen des Booms der Computerspiele und reflektieren die Diskussion über Eskalationen ludischer Gewalt. Kritisch ausgeleuchtet werden Instrumentalisierungen des Spiels, die sich (...)
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  10. The golden rule of ethics: a dynamic game-theoretic framework based on berge equilibrium.Vladislav Iosifovich Zhukovskiĭ - 2021 - Boca Raton: CRC Press. Edited by M. E. Salukvadze.
    This book synthesizes the game-theoretic modeling of decision-making processes and an ancient moral requirement, called the Golden Rule of ethics (GR). This rule states, "Behave to others as you would like them to behave to you." The GR is one of the oldest, most widespread and specific moral requirements that appear in Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. The book constructs and justifies mathematical models of dynamic socio-economic processes and phenomena that reveal the mechanism of the GR and are based (...)
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  11. Logics for Analyzing Games.Johan Van Benthem & Dominik Klein - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  12. From Semantic Games to Provability: The Case of Gödel Logic.Alexandra Pavlova, Robert Freiman & Timo Lang - 2021 - Studia Logica 110 (2):429-456.
    We present a semantic game for Gödel logic and its extensions, where the players’ interaction stepwise reduces arbitrary claims about the relative order of truth degrees of complex formulas to atomic ones. The paper builds on a previously developed game for Gödel logic with projection operator in Fermüller et al., Information processing and management of uncertainty in knowledge-based systems, Springer, Cham, 2020, pp. 257–270). This game is extended to cover Gödel logic with involutive negations and constants, and then lifted to (...)
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  13. TEXTOS SELECIONADOS DE FILOSOFIA DA ECONOMIA.Ramiro Ávila Peres, André Nascimento Pontes & Mariana Kuhn de Oliveira - 2022 - Pelotas - Princesa, Pelotas - RS, Brasil: Ufpel.
    Translation into Portuguese of SEP entries on Philosophy of Economics.
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  14. Game Changers: Stories of the Revolutionary Minds Behind Game Theory.Rudolf Taschner - 2015 - Amherst and New York: Prometheus. Edited by Brian Taylor.
    In this lively history of game theory, a gifted math educator and science writer explains for lay readers the uses and value of this innovative yet easy-to-understand approach to mathematical modeling. Essentially, game theory interprets life as a game with mathematical rules. By following the rules, decisions can be calculated that result in the greatest benefit for all participants. The author takes the reader from the 17th century through the Cold War to today's age of turbo capitalism. Along the way (...)
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  15. On Farkas' lemma and related propositions in BISH.Josef Berger & Gregor Svindland - 2022 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 173 (2):103059.
    In this paper we analyse in the framework of constructive mathematics (BISH) the validity of Farkas' lemma and related propositions, namely the Fredholm alternative for solvability of systems of linear equations, optimality criteria in linear programming, Stiemke's lemma and the Superhedging Duality from mathematical finance, and von Neumann's minimax theorem with application to constructive game theory.
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  16. An impossibility result on methodological individualism.Hein Duijf, Allard Tamminga & Frederik Van De Putte - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):4165-4185.
    Methodological individualists often claim that any social phenomenon can ultimately be explained in terms of the actions and interactions of individuals. Any Nagelian version of methodological individualism requires that there be bridge laws that translate social statements into individualistic ones. We show that Nagelian individualism can be put to logical scrutiny by making the relevant social and individualistic languages fully explicit and mathematically precise. In particular, we prove that the social statement that a group of (at least two) agents performs (...)
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  17. Games and Bisimulations for Intuitionistic First-Order Kripke Models.Małgorzata Kruszelnicka - 2021 - Studia Logica 109 (5):903-916.
    The aim of this paper is to introduce the notion of a game for intuitionistic first-order Kripke models. We also establish links between notions presented here and the notions of logical equivalence and bounded bisimulation for intuitionistic first-order Kripke models, and the Ehrenfeucht–Fraïssé game for classical first-order structures.
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  18. Heidegger’s Being And Time.Irfan Ajvazi - manuscript
    Heidegger’s Being and Time - Irfan Ajvazi.
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  19. Can One Both Contribute to and Benefit from Herd Immunity?Lucie White - 2021 - Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics 14 (2).
    In a recent article, Ethan Bradley and Mark Navin (2021) argue that vaccine refusal is not akin to free riding. Here, I defend one connection between vaccine refusal and free riding and suggest that, when viewed in conjunction with their other arguments, this might constitute a reason to mandate Covid-19 vaccination.
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  20. Games with finitely generated structures.Adam Krawczyk & Wiesław Kubiś - 2021 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 172 (10):103016.
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  21. Games and reflection in.J. P. Aguilera - 2020 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 85 (3):1102-1123.
    We characterize the determinacy of $F_\sigma $ games of length $\omega ^2$ in terms of determinacy assertions for short games. Specifically, we show that $F_\sigma $ games of length $\omega ^2$ are determined if, and only if, there is a transitive model of ${\mathsf {KP}}+{\mathsf {AD}}$ containing $\mathbb {R}$ and reflecting $\Pi _1$ facts about the next admissible set.As a consequence, one obtains that, over the base theory ${\mathsf {KP}} + {\mathsf {DC}} + ``\mathbb {R}$ exists,” determinacy for $F_\sigma $ (...)
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  22. Co-production and economics: insights from the constructive use of experimental games in adaptive resource management.Michiru Nagatsu - 2021 - Journal of Economic Methodology 28 (1):134-142.
    I envision new directions in the methodology of experimental games in the field of developmental, environmental and resource economics. Although there have been extensive discussions on experimenta...
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  23. Salience reasoning in coordination games.Julius Schönherr - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6601-6620.
    Salience reasoning, many have argued, can help solve coordination problems, but only if such reasoning is supplemented by higher-order predictions, e.g. beliefs about what others believe yet others will choose. In this paper, I will argue that this line of reasoning is self-undermining. Higher-order behavioral predictions defeat salience-based behavioral predictions. To anchor my argument in the philosophical literature, I will develop it in response and opposition to the popular Lewisian model of salience reasoning in coordination games. This model imports the (...)
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  24. Strongly Stable Equilibrium Points of n-Person Noncooperative Games.M. Kojima, A. Okada & S. Shindoh - 1985 - Mathematics of Operations Research 10:650-663.
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  25. Persistent Equilibria in Strategic Games.Ehud Kalai & Dov Samet - 1984 - International Journal of Game Theory 13:129-144.
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  26. Essential Equilibrium Points of n-Person Non-cooperative Games.Wu Wen-Tsün & Jiang Jia-He - 1962 - Scientia Sinica 11:1307-1322.
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  27. Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit.Reinhard Selten - 1965 - Zeitschrift Für Die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft 121:301-324, 667-689.
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  28. On Stability of Perfect Equilibrium Points.Akira Okada - 1981 - International Journal of Game Theory 10:67-73.
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  29. Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept.Roger B. Myerson - 1978 - International Journal of Game Theory 7:73-80.
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  30. Sequential Equilibria.David Kreps - 1982 - Econometrica 50:863-894.
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  31. Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria.Eric van Damme - 1987 - Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
    This book discusses the main shortcomings of the classical solution concept from noncooperative game theory and provides a comprehensive study of the more refined concepts that have been introduced to overcome these drawbacks. The plausibility of the assumptions underlying each such concept are discussed, desirable properties as well as deficiencies are illustrated, characterizations are derived and the relationships between the various concepts are studied. The first six chapters provide an informal discussion with many examples as well as a comprehensive overview (...)
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  32. Oddness of the Number of Equilibrium Points: A New Proof.John Harsanyi - 1973 - International Journal of Game Theory 2:235-250.
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  33. Game Theory: A Survey.Ken Binmore & Partha Dasgupta - 1986 - In Ken Binmore & Partha Dasgupta (eds.), Economic Organizations as Games. Oxford:
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  34. Game Theory: Concepts and Applications.Frank C. Zagare - 1984 - Sage.
    Professor Zagare provides methods for analysing the structure of the game; considers zero and nonzero-sum games and the fundamental 'minimax theorem'; and investigates games with more than two players, including the possibility of coalitions between players.
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  35. Twice Two Game the 2 X 2 Game.Anatol Rapoport, Melvin J. Guyer & David G. Gordon - 1976 - University of Michigan Press.
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  36. Games as Models of Social Phenomena.Henry Hamburger - 1979 - New York: W. H. Freeman.
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  37. Rational Choice.Jon Elster (ed.) - 1986 - New York University Press.
  38. Why `Might'?Giorgio Sbardolini - manuscript
    Why do we use epistemic modals like 'might'? According to Factualism, the function of 'might' is to exchange information about state-of-affairs in the modal universe. As an alternative to Factualism, this paper offers a game-theoretic rationale for epistemic possibility operators in a Bayesian setting. The background picture is one whereby communication facilitates coordination, but coordination could fail if there's too much uncertainty, since the players' ability to share a belief is undermined. However, 'might' and related expressions can be used to (...)
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  39. Universalizing and the we: endogenous game theoretic deontology.Paul Studtmann & Shyam Gouri Suresh - 2020 - Economics and Philosophy 37 (2):244-259.
    The Nash counterfactual considers the question: what would happen were I to change my behaviour assuming no one else does. By contrast, the Kantian counterfactual considers the question: what would happen were everyone to deviate from some behaviour. We present a model that endogenizes the decision to engage in this type of Kantian reasoning. Autonomous agents using this moral framework receive psychic payoffs equivalent to the cooperate-cooperate payoff in Prisoner’s Dilemma regardless of the other player’s action. Moreover, if both interacting (...)
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  40. Beyond team-directed reasoning: participatory intentions contribute to a theory of collective agency.Duijf Hein - 2017 - Logique Et Analyse.
    Philosophical accounts of collective intentionality typically rely on members to form a personal intention of sorts, viewed as a mental state. This tendency is opposed by recent economic literature on team-directed reasoning, which focuses on the reasoning process leading up to the formation of the members’ intentions. Our formal analysis bridges these paradigms and criticizes the team- directed reasoning account on two counts: first, team-directed reasoning is supposed to transcend traditional game and decision theory by adopting a certain collectivistic reasoning (...)
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  41. Minimal Cooperation and Group Roles.Katherine Ritchie - 2020 - In Anika Fiebich (ed.), Minimal Cooperation and Shared Agency.
    Cooperation has been analyzed primarily in the context of theories of collective intentionality. These discussions have primarily focused on interactions between pairs or small groups of agents who know one another personally. Cooperative game theory has also been used to argue for a form of cooperation in large unorganized groups. Here I consider a form of minimal cooperation that can arise among members of potentially large organized groups (e.g., corporate teams, committees, governmental bodies). I argue that members of organized groups (...)
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  42. Games of strategy in culture and economics research.Maxwell Mkondiwa - 2019 - Journal of Economic Methodology 27 (2):146-163.
    Games are meant to be fun, yet economists have successfully developed games that are less fun and less understood by participants especially in developing countries. This paper surveys failures in...
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  43. Toward a formal analysis of deceptive signaling.Don Fallis & Peter J. Lewis - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2279-2303.
    Deception has long been an important topic in philosophy. However, the traditional analysis of the concept, which requires that a deceiver intentionally cause her victim to have a false belief, rules out the possibility of much deception in the animal kingdom. Cognitively unsophisticated species, such as fireflies and butterflies, have simply evolved to mislead potential predators and/or prey. To capture such cases of “functional deception,” several researchers Machiavellian intelligence II, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 112–143, 1997; Searcy and Nowicki, The (...)
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  44. Jens Erik Fenstad. The axiom of determinateness. Proceedings of the Second Scandinavian Logic Symposium, edited by J. E. Fenstad, Studies in logic and the foundations of mathematics, vol. 63, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam and London 1971, pp. 41–61. [REVIEW]A. S. Kechris - 1974 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 39 (2):331-332.
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  45. Moral Hazard, the Savage Framework, and State-Dependent Utility.Jean Baccelli - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (2):367-387.
    In this paper, I investigate the betting behavior of a decision-maker who can influence the likelihood of the events upon which she is betting. In decision theory, this is best known as a situation of moral hazard. Focusing on a particularly simple case, I sketch the first systematic analysis of moral hazard in the canonical Savage framework. From the results of this analysis, I draw two philosophical conclusions. First, from an observational and a descriptive point of view, there need to (...)
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  46. Temptation and preference-based instrumental rationality.Johanna Thoma - 2018 - In José Bermudez (ed.), Self-control, decision theory and rationality. Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press.
    In the dynamic choice literature, temptations are usually understood as temporary shifts in an agent’s preferences. What has been puzzling about these cases is that, on the one hand, an agent seems to do better by her own lights if she does not give into the temptation, and does so without engaging in costly commitment strategies. This seems to indicate that it is instrumentally irrational for her to give into temptation. On the other hand, resisting temptation also requires her to (...)
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  47. Texas Hold'em Poker Odds for Your Strategy, with Probability-Based Hand Analyses.Catalin Barboianu - 2011 - Craiova, Romania: Infarom.
    A complete probability guide of Hold'em Poker, this guide covers all possible gaming situations. The author focuses on the practical side of the presentation and use of the probabilities involved in Hold'em, while taking into account the subjective side of the probability-based criteria of each player's strategy.
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  48. Understanding and Calculating the Odds: Probability Theory Basics and Calculus Guide for Beginners, with Applications in Games of Chance and Everyday Life.Catalin Barboianu - 2006 - Craiova, Romania: Infarom.
    This book presents not only the mathematical concept of probability, but also its philosophical aspects, the relativity of probability and its applications and even the psychology of probability. All explanations are made in a comprehensible manner and are supported with suggestive examples from nature and daily life, and even with challenging math paradoxes.
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  49. Probability Guide to Gambling: The Mathematics of Dice, Slots, Roulette, Baccarat, Blackjack, Poker, Lottery and Sport Bets.Catalin Barboianu - 2006 - Craiova, Romania: Infarom.
    Over the past two decades, gamblers have begun taking mathematics into account more seriously than ever before. While probability theory is the only rigorous theory modeling the uncertainty, even though in idealized conditions, numerical probabilities are viewed not only as mere mathematical information, but also as a decision-making criterion, especially in gambling. This book presents the mathematics underlying the major games of chance and provides a precise account of the odds associated with all gaming events. It begins by explaining in (...)
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  50. Roulette Odds and Profits: The Mathematics of Complex Bets.Catalin Barboianu - 2008 - Craiova, Romania: Infarom.
    Continuing his series of books on the mathematics of gambling, the author shows how a simple-rule game such as roulette is suited to a complex mathematical model whose applications generate improved betting systems that take into account a player's personal playing criteria. The book is both practical and theoretical, but is mainly devoted to the application of theory. About two-thirds of the content is lists of categories and sub-categories of improved betting systems, along with all the parameters that might stand (...)
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