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  1. A. R. A. (1956). Theory of Games as a Tool for the Moral Philosopher. Review of Metaphysics 9 (3):516-516.
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  2. Thomas Agotnes, Wiebe van der Hoek & Michael Wooldridge (2009). Logics for Qualitative Coalitional Games. Logic Journal of the Igpl 17 (3):299-321.
    Qualitative Coalitional Games are a variant of coalitional games in which an agent's desires are represented as goals that are either satisfied or unsatisfied, and each choice available to a coalition is a set of goals, which would be jointly satisfied if the coalition made that choice. A coalition in a QCG will typically form in order to bring about a set of goals that will satisfy all members of the coalition. Our goal in this paper is to develop and (...)
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  3. Fernando Aguiar, Pablo Brañas-Garza, Maria Paz Espinosa & Luis M. Miller (2010). Personal Identity: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis. Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (3):261-275.
    This paper aims to analyze the role of personal identity in altruism. To this end, it starts by reviewing critically the growing literature on economics and identity. Considering the ambiguities that the concept of social identity poses, our proposal focuses on the concept of personal identity. A formal model to study how personal identity enters in individuals' utility function when facing a dictator game decision is then presented. Finally, this ?identity-based? utility function is studied experimentally. The experiment allows us to (...)
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  4. Scott H. Ainsworth (1999). A Strategic Foundation for the Cooperator's Advantage. Theory and Decision 47 (2):101-110.
    Orbell and Dawes develop a non-game theoretic heuristic that yields a ‘cooperator's advantage’ by allowing players to project their own ‘cooperate-defect’ choices onto potential partners (1991, p. 515). With appropriate parameter values their heuristic yields a cooperative environment, but the cooperation depends, simply, on optimism about others' behavior (1991, p. 526). In earlier work, Dawes (1989) established a statistical foundation for such optimism. In this paper, I adapt some of the concerns of Dawes (1989) and develop a game theoretic model (...)
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  5. Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Jonathan Weinstein (2009). Rejoinder: The “Ambiguity Aversion Literature: A Critical Assessment”. Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):357-369.
    The pioneering contributions of Bewley, Gilboa and Schmeidler highlighted important weaknesses in the foundations of economics and game theory. The Bayesian methodology on which these fields are based does not answer such basic questions as what makes beliefs reasonable, or how agents should form beliefs and expectations. Providing the initial impetus for debating these issues is a contribution that will have the lasting value it deserves.
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  6. Peter S. Albin & Duncan K. Foley (2001). The Co‐Evolution of Cooperation and Complexity in a Multi‐Player, Local‐Interaction Prisoners' Dilemma. Complexity 6 (3):54-63.
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  7. J. McKenzie Alexander (2011). Expectations and Choiceworthiness. Mind 120 (479):803-817.
    The Pasadena game is an example of a decision problem which lacks an expected value, as traditionally conceived. Easwaran (2008) has shown that, if we distinguish between two different kinds of expectations, which he calls ‘strong’ and ‘weak’, the Pasadena game lacks a strong expectation but has a weak expectation. Furthermore, he argues that we should use the weak expectation as providing a measure of the value of an individual play of the Pasadena game. By considering a modified version of (...)
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  8. J. McKenzie Alexander, Game Theory.
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  9. J. McKenzie Alexander (2006). The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure, Brian Skyrms. Cambridge University Press, 2004, 149 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 22 (3):441-448.
  10. J. McKenzie Alexander, Cheap Talk, Reinforcement Learning and the Emergence of Cooperation.
    Cheap talk has often been thought incapable of supporting the emergence of cooperation because costless signals, easily faked, are unlikely to be reliable (Zahavi and Zahavi, 1997). I show how, in a social network model of cheap talk with reinforcement learning, cheap talk does enable the emergence of cooperation, provided that individuals also temporally discount the past. This establishes one mechanism that suffices for moving a population of initially uncooperative individuals to a state of mutually beneficial cooperation even in the (...)
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  11. G. A. Antonelli (1993). Review of Robert Koons's Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 9:305-305.
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  12. Gian Aldo Antonelli (1993). Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality, Koons Robert. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, Xii + 174 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 9 (02):305-.
  13. Rossella Argenziano & Itzhak Gilboa (2012). History as a Coordination Device. Theory and Decision 73 (4):501-512.
    Coordination games often have multiple equilibria. The selection of equilibrium raises the question of belief formation: how do players generate beliefs about the behavior of other players? This article takes the view that the answer lies in history, that is, in the outcomes of similar coordination games played in the past, possibly by other players. We analyze a simple model in which a large population plays a game that exhibits strategic complementarities. We assume a dynamic process that faces different populations (...)
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  14. Masanari Asano, Masanori Ohya & Andrei Khrennikov (2011). Quantum-Like Model for Decision Making Process in Two Players Game. Foundations of Physics 41 (3):538-548.
    In experiments of games, players frequently make choices which are regarded as irrational in game theory. In papers of Khrennikov (Information Dynamics in Cognitive, Psychological and Anomalous Phenomena. Fundamental Theories of Physics, Kluwer Academic, Norwell, 2004; Fuzzy Sets Syst. 155:4–17, 2005; Biosystems 84:225–241, 2006; Found. Phys. 35(10):1655–1693, 2005; in QP-PQ Quantum Probability and White Noise Analysis, vol. XXIV, pp. 105–117, 2009), it was pointed out that statistics collected in such the experiments have “quantum-like” properties, which can not be explained in (...)
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  15. Michael Bacharach (2006). Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory. Princeton University Press.
    This is a revision of game theory which takes account of agents' own descriptions of their situations, and which allows people to reason as members of groups.
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  16. Sylvain Béal (2010). Perceptron Versus Automaton in the Finitely Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Theory and Decision 69 (2):183-204.
    We study the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which the players are restricted to choosing strategies which are implementable by a machine with a bound on its complexity. One player has to use a finite automaton while the other player has to use a finite perceptron. Some examples illustrate that the sets of strategies which are induced by these two types of machines are different and not ordered by set inclusion. Repeated game payoffs are evaluated according to the limit of (...)
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  17. Neal C. Becker & Ann E. Cudd (1990). Indefinitely Repeated Games: A Response to Carroll. Theory and Decision 28 (2):189-195.
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  18. José Luis Bermúdez (2013). Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem: Why Lewis's Argument Fails. Analysis 73 (3):423-429.
    According to David Lewis, the prisoner's dilemma (PD) and Newcomb's problem (NP) are really just one dilemma in two different forms (Lewis 1979). Lewis's argument for this conclusion is ingenious and has been widely accepted. However, it is flawed. As this paper shows, the considerations that Lewis brings to bear to show that the game he starts with is an NP equally show that the game is not a PD.
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  19. José Luis Bermúdez (2010). Rational Decisions , Ken Binmore. Princeton University Press, 2009, X + 200 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 26 (1):95-101.
  20. Gregory S. Berns (2003). Neural Game Theory and the Search for Rational Agents in the Brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):155-156.
    The advent of functional brain imaging has revolutionized the ability to understand the biological mechanisms underlying decision-making. Although it has been amply demonstrated that assumptions of rationality often break down in experimental games, there has not been an overarching theory of why this happens. I describe recent advances in functional brain imaging and suggest a framework for considering the function of the human reward system as a discrete agent.
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  21. Sebastian Bervoets (2010). An Axiomatic Approach to Predictability of Outcomes in an Interactive Setting. Theory and Decision 68 (3):311-323.
    This article is an axiomatic approach to the problem of ranking game forms in terms of the predictability they offer to individuals. Two criteria are proposed and characterized, the CardMin and the CardMax. Both compare game forms on the basis of the number of distinct outcomes that can result from the choice of a CardMin (resp. CardMax) strategy. The CardMin (resp. CardMax) strategy is defined as a strategy leading to the smallest (resp. highest) number of different outcomes. In both cases, (...)
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  22. C. Bicchieri (2010). Norms, Preferences, and Conditional Behavior. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (3):297-313.
    This article addresses several issues raised by Nichols, Gintis, and Skyrms and Zollman in their comments on my book, The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms . In particular, I explore the relation between social and personal norms, what an adequate game-theoretic representation of norms should be, and what models of norms emergence should tell us about the formation of normative expectations.
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  23. C. Bicchieri, E. Xiao & R. Muldoon (2011). Trustworthiness is a Social Norm, but Trusting is Not. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (2):170-187.
    Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a survey with salient rewards to elicit people’s attitudes regarding (...)
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  24. Cristina Bicchieri, Knowing and Supposing In.
    The paper provides a framework for representing belief-contravening hypotheses in games of perfect information. The resulting t-extended information structures are used to encode the notion that a player has the disposition to behave rationally at a node. We show that there are models where the condition of all players possessing this disposition at all nodes (under their control) is both a necessary and a su cient for them to play the backward induction solution in centipede games. To obtain this result, (...)
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  25. Cristina Bicchieri (1988). Backward Induction Without Common Knowledge. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:329 - 343.
    A large class of games is that of non-cooperative, extensive form games of perfect information. When the length of these games is finite, the method used to reach a solution is that of a backward induction. Working from the terminal nodes, dominated strategies are successively deleted and what remains is a unique equilibrium. Game theorists have generally assumed that the informational requirement needed to solve these games is that the players have common knowledge of rationality. This assumption, however, has given (...)
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  26. Cristina Bicchieri (1988). Strategic Behavior and Counterfactuals. Synthese 76 (1):135 - 169.
    The difficulty of defining rational behavior in game situations is that the players'' strategies will depend on their expectations about other players'' strategies. These expectations are beliefs the players come to the game with. Game theorists assume these beliefs to be rational in the very special sense of beingobjectively correct but no explanation is offered of the mechanism generating this property of the belief system. In many interesting cases, however, such a rationality requirement is not enough to guarantee that an (...)
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  27. Cristina Bicchieri & Mitchell S. Green (1999). Symmetry Arguments for Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma. In Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.), The Logic of Strategy. Oxford University Press. 175.
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  28. Cristina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (1999). Knowledge, Belief, and Counterfactual Reasoning in Games. In Cristina Bicchieri, Richard C. Jeffrey & Brian Skyrms (eds.), The Logic of Strategy. Oxford University Press.
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  29. Cristina Bicchieri & Azi Lev-On (2007). Computer-Mediated Communication and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: An Experimental Analysis. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 6 (2):139-168.
    University of Pennsylvania, USA, el322{at}nyu.edu ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> One of the most consistent findings in experimental studies of social dilemmas is the positive influence of face-to-face communication on cooperation. The face-to-face `communication effect' has been recently explained in terms of a `focus theory of norms': successful communication focuses agents on pro-social norms, and induces preferences and expectations conducive to cooperation. 1 Many of the studies that point to a communication effect, however, do not (...)
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  30. Cristina Bicchieri & Jiji Zhang, An Embarrassment of Riches : Modeling Social Preferences in Ultimatum Games.
    Experimental results in Ultimatum, Trust and Social Dilemma games have been interpreted as showing that individuals are, by and large, not driven by selfish motives. But we do not need experiments to know that. In our view, what the experiments show is that the typical economic auxiliary hypothesis of non-tuism should not be generalized to other contexts. Indeed, we know that when the experimental situation is framed as a market interaction, participants will be more inclined to keep more money, share (...)
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  31. K. Binmore (2002). Using Game Theory in Social Science A Review of Kaushik Basu's Prelude to Political Economy. Journal of Economic Methodology 9 (3):379-383.
    David Hume’s Treatise on Human Nature famously fell `deadborn from the press’ because it was too far ahead of its time. Basu’s book is one of a number published in recent years that suggest we are at last ready to put its precepts into action.1 Modern game theory provides a framework that makes Hume’s insights genuinely applicable, and I totally agree with Basu that this is not only the right way forward, but that it now looks increasingly likely that this (...)
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  32. Ken Binmore, Interpersonal Comparison in Egalitarian Societies.
    When judging what is fair, how do we decide how much weight to assign to the conflicting interests of different classes of people? This subject has received some attention in a utilitarian context, but has been largely neglected in the case of egalitarian societies of the kind studied by John Rawls. My Game Theory and the Social Contract considers the problem for a toy society with only two citizens. This paper examines the theoretical difficulties in extending the discussion to societies (...)
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  33. Ken Binmore (2008). Do Conventions Need to Be Common Knowledge? Topoi 27 (1-2):17-27.
    Do conventions need to be common knowledge in order to work? David Lewis builds this requirement into his definition of a convention. This paper explores the extent to which his approach finds support in the game theory literature. The knowledge formalism developed by Robert Aumann and others militates against Lewis’s approach, because it shows that it is almost impossible for something to become common knowledge in a large society. On the other hand, Ariel Rubinstein’s Email Game suggests that coordinated action (...)
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  34. Ken Binmore (2001). Game Theory and the Social Contract, Vol. II: Just Playing. Mind 110 (437):168-171.
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  35. Ken Binmore (1997). Rationality and Backward Induction. Journal of Economic Methodology 4 (1):23-41.
    This paper uses the Centipede Game to criticize formal arguments that have recently been offered for and against backward induction as a rationality principle. It is argued that the crucial issues concerning the interpretation of counterfactuals depend on contextual questions that are abstracted away in current formalisms. I have a text, it always is the same, And always has been, Since I learnt the game. Chaucer, The Pardoner's Tale.
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  36. John Douglas Bishop (2006). Moral Intuitions Versus Game Theory: A Response to Marcoux on Résumé Embellishing. [REVIEW] Journal of Business Ethics 67 (2):181 - 189.
    Marcoux argues that job candidates ought to embellish non-verifiable information on their résumés because it is the best way to coordinate collective action in the résumé ‚game’. I do not dispute his analysis of collective action; I look at the larger picture, which throws light on the role game theory might play in ethics. I conclude that game theory’s conclusions have nothing directly to do with ethics. Game theory suggests the means to certain ends, but the ethics of both the (...)
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  37. Max Black (1978). The « Prisoner's Dilemma » and the Limits of Rationality. International Studies in Philosophy 10:7-22.
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  38. Romina Boarini, Jean-François Laslier & Stéphane Robin (2009). Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility in Bargaining: Evidence From a Transcontinental Ultimatum Game. Theory and Decision 67 (4):341-373.
    This paper presents the experimental results of a “Transcontinental Ultimatum Game” implemented between India and France. We use a standard ultimatum game, but in one treatment Indian subjects made offers to French subjects (ItoF treatment) and, in another treatment, French subjects made offers to Indian subjects (FtoI treatment). We observed that FtoI treatment bargaining mostly ended up with unequal splits of money in favor of French, while nearly equal splits were the most frequent outcome in ItoF treatment interactions. The experimental (...)
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  39. Giacomo Bonanno (2004). A Characterization of Von Neumann Games in Terms of Memory. Synthese 139 (2):281 - 295.
    An information completion of an extensive game is obtained by extending the information partition of every player from the set of her decision nodes to the set of all nodes. The extended partition satisfies Memory of Past Knowledge (MPK) if at any node a player remembers what she knew at earlier nodes. It is shown that MPK can be satisfied in a game if and only if the game is von Neumann (vN) and satisfies memory at decision nodes (the restriction (...)
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  40. Giacomo Bonanno (2004). Memory and Perfect Recall in Extensive Games. Games and Economic Behavior 47 (2):237-256.
    The notion of perfect recall in extensive games was introduced by Kuhn (1953), who interpreted it as "equivalent to the assertion that each player is allowed by the rules of the game to remember everything he knew at previous moves and all of his choices at those moves''. We provide a characterization and axiomatization of perfect recall based on two notions of memory: (1) memory of past knowledge and (2) memory of past actions.
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  41. Giacomo Bonanno (1999). Synchronic Information, Knowledge and Common Knowledge in Extensive Games. Research in Economics 53 (1):77-99.
    Restricting attention to the class of extensive games defined by von Neumann and Morgenstern with the added assumption of perfect recall, we specify the information of each player at each node of the game-tree in a way which is coherent with the original information structure of the extensive form. We show that this approach provides a framework for a formal and rigorous treatment of questions of knowledge and common knowledge at every node of the tree. We construct a particular information (...)
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  42. Giacomo Bonanno (1995). Review of Cristina Bicchieri's Rationality and Coordination. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 11 (2):359-366.
    In her book Rationality and coordination (Cambridge University Press, 1994) Cristina Bicchieri brings together (and adds to) her own contributions to game theory and the philosophy of economics published in various journals in the period 1987-1992. The book, however, is not a collection of separate articles but rather a homogeneous unit organized around some central themes in the foundations of non-cooperative game theory. Bicchieri’s exposition is admirably clear and well organized. Somebody with a good knowledge of game theory would probably (...)
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  43. Giacomo Bonanno (1995). Rationality and Coordination, Bicchieri Cristina. Cambridge University Press, 1994, Xiii + 270 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 11 (02):359-.
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  44. Giacomo Bonanno (1991). The Logic of Rational Play in Games of Perfect Information. Economics and Philosophy 7 (01):37-65.
    For the past 20 years or so the literature on noncooperative games has been centered on the search for an equilibrium concept that expresses the notion of rational behavior in interactive situations. A basic tenet in this literature is that if a “rational solution” exists, it must be a Nash equilibrium . The consensus view, however, is that not all Nash equilibria can be accepted as rational solutions. Consider, for example, the game of Figure 1.
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  45. Wafik Boulos Lotfallah (2004). An Ehrenfeucht‐Fraïssé Class Game. Mathematical Logic Quarterly 50 (2):179-188.
    This paper introduces a new Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé type game that is played on two classes of models rather than just two models. This game extends and generalizes the known Ajtai-Fagin game to the case when there are several alternating moves played in different models. The game allows Duplicator to delay her choices of the models till the very end of the game, making it easier for her to win. This adds on the toolkit of winning strategies for Duplicator in Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé type (...)
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  46. Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour (1988). National Security Games. Synthese 76 (2):185 - 200.
    Issues that arise in using game theory to model national security problems are discussed, including positing nation-states as players, assuming that their decision makers act rationally and possess complete information, and modeling certain conflicts as two-person games. A generic two-person game called the Conflict Game, which captures strategic features of such variable-sum games as Chicken and Prisoners'' Dilemma, is then analyzed. Unlike these classical games, however, the Conflict Game is a two-stage game in which each player can threaten to retaliate (...)
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  47. Adam Brandenburger & H. Jerome Keisler (2006). An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games. Studia Logica 84 (2):211 - 240.
    A paradox of self-reference in beliefs in games is identified, which yields a game-theoretic impossibility theorem akin to Russell’s Paradox. An informal version of the paradox is that the following configuration of beliefs is impossible:Ann believes that Bob assumes that.
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  48. Geoffrey Brennan & Philip Pettit (2000). The Hidden Economy of Esteem. Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):77-98.
    A generation of social theorists have argued that if free-rider considerations show that certain collective action predicaments are unresolvable under individual, rational choice – unresolvable under an arrangement where each is free to pursue their own relative advantage – then those considerations will equally show that the predicaments cannot be resolved by recourse to norms (Buchanan, 1975, p. 132; Heath, 1976, p. 30; Sober and Wilson, 1998, 156ff; Taylor, 1987, p. 144). If free-rider considerations explain why people do not spontaneously (...)
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  49. Geoffrey Brennan & Philip Pettit (1993). Hands Invisible and Intangible. Synthese 94 (2):191 - 225.
    The notion of a spontaneous social order, an order in human affairs which operates without the intervention of any directly ordering mind, has a natural fascination for social and political theorists. This paper provides a taxonomy under which there are two broadly contrasting sorts of spontaneous social order. One is the familiar invisible hand; the other is an arrangement that we describe as the intangible hand. The paper is designed to serve two main purposes. First, to provide a pure account (...)
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  50. Luigino Bruni (2010). Reciprocity: An Economics of Social Relations , Serge C. Kolm. Cambridge University Press, 2008. XI + 390 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 26 (2):241-247.
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