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  1. Fernando Aguiar, Pablo Brañas-Garza, Maria Paz Espinosa & Luis M. Miller (2010). Personal Identity: A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis. Journal of Economic Methodology 17 (3):261-275.
    This paper aims to analyze the role of personal identity in altruism. To this end, it starts by reviewing critically the growing literature on economics and identity. Considering the ambiguities that the concept of social identity poses, our proposal focuses on the concept of personal identity. A formal model to study how personal identity enters in individuals' utility function when facing a dictator game decision is then presented. Finally, this ?identity-based? utility function is studied experimentally. The experiment allows us to (...)
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  2. Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Jonathan Weinstein (2009). Rejoinder: The “Ambiguity Aversion Literature: A Critical Assessment”. Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):357-369.
  3. J. McKenzie Alexander (2011). Expectations and Choiceworthiness. Mind 120 (479):803-817.
    The Pasadena game is an example of a decision problem which lacks an expected value, as traditionally conceived. Easwaran (2008) has shown that, if we distinguish between two different kinds of expectations, which he calls ‘strong’ and ‘weak’, the Pasadena game lacks a strong expectation but has a weak expectation. Furthermore, he argues that we should use the weak expectation as providing a measure of the value of an individual play of the Pasadena game. By considering a modified version of (...)
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  4. J. McKenzie Alexander, Game Theory.
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  5. J. McKenzie Alexander (2006). The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure, Brian Skyrms. Cambridge University Press, 2004, 149 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 22 (3):441-448.
  6. G. A. Antonelli (1993). Review of Robert Koons's Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 9:305-305.
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  7. Gian Aldo Antonelli (1993). Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality, Koons Robert. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, Xii + 174 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 9 (02):305-.
  8. Masanari Asano, Masanori Ohya & Andrei Khrennikov (2011). Quantum-Like Model for Decision Making Process in Two Players Game. Foundations of Physics 41 (3):538-548.
    In experiments of games, players frequently make choices which are regarded as irrational in game theory. In papers of Khrennikov (Information Dynamics in Cognitive, Psychological and Anomalous Phenomena. Fundamental Theories of Physics, Kluwer Academic, Norwell, 2004; Fuzzy Sets Syst. 155:4–17, 2005; Biosystems 84:225–241, 2006; Found. Phys. 35(10):1655–1693, 2005; in QP-PQ Quantum Probability and White Noise Analysis, vol. XXIV, pp. 105–117, 2009), it was pointed out that statistics collected in such the experiments have “quantum-like” properties, which can not be explained in (...)
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  9. José Luis Bermúdez (2010). Rational Decisions , Ken Binmore. Princeton University Press, 2009, X + 200 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 26 (1):95-101.
  10. Gregory S. Berns (2003). Neural Game Theory and the Search for Rational Agents in the Brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):155-156.
    The advent of functional brain imaging has revolutionized the ability to understand the biological mechanisms underlying decision-making. Although it has been amply demonstrated that assumptions of rationality often break down in experimental games, there has not been an overarching theory of why this happens. I describe recent advances in functional brain imaging and suggest a framework for considering the function of the human reward system as a discrete agent.
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  11. C. Bicchieri (2010). Norms, Preferences, and Conditional Behavior. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 9 (3):297-313.
    This article addresses several issues raised by Nichols, Gintis, and Skyrms and Zollman in their comments on my book, The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms . In particular, I explore the relation between social and personal norms, what an adequate game-theoretic representation of norms should be, and what models of norms emergence should tell us about the formation of normative expectations.
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  12. C. Bicchieri, E. Xiao & R. Muldoon (2011). Trustworthiness is a Social Norm, but Trusting is Not. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 10 (2):170-187.
    Previous literature has demonstrated the important role that trust plays in developing and maintaining well-functioning societies. However, if we are to learn how to increase levels of trust in society, we must first understand why people choose to trust others. One potential answer to this is that people view trust as normative: there is a social norm for trusting that imposes punishment for noncompliance. To test this, we report data from a survey with salient rewards to elicit people’s attitudes regarding (...)
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  13. Cristina Bicchieri (1988). Strategic Behavior and Counterfactuals. Synthese 76 (1):135 - 169.
    The difficulty of defining rational behavior in game situations is that the players'' strategies will depend on their expectations about other players'' strategies. These expectations are beliefs the players come to the game with. Game theorists assume these beliefs to be rational in the very special sense of beingobjectively correct but no explanation is offered of the mechanism generating this property of the belief system. In many interesting cases, however, such a rationality requirement is not enough to guarantee that an (...)
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  14. Cristina Bicchieri & Azi Lev-On (2007). Computer-Mediated Communication and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas: An Experimental Analysis. Politics, Philosophy and Economics 6 (2):139-168.
    University of Pennsylvania, USA, el322{at}nyu.edu ' + u + '@' + d + ' '//--> One of the most consistent findings in experimental studies of social dilemmas is the positive influence of face-to-face communication on cooperation. The face-to-face `communication effect' has been recently explained in terms of a `focus theory of norms': successful communication focuses agents on pro-social norms, and induces preferences and expectations conducive to cooperation. 1 Many of the studies that point to a communication effect, however, do not (...)
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  15. Ken Binmore, Interpersonal Comparison in Egalitarian Societies.
    When judging what is fair, how do we decide how much weight to assign to the conflicting interests of different classes of people? This subject has received some attention in a utilitarian context, but has been largely neglected in the case of egalitarian societies of the kind studied by John Rawls. My Game Theory and the Social Contract considers the problem for a toy society with only two citizens. This paper examines the theoretical difficulties in extending the discussion to societies (...)
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  16. Ken Binmore (1997). Rationality and Backward Induction. Journal of Economic Methodology 4 (1):23-41.
    This paper uses the Centipede Game to criticize formal arguments that have recently been offered for and against backward induction as a rationality principle. It is argued that the crucial issues concerning the interpretation of counterfactuals depend on contextual questions that are abstracted away in current formalisms. I have a text, it always is the same, And always has been, Since I learnt the game. Chaucer, The Pardoner's Tale.
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  17. Max Black (1978). The « Prisoner's Dilemma » and the Limits of Rationality. International Studies in Philosophy 10:7-22.
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  18. Giacomo Bonanno (2004). A Characterization of Von Neumann Games in Terms of Memory. Synthese 139 (2):281 - 295.
    An information completion of an extensive game is obtained by extending the information partition of every player from the set of her decision nodes to the set of all nodes. The extended partition satisfies Memory of Past Knowledge (MPK) if at any node a player remembers what she knew at earlier nodes. It is shown that MPK can be satisfied in a game if and only if the game is von Neumann (vN) and satisfies memory at decision nodes (the restriction (...)
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  19. Giacomo Bonanno (2004). Memory and Perfect Recall in Extensive Games. Games and Economic Behavior 47 (2):237-256.
    The notion of perfect recall in extensive games was introduced by Kuhn (1953), who interpreted it as "equivalent to the assertion that each player is allowed by the rules of the game to remember everything he knew at previous moves and all of his choices at those moves''. We provide a characterization and axiomatization of perfect recall based on two notions of memory: (1) memory of past knowledge and (2) memory of past actions.
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  20. Giacomo Bonanno (1995). Review of Cristina Bicchieri's Rationality and Coordination. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 11 (2):359-366.
    In her book Rationality and coordination (Cambridge University Press, 1994) Cristina Bicchieri brings together (and adds to) her own contributions to game theory and the philosophy of economics published in various journals in the period 1987-1992. The book, however, is not a collection of separate articles but rather a homogeneous unit organized around some central themes in the foundations of non-cooperative game theory. Bicchieri’s exposition is admirably clear and well organized. Somebody with a good knowledge of game theory would probably (...)
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  21. Giacomo Bonanno (1991). The Logic of Rational Play in Games of Perfect Information. Economics and Philosophy 7 (01):37-65.
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  22. Geoffrey Brennan & Philip Pettit (2000). The Hidden Economy of Esteem. Economics and Philosophy 16 (1):77-98.
    A generation of social theorists have argued that if free-rider considerations show that certain collective action predicaments are unresolvable under individual, rational choice – unresolvable under an arrangement where each is free to pursue their own relative advantage – then those considerations will equally show that the predicaments cannot be resolved by recourse to norms (Buchanan, 1975, p. 132; Heath, 1976, p. 30; Sober and Wilson, 1998, 156ff; Taylor, 1987, p. 144). If free-rider considerations explain why people do not spontaneously (...)
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  23. Geoffrey Brennan & Philip Pettit (1993). Hands Invisible and Intangible. Synthese 94 (2):191 - 225.
    The notion of a spontaneous social order, an order in human affairs which operates without the intervention of any directly ordering mind, has a natural fascination for social and political theorists. This paper provides a taxonomy under which there are two broadly contrasting sorts of spontaneous social order. One is the familiar invisible hand; the other is an arrangement that we describe as the intangible hand. The paper is designed to serve two main purposes. First, to provide a pure account (...)
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  24. Luigino Bruni (2010). Reciprocity: An Economics of Social Relations , Serge C. Kolm. Cambridge University Press, 2008. XI + 390 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 26 (2):241-247.
  25. Luigino Bruni & Robert Sugden (2009). Fraternity, Intrinsic Motivation and Sacrifice: A Reply to Gui and Nelson. Economics and Philosophy 25 (2):195-198.
    This paper responds to Gui and Nelson's separate comments on our paper , which analysed sociality in markets as joint commitment to mutual assistance. We argue that our analysis is fundamentally different both from Nelson's analysis (a mixture of self-interested and intrinsic motivations) and from that provided by theories of warm glow or guilt aversion, as discussed by Gui. We agree with Gui that, in initiating and maintaining cooperative relationships, individuals sometimes incur personal costs to benefit others without any certainty (...)
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  26. James M. Buchanan (2001). Game Theory, Mathematics, and Economics. Journal of Economic Methodology 8 (1):27-32.
  27. Martin Bunzl (2002). Evolutionary Games Without Rationality? Philosophy of the Social Sciences 32 (3):365-378.
    It is sometimes claimed that evolutionary game theory provides a basis fordoing without rationality. The author defends the thesis that on any plausibleconstrual of the assumptions underlying evolutionary game theory, it cannotprovide a plausible basis for deviations from rationality. But on any plausibleconstrual of rationality, evolutionary game theory cannot provide an alternativethat coincides with the outcomes dictated by considerations of rationality,either. Key Words: evolutionary game theory • game theory • rationality • Skyrms.
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  28. David J. Butler (2003). Evolution, the Emotions, and Rationality in Social Interaction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (2):156-157.
    Although Colman's criticisms of orthodox game theory are convincing, his assessment of progress toward construction of an alternative is unnecessarily restrictive and pessimistic. He omits an important multidisciplinary literature grounded in human evolutionary biology, in particular the existence and function of social emotions experienced when facing some strategic choices. I end with an alternative suggestion for modifying orthodox game theory.
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  29. Thorsten Clausing (2004). Belief Revision in Games of Perfect Information. Economics and Philosophy 20 (1):89-115.
    A syntactic formalism for the modeling of belief revision in perfect information games is presented that allows to define the rationality of a player's choice of moves relative to the beliefs he holds as his respective decision nodes have been reached. In this setting, true common belief in the structure of the game and rationality held before the start of the game does not imply that backward induction will be played. To derive backward induction, a “forward belief” condition is formulated (...)
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  30. Thorsten Clausing (2002). A Syntactic Framework with Probabilistic Beliefs and Conditionals for the Analysis of Strategic Form Games. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 11 (3):335-348.
    In this paper, I develop a syntactic framework for the analysis ofstrategic form games that is based on a straightforward combination ofstandard systems of doxastic, probabilistic and conditionalpropositional logic. In particular, for the probabilistic part I makeuse of the axiomatization provided in Fagin and Halpern (1994). The use ofconditionals allows to represent a strategic form game by a logicalformula in a very natural way. Also expected utility maximization can benaturally captured. I use this framework to prove a version of a (...)
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  31. Andrew Colman (1997). Salience and Focusing in Pure Coordination Games. Journal of Economic Methodology 4 (1):61-81.
    This article is devoted to explaining why decision makers choose salient equilibria or focal points in pure coordination games - games in which players have identical preferences over the set of possible outcomes. Focal points, even when they arise as framing effects based on the labelling of options, are intuitively obvious choices, and experimental evidence shows that decision makers often coordinate successfully by choosing them. In response to arguments that focusing is not rationally justified, a psychological explanation and a conditional (...)
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  32. Andrew M. Colman (2007). Love is Not Enough: Other-Regarding Preferences Cannot Explain Payoff Dominance in Game Theory. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):22-23.
    Even if game theory is broadened to encompass other-regarding preferences, it cannot adequately model all aspects of interactive decision making. Payoff dominance is an example of a phenomenon that can be adequately modeled only by departing radically from standard assumptions of decision theory and game theory – either the unit of agency or the nature of rationality. (Published Online April 27 2007).
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  33. Miranda Del Corral & Jesús Zamora Bonilla (2008). Introduction:Also Sprach der Homo Oeconomicus. Journal of Economic Methodology 15 (3):241-244.
  34. Tyler Cowen (2002). Prelude to Political Economy, Kaushik Basu. Cambridge University Press, 2000, XV + 288 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 18 (1):183-204.
  35. Jelle de Boer (2013). A Stag Hunt with Signalling and Mutual Beliefs. Biology and Philosophy 28 (4):559-576.
    The problem of cooperation for rational actors comprises two sub problems: the problem of the intentional object (under what description does each actor perceive the situation?) and the problem of common knowledge for finite minds (how much belief iteration is required?). I will argue that subdoxastic signalling can solve the problem of the intentional object as long as this is confined to a simple coordination problem. In a more complex environment like an assurance game signals may become unreliable. Mutual beliefs (...)
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  36. Boudewijn de Bruin (2009). Overmathematisation in Game Theory: Pitting the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme Against the Epistemic Programme. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 40 (3):290-300.
    The paper argues that the Nash Equilibrium Refinement Programme in game theory was less successful than its competitor, the Epistemic Programme (Interactive Epistemology). The prime criterion of success is the extent to which the programmes were able to reach the key objective guiding non-cooperative game theory for much of the 20th century, namely, to develop a complete characterisation of the strategic rationality of economic agents in the form of the ultimate game theoretic solution concept for any normal form and extensive (...)
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  37. Boudewijn de Bruin (2008). Common Knowledge of Payoff Uncertainty in Games. Synthese 163 (1):79-97.
    Using epistemic logic, we provide a non-probabilistic way to formalise payoff uncertainty, that is, statements such as ‘player i has approximate knowledge about the utility functions of player j.’ We show that on the basis of this formalisation common knowledge of payoff uncertainty and rationality (in the sense of excluding weakly dominated strategies, due to Dekel and Fudenberg (1990)) characterises a new solution concept we have called ‘mixed iterated strict weak dominance.’.
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  38. Kris de Jaegher (2008). The Evolution of Horn's Rule. Journal of Economic Methodology 15 (3):275-284.
    Horn's rule says that messages can be kept ambiguous if only a single interpretation is plausible. Speakers only perform costly disambiguation to convey surprising information. This paper shows that, while non?cooperative game theory cannot justify Horn's rule, evolutionary game theory can. In order to model the evolution of signalling, the pooling equilibrium needs to be one's starting point. But in such an equilibrium, the plausible interpretation is made, and the receiver is therefore already predisposed to interpret absence of a signal (...)
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  39. José Luis Ferreira & Jesús Zamora Bonilla (2008). The Surprise Exam Paradox, Rationality, and Pragmatics: A Simple Game‐Theoretic Analysis. Journal of Economic Methodology 15 (3):285-299.
    The surprise exam paradox has attracted the attention of prominent logicians, mathematicians and philosophers for decades. Although the paradox itself has been resolved at least since Quine (1953), some aspects of it are still being discussed. In this paper we propose, following Sober (1998), to translate the paradox into the language of game theory to clarify these aspects. Our main conclusions are that a much simpler game?theoretic analysis of the paradox is possible, which solves most of the puzzles related (...)
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  40. Agnès Festré & Pierre Garrouste (2008). Rationality, Behavior, Institutional, and Economic Change in Schumpeter. Journal of Economic Methodology 15 (4):365-390.
    In 1940 Schumpeter wrote a paper entitled: ?The Meaning of Rationality in the Social Sciences?, which was intended as a contribution to one of the meetings of a seminar including Talcott Parsons, Wassily Leontief, Paul Sweezy and other Harvard scholars, that he initiated. In this paper Schumpeter develops thoroughly his own conception of rationality in economics. First, this paper is interesting in itself because it relates to contemporary methodological debates on rationality in the social sciences. Second Schumpeter?s conception of rationality (...)
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  41. Philippe Fontaine (2007). Harsanyi Before Economics: An Introduction. Economics and Philosophy 23 (3):343-348.
  42. Daniel Friedman (2008). Morals and Markets: An Evolutionary Account of the Modern World. Palgrave Macmillan.
    Economist and evolutionary game theorist Daniel Friedman demonstrates that our moral codes and our market systems-while often in conflict-are really devices evolved to achieve similar ends, and that society functions best when morals and markets are in balance with each other.
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  43. David D. Friedman (1994). Law as a Private Good: A Response to Tyler Cowen on the Economics of Anarchy. Economics and Philosophy 10 (02):319-.
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  44. Norman Frohlich (1990). Social Contract, Free Ride: A Study of the Public Goods Problem, Anthony De Jassay. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989, Vi + 256 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 6 (02):327-.
  45. Edward J. Green (1991). Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment, Allan Gibbard. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990, X + 346 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 7 (02):289-.
  46. Jonathan Grose (2009). Review of The Structural Evolution of Morality. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 25 (1):113-119.
  47. Jeremy Gwiazda (2012). Repeated St Petersburg Two-Envelope Trials and Expected Value. The Reasoner 6 (3).
    It is commonly believed that when a finite value is received in a game that has an infinite expected value, it is in one’s interest to redo the game. We have argued against this belief, at least in the repeated St Petersburg two-envelope case. We also show a case where repeatedly opting for a higher expected value leads to a worse outcome.
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  48. Sven Ove Hansson (1999). The Dynamics of Norms, Christina Bicchieri, Richard Jeffrey, and Brain Skyrms (Eds.). Cambridge University Press, 1997, 222 + X Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 15 (02):307-.
  49. John C. Harsanyi (1987). Morals by Agreement, David Gauthier, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986, 297 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 3 (02):339-.
  50. Daniel M. Hausman (2005). 'Testing' Game Theory. Journal of Economic Methodology 12 (2):211-223.
    This paper considers whether game theory can be tested, what difficulties experimenters face in testing it, and what can be learned from attempts to test it. I emphasize that tests of game theory rely on fallible assumptions concerning particular features of the strategic situation and of the players. These do not render game theory untestable in principle, but they create serious problems. In coping with these problems, experimenters may use game theory to learn what games experimental subjects are playing.
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