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  1. Tudor M. Baetu (2011). The Referential Convergence of Gene Concepts Based on Classical and Molecular Analyses. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (4):411-427.
    Kenneth Waters and Marcel Weber argue that the joint use of distinct gene concepts and the transfer of knowledge between classical and molecular analyses in contemporary scientific practice is possible because classical and molecular concepts of the gene refer to overlapping chromosomal segments and the DNA sequences associated with these segments. However, while pointing in the direction of coreference, both authors also agree that there is a considerable divergence between the actual sequences that count as genes in classical genetics and (...)
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  2. Jordan Bartol (2013). Re-Examining the Gene in Personalized Genomics. Science and Education 22 (10):2529-2546.
    Personalized genomics companies (PG; also called ‘direct-to-consumer genetics’) are businesses marketing genetic testing to consumers over the Internet. While much has been written about these new businesses, little attention has been given to their roles in science communication. This paper provides an analysis of the gene concept presented to customers and the relation between the information given and the science behind PG. Two quite different gene concepts are present in company rhetoric, but only one features in the science. To explain (...)
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  3. Ingo Brigandt (2010). The Epistemic Goal of a Concept: Accounting for the Rationality of Semantic Change and Variation. Synthese 177 (1):19-40.
    The discussion presents a framework of concepts that is intended to account for the rationality of semantic change and variation, suggesting that each scientific concept consists of three components of content: 1) reference, 2) inferential role, and 3) the epistemic goal pursued with the concept’s use. I argue that in the course of history a concept can change in any of these components, and that change in the concept’s inferential role and reference can be accounted for as being rational relative (...)
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  4. Frederick B. Churchill (1974). William Johannsen and the Genotype Concept. Journal of the History of Biology 7 (1):5 - 30.
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  5. Paul Griffiths, 6 the Baldwin Effect and Genetic Assimilation: Contrasting Explanatory Foci and Gene Concepts in Two Approaches to an Evolutionary Process.
    David Papineau (2003; 2005) has discussed the relationship between social learning and the family of postulated evolutionary processes that includes ‘organic selection’, ‘coincident selection’, ‘autonomisation’, ‘the Baldwin effect’ and ‘genetic assimilation’. In all these processes a trait which initially develops in the members of a population as a result of some interaction with the environment comes to develop without that interaction in their descendants. It is uncontroversial that the development of an identical phenotypic trait might depend on an interaction with (...)
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  6. Eva Jablonka & Snait Gissis (eds.) (forthcoming). Transformations of Lamarckism: From Subtle Fluids to Molecular Biology. MIT Press.
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  7. Péter Kakuk (2008). Gene Concepts and Genethics: Beyond Exceptionalism. Science and Engineering Ethics 14 (3):357-375.
    The discursive explosion that was provoked by the new genetics could support the impression that the ethical and social problems posed by the new genetics are somehow exceptional in their very nature. According to this view we are faced with special ethical and social problems that create a challenge so fundamental that the special label of genethics is needless to justify. The historical account regarding the evolution of the gene concepts could serve us to highlight the limits of what we (...)
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  8. Ehud Lamm (2011). The Metastable Genome: A Lamarckian Organ in a Darwinian World? In Eva Jablonka & Snait Gissis (eds.), Transformations of Lamarckism: from subtle fluids to molecular biology. MIT Press.
    This article is arranged around two general claims and a thought experiment. I begin by suggesting that the genome should be studied as a developmental system, and that genes supervene on genomes (rather than the other way around). I move on to present a thought experiment that illustrates the implications a dynamic view of the genome has for central concepts in biology, in particular the information content of the genome, and the notion of responses to stress.
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  9. Ehud Lamm (2008). Hopeful Heretic – Richard Goldschmidt’s Genetic Metaphors. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 30 (3-4):387-406.
    Richard Goldschmidt famously rejected the notion of atomic and corpuscular genes, arranged on the chromosome like beads-on-a-string. I provide an exegesis of Goldschmidt’s intuition by analyzing his repeated and extensive use of metaphorical language and analogies in his attempts to convey his notion of the nature of the genetic material and specifically the significance of chromosomal pattern. The paper concentrates on Goldschmidt’s use of metaphors in publications spanning 1940-1955. -/- .
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  10. Slobodan Perovic & Paul-Antoine Miquel (2011). On Gene's Action and Reciprocal Causation. Foundations of Science 16 (1):31-46.
    Advancing the reductionist conviction that biology must be in agreement with the assumptions of reductive physicalism (the upward hierarchy of causal powers, the upward fixing of facts concerning biological levels) A. Rosenberg argues that downward causation is ontologically incoherent and that it comes into play only when we are ignorant of the details of biological phenomena. Moreover, in his view, a careful look at relevant details of biological explanations will reveal the basic molecular level that characterizes biological systems, defined by (...)
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  11. Rosario M. Piro (2011). Are All Genes Regulatory Genes? Biology and Philosophy 26 (4):595-602.
    Although much has been learned about hereditary mechanisms since Gregor Mendel’s famous experiments, gene concepts have always remained vague, notwithstanding their central role in biology. During over hundred years of genetic research, gene concepts have often and dynamically changed to accommodate novel experimental findings, without ever providing a generally accepted definition of the ‘gene.’ Yet, the distinction between ‘regulatory genes’ and ‘structural genes’ has remained a common theme in modern gene concepts since the definition of the operon-model. This distinction is (...)
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  12. C. Kenneth Waters (2004). What Concept Analysis in Philosophy of Science Should Be (and Why Competing Philosophical Analyses of Gene Concepts Cannot Be Tested by Polling Scientists). History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 26 (1):29 - 58.
    What should philosophers of science accomplish when they analyze scientific concepts and interpret scientific knowledge? What is concept analysis if it is not a description of the way scientists actually think? I investigate these questions by using Hans Reichenbach's account of the descriptive, critical, and advisory tasks of philosophy of science to examine Karola Stotz and Paul Griffiths' idea that poll-based methodologies can test philosophical analyses of scientific concepts. Using Reichenbach's account as a point of departure, I argue that philosophy (...)
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  13. Marcel Weber, Reference, Truth, and Biological Kinds. In: J. Dutant, D. Fassio and A. Meylan (Eds.) Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.
    This paper examines causal theories of reference with respect to how plausible an account they give of non-physical natural kind terms such as ‘gene’ as well as of the truth of the associated theoretical claims. I first show that reference fixism for ‘gene’ fails. By this, I mean the claim that the reference of ‘gene’ was stable over longer historical periods, for example, since the classical period of transmission genetics. Second, I show that the theory of partial reference does not (...)
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  14. Rasmus Grønfeldt Winther (2000). Darwin on Variation and Heredity. Journal of the History of Biology 33 (3):425-455.
    Darwin's ideas on variation, heredity, and development differ significantly from twentieth-century views. First, Darwin held that environmental changes, acting either on the reproductive organs or the body, were necessary to generate variation. Second, heredity was a developmental, not a transmissional, process; variation was a change in the developmental process of change. An analysis of Darwin's elaboration and modification of these two positions from his early notebooks (1836-1844) to the last edition of the /Variation of Animals and Plants Under Domestication/ (1875) (...)
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