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  1. Corine Besson (2009). Externalism, Internalism, and Logical Truth. Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (1):1-29.
    The aim of this paper is to show what sorts of logics are required by externalist and internalist accounts of the meanings of natural kind nouns. These logics give us a new perspective from which to evaluate the respective positions in the externalist-internalist debate about the meanings of such nouns. The two main claims of the paper are the following: first, that adequate logics for internalism and externalism about natural kind nouns are second-order logics; second, that an internalist second-order logic (...)
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  2. Kathrin Glüer & Peter Pagin (2012). General Terms and Relational Modality. Noûs 46 (1):159-199.
    Natural kind terms have exercised philosophical fancy ever since Kripke, in Naming and Necessity, claimed them to be rigid designators. He there drew attention to the peculiar, name-like behavior of a family of prima facie loosely related general terms of ordinary English: terms such as ‘water’, ‘tiger’, ‘heat’, and ‘red’. Just as for ordinary proper names, Kripke argued that such terms cannot be synonymous with any of the definite descriptions ordinary speakers associate with them. Rather, the name-like behavior of these (...)
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  3. Ilhan Inan (2008). Rigid General Terms and Essential Predicates. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):213 - 228.
    What does it mean for a general term to be rigid? It is argued by some that if we take general terms to designate their extensions, then almost no empirical general term will turn out to be rigid; and if we take them to designate some abstract entity, such as a kind, then it turns out that almost all general terms will be rigid. Various authors who pursue this line of reasoning have attempted to capture Kripke’s intent by defining a (...)
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  4. Bernard Linsky (2006). General Terms as Rigid Designators. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 128 (3):655 - 667.
    According to Scott Soames’ Beyond Rigidity, there are two important pieces of unfinished business left over from Saul Kripke’s influential Naming and Necessity. Soames reads Kripke’s arguments about names as primarily negative, that is, as proving that names don’t have a meaning expressible by definite descriptions or clusters of them. The famous Kripkean doctrine that names are rigid designators is really only part of the negative case. The thesis that names refer to the same object with respect to every possible (...)
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  5. Dan López de Sa (2007). Rigidity, General Terms, and Trivialization. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):117-123.
    The simple proposal for a characterization of general term rigidity is in terms of sameness of designation in very possible world. Critics like Schwartz (2002) and Soames (2002) have argued that such a proposal would trivialize rigidity for general terms. Martí (2004) claims that the objection rests on the failure to distinguish what is expressed by a general term and the property designated. I argue here against such a response by showing that the trivialization problem reappears even if one pays (...)
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  6. Genoveva Marti (2004). Rigidity and General Terms. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 104 (2):129–146.
    In this paper I examine two ways of defining the rigidity of general terms. First I discuss the view that rigid general terms express essential properties. I argue that the view is ultimately unsatisfactory, although not on the basis of the standard objections raised against it. I then discuss the characterisation in terms of sameness of designation in every possible world. I defend that view from two objections but I argue that the approach, although basically right, should be interpreted cautiously.
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  7. Genoveva Martí & José Martínez-Fernández (2010). General Terms as Designators : A Defence of the View. In Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. Routledge. 46--63.
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  8. Robert May, Comments on Nathan Salmon “Are General Terms Rigid”.
    1. Nathan Salmon paper is entitled with a question: are general terms rigid? He asks this question in way of engaging the issue of the extension of the notion of rigidity beyond the domain of singular terms. While singular terms has been the province of most of the discussion of this rigidity since Naming and Necessity, it is well known that Kripke saw the notion extending to at least certain general terms such as terms for natural kinds. Scott Soames has (...)
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  9. Patrick L. McKee & William Slauson (1979). General Terms and Common Resemblances. Mind 88 (349):120-123.
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  10. Peter Pagin & Kathrin Glüer, Analyticity, Modality and General Terms. Hommage à Wlodek. Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz.
    In his recent paper ‘Analyticity: An Unfinished Business in Possible-World Semantics’ (Rabinowicz 2006), Wlodek Rabinowicz takes on the task of providing a satisfactory definition of analyticity in the framework of possible-worlds semantics. As usual, what Wlodek proposes is technically well-motivated and very elegant. Moreover, his proposal does deliver an interesting analytic/synthetic distinction when applied to sentences with natural kind terms. However, the longer we thought and talked about it, the more questions we had, questions of both philosophical and technical nature. (...)
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  11. T. Parent, A Puzzle About Kinds and Kind Terms.
    'The kind Dinosaur’ denotes a kind. Yet many generics are thought to denote a kind also, like the subject-terms in ‘Dinosaurs are extinct’, ‘Water is a liquid’, and ‘The mosquito carries malaria’. This may be an adequate view for the linguist’s purposes--however, it raises a puzzle for the ontologist. The problem is that what is often claimed about kinds is never claimed about dinosaurs, water, and the mosquito. Thus, kinds are sometimes claimed to be abstract objects, immanent universals, nominal essences, (...)
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  12. Nathan Salmon (2005). Are General Terms Rigid? Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (1):117 - 134.
    On Kripke’s intended definition, a term designates an object x rigidly if the term designates x with respect to every possible world in which x exists and does not designate anything else with respect to worlds in which x does not exist. Kripke evidently holds in Naming and Necessity, hereafter N&N (pp. 117–144, passim, and especially at 134, 139–140), that certain general terms – including natural-kind terms like ‘‘water’’ and ‘‘tiger’’, phenomenon terms like ‘‘heat’’ and ‘‘hot’’, and color terms like (...)
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  13. Stephen P. Schwartz (2002). Kinds, General Terms, and Rigidity: A Reply to LaPorte. Philosophical Studies 109 (3):265 - 277.
    Joseph LaPorte in an article on `Kind and Rigidity'(Philosophical Studies, Volume 97) resurrects an oldsolution to the problem of how to understand the rigidityof kind terms and other general terms. Despite LaPorte'sarguments to the contrary, his solution trivializes thenotion of rigidity when applied to general terms. Hisarguments do lead to an important insight however. Thenotions of rigidity and non-rigidity do not usefullyapply at all to kind or other general terms. Extendingthe notion of rigidity from singular terms such as propernames to (...)
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  14. John Tienson (1984). Hume on Universals and General Terms. Noûs 18 (2):311-330.
  15. John L. Tienson (1988). Resemblance and General Terms. Philosophical Studies 54 (1):87 - 108.
    Any successful account of general terms must explain our ability to apply terms correctly to new instances. Many philosophers have thought resemblance offers an ontologically sparse basis for such an account. However, Any natural and plausible account of general terms on the basis of resemblance requires quite a rich ontology, Including at least second order properties and relations. Given a sufficiently rich structure of resemblances, We can surely account for the application of many general terms. I argue, However, That our (...)
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