My aim in this paper is to quickly sketch a teleological approach to the problem of isolating the impact of genes on phenotypic characters. I begin by arguing that it is a mistake to think that there will be only one analysis of genetic input suitable for all theoretical interests. My principle focus is Richard Dawkins' argument for genic selectionism. I argue that a teleological analysis of genetic input is what Dawkins requires to establish the right kind of mapping of (...) gene onto phenotype. This comes at a certain cost, however. Accepting the analysis will threaten Dawkins' claims about the teleogogical priority of gene over phenotype. (shrink)

All complex systems are complex, but some are more complex than others are. Biological systems are generally more complex than physical systems. How do biologists tackle complex systems? In this talk, we will consider two biological systems, the genome and the brain. Scientists know much about them, but much more remains unknown. Ignorance breeds philosophical speculation. Reductionism makes a strong showing here, as it does in other frontier sciences where large gaps remain in our understanding. I will show that reductionism (...) and its claims have no bases in actual scientific research and results. The Human Genome Project will serve as a case in point.. (shrink)

This paper brings needed clarity to the influential view that species are cohesive entities held together by gene flow, and then develops an empirical argument against that view: Neglected data suggest gene flow is neither necessary nor sufficient for species cohesion. Implications are discussed. ‡I'm grateful to Rob Wilson, Alex Rueger and Lindley Darden for important comments on earlier drafts, and to Joseph Nagel, Heather Proctor, Ken Bond, members of the DC History and Philosophy of Biology reading group, and audience (...) members at the November 2006 meeting of the PSA, for helpful comments or discussion. Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada fellowship 752-2005-1208 supported research. †To contact the author, please write to: Philosophy Department, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 5185 Helen C. White Hall, 600 North Park Street, Madison, WI 53706; e-mail: mjbarker2@wisc.edu. (shrink)

Peer reporting is a specific form of whistelblowing in which an individual discloses the wrongdoing of a peer. Previous studies have examined situational variables thought to influence a person's decision to report the wrongdoing of a peer. The present study looked at peer reporting from the individual level. Five hypotheses were developed concerning the relationships between (1) religiosity and ethical ideology, (2) ethical ideology and ethical judgments about peer reporting, and (3) ethical judgments and intentions to report peer wrongdoing.Subjects read (...) a vignette concerning academic cheating, and were asked to respond to a question-naire concerning the vignette. Data were analyzed using structural equation methodology. (shrink)

Differences in ethical ideology are thought to influence individuals'' reasoning about moral issues (Forsyth and Nye, 1990; Forsyth, 1992). To date, relatively little research has addressed this proposition in terms of business-related ethical issues. In the present study, four groups, representing four distinct ethical ideologies, were created based on the two dimensions of the Ethical Position Questionnaire (idealism and relativism), as posited by Forsyth (1980). The ethical judgments of individuals regarding several business-related issues varied, depending upon their ethical ideology.

The present study extends the study of individuals' ethical ideology withinthe context of marketing ethics issues. A national sample of marketing professionals participated. Respondents' ethical ideologies were classified as absolutists, situationists, exceptionists, or subjectivists using the Ethical Position Questionnaire (Forsyth, 1980). Respondents then answered questions about three ethically ambiguous situations common to marketing and sales. The results indicated that marketers' ethical judgments about the situations differed based on their ethical ideology, with absolutists rating the actions as most unethical. The findings (...) are consistent with those of two earlier studies that utilized samples of business students (Barnett et al., 1994, 1995). The results suggest that personal moral philosophy is an important influence on ethical decision making that should be considered in empirical studies of business ethics. The results also support the utility of the Ethical Position Questionnaire (Forsyth, 1980) as a means for researchers and practitioners to assess individuals' ethical ideology. (shrink)

Advances in molecular biological research in the last forty years have made the story of the gene vastly complicated: the more we learn about genes, the less sure we are of what a gene really is. Knowledge about the structure and functioning of genes abounds, but the gene has also become curiously intangible. This collection of essays renews the question: what are genes? Philosophers, historians, and working scientists re-evaluate the question in this volume, treating the gene as a focal point (...) of interdisciplinary and international research. This book is unique in that it is the first interdisciplinary volume solely devoted to the quest for the gene. It will be of interest to professionals and students in the philosophy and history of science, genetics, and molecular biology. (shrink)

The properties of DNA -- DNA as universal property -- DNA as intellectual property -- DNA as national property -- DNA as personal property -- DNA as academic property -- DNA as taxable propety.

The present paper discusses Kitcher’s framework for studying conceptual change and progress. Kitcher’s core notion of reference potential is hard to apply to concrete cases. In addition, an account of conceptual change as change in reference potential misses some important aspects of conceptual change and conceptual progress. I propose an alternative framework that focuses on the inferences and explanations supported by scientific concepts. The application of my approach to the history of the gene concept offers a better account of the (...) conceptual progress that occurred in the transition from the Mendelian to the molecular gene than Kitcher’s theory. (shrink)

This chapter offers a review of standard views about the requirements for natural selection to shape evolution and for the sorts of ‘units’ on which selection might operate. It then summarizes traditional arguments for genic selectionism, i.e., the view that selection operates primarily on genes (e.g., those of G. C. Williams, Richard Dawkins, and David Hull) and traditional counterarguments (e.g., those of William Wimsatt, Richard Lewontin, and Elliott Sober, and a diffuse group based on life history strategies). It then offers (...) a series of responses to the arguments, based on more contemporary considerations from molecular genetics, offered by Carmen Sapienza. A key issue raised by Sapienza concerns the degree to which a small number of genes might be able to control much of the variation relevant to selection operating on such selectively critical organs as hearts. The response to these arguments suggests that selection acts on many levels at once and that sporadic selection, acting with strong effects, can act successively on different key traits (and genes) while maintaining a balance among many potentially conflicting demands faced by organisms within an evolving lineage. (shrink)

The Architecture of Mind is an ambitious and informative work, surveying an impressive range of empirical literature and arguing that the mind is massively modular. However, it suffers from two major theoretical flaws. First, Carruthers’ concept of a module is weak, so much so that it robs his thesis of massive modularity of any real substance. Second, his conception of how the mind’s modules evolved ignores the role of niche construction and cultural evolution to its detriment.

Mike Gene and I used to be quite active on a private listserve some years back. I even arranged for him to give a keynote address at a private ID conference in the fall of 1997. When we were on that listserve together, I used to keep many of his posts because I thought that they were so insightful (unfortunately many were lost when a computer virus chewed up my email program). In all that time I do not recall ever (...) taking sharp exception to him. But this time it's happened. My beef centers on Mike's comments on my exchange with Scott and Branch. (shrink)

This note argues that the charge of reductionism levelled against Richard Dawkins is false. It does so by examining the development of his notion of the genes in his books The Selfish Gene (TSG), and The Extended Phenotype (TEP).

What accounts for the continued lack of clarity over the legal procedures for the patenting of DNA sequences? The patenting system was built for a "bricks-and-mortar" world rather than an information economy. The fact that genes are both material molecules and informational systems helps explain the difficulty that the patent system is going to continue to have.

This article develops a theory for how caringbehavior fits into the makeup of humans andother mammals. Biochemical evidence for threemajor patterns of response to stressful orotherwise complex situations is reviewed. There is the classic fight-or-flight response;the dissociative response, involving emotionalwithdrawal and disengagement; and the bondingresponse, a variant of which Taylor et al. (2000) called tend-and-befriend. All three ofthese responses can be explained as adaptationsthat have been selected for in evolution andare shared between humans and other mammals. Yet each of us (...) contains varying tendenciestoward all of these responses. How doesdevelopment interact with genes to influencethese tendencies? How do individuals,societies, and institutions make choicesbetween these types of responses?We review the evidence, based on behavioral,lesion, single-cell, and brain imaging studies,for cortical-subcortical interactions involvedin all three of these response types, andpropose partial neural network models for someof these interactions. We propose that theorbitomedial prefrontal cortex mediates thischoice process. This area of prefrontal cortexperforms this mediation through its connectionswith areas of sensory and association cortexthat represent social contexts or stimuli, andwith areas of the hypothalamus, limbic system,and autonomic nervous system that representemotional states or classes of response patterns.The article concludes with implications of ourtheory for social interactions andinstitutions. We argue that despite the wideprevalence of fight-or-flight responses, thebonding, caring responses remain available. Weshow with historical and contemporary exampleshow social settings – whether in education,work places, families, politics, and informalsocial customs – can be designed to supportand enhance the natural caring responses of thebrain. (shrink)

This paper concerns periodic solutions of a class of equations that model gene regulatory networks. Unlike the vast majority of previous studies, it is not assumed that all decay rates are identical. To handle this more general situation, we rely on monotonicity properties of these systems. Under an alternative assumption, it is shown that a classical fixed point theorem for monotone, concave operators can be applied to these systems. The required assumption is expressed in geometrical terms as an alignment condition (...) on so-called focal points . As an application, we show the existence and uniqueness of a stable periodic orbit for negative feedback loop systems in dimension 3 or more, and of a unique stable equilibrium point in dimension 2. This extends a theorem of Snoussi, which showed the existence of these orbits only. (shrink)

What we think about equality as a value will influence how we think genetic interventions should be regulated. In this paper I utilise the taxonomy of equality put forth by Derek Parfit and apply this to the issue of genetic interventions. I argue that Telic Egalitarianism is untenable and that Deontic Egalitarianism collapses into the Priority View. The Priority View maintains that it is morally more important to benefit those who are worse off. Once this precision has been given to (...) the concerns egalitarians have a number of diverse issues must be considered before determining what the just regulation of genetic interventions would be. Consideration must be given to the current situation of the current situation of the least advantaged, the fiscal realities behind genetic interventions, the budget constraints on other programmes egalitarians believe should receive scarce public funds and the interconnected nature of genetic information. These considerations might lead egalitarians to abandon what they take to be the obvious policy recommendations for them to endorse regarding the regulation of genetic therapies and enhancements. (shrink)

Definitions of the term gene typically superimpose molecular genetics onto Mendelism. What emerges are persistent attempts to regard the gene as a unit of structure and/or function, language that creates multiple meanings for the term and fails to acknowledge the diversity of gene architecture. I argue that coherence at the molecular level requires abandonment of the classical unit concept and recognition that a gene is constructed from an assemblage of domains. Hence, a domain set (1) conforms more closely to empirical (...) evidence for genetic organization of DNA regions capable of transcription and (2) has ontological properties lacking in the traditional unit definition. (shrink)

Although the ability to perform gene therapy in human germ-line cells is still hypothetical, the rate of progress in molecular and cell biology suggests that it will only be a matter of time before reliable clinical techniques will be within reach. Three sets of arguments are commonly advanced against developing those techniques, respectively pointing to the clinical risks, social dangers and better alternatives. In this paper we analyze those arguments from the perspective of the client-centered ethos that traditionally governs practice (...) in medical genetics. This perspective clarifies the merits of these arguments for geneticists, and suggests useful new directions for the professional discussion of germ-line gene therapy. It suggests, for example, that the much discussed prospect of germ-line therapy in human pre-embryos may always be more problematic for medical genetics than adult germ-line interventions, even though the latter faces greater technical difficulties. (shrink)