After some opening comments on how I think one should approach the philosophy of mind, I look at what relatively little Gilbert Ryle had to say explicitly about intentionality, that occurring almost exclusively in his several papers on phenomenology. Then, I discuss the notion of intentionality with respect to the doctrines of The Concept of Mind, although neither the word nor the idea, strictly speaking, appears anywhere in the book. Following more exposition of my own views, including an argument I (...) have made for a certain specific theory of intentionality, I close with some reflections on Ryle as a modern-day Aristotelian. (shrink)
Crombie's acceptance of the deliberate commission of a category mistake in his defense of the meaningfulness of theological statements raises a pointed challenge to the philosophy of Ryle which seems not to have been specifically addressed in subsequent literature. We review the analysis which leads Crombie into it, including concepts of anomaly, deficiency, affinity, and inadequate notion, noting basic differences in method and attitude from Ryle. We express our own agreements and disagreements in keeping with an overall concern for the (...) preservation of rationality in this sphere of language, finding acceptable distinct contributions to that end from both. (shrink)
Gilbert Ryle has argued that Plato's Theory of Forms is a "logically vicious" doctrine because it's fundamental concept of exemplification leads to a vicious infinite regress. David Armstrong and Alan Donagan have agreed with Ryle. After making Ryle's argument logically explicit, I show the exemplification regress is illusory. Exemplification is a genuine universal alongside other relations; there is nothing paradoxical in its being exemplified over and over and over ... Platonism can define logical properties of this relation but not the (...) relation itself, however. (shrink)
This paper argues that Collingwood's philosophy of mind offers an interesting and compelling account of the nature of the mind and of the irreducibility of the mental, an account whose viability and relevance to contemporary debates ought to be given serious consideration. I suggest that the reason why Collingwood's contribution to the philosophy of mind has been neglected is due to the fact that his philosophy of mind is widely, even if mistakenly, regarded as the target of Ryle's attacks on (...) the dogma of the ghost in the machine and proceed to undermine the assumption that Collingwood is a twentieth century adherent of the dogma. (shrink)
Idealism in the 'social' sense in which i accept it is defended against the three writers mentioned. topics dealt with include mind as spatial, sensation as species of feeling, 'direct intuition', singulars vs. crowds, the body as society, participation as universal principle. it is held that ryle, ayer, and lewis overlook the direct participations which alone give experience access to a world and indeed alone enable it to be experience at all.
Gilles Deleuze's notion of sense, as developed in Difference and Repetition and The Logic of Sense, is meant to be a fourth dimension of the proposition besides denotation, manifestation and signification. While Deleuze explains signification in inferentialist terms, he ascribes to sense some very unusual properties, making it hard to understand what sense is. The aim of this paper is to improve this situation by confronting Deleuzian sense with a more or less contemporary, but otherwise rather distant philosophical conception: Gilbert (...) Ryle's theory of categories and category mistakes. The leading idea is that to understand the sense of a proposition regarding X is to know the category of the concept X, which requires that one knows which questions may appropriately be asked with regard to X. Thus, sense, category and questions are intimately related to each other. Finally, it seems to be consistent with Deleuze's views to assume that abstract signification is contextually generated by concrete sense. (shrink)