This new edition of William James’s 1909 classic, A Pluralistic Universe reproduces the original text, only modernizing the spelling. The books has been annotated throughout to clarify James’s points of reference and discussion. There is a new, fuller index, a brief chronology of James’s life, and a new bibliography—chiefly based on James’s own references. The editor, H.G. Callaway, has included a new Introduction which elucidates the legacy of Jamesian pluralism to survey some related questions of contemporary American society. -/- A (...) Pluralistic Universe was the last major book James published during his life time. It is a substantial philosophical work, devoted to a thorough-going criticism of Hegelian monism and Absolutism—and the exploration of philosophical and social-theological alternatives. Our world of some one hundred years on is much the better for James’s contributions; and understanding James’s pluralism deeply contributes even now to America’s self-understanding. At present, we are more certain that American is, and is best, a pluralistic society, than we are of what particular forms our pluralism should take. Keeping an eye out for social interpretations of Jamesian pluralism, this new philosophical reading casts light on our twenty-first century alternatives by reference to prior American experience and developments. -/- . (shrink)

When Leibnitz expressed his wish for a Euclidean universal language for which the truth-value of all philosophical propositions would be derivable from the axioms without controversy he probably spoke for all metaphysicians. Less obviously, he may have spoken for all mystics. Mysticism claims of its logical scheme that it is Euclidean, that from its first axiom or principle the remainder of its doctrine follows, but it makes this claim in so many languages and in such a variety of obscure and (...) self-contradictory ways that it is difficult to discern how this could be possible, and it is rarely considered plausible in metaphysics. I believe it is plausible, and in this essay I try to explain why. <br><br><br><br>I propose that the philosophical scheme of mysticism in almost its entirety can be reliably and systematically derived from an axiom stating that the universe is metaphysically neutral, thus a unity, and, in addition, that this thesis and its ramifications cannot be refuted in logic or experience. If this is not often noticed then it may be because the full subtlety of Aristotle’s logic is not generally recognised. What is often overlooked, or so I suggest, is that a logic of contradictory complementarity, such as that on which quantum theory, dialethism and mysticism depend, would not contravene Aristotle’s rules for the dialectic nor require their modification. <br><br><br><br>While the problem of consciousness is only one of many matters arising it is crucial. The essay might be read as a response to the challenge laid down by David Chalmers when he asks us to identify the ingredient missing, or so he surmises, from our current mind-matter theories. More generally it is an attempt to show that for a fundamental analysis there can be no conflict nor even a clear divide between metaphysics and mysticism, and thus no rational basis for a war between science and religion. <br><br><br><br>. (shrink)

This paper develops a version of the self-refutation argument against relativism in the teeth of the prevailing response by relativists: that this argument begs the question against them. It is maintained that although weaker varieties of relativism are not self-refuting, strong varieties are faced by this argument with a choice between making themselves absolute (one thing is absolutely true - relativism); or reflexive (relativism is 'true for' the relativist). These positions are in direct conflict. The commonest response, Reflexive Relativism, is (...) shown to be vulnerable to an iterated version of the self-refutation argument. As a result, Reflexive Relativism possesses only the appearance of content, being either incoherent, or a regressively disguised version of Absolute Relativism. Concluding remarks on Absolute Relativism acknowledge this to be a bare, formal possibility, but claim that in fact it must represent one of a range of weaker varieties of relativism that alone remain tenable. (shrink)

Metaphysics is supposed to tell us about the metaphysical nature of our world: under what conditions composition occurs; how objects persist through time; whether properties are universals or tropes. It is near orthodoxy that whichever of these sorts of metaphysical claims is true is necessarily true. This paper looks at the debate between that orthodox view and a recently emerging view that claims like these are contingent, by focusing on the metaphysical debate between monists and pluralists about concrete particulars. This (...) paper argues that we should be contingentists about monism and pluralism, and it defends contingentism against some necessitarian objections by offering an epistemology of contingent metaphysical claims. (shrink)

The debate over foundationalism, the viewpoint that there exists some secure foundation upon which to build a system of knowledge, appears to have been resolved and the antifoundationalists have at least temporarily prevailed. From a firmly historical approach, the book traces the foundationalism/antifoundationalism controversy in the work of many important figures Animaxander, Aristotle and Plato, Augustine, Descartes, Hegel and Nietzsche, Habermas and Chisholm, and others throughout the history of philosophy. The contributors, Joseph Margolis, Ronald Polansky, Gary Calore, Fred and Emily (...) Michael, William Wurzer, Charlene Haddock Siegfried, Sandra B. Rosenthal, Kathleen Wallace, and the editors present well the diversity, interest, and roots of antifoundationalism. Tom Rockmore is Professor and Chairman in the Department of Philosophy at Duquesne University. Beth J. Singer is Professor of Philosophy at Brooklyn College of the City University of New York. (shrink)

It is about the pure theoretical system of EDWs (almost without applications to any particular sciences - cognitive science, physics or biology). I constructed the conditions of the possibility for any EDWs (that exist or possible to exist) given by 13 propositions that represent the axiomatic-hyperontological framework in 13 parts. In general, these propositions refer to the abstract entities andtheir interactions. Being is the only entity that is an epistemological world. In this short book, I deal with the hyperontology of (...) the hyperverse, no more or less than “pure philosophy". (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).