 | 1 — 100 / 106 |  |
- Paul Benacerraf (1967). God, the Devil, and Godel. The Monist 51 (January):9-32.
- Damjan Bojadziev (1997). Mind Versus Godel. In Matjaz Gams & M. Wu Paprzycki (eds.), Mind Versus Computer. IOS Press.
- G. Lee Bowie (1982). Lucas' Number is Finally Up. Journal of Philosophy Logic 11 (August):279-85.
- David L. Boyer (1983). R. Lucas, Kurt Godel, and Fred Astaire. Philosophical Quarterly 33 (April):147-59.
- Selmer Bringsjord, A Refutation of Penrose's Godelian Case Against Artificial Intelligence.
- Selmer Bringsjord & H. Xiao (2000). A Refutation of Penrose's New Godelian Case Against the Computational Conception of Mind. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 12.
- Donald E. Broadbent (ed.) (1993). The Simulation of Human Intelligence. Blackwell.
- Peter Carruthers & Peter K. Smith (eds.) (1996). Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
- David J. Chalmers (1996). Minds, Machines, and Mathematics. Psyche 2:11-20.
- C. T. K. Chari (1963). Further Comments on Minds, Machines and Godel. Philosophy 38 (April):175-8.
- C. Chihara (1972). On Alleged Refutations of Mechanism Using Godel's Incompleteness Results. Journal of Philosophy 69 (September):507-26.
- David Coder (1969). Godel's Theorem and Mechanism. Philosophy 44 (September):234-7.
- Jon Cogburn & Jason Megil (2010). Are Turing Machines Platonists? Inferentialism and the Computational Theory of Mind. Minds and Machines 20 (3):423-439.
- A. G. Cohn & J. R. Thomas (eds.) (1986). Artificial Intelligence and Its Applications. John Wiley and Sons.
- Jack Copeland (1998). Turing's o-Machines, Searle, Penrose, and the Brain. Analysis 58 (2):128-138.
- Daniel C. Dennett (1989). Murmurs in the Cathedral: Review of R. Penrose, The Emperor's New Mind. [REVIEW] Times Literary Supplement (September) 29.
- Daniel C. Dennett (1978). Brainstorms. MIT Press.
- Daniel C. Dennett (1978). The Abilities of Men and Machines. In Brainstorms. MIT Press.
- Taner Edis (1998). How Godel's Theorem Supports the Possibility of Machine Intelligence. Minds and Machines 8 (2):251-262.
- Eva-Maria Engelen (forthcoming). Hat Kurt Gödel Thomas von Aquins Kommentar Zu Aristoteles’ „De Anima“ Rezipiert? / Has Kurt Gödel Received Thomas Aquinas’ Commentary on Aristotle’s „De Anima“? Philosophia Scientiae.
- S. Feferman (1996). Penrose's Godelian Argument. Psyche 2:21-32.
- H. Gaifman (2000). What Godel's Incompleteness Result Does and Does Not Show. Journal of Philosophy 97 (8):462-471.
- Matjaz Gams (ed.) (1997). Mind Versus Computer: Were Dreyfus and Winograd Right? Amsterdam: IOS Press.
- Jay L. Garfield (1990). Foundations of Cognitive Science: The Essential Readings. New York: Paragon House.
- A. George & Daniel J. Velleman (2000). Leveling the Playing Field Between Mind and Machine: A Reply to McCall. Journal of Philosophy 97 (8):456-452.
- F. H. George (1962). Minds, Machines and Godel: Another Reply to Mr. Lucas. Philosophy 37 (January):62-63.
- Brie Gertler (2004). Simulation Theory on Conceptual Grounds. Protosociology 20:261-284.
- I. J. Good (1969). Godel's Theorem is a Red Herring. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (February):357-8.
- I. J. Good (1967). Human and Machine Logic. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (August):145-6.
- Robert M. Gordon, Folk Psychology As Mental Simulation. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Rick Grush & P. Churchland (1995). Gaps in Penrose's Toiling. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Ferdinand Schoningh.
- Robert F. Hadley (1987). Godel, Lucas, and Mechanical Models of Mind. Computational Intelligence 3:57-63.
- William H. Hanson (1971). Mechanism and Godel's Theorem. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (February):9-16.
- Douglas R. Hofstadter (1979). Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid. Basic Books.
- A. Hutton (1976). This Godel is Killing Me. Philosophia 3 (March):135-44.
- Andrew D. Irvine (1983). Lucas, Lewis, and Mechanism -- One More Time. Analysis 43 (March):94-98.
- Dale Jacquette (1987). Metamathematical Criteria for Minds and Machines. Erkenntnis 27 (July):1-16.
- Jeffrey Ketland & Panu Raatikainen, Truth and Provability Again.
- D. King (1996). Is the Human Mind a Turing Machine? Synthese 108 (3):379-89.
- Robert Kirk (1986). Mental Machinery and Godel. Synthese 66 (March):437-452.
- Geoffrey Laforte, Pat Hayes & Kenneth M. Ford (1998). Why Godel's Theorem Cannot Refute Computationalism: A Reply to Penrose. Artificial Intelligence 104.
- Alan M. Leslie, Shaun Nichols, Stephen P. Stich & David B. Klein (1996). Varieties of Off-Line Simulation. In P. Carruthers & P. Smith (eds.), Theories of Theories of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
- David Lewis (1979). Lucas Against Mechanism II. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 9 (June):373-6.
- David Lewis (1969). Lucas Against Mechanism. Philosophy 44 (June):231-3.
- Per Lindstrom (2006). Remarks on Penrose's New Argument. Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (3):231-237.
- John R. Lucas, The Implications of Godel's Theorem.
- John R. Lucas, The Godelian Argument: Turn Over the Page.
- John R. Lucas (1996). Mind, Machines and Godel: A Retrospect. In Peter Millican & A. Clark (eds.), Machines and Thought. Oxford University Press.
- John R. Lucas (1984). Lucas Against Mechanism II: A Rejoinder. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (June):189-91.
- John R. Lucas (1976). This Godel is Killing Me: A Rejoinder. Philosophia 6 (March):145-8.
- John R. Lucas (1971). Metamathematics and the Philosophy of Mind: A Rejoinder. Philosophy of Science 38 (2):310-13.
- John R. Lucas (1970). The Freedom of the Will. Oxford University Press.
- John R. Lucas (1970). Mechanism: A Rejoinder. Philosophy 45 (April):149-51.
- John R. Lucas (1968). Satan Stultified: A Rejoinder to Paul Benacerraf. The Monist 52 (1):145-58.
- John R. Lucas (1967). Human and Machine Logic: A Rejoinder. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (August):155-6.
- John R. Lucas (1961). Minds, Machines and Godel. Philosophy 36 (April-July):112-127.
- John R. Lucas & Michael Redhead (2007). Truth and Provability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):331-2.
- Albert E. Lyngzeidetson (1990). Massively Parallel Distributed Processing and a Computationalist Foundation for Cognitive Science. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (March):121-127.
- Albert E. Lyngzeidetson & Martin K. Solomon (1994). Abstract Complexity Theory and the Mind-Machine Problem. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (2):549-54.
- J. Martin & K. Engleman (1990). The Mind's I has Two Eyes. Philosophy 65 (264):510-515.
- Tim Maudlin (1996). Between the Motion and the Act. Psyche 2:40-51.
- Storrs McCall (2001). On "Seeing" the Truth of the Godel Sentence. Facta Philosophica 3:25-30.
- Storrs McCall (1999). Can a Turing Machine Know That the Godel Sentence is True? Journal of Philosophy 96 (10):525-32.
- D. McCullough (1996). Can Humans Escape Godel? Psyche 2:57-65.
- Drew McDermott (1996). [Star] Penrose is Wrong. Psyche 2:66-82.
- Jason L. Megill (2004). Are We Paraconsistent? On the Lucas-Penrose Argument and the Computational Theory of Mind. Auslegung 27 (1):23-30.
- Jason L. Megill, Tim Melvin & Alex Beal (forthcoming). On Some Properties of Humanly Known and Humanly Knowable Mathematics. Axiomathes:1-8.
- Peter Millican & A. Clark (eds.) (1996). Machines and Thought. Oxford University Press.
- E. Nelson (2002). Mathematics and the Mind. In Kunio Yasue, Marj Jibu & Tarcisio Della Senta (eds.), No Matter, Never Mind. John Benjamins.
- Roger Penrose (1999). The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers, Minds, and the Laws of Physics. OUP Oxford.
- Roger Penrose (1996). Beyond the Doubting of a Shadow. Psyche 2:89-129.
- Roger Penrose (1994). Shadows of the Mind. Oxford University Press.
- Roger Penrose (1992). Setting the Scene: The Claim and the Issues. In D. Broadbent (ed.), The Simulation of Human Intelligence. Blackwell.
- Roger Penrose (1990). Precis of the Emperor's New Mind. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13:643-705.
- Roger Penrose (1989). The Emperor's New Mind. Oxford University Press.
- Gualtiero Piccinini (2003). Alan Turing and the Mathematical Objection. Minds and Machines 13 (1):23-48.
- Graham Priest (1994). Godel's Theorem and the Mind... Again. In M. Michael & John O'Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind: The Place of Philosophy in the Study of Mind. Kluwer.
- Hilary Putnam (1995). Review of Shadows of the Mind. [REVIEW] AMS Bulletin 32 (3).
- Hilary Putnam (1985). Reflexive Reflections. Erkenntnis 22 (January):143-153.
- Panu Raatikainen, Truth and Provability Again.
- Panu Raatikainen (2005). On the Philosophical Relevance of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 59 (4):513-534.
- Panu Raatikainen (2005). Truth and Provability: A Comment on Redhead. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):611-613.
- Panu Raatikainen (2002). McCall's Gödelian Argument is Invalid. Facta Philosophica 4 (1):167-69.
- M. Redhead (2004). Mathematics and the Mind. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (4):731-737.
- Rosemarie Rheinwald (1991). Menschen, Maschinen Und Gödels Theorem. Erkenntnis 34 (1):1 - 21.
- William S. Robinson (1992). Penrose and Mathematical Ability. Analysis 52 (2):80-88.
- Gerhard Schurz (2002). McCall and Raatikainen on Mechanism and Incompleteness. Facta Philosophica 4:171-74.
- William E. Seager (2003). Yesterday's Algorithm: Penrose and the Godel Argument. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 3 (9):265-273.
- Peter Slezak (1984). Minds, Machines and Self-Reference. Dialectica 38:17-34.
- Peter Slezak (1983). Descartes's Diagonal Deduction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (March):13-36.
- Peter Slezak (1982). Godel's Theorem and the Mind. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 33 (March):41-52.
- Aaron Sloman (1992). The Emperor's Real Mind -- Review of Roger Penrose's The Emperor's New Mind: Concerning Computers Minds and the Laws of Physics. Artificial Intelligence 56 (2-3):355-396.
- J. J. C. Smart (1961). Godel's Theorem, Church's Theorem, and Mechanism. Synthese 13 (June):105-10.
- Tony Stone & Martin Davies (1998). Folk Psychology and Mental Simulation. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43:53-82.
- Richard Tieszen (2006). After Gödel: Mechanism, Reason, and Realism in the Philosophy of Mathematics. Philosophia Mathematica 14 (2):229-254.
- Richard Tieszen (1996). Review of R. Penrose, Shadows of the Mind: A Search for the Missing Science of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophia Mathematica 4 (3).
- Thomas Tymoczko (1998). Gödel and the Concept of Meaning in Mathematics. Synthese 114 (1):25-40.
- Thomas Tymoczko (1991). Why I Am Not a Turing Machine: Godel's Theorem and the Philosophy of Mind. In Jay L. Garfield (ed.), Foundations of Cognitive Science. Paragon House.
- H. Wang (1974). From Mathematics to Philosophy. London.
- Hao Wang (1993). On Physicalism and Algorithmism: Can Machines Think? Philosophia Mathematica 1 (2):97-138.
 | 1 — 100 / 106 |  |
|
Off-campus access
Using PhilPapers from home?
Click here to configure this browser for off-campus access.
Monitor this page
Be alerted of all new items appearing on this page. Choose how you want to monitor it:
Email
|
RSS feed
|
|