The United States Government does not mandate that US based firms follow US social and environmental law in foreign markets. However, because many developing countries do not have strong human rights, labor, and environmental laws, many multinationals have adopted voluntary corporate responsibility initiatives to self-regulate their overseas social and environmental practices. This article argues that voluntary actions, while important, are insufficient to address the magnitude of problems companies confront as they operate in developing countries where governance is often inadequate. The (...) United States can do more to ensure that its multinationals act responsibly everywhere they operate. First, policymakers should define the social and environmental responsibilities of global companies. They must consistently make their expectations for global business clear – and underscore that this objective can often be accomplished without mandates. Second, the US should closely examine the policies that undermine global Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and address the many conflicting signals sent by policymakers. Third, the President should make the US government a CSR model by examining how to use its purchasing power to promote human rights. Finally, the US government should require pension funds to report on the social and environmental consequences of their investments. In these ways, Americans can mind our business – and thus make sure that US based firms do not undermine social and environmental progress when they operate in the developing world. (shrink)

Many economists consider public goods to be a case of market "failure.’ They argue that the free market cannot finance the optimal amount of public goods. Therefore, they say, the government must finance their provision. In this paper I shall challenge this view. Three well—known arguments supporting this view will be presented and critically examined. The definition of public goods to be used in this paper is those goods that are characterized by both nonrival consumption and nonexcludability. These are the (...) so-called "pure” public goods. The three arguments that I shall challenge, however, focus on the nonexcludability characteristic. ln addition, I shall assume that large numbers of people are involved and therefore that transactions costs are high. By making such extreme assumptions I wish to disarm the strongest case in support of government financing of public goods and to put to rest this particular "rnarket failure" justification for government economic activity. One argument which criticizes the free market`s ability to provide public goods is a basic one. This argument states that because a public good’s provision costs exceed its benefits for each individual concerned, a voluntary arrangement must be made among those individuals to provide the good collectively. But when large numbers of people ar involved, transactions costs are high. If the good is being provided via voluntary arrangement, there is an incentive for individuals to become free 1iders—to refrain from paying their full share of the costs of providing the public good (or their full share of the future costs of provision) and, instead, to let others pay. Owing to imperfect exclusion from consumption, free riders can enjoy the good’s benefits without contributing anything toward its costs. The second argument states that since individuals will tend to become free riders because of the presence of a free-rider incentive, a less than optimal amount of the good, at best, will be provided in the free market.. (shrink)

There is an argument that government cannot be good for individuals because it causes them to act through fear of punishment, hence for nonmoral reasons. The obvious responses of accepting the conclusion (anarchism) and denying the premiss about moral motivation (utilitarianism) are first considered. Then the strategy of accepting the premiss but denying the conclusion is pursued at greater length. Some arguments of T. H. Green and B. Bosanquet which attempt to do this are considered before an independent resolution is (...) proposed. (shrink)

Formal, informal and material institutions constitute the framework for human interaction and communicative practice. Three ideas from institutional theory are particularly relevant to technical change. Exclusion cost refers to the effort that must be expended to prevent others from usurping or interfering in one’s use or disposal of a given good or resource. Alienability refers to the ability to tangibly extricate a good or resource from one setting, making it available for exchange relations. Rivalry refers to the degree and character (...) of compatibility in various uses for goods. The paper closes with a note on how attention to these factors might be useful ways toconceptualize what Langdon Winner has called “the technological constitution of society,” and what Andrew Feenberg has theorized as “secondary rationalization,” as well as within more practical contexts of technical research, development and design. (shrink)