About this topic
Summary Some possibilities (e.g., the possibility that some objects are furry) are qualitative, because they involve properties but not specific objects. Other possibilities (e.g., the possibility that Napoleon is shorter than Bush) are non-qualitative, because they involve specific objects. According to haecceitism, some maximal possibilities--total ways things could be--differ only with respect to the non-qualitative possibilities they include. In terms of possible worlds, haecceitism is the thesis that some possible worlds differ only with respect to the distribution of non-qualitative properties like haecceities (e.g, Socrateity) and "impure properties" (e.g, being five feet from Socrates). Consider, for example, a world qualitatively indiscernible from actuality where you fail to exist or a world where you swap qualitative roles with Obama. Such worlds differ only haecceitistically from actuality and therefore entail haecceitism.
Key works Haecceitism has consequences for a broad range of issues in the metaphysics of modality and for the nature of properties, propositions, and many other entities. Key contributions to the discussion of haecceitism in modal metaphysics include Adams 1979 and Lewis 1986. Lewis' views on haeceitism and its accommodation within the framework of modal realism have been a topic of considerable interest. See, for example, Skow 2008 and Fara 2009. On haecceitism's role within physical theories, see Melia 1999 and Pooley 2006.
Introductions Lewis 1986 (Section 4.4)
  Show all references
Related categories
Siblings:See also:
45 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Robert Merrihew Adams (1997). Thisness and Time Travel. Philosophia 25 (1-4):407-415.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Robert Merrihew Adams (1981). Actualism and Thisness. Synthese 49 (1):3 - 41.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Robert Merrihew Adams (1979). Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity. Journal of Philosophy 76 (1):5-26.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. David F. Austin (1981). Plantinga on Actualism and Essences. Philosophical Studies 39 (1):35 - 42.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Michelle Beer (2007). On the Individual Essences of Moments of Time. Philo 10 (1):69-71.
    In “Can the New Tenseless Theory of Time be Saved by Individual Essences?” Smith objects to the co-reporting theory on the groundsthat, since it grants that every time “now” is tokened it expresses a unique individual essence of that time which can be apprehended only at that time, the co-reporting theory is consistent with an A-theory of time that holds that each moment of time acquires its own particular property of presentness. I argue that Smith’s conclusion does not follow, since (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Kenneth Boyce (2014). Existentialism Entails Anti-Haecceitism. Philosophical Studies 168 (2):297-326.
    Existentialism concerning singular propositions is the thesis that singular propositions ontologically depend on the individuals they are directly about in such a way that necessarily, those propositions exist only if the individuals they are directly about exist. Haecceitism is the thesis that what non-qualitative facts there are fails to supervene on what purely qualitative facts there are. I argue that existentialism concerning singular propositions entails the denial of haecceitism and that this entailment has interesting implications for debates concerning the philosophy (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Troy Thomas Catterson (2008). Reducing Reductionism: On a Putative Proof for Extreme Haecceitism. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):149 - 159.
    Nathan Salmon, in his paper Trans-World Identification and Stipulation (1996) purports to give a proof for the claim that facts concerning trans-world identity cannot be conceptually reduced to general facts. He calls this claim ‘Extreme Haecceitism.’ I argue that his proof is fallacious. However, I also contend that the analysis and ultimate rejection of his proof clarifies the fundamental issues that are at stake in the debate between the reductionist and haecceitist solutions to the problem of trans-world identity. These issues (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Robert C. Coburn (1986). Individual Essences and Possible Worlds. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1):165-183.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. J. A. Cover & John O'Leary-Hawthorne (1996). Haecceitism and Anti-Haecceitism in Leibniz's Philosophy. Noûs 30 (1):1-30.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Sam Cowling (forthcoming). Non-Qualitative Properties. Erkenntnis.
    The distinction between qualitative properties like mass and shape and non-qualitative properties like being Napoleon and being next to Obama is important, but remains largely unexamined. After discussing its theoretical significance and cataloguing various kinds of non-qualitative properties, I survey several views about the nature of this distinction and argue that all proposed reductive analyses of this distinction are unsatisfactory. I then defend primitivism, according to which the distinction resists reductive analysis.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Sam Cowling (2012). Haecceitism for Modal Realists. Erkenntnis 77 (3):399-417.
    In this paper, I examine the putative incompatibility of three theses: (1) Haecceitism, according to which some maximal possibilities differ solely in terms of the non-qualitative or de re possibilities they include; (2) Modal correspondence, according to which each maximal possibility is identical with a unique possible world; (3) Counterpart theory, according to which de re modality is analyzed in terms of counterpart relations between individuals. After showing how the modal realism defended by David Lewis resolves this incompatibility by rejecting (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Marian David (2009). Defending Existentialism? In M. Reicher (ed.), States of Affairs. Ontos Verlag. 167--209.
    This paper is concerned with a popular view about the nature of propositions, commonly known as the Russellian view of propositions. Alvin Plantinga has dubbed it, or more precisely, a crucial consequence of it, Existentialism, and in his paper “On Existentialism” (1983) he has presented a forceful argument intended as a reductio of this view. In what follows, I describe the main relevant ingredients of the Russellian view of propositions and states of affairs. I present a relatively simple response Russellians (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Sandra Edwards (1985). Aquinas on Individuals and Their Essences. Philosophical Topics 13 (2):155-163.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Delia Graff Fara (2009). Dear Haecceitism. Erkenntnis 70 (3):285 - 297.
    If a counterpart theorist's understanding of the counterpart relation precludes haecceitist differences between possible worlds, as David Lewis's does, how can he admit haecceitist possibilities, as Lewis wants to? Lewis (Philosophical Review 3-32, 1983; On the Plurality of Worlds, 1986) devised what he called a 'cheap substitute for haecceitism,' which would allow for haecceitist possibilities while preserving the counterpart relation as a purely qualitative one. The solution involved lifting an earlier (Journal of Philosophy 65(5): 113-126, 1968; 68(7): 203-211, 1971) ban (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Kit Fine (1994). Essence and Modality. Philosophical Perspectives 8:1-16.
    It is my aim in this paper to show that the contemporary assimilation of essence to modality is fundamentally misguided and that, as a consequence, the corresponding conception of metaphysics should be given up. It is not my view that the modal account fails to capture anything which might reasonably be called a concept of essence. My point, rather, is that the notion of essence which is of central importance to the metaphysics of identity is not to be understood in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Michael Hymers (2008). How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties - by Penelope Mackie. Philosophical Books 49 (1):67-68.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. David Kaplan (1975). How to Russell a Frege-Church. Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):716-729.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Peter King, Duns Scotus on Singular Essences.
    Socrates, for example, has an essence that includes more than his human nature, which is his specific essence; he has an essence proper to himself alone, an essence that cannot be had by anyone else. Although Socrates does have singular (individualized) forms, his singular essence is not a form—there is no form Socrateity for the singular essence parallelling the form humanity for the specific essence. Instead, Socrates has his singular essence in consequence of being an individual, that is, in consequence (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. B. Kment (2012). Haecceitism, Chance, and Counterfactuals. Philosophical Review 121 (4):573-609.
    Antihaecceitists believe that all facts about specific individuals—such as the fact that Fred exists, or that Katie is tall—globally supervene on purely qualitative facts. Haecceitists deny that. The issue is not only of interest in itself, but receives additional importance from its intimate connection to the question of whether all fundamental facts are qualitative or whether they include facts about which specific individuals there are and how qualitative properties and relations are distributed over them. Those who think that all fundamental (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Gary Legenhausen (1989). Moderate Anti-Haecceitism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (4):625-642.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Catherine Legg (2008). Catnesses. In Stephen D. Hales (ed.), What Philosophy Can Tell you About your Cat. Carus.
    An introduction to cat metaphysics..........
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. David Lewis (1983). Individuation by Acquaintance and by Stipulation. Philosophical Review 92 (1):3-32.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Michael Losonsky (1987). Individual Essences. American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (3):253 - 260.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Penelope Mackie (2006). How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. Published in the United States by Oxford University Press.
    Penelope Mackie's book is a novel treatment of an issue central to much current work in metaphysics: the distinction between the essential and accidental properties of individuals. Mackie challenges widely held views, and arrives at what she calls "minimalist essentialism," an unorthodox theory according to which ordinary individuals have relatively few interesting essential properties. Mackie's clear and accessible discussions of issues surrounding necessity and essentialism mean that the book will appeal as much to graduate students as it will to seasoned (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Anna Maidens (1998). Particles and the Perversely Philosophical Schoolchild: Rigid Designation, Haecceitism and Statistics. Teorema 17 (1):75-87.
    In this paper, I want to draw attention to a connection between rigid designation with its consequence that we are able to stipulate worlds and haecceitism, the doctrine that we have possible worlds alike in all qualitative features which nonetheless are metaphysically different, in that two individuals can have all their qualitative features swapped while remaining the same individuals. I shall argue that stipulation leads to haecceitism, which in turn depends upon commitment to haecceity ("primitive thisness"). Haecceitism is, I claim, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Gareth B. Matthews (1976). Moravcsik on Individuals and Their Essences. Journal of Philosophy 73 (17):598-599.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Ari Maunu (2005). Generalist Transworld Identitism (or, Identity Through Possible Worlds Without Nonqualitative Thisnesses). Logique Et Analyse 48 (189-192):151-158.
    A certain argument has been given in the literature to the effect that generalism (the view that all facts about all possible worlds can (in principle) be given in general terms, that is, without resorting to nonqualitative thisnesses) excludes transworld identitism (the view that there are numerical identities through possible worlds). It follows from this argument, among other things, that transworld identitism entails Scotistic haecceitism (acceptance of nonqualitative thisnesses), and that generalists subscribing to de reism (the view that there are (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. J. Melia (1999). Holes, Haecceitism and Two Conceptions of Determinism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (4):639--64.
    In this paper I claim that Earman and Norton's hole argument against substantivalist interpretations of General Relativity assumes that the substantivalist must adopt a conception of determinism which I argue is unsatisfactory. Butterfield and others have responded to the hole argument by finding a conception of determinism open to the substantivalist that is not prone to the hole argument. But, unfortunately for the substantivalist, I argue this conception also turns out to be unsatisfactory. Accordingly, I search for a conception (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. John O'Leary-Hawthorne & J. A. Cover (1996). Haecceitism and Anti-Haecceitism in Leibniz's Philosophy. Noûs 30 (1):1-30.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Woosuk Park (1998). Haecceitas and Individual Essence in Leibniz. In S. Brown (ed.), Meeting of the Minds: The Relationship between Medieval and Modern Philosophy. Brespols.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Alvin Plantinga (1979). De Essentia. Grazer Philosophische Studien 7:101-121.
    In this paper I propose an amendment to Chisholm's definition of individual essence. I then argue that a thing has more than one individual essence and that there is no reason to believe no one grasps anyone else's essence. The remainder of the paper is devoted to a refutation of existentialism, the view that the essence of an object X (along with propositions and states of affairs directly about x) is ontologically dependent upon x in the sense that it could (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Oliver Pooley (2006). Points, Particles and Structural Realism. In Dean Rickles, Steven French & Juha Saatsi (eds.), The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity. Oxford University Press. 83--120.
    In his paper ``What is Structural Realism?'' James Ladyman drew a distinction between epistemological structural realism and metaphysical (or ontic) structural realism. He also drew a suggestive analogy between the perennial debate between substantivalist and relationalist interpretations of spacetime on the one hand, and the debate about whether quantum mechanics treats identical particles as individuals or as `non-individuals' on the other. In both cases, Ladyman's suggestion is that an ontic structural realist interpretation of the physics might be just what is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. M. Reicher (ed.) (2009). States of Affairs. ontos verlag.
    States of affairs raise, among others, the following questions: What kind of entity are they (if there are any)?
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Dean Rickles, Steven French & Juha Saatsi (eds.) (2006). The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity. Oxford University Press.
    This volume closes that gap, with essays written by some of the leading researchers in the field.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Teresa Robertson (2009). Essentialism and Reference to Kinds: Three Issues in Penelope Mackie'show Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. Philosophical Books 50 (3):125-141.
  36. Sonia Roca-Royes (2009). Book Review: How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 118 (2):266-269.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Jeffrey Sanford Russell (2013). Possible Worlds and the Objective World. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Nathan Salmon (1996). Trans-World Identification and Stipulation. Philosophical Studies 84 (2-3):203 - 223.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Bradford Skow (2011). More on Haecceitism and Possible Worlds. Analytic Philosophy 52 (4):267-269.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Bradford Skow (2008). Haecceitism, Anti-Haecceitism and Possible Worlds. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):98-107.
    Possible-worlds talk obscures the debate about haecceitism, rather than clarifying it. I distinguish haecceitism and anti-haeccatismfrom other doctrìnes which sometimes go under those names. Then defend the claim that any definition of 'haecceitism' using possible-worlds talk depends for its conectness on a substantive theory of the nature of possible worlds. This explains why using possible-worlds talk when discussing haecceitism causes confusion: the term will mean different things to parties who depend on different presuppositions about possible worlds.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Richard Swinburne (1995). Thisness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3):389 – 400.
    The principle of the identity of indiscernibles holds that two individuals are the same individual if they have all the same properties. There are different forms of the principle, varying with what is allowed to count as a property. An individual has thisness if the weakest form of the principle does not apply to it. Abstract objects, places and times do not have thisness. Inanimate material objects probably do not. Animate beings, and the conscious events which involve them do have (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Gregg A. Ten Elshof (2000). A Defense of Moderate Haecceitism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 60:55-74.
    The identity of indiscernibles is false. Robert Adams and others have argued that if the identity of indiscernibles is false, then primitive thisness must be admitted as a fundamental feature of the world (i.e. haecceitism is true). Moreover, it has been suggested that if haecceitism is true, then essentialism is false - that accounting for individuation by means of haecceities precludes a thing's having essential qualitative properties. I will argue that this suggestion is misguided. In so doing, I will be (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Alessandro Torza (2011). A Characterization of Haecceitism. Analytic Philosophy 52 (4):262-266.
    Anti-haecceitism is the thesis that things cannot differ from actuality in a purely non-qualitatively fashion. Anti-haecceitism being a modal notion, we would expect it to be explicable in terms of possible worlds. Bradford Skow denied that, arguing that alternative conceptions of possible worlds prompt non-equivalent characterizations of anti-haecceitism. Therefore, the haecceitism debate should take place in the modal language, rather than in the language of possible worlds. The aim of this paper is to provide a metaphysically neutral possible-world characterization of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Márta Ujvári (2013). Individual Essence: Gibt Es Solche? [REVIEW] Metaphysica 14 (1):17-30.
    Two arguments are offered here for postulating individual essences of concrete individuals on top of their sortal essences. One is the explanatory gap argument, the other draws on the analogy with the individual essences of events presupposed in single causal explanations. These arguments support qualitative individual essences with explanatory goals as opposed to hybrid impure relational essences accounting for origin and numerical identity. It is highlighted why origin properties as parts of impure relational essences do not yield genuine de re (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. R. S. Woolhouse (1973). Locke, Geach, and Individuals' Essences. Philosophical Studies 24 (3):204 - 207.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation