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  1. Torin Alter (forthcoming). The Hard Problem of Consciousness. In T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans & P. Wilken (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press
    As I type these words, cognitive systems in my brain engage in visual and auditory information processing. This processing is accompanied by subjective states of consciousness, such as the auditory experience of hearing the tap-tap-tap of the keyboard and the visual experience of seeing the letters appear on the screen. How does the brain's activity generate such experiences? Why should it be accompanied by conscious experience in the first place? This is the hard problem of consciousness.
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  2. Marcus Arvan (1998). Out with Qualia and in with Consciousness: Why the Hard Problem is a Myth. Dissertation, Tufts Honours Thesis
    The subjective features of conscious mental processes--as opposed to their physical causes and effects--cannot be captured by the purified form of thought suitable for dealing with the physical world that underlies appearances.".
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  3. Katalin Balog, Illuminati, Zombies and Metaphysical Gridlock.
    In this paper I survey the landscape of anti-physicalist arguments and physicalist responses to them. The anti-physicalist arguments I discuss start from a premise about a conceptual, epistemic, or explanatory gap between physical and phenomenal descriptions and conclude from this – on a priori grounds – that physicalism is false. My primary aim is to develop a master argument to counter these arguments. With this master argument in place, it is apparent that there is a puzzling symmetry between dualist attacks (...)
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  4. Katalin Balog, Hard, Harder, Hardest.
    In this paper I discuss three problems of consciousness. The first two have been dubbed the “Hard Problem” and the “Harder Problem”. The third problem has received less attention and I will call it the “Hardest Problem”. The Hard Problem is a metaphysical and explanatory problem concerning the nature of conscious states. The Harder Problem is epistemological, and it concerns whether we can know, given physicalism, whether some creature physically different from us is conscious. The Hardest Problem is a problem (...)
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  5. Katalin Balog (2012). Acquaintance and the Mind-Body Problem. In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press 16.
    In this paper I begin to develop an account of the acquaintance that each of us has with our own conscious states and processes. The account is a speculative proposal about human mental architecture and specifically about the nature of the concepts via which we think in first personish ways about our qualia. In a certain sense my account is neutral between physicalist and dualist accounts of consciousness. As will be clear, a dualist could adopt the account I will offer (...)
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  6. Katalin Balog (2007). Comments on Ned Block's Target Article “Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience”. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (4):499-500.
    Block argues that relevant data in psychology and neuroscience shows that access consciousness is not constitutively necessary for phenomenality. However, a phenomenal state can be access conscious in two radically different ways. Its content can be access conscious, or its phenomenality can be access conscious. I’ll argue that while Block’s thesis is right when it is formulated in terms of the first notion of access consciousness, there is an alternative hypothesis about the relationship between phenomenality and access in terms of (...)
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  7. Katalin Balog (2004). Review: Thinking About Consciousness. [REVIEW] Mind 113 (452):774-778.
    Papineau in his book provides a detailed defense of physicalism via what has recently been dubbed the “phenomenal concept strategy”. I share his enthusiasm for this approach. But I disagree with his account of how a physicalist should respond to the conceivability arguments. Also I argue that his appeal to teleosemantics in explaining mental quotation is more like a promissory note than an actual theory.
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  8. Katalin Balog (2001). Commentary on Frank Jackson's From Metaphysics to Ethics. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (3):645–652.
    Symposium contribution on Frank Jackson’s a priori entailment thesis – which he employs to connect metaphysics and conceptual analysis. In the book he develops this thesis within the two-dimensional framework and also proposes a formal argument for it. I argue that the two-dimensional framework doesn’t provide independent support for the a priori entailment thesis since one has to build into the framework assumptions as strong as the thesis itself.
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  9. Kati Balog (2009). Phenomenal Concepts. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. OUP Oxford
    This article is about the special, subjective concepts we apply to experience, called “phenomenal concepts”. They are of special interest in a number of ways. First, they refer to phenomenal experiences, and the qualitative character of those experiences whose metaphysical status is hotly debated. Conscious experience strike many philosophers as philosophically problematic and difficult to accommodate within a physicalistic metaphysics. Second, PCs are widely thought to be special and unique among concepts. The sense that there is something special about PCs (...)
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  10. James Behuniak (2011). The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World – By Owen Flanagan. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38 (2):323-327.
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  11. D. Bilodeau (1996). Physics, Machines, and the Hard Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):386-401.
    The ‘hard problem’ of the origin of phenomenal consciousness in a physical universe is aggravated by a simplistic and uncritical concept of the physical realm which still predominates in much discussion of the subject. David Chalmers is correct in claiming that phenomenal experience is logically independent of a physical description of the world, but his proposal for a ‘natural supervenience’ of experience on a physical substrate is misguided. His statements about machine consciousness and the role of information are especially compromised. (...)
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  12. Ned Block (2002). The Harder Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy 99 (8):391-425.
    consciousness comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as the appearance of Djin when Aladdin rubbed his lamp.
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  13. Nicholas Boltuc & Piotr Boltuc (2007). Replication of the Hard Problem of Consciousness in AI and Bio-AI: An Early Conceptual Framework. In Anthony Chella & Ricardo Manzotti (eds.), Ai and Consciousness: Theoretical Foundations and Current Approaches. Aaai Press, Merlo Park, Ca
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  14. David Brooks (2000). How to Solve the Hard Problem: A Predictable Inexplicability. Psyche 6 (4):5-20.
    Qualitative states are no threat to physicalism. They have a causal effect upon the world in virtue of their qualitative nature. This effect is exploited in biological mechanisms for representing the world. Representation requires differential responsiveness to different perceived properties of things. Qualia are taken to be tagged properties of internal representation models. These properties are properties for-the-organism. Such for-the-organism properties are to be expected in beings which perceive the world and interact with it intelligently. Consciousness presents a problem for (...)
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  15. Joanna J. Bryson (2004). Consciousness is Easy but Learning is Hard. The Philosophers' Magazine 28:70-72.
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  16. Glenn Carruthers & Elizabeth Schier (forthcoming). Why Are We Still Being Hornswoggled? Dissolving the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Topoi.
    In this paper we try to diagnose one reason why the debate regarding the Hard Problem of consciousness inevitably leads to a stalemate: namely that the characterisation of consciousness assumed by the Hard Problem is unjustified and probably unjustifiable. Following Dennett (2012; 1996, 2001; 1991) and Patricia Churchland (1996; 2002), we argue that there is in fact no non-question begging argument for the claim that consciousness is a uniquely Hard Phenomenon. That is; there is no non-question begging argument for the (...)
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  17. David J. Chalmers (2007). The Hard Problem of Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell
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  18. David J. Chalmers (1998). The Problems of Consciousness. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven 29-59.
    This paper is an edited transcription of a talk at the 1997 Montreal symposium on "Consciousness at the Frontiers of Neuroscience". There's not much here that isn't said elsewhere, e.g. in "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness" and "How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?"]].
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  19. David J. Chalmers (1997). Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (1):3-46.
    This paper is a response to the 26 commentaries on my paper "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness". First, I respond to deflationary critiques, including those that argue that there is no "hard" problem of consciousness or that it can be accommodated within a materialist framework. Second, I respond to nonreductive critiques, including those that argue that the problems of consciousness are harder than I have suggested, or that my framework for addressing them is flawed. Third, I address positive (...)
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  20. David J. Chalmers (1995). Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
    To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and giving an account of why it is so difficult to explain. I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that such methods inevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem. Once this failure is recognized, the (...)
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  21. David J. Chalmers (1995). The Puzzle of Conscious Experience. Scientific American 273 (6):80-86.
    Conscious experience is at once the most familiar thing in the world and the most mysterious. There is nothing we know about more directly than consciousness, but it is extraordinarily hard to reconcile it with everything else we know. Why does it exist? What does it do? How could it possibly arise from neural processes in the brain? These questions are among the most intriguing in all of science.
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  22. Patricia S. Churchland (1996). The Hornswoggle Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):402-8.
    Beginning with Thomas Nagel, various philosophers have propsed setting conscious experience apart from all other problems of the mind as ‘the most difficult problem’. When critically examined, the basis for this proposal reveals itself to be unconvincing and counter-productive. Use of our current ignorance as a premise to determine what we can never discover is one common logical flaw. Use of ‘I-cannot-imagine’ arguments is a related flaw. When not much is known about a domain of phenomena, our inability to imagine (...)
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  23. Thomas W. Clark (1995). Function and Phenomenology: Closing the Explanatory Gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):241-54.
    This paper critiques the view that consciousness is likely something extra which accompanies or is produced by neural states, something beyond the functional cognitive processes realized in the brain. Such a view creates the `explanatory gap'between function and nomenology which many suppose cannot be filled by functionalist theories of mind. Given methodological considerations of simplicity, ontological parsimony, and theoretical conservatism, an alternative hypothesis is recommended, that subjective qualitative experience is identical to certain information-bearing, behaviour-controlling functions, not something which emerges from (...)
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  24. Axel Cleeremans (1998). The Other Hard Problem: How to Bridge the Gap Between Subsymbolic and Symbolic Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):22-23.
    The constructivist notion that features are purely functional is incompatible with the classical computational metaphor of mind. I suggest that the discontent expressed by Schyns, Goldstone and Thibaut about fixed-features theories of categorization reflects the growing impact of connectionism, and show how their perspective is similar to recent research on implicit learning, consciousness, and development. A hard problem remains, however: How to bridge the gap between subsymbolic and symbolic cognition.
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  25. Jason Costanzo & Rodrigo González, Hard Problems.
    Within this paper we examine the so-called ‘hard’ problem of consciousness. In general, contemporary materialists claim that either phenomenally conscious states are inexistent or that the question of mind is meaningless. Against this background, we argue that human type experience cannot be elucidated by any science that omits the first-person perspective of consciousness itself. We further provide a model for the phenomenal character of our experience. Following, we criticizing the relationist account while offering an alternative basis for the phenomenon of (...)
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  26. Rodney M. J. Cotterill (2003). Conscious Unity, Emotion, Dreaming, and the Solution of the Hard Problem. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press
  27. Tim Crane (2012). Tye on Acquaintance and the Problem of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):190-198.
  28. Francis Crick & Christof Koch (1995). Why Neuroscience May Be Able to Explain Consciousness. Scientific American 273 (6):84-85.
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  29. Paul F. Cunningham (2013). Explaining Consciousness: A (Very) Different Approach to the “Hard Problem”. Journal of Mind and Behavior 34 (1):41-62.
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  30. Erhan Demircioglu (forthcoming). On an Argument From Analogy for the Possibility of Human Cognitive Closure. Minds and Machines:1-15.
    In this paper, I aim to show that McGinn’s argument from analogy for the possibility of human cognitive closure survives the critique raised on separate occasions by Dennett and Kriegel. I will distinguish between linguistic and non-linguistic cognitive closure and argue that the analogy argument from animal non-linguistic cognitive closure goes untouched by the objection Dennett and Kriegel raises.
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  31. L. Dempsey (2002). Chalmers's Fading and Dancing Qualia: Consciousness and the "Hard Problem". Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (2):65-80.
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  32. Daniel C. Dennett (2003). Explaining the "Magic" of Consciousness. Journal of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology 1 (1):7-19.
    Is the view supported that consciousness is a mysterious phenomenon and cannot succumb, even with much effort, to the standard methods of cognitive science? The lecture, using the analogy of the magician’s praxis, attempts to highlight a strong but little supported intuition that is one of the strongest supporters of this view. The analogy can be highly illuminating, as the following account by LEE SIEGEL on the reception of her work on magic can illustrate it: “I’m writing a book on (...)
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  33. Daniel C. Dennett (1996). Commentary on Chalmers "Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness". Philosophical Explorations.
    The strategy of divide and conquer is usually an excellent one, but it all depends on how you do the carving. Chalmer's attempt to sort the "easy" problems of consciousness from the "really hard" problem is not, I think, a useful contribution to research, but a major misdirector of attention, an illusion-generator. How could this be? Let me describe two somewhat similar strategic proposals, and compare them to Chalmers' recommendation.
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  34. Daniel C. Dennett (1996). Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):4-6.
    The strategy of divide and conquer is usually an excellent one, but it all depends on how you do the carving. Chalmer's attempt to sort the "easy" problems of consciousness from the "really hard" problem is not, I think, a useful contribution to research, but a major misdirector of attention, an illusion-generator. How could this be? Let me describe two somewhat similar strategic proposals, and compare them to Chalmers' recommendation.
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  35. Eric Dietrich (1998). Review of David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 8 (3):441-461.
    When Charles Darwin died in April, 1882, he left behind a world changed forever. Because of his writings, most notably, of course, The Origin of Species, by 1882, evolution was an almost universally acknowledged fact. What remained in dispute, however, was how evolution occurred. So because of Darwin’s work, everyone accepted that new species emerge over time, yet few agreed with him that it was natural selection that powered the change, as Darwin hypothesized. Chalmers’ book, The Conscious Mind , reminds (...)
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  36. Jonathan Eric Dorsey (2015). Four Conceptions of the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (9-10):129-44.
    Though widely discussed, the hard problem of consciousness (‘the hard problem’ hereafter) is surprisingly difficult to pin down. In fact, one may see that not just a couple of plausible conceptions of the problem exist but rather four do. After providing some background for the hard problem, I present and clarify these four conceptions of it. I close by providing some key considerations for and against each of the four conceptions without passing final judgment on any of them. Ultimately, though, (...)
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  37. Blake H. Dournaee (2010). Comments on “The Replication of the Hard Problem of Consciousness in AI and Bio-AI”. Minds and Machines 20 (2):303-309.
    In their joint paper entitled The Replication of the Hard Problem of Consciousness in AI and BIO-AI (Boltuc et al. Replication of the hard problem of conscious in AI and Bio- AI: An early conceptual framework 2008), Nicholas and Piotr Boltuc suggest that machines could be equipped with phenomenal consciousness, which is subjective consciousness that satisfies Chalmer’s hard problem (We will abbreviate the hard problem of consciousness as H-consciousness ). The claim is that if we knew the inner workings of (...)
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  38. Włodzisław Duch (2001). Facing the Hard Question. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):187-188.
    The following questions are considered: Why is it difficult to create a theory of consciousness? What are the contents of consciousness? What kind of theory is acceptable as transparent? and, What is the value of conscious experience?
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  39. John Dupre (2009). Hard and Easy Questions About Consciousness. In P. M. S. Hacker, Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman (eds.), Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy: Essays for P.M.S. Hacker. Oxford University Press
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  40. Brian D. Earp (2012). I Can't Get No (Epistemic) Satisfaction: Why the Hard Problem of Consciousness Entails a Hard Problem of Explanation. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 5 (1):14-20.
    Daniel Dennett (1996) has disputed David Chalmers' (1995) assertion that there is a "hard problem of consciousness" worth solving in the philosophy of mind. In this paper I defend Chalmers against Dennett on this point: I argue that there is a hard problem of consciousness, that it is distinct in kind from the so-called easy problems, and that it is vital for the sake of honest and productive research in the cognitive sciences to be clear about the difference. But I (...)
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  41. Naomi M. Eilan (2000). Primitive Consciousness and the 'Hard Problem'. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):28-39.
    [opening paragraph]: If we think intuitively and non-professionally about the evolution of consciousness, the following is a compelling thought. What the emergence of consciousness made possible, uniquely in the natural world, was the capacity for representing the world, and, hence, for acquiring knowledge about it. This is the kind of thought that surfaces when, for example, we make explicit what lies behind wondering whether a frog, as compared to a dog, say, is conscious. The thought that it might not be (...)
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  42. Luis H. Favela (2009). Biological Theories of Consciousness: The Search for Experience. Dissertation, San Diego State University
    Consciousness has traditionally been the subject matter of philosophy. However, especially in recent years, various branches of science have attempted to develop theories of consciousness. I evaluate the biological theories of Francis Crick, Gerald Edelman, and Antti Revonsuo in order to gauge the current state of biological accounts of consciousness. I begin with an explication of the easy and hard problems of consciousness as defined by David Chalmers. Next, I summarize how each theory defines ‘consciousness’ and then I evaluate each (...)
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  43. William Fish (2008). Relationalism and the Problems of Consciousness. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 28 (3):167-80.
    Recent attempts to show that functional processing entails the presence of phenomenal consciousness have failed to deliver the kind of answers to the “problems of consciousness” that anti-materialists insist the functionalist must provide. I will illustrate this by focusing on the claims that there is a special “Hard Problem” of consciousness and an “explanatory gap” between functional and phenomenal facts. I then argue that if we supplement the functionalist stories with a relationalist conception of phenomenal properties, we can begin to (...)
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  44. Owen Flanagan (2007). The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World. A Bradford Book.
    If consciousness is "the hard problem" in mind science -- explaining how the amazing private world of consciousness emerges from neuronal activity -- then "the really hard problem," writes Owen Flanagan in this provocative book, is explaining how meaning is possible in the material world. How can we make sense of the magic and mystery of life naturalistically, without an appeal to the supernatural? How do we say truthful and enchanting things about being human if we accept the fact that (...)
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  45. Georg Franck (2012). What Kind of Being Is Mental Presence? Toward a Novel Analysis of the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Mind and Matter 10 (1):7-24.
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  46. Mr Shan Gao, Quantum, Consciousness and Panpsychism: A Solution to the Hard Problem.
    We analyze the results and implications of the combination of quantum and consciousness in terms of the recent QSC analysis. The quantum effect of consciousness is first explored. We show that the consciousness of the observer can help to distinguish the nonorthogonal states under some condition, while the usual physical measuring device without consciousness can’t. The result indicates that the causal efficacies of consciousness do exist when considering the basic quantum process. Based on this conclusion, we demonstrate that consciousness is (...)
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  47. Brian Jonathan Garrett (2006). What the History of Vitalism Teaches Us About Consciousness and the "Hard Problem". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):576 - 588.
    Daniel Dennett has claimed that if Chalmers' argument for the irreducibility of consciousness were to succeed, an analogous argument would establish the truth of Vitalism. Chalmers denies that there is such an analogy. I argue that the analogy does have merit and that skepticism is called for.
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  48. Dimitria Electra Gatzia & Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). What Can Neuroscience Tell Us About the Hard Problem of Consciousness? (Doi: 10.3389/Fnins.2016.00395). Frontiers in Neuroscience.
    Rapid advances in the field of neuroimaging techniques including magnetoencephalography (MEG), electroencephalography (EEG), functional MRI (fMRI), diffusion tensor imaging (DTI), voxel based morphomentry (VBM), and optical imaging, have allowed neuroscientists to investigate neural processes in ways that have not been possible until recently. Combining these techniques with advanced analysis procedures during different conditions such as hypnosis, psychiatric and neurological conditions, subliminal stimulation, and psychotropic drugs began transforming the study of neuroscience, ushering a new paradigm that may allow neuroscientists to tackle (...)
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  49. Rocco J. Gennaro (2012). The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts. MIT Press.
    Consciousness is arguably the most important area within contemporary philosophy of mind and perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the world. Despite an explosion of research from philosophers, psychologists, and scientists, attempts to explain consciousness in neurophysiological, or even cognitive, terms are often met with great resistance. In The Consciousness Paradox, Rocco Gennaro aims to solve an underlying paradox, namely, how it is possible to hold a number of seemingly inconsistent views, including higher-order thought (HOT) theory, conceptualism, infant and animal (...)
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  50. Ian Philip Gent & Toby Walsh (1993). Easy Problems Are Sometimes Hard. Department of Artificial Intelligence, University of Edinburgh.
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