Related categories
Siblings:See also:
123 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 123
  1. Torin Alter (forthcoming). The Hard Problem of Consciousness. In T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans & P. Wilken (eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
    As I type these words, cognitive systems in my brain engage in visual and auditory information processing. This processing is accompanied by subjective states of consciousness, such as the auditory experience of hearing the tap-tap-tap of the keyboard and the visual experience of seeing the letters appear on the screen. How does the brain's activity generate such experiences? Why should it be accompanied by conscious experience in the first place? This is the hard problem of consciousness.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Marcus Arvan (1998). Out with Qualia and in with Consciousness: Why the Hard Problem is a Myth. Dissertation, Tufts Honours Thesis
    The subjective features of conscious mental processes--as opposed to their physical causes and effects--cannot be captured by the purified form of thought suitable for dealing with the physical world that underlies appearances.".
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. James Behuniak (2011). The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World – By Owen Flanagan. Journal of Chinese Philosophy 38 (2):323-327.
  4. D. Bilodeau (1996). Physics, Machines, and the Hard Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):386-401.
    The ‘hard problem’ of the origin of phenomenal consciousness in a physical universe is aggravated by a simplistic and uncritical concept of the physical realm which still predominates in much discussion of the subject. David Chalmers is correct in claiming that phenomenal experience is logically independent of a physical description of the world, but his proposal for a ‘natural supervenience’ of experience on a physical substrate is misguided. His statements about machine consciousness and the role of information are especially compromised. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Ned Block (2002). The Harder Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy 99 (8):391-425.
    consciousness comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as the appearance of Djin when Aladdin rubbed his lamp.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Nicholas Boltuc & Piotr Boltuc (2007). Replication of the Hard Problem of Consciousness in AI and Bio-AI: An Early Conceptual Framework. In Anthony Chella & Ricardo Manzotti (eds.), Ai and Consciousness: Theoretical Foundations and Current Approaches. Aaai Press, Merlo Park, Ca.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. David Brooks (2000). How to Solve the Hard Problem: A Predictable Inexplicability. Psyche 6 (4):5-20.
    Qualitative states are no threat to physicalism. They have a causal effect upon the world in virtue of their qualitative nature. This effect is exploited in biological mechanisms for representing the world. Representation requires differential responsiveness to different perceived properties of things. Qualia are taken to be tagged properties of internal representation models. These properties are properties for-the-organism. Such for-the-organism properties are to be expected in beings which perceive the world and interact with it intelligently. Consciousness presents a problem for (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Joanna J. Bryson (2004). Consciousness is Easy but Learning is Hard. The Philosophers' Magazine 28:70-72.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Glenn Carruthers & Elizabeth Schier (forthcoming). Why Are We Still Being Hornswoggled? Dissolving the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Topoi.
    In this paper we try to diagnose one reason why the debate regarding the Hard Problem of consciousness inevitably leads to a stalemate: namely that the characterisation of consciousness assumed by the Hard Problem is unjustified and probably unjustifiable. Following Dennett (2012; 1996, 2001; 1991) and Patricia Churchland (1996; 2002), we argue that there is in fact no non-question begging argument for the claim that consciousness is a uniquely Hard Phenomenon. That is; there is no non-question begging argument for the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. David J. Chalmers (2007). The Hard Problem of Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. David J. Chalmers (1998). The Problems of Consciousness. In H. Jasper, L. Descarries, V. Castellucci & S. Rossignol (eds.), Consciousness: At the Frontiers of Neuroscience. Lippincott-Raven. 29-59.
    This paper is an edited transcription of a talk at the 1997 Montreal symposium on "Consciousness at the Frontiers of Neuroscience". There's not much here that isn't said elsewhere, e.g. in "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness" and "How Can We Construct a Science of Consciousness?"]].
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. David J. Chalmers (1997). Moving Forward on the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (1):3-46.
    This paper is a response to the 26 commentaries on my paper "Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness". First, I respond to deflationary critiques, including those that argue that there is no "hard" problem of consciousness or that it can be accommodated within a materialist framework. Second, I respond to nonreductive critiques, including those that argue that the problems of consciousness are harder than I have suggested, or that my framework for addressing them is flawed. Third, I address positive (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. David J. Chalmers (1996). Can Consciousness Be Reductively Explained? In The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. David J. Chalmers (1995). The Puzzle of Conscious Experience. Scientific American 273 (6):80-86.
    Conscious experience is at once the most familiar thing in the world and the most mysterious. There is nothing we know about more directly than consciousness, but it is extraordinarily hard to reconcile it with everything else we know. Why does it exist? What does it do? How could it possibly arise from neural processes in the brain? These questions are among the most intriguing in all of science.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. David J. Chalmers (1995). Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
    To make progress on the problem of consciousness, we have to confront it directly. In this paper, I first isolate the truly hard part of the problem, separating it from more tractable parts and giving an account of why it is so difficult to explain. I critique some recent work that uses reductive methods to address consciousness, and argue that such methods inevitably fail to come to grips with the hardest part of the problem. Once this failure is recognized, the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (16 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Patricia S. Churchland (1996). The Hornswoggle Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (5-6):402-8.
    Beginning with Thomas Nagel, various philosophers have propsed setting conscious experience apart from all other problems of the mind as ‘the most difficult problem’. When critically examined, the basis for this proposal reveals itself to be unconvincing and counter-productive. Use of our current ignorance as a premise to determine what we can never discover is one common logical flaw. Use of ‘I-cannot-imagine’ arguments is a related flaw. When not much is known about a domain of phenomena, our inability to imagine (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Thomas W. Clark (1995). Function and Phenomenology: Closing the Explanatory Gap. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):241-54.
    This paper critiques the view that consciousness is likely something extra which accompanies or is produced by neural states, something beyond the functional cognitive processes realized in the brain. Such a view creates the `explanatory gap'between function and nomenology which many suppose cannot be filled by functionalist theories of mind. Given methodological considerations of simplicity, ontological parsimony, and theoretical conservatism, an alternative hypothesis is recommended, that subjective qualitative experience is identical to certain information-bearing, behaviour-controlling functions, not something which emerges from (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Axel Cleeremans (1998). The Other Hard Problem: How to Bridge the Gap Between Subsymbolic and Symbolic Cognition. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):22-23.
    The constructivist notion that features are purely functional is incompatible with the classical computational metaphor of mind. I suggest that the discontent expressed by Schyns, Goldstone and Thibaut about fixed-features theories of categorization reflects the growing impact of connectionism, and show how their perspective is similar to recent research on implicit learning, consciousness, and development. A hard problem remains, however: How to bridge the gap between subsymbolic and symbolic cognition.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Rodney M. J. Cotterill (2003). Conscious Unity, Emotion, Dreaming, and the Solution of the Hard Problem. In Axel Cleeremans (ed.), The Unity of Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
  20. Tim Crane (2012). Tye on Acquaintance and the Problem of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):190-198.
  21. Francis Crick & Christof Koch (1995). Why Neuroscience May Be Able to Explain Consciousness. Scientific American 273 (6):84-85.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Paul F. Cunningham (2013). Explaining Consciousness: A (Very) Different Approach to the “Hard Problem”. Journal of Mind and Behavior 34 (1):41-62.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Donald Dav1dson (1999). Lnterpretatlon: Hard Ln Theory, Easy Ln Practlce. In Mario De Caro (ed.), Interpretations and Causes: New Perspectives on Donald Davidson's Philosophy. Kluwer. 31.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. L. Dempsey (2002). Chalmers's Fading and Dancing Qualia: Consciousness and the "Hard Problem". Southwest Philosophy Review 18 (2):65-80.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Daniel C. Dennett (2003). Explaining the "Magic" of Consciousness. Journal of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology 1 (1):7-19.
    Is the view supported that consciousness is a mysterious phenomenon and cannot succumb, even with much effort, to the standard methods of cognitive science? The lecture, using the analogy of the magician’s praxis, attempts to highlight a strong but little supported intuition that is one of the strongest supporters of this view. The analogy can be highly illuminating, as the following account by LEE SIEGEL on the reception of her work on magic can illustrate it: “I’m writing a book on (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Daniel C. Dennett (1996). Commentary on Chalmers "Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness". Philosophical Explorations.
    The strategy of divide and conquer is usually an excellent one, but it all depends on how you do the carving. Chalmer's attempt to sort the "easy" problems of consciousness from the "really hard" problem is not, I think, a useful contribution to research, but a major misdirector of attention, an illusion-generator. How could this be? Let me describe two somewhat similar strategic proposals, and compare them to Chalmers' recommendation.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Daniel C. Dennett (1996). Facing Backwards on the Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):4-6.
    The strategy of divide and conquer is usually an excellent one, but it all depends on how you do the carving. Chalmer's attempt to sort the "easy" problems of consciousness from the "really hard" problem is not, I think, a useful contribution to research, but a major misdirector of attention, an illusion-generator. How could this be? Let me describe two somewhat similar strategic proposals, and compare them to Chalmers' recommendation.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Eric Dietrich (1998). Review of David Chalmers, The Conscious Mind. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 8 (3):441-461.
    When Charles Darwin died in April, 1882, he left behind a world changed forever. Because of his writings, most notably, of course, The Origin of Species, by 1882, evolution was an almost universally acknowledged fact. What remained in dispute, however, was how evolution occurred. So because of Darwin’s work, everyone accepted that new species emerge over time, yet few agreed with him that it was natural selection that powered the change, as Darwin hypothesized. Chalmers’ book, The Conscious Mind , reminds (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Blake H. Dournaee (2010). Comments on “The Replication of the Hard Problem of Consciousness in AI and Bio-AI”. Minds and Machines 20 (2):303-309.
    In their joint paper entitled The Replication of the Hard Problem of Consciousness in AI and BIO-AI (Boltuc et al. Replication of the hard problem of conscious in AI and Bio- AI: An early conceptual framework 2008), Nicholas and Piotr Boltuc suggest that machines could be equipped with phenomenal consciousness, which is subjective consciousness that satisfies Chalmer’s hard problem (We will abbreviate the hard problem of consciousness as H-consciousness ). The claim is that if we knew the inner workings of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Włodzisław Duch (2001). Facing the Hard Question. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):187-188.
    The following questions are considered: Why is it difficult to create a theory of consciousness? What are the contents of consciousness? What kind of theory is acceptable as transparent? and, What is the value of conscious experience?
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. John Dupre (2009). Hard and Easy Questions About Consciousness. In P. M. S. Hacker, Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman (eds.), Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy: Essays for P.M.S. Hacker. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Naomi M. Eilan (2000). Primitive Consciousness and the 'Hard Problem. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):28-39.
    [opening paragraph]: If we think intuitively and non-professionally about the evolution of consciousness, the following is a compelling thought. What the emergence of consciousness made possible, uniquely in the natural world, was the capacity for representing the world, and, hence, for acquiring knowledge about it. This is the kind of thought that surfaces when, for example, we make explicit what lies behind wondering whether a frog, as compared to a dog, say, is conscious. The thought that it might not be (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. William Fish (2008). Relationalism and the Problems of Consciousness. Teorema 28 (3):167-80.
    Recent attempts to show that functional processing entails the presence of phenomenal consciousness have failed to deliver the kind of answers to the “problems of consciousness” that anti-materialists insist the functionalist must provide. I will illustrate this by focusing on the claims that there is a special “Hard Problem” of consciousness and an “explanatory gap” between functional and phenomenal facts. I then argue that if we supplement the functionalist stories with a relationalist conception of phenomenal properties, we can begin to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Owen Flanagan (2007). The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World. A Bradford Book.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Georg Franck (2012). What Kind of Being Is Mental Presence? Toward a Novel Analysis of the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Mind and Matter 10 (1):7-24.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Brian Jonathan Garrett (2006). What the History of Vitalism Teaches Us About Consciousness and the "Hard Problem". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):576 - 588.
    Daniel Dennett has claimed that if Chalmers' argument for the irreducibility of consciousness were to succeed, an analogous argument would establish the truth of Vitalism. Chalmers denies that there is such an analogy. I argue that the analogy does have merit and that skepticism is called for.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Rocco J. Gennaro (2011). The Consciousness Paradox: Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts. Mit Pr.
    In The Consciousness Paradox, Rocco Gennaro aims to solve an underlying paradox, namely, how it is possible to hold a number of seemingly inconsistent views, including higher-order thought (HOT) theory, conceptualism, infant and animal ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Philip Goff (2012). Does Mary Know I Experience Plus Rather Than Quus? A New Hard Problem. Philosophical Studies 160 (2):223-235.
    Realism about cognitive or semantic phenomenology, the view that certain conscious states are intrinsically such as to ground thought or understanding, is increasingly being taken seriously in analytic philosophy. The principle aim of this paper is to argue that it is extremely difficult to be a physicalist about cognitive phenomenology. The general trend in later 20th century/early 21st century philosophy of mind has been to account for the content of thought in terms of facts outside the head of the thinker (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Jeffrey A. Gray (2005). Synesthesia: A Window on the Hard Problem of Consciousness. In Lynn C. Robertson & Noam Sagiv (eds.), Synesthesia: Perspectives From Cognitive Neuroscience. Oxford University Press. 127-146.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Jeffrey A. Gray (2004). Consciousness: Creeping Up on the Hard Problem. Oxford University Press.
    This important new book analyses these core issues and reviews the evidence from both introspection and experiment.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Jeffrey A. Gray (1998). Creeping Up on the Hard Question of Consciousness. In Stuart R. Hameroff, Alfred W. Kaszniak & A. C. Scott (eds.), Toward a Science of Consciousness Ii. Mit Press.
  42. Stevan Harnad (2001). Explaining the Mind: Problems, Problems. Philosophical Explorations 41:36-42.
    The mind/body problem is the feeling/function problem: How and why do feeling systems feel? The problem is not just "hard" but insoluble . Fortunately, the "easy" problems of cognitive science are not insoluble. Five books are reviewed in this context.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Stevan Harnad (2001). No Easy Way Out. Philosophical Explorations.
    The mind/body problem is the feeling/function problem: How and why do feeling systems feel? The problem is not just "hard" but insoluble (unless one is ready to resort to telekinetic dualism). Fortunately, the "easy" problems of cognitive science (such as the how and why of categorization and language) are not insoluble. Five books (by Damasio, Edelman/Tononi, McGinn, Tomasello and Fodor) are reviewed in this context.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Stevan Harnad (2000). Correlation Vs. Causality: How/Why the Mind-Body Problem is Hard. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (4):54-61.
    The Mind/Body Problem is about causation not correlation. And its solution will require a mechanism in which the mental component somehow manages to play a causal role of its own, rather than just supervening superflously on other, nonmental components that look, for all the world, as if they can do the full causal job perfectly well without it. Correlations confirm that M does indeed "supervene" on B, but causality is needed to show how/why M is not supererogatory; and that's the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Stevan Harnad (1998). The Hardships of Cognitive Science. Philosophical Explorations.
    Comments on David Chalmers's "hard problem" and some unsuccessful attempts to solve it.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Greg P. Hodes (2005). What Would It "Be Like" to Solve the Hard Problem?: Cognition, Consciousness, and Qualia Zombies. Neuroquantology 3 (1):43-58.
    David Chalmers argues that consciousness -- authentic, first-person, conscious consciousness -- cannot be reduced to brain events or to any physical event, and that efforts to find a workable mind-body identity theory are, therefore, doomed in principle. But for Chalmers and non-reductionist in general consciousness consists exclusively, or at least paradigmatically, of phenomenal or qualia-consciousness. This results in a seriously inadequate understanding both of consciousness and of the “hard problem.” I describe other, higher-order cognitional events which must be conscious if (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. David Hodgson (1996). The Easy Problems Ain't so Easy. Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):69-75.
    David Chalmers distinguishes the hard problem of consciousness -- why should a physical system give rise to conscious experiences at all -- with what he calls the easy problems, the explanation of how cognitive systems, including human brains, perform various cognitive functions. He argues that the easy problems are easy because the performance of any function can be explained by specifying a mechanism that performs the function. This article argues that conscious experiences have a role in the performance by human (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Jakob Hohwy (2004). Evidence, Explanation, and Experience: On the Harder Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Philosophy 101 (5):242-254.
    Creatures that have different physical realizations than human beings may or may not be conscious. Ned Block’s ‘harder problem of consciousness’ is that naturalistic phenomenal realists have no conception of a rational ground for belief that they have or have not discovered consciousness in such a creature. Drawing on the notion of inference to the best explanation, it appears the arguments to these conclusions beg the question and ignore that explanation may be a guide to discovery. Thus, best explanation can (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Terry Horgan (2009). Materialism, Minimal Emergentism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness. In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
  50. Steven Horst (1999). Evolutionary Explanation and the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (1):39-48.
    Chalmers and others have argued that physicalist microexplanation is incapable of solving the ‘hard problem’ of consciousness. This article examines whether evolutionary accounts of the mind, such as those developed by Millikan, Dretske and Flanagan, can add anything to make up for the possible short falls of more reductionist accounts. I argue that they cannot, because evolutionary accounts explain by appeal to a selectional history that only comes into the picture if consciousness can first arise due to spontaneous mutation in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 123