This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
67 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 67
  1. David Archard (2014). Insults, Free Speech and Offensiveness. Journal of Applied Philosophy 31 (2):127-141.
    This article examines what is wrong with some expressive acts, ‘insults’. Their putative wrongfulness is distinguished from the causing of indirect harms, aggregated harms, contextual harms, and damaging misrepresentations. The article clarifies what insults are, making use of work by Neu and Austin, and argues that their wrongfulness cannot lie in the hurt that is caused to those at whom such acts are directed. Rather it must lie in what they seek to do, namely to denigrate the other. The causing (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. C. Belshaw (2012). Harm, Change, and Time. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (5):425-444.
    What is harm? I offer an account that involves the victim’s either suffering some adverse intrinsic change or being prevented from enjoying some beneficial intrinsic change. No one is harmed, I claim, in virtue of relational changes alone. Thus (excepting for contrived cases), there are neither posthumous harms nor, in life, harms of the undiscovered betrayal, slander, reputation-damaging variety. Further, two widespread moves in the philosophy of death are rejected. First, death and posthumous are not to be assimilated—death does bring (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. D. G. Brown (1972). Drugs and the Problem of Law Abuse. University of British Columbia Law Review 7 (1):1-16.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Jan Christoph Bublitz & Reinhard Merkel (2014). Crimes Against Minds: On Mental Manipulations, Harms and a Human Right to Mental Self-Determination. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (1):51-77.
    The neurosciences not only challenge assumptions about the mind’s place in the natural world but also urge us to reconsider its role in the normative world. Based on mind-brain dualism, the law affords only one-sided protection: it systematically protects bodies and brains, but only fragmentarily minds and mental states. The fundamental question, in what ways people may legitimately change mental states of others, is largely unexplored in legal thinking. With novel technologies to both intervene into minds and detect mental activity, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. Silverstein (eds.) (forthcoming). Action, Ethics and Responsibility: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 7. MIT Press.
    Overview -/- Most philosophical explorations of responsibility discuss the topic solely in terms of metaphysics and the "free will" problem. By contrast, these essays by leading philosophers view responsibility from a variety of perspectives—metaphysics, ethics, action theory, and the philosophy of law. After a broad, framing introduction by the volume's editors, the contributors consider such subjects as responsibility as it relates to the "free will" problem; the relation between responsibility and knowledge or ignorance; the relation between causal and moral responsibility; (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Stephen M. Campbell (2013). An Analysis of Prudential Value. Utilitas 25 (03):334-54.
    This essay introduces and defends a new analysis of prudential value. According to this analysis, what it is for something to be good for you is for that thing to contribute to the appeal or desirability of being in your position. I argue that this proposal fits well with our ways of talking about prudential value and well-being; enables promising analyses of the related concepts of luck, selfishness, self-sacrifice, and paternalism; preserves the relationship between prudential value and the attitudes of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Marc Champagne (2011). What About Suicide Bombers? A Terse Response to a Terse Objection. Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 11 (2):233–236.
    Stressing that the pronoun "I" picks out one and only one person in the world (i.e., me), I argue against Hunt (and other like-minded Rand commentators) that the supposed "hard case" of destructive people who do not care for their own lives poses no special difficulty for rational egoism. I conclude that the proper response to a terse objection like "What about suicide bombers?" is the equally terse assertion "But I don't want to get blown up.".
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Ezio Di Nucci (forthcoming). Eight Arguments Against Double Effect. In Proceedings of the XXIII. Kongress der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Philosophie.
    I offer eight arguments against the Doctrine of Double Effect, a normative principle according to which in pursuing the good it is sometimes morally permissible to bring about some evil as a side-effect or merely foreseen consequence: the same evil would not be morally justified as an intended means or end.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Ulrich Diehl (2003). Über die Würde der Kinder als Patienten. In C. Wiesemann, A. Dörries, G. Wolfslast & A. Simon (eds.), Das Kind als Patient. Campus.
    In der Medizin gehören Kinder neben Ausländern, Behinderten und psychiatrisch Erkrankten zu den besonders vulnerablen Patientengruppen. Im Folgenden soll die Frage nach der Würde der Kinder in medizinethischer Hinsicht behandelt werden. Dazu werden drei Thesen erläutert und begründet: (1.) das Prinzip der Menschenwürde kann nicht ganz außer Acht gelassen werden, wenn Kinder als Patienten in medizinethischer Hinsicht thematisiert werden; (2.) das Prinzip der Menschenwürde wird in der Medizinethik nicht schon vollständig durch die medizinethischen Prinzipien der Patientenautonomie und der Fürsorge für (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Donald A. Dripps (1998). The Liberal Critique of the Harm Principle. Criminal Justice Ethics 17 (2):3-18.
  11. Silvia Edling (2012). The Paradox of Meaning Well While Causing Harm: A Discussion About the Limits of Tolerance Within Democratic Societies. Journal of Moral Education 41 (4):457-471.
    Curriculum guidelines in many democratic countries argue for the need to practice tolerance as a means to creating peaceful relations. Through moral education, young people are believed to be able to develop a way of being that respects plurality and decreases interpersonal violence in society. But where do students? personal involvements or the issue of unpredictability accompanying inter-personal relations fit into the discussion? This article draws on four young people?s narratives as starting points to discuss the gap between progressive educational (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Joel Feinberg (1986). Harm to Others—a Rejoinder. Criminal Justice Ethics 5 (1):16-29.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. William Ferraiolo (2011). Stoic “Harm” as Degradation. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (1):119-120.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. John Martin Fischer (ed.) (1993). The Metaphysics of Death. Stanford University Press.
    This collection of seventeen essays deals with the metaphysical, as opposed to the moral, issues pertaining to death. For example, the authors investigate (among other things) the issue of what makes death a bad thing for an individual, if indeed death is a bad thing. This issue is more basic and abstract than such moral questions as the particular conditions under which euthanasia is justified, if it is ever justified. Though there are important connections between the more abstract questions addressed (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza (1994). Ducking Harm and Sacrificing Others. Journal of Social Philosophy 25 (3):135-145.
  16. Helen Frowe (forthcoming). Defensive Killing: An Essay on War and Self-Defence. OUP.
  17. Helen Frowe (forthcoming). Killing John to Save Mary: A Defence of the Distinction Between Killing and Letting Die. In J. Campbell, M. O’Rourke & H. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics and Responsibility. MIT Press.
    Introduction This paper defends the moral significance of the distinction between killing and letting die. In the first part of the paper, I consider and reject Michael Tooley’s argument that initiating a causal process is morally equivalent to refraining from interfering in that process. The second part disputes Tooley’s suggestion it is merely external factors that make killing appear to be worse than letting die, when in reality the distinction is morally neutral. Tooley is mistaken to claim that we are (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Helen Frowe (2010). A Practical Account of Self-Defence. Law and Philosophy 29 (3):245-272.
    I argue that any successful account of permissible self- defence must be action-guiding, or practical . It must be able to inform people’s deliberation about what they are permitted to do when faced with an apparent threat to their lives. I argue that this forces us to accept that a person can be permitted to use self-defence against Apparent Threats: characters whom a person reasonably, but mistakenly, believes threaten her life. I defend a hybrid account of self-defence that prioritises an (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Helen Frowe (2009). The Justified Infliction of Unjust Harm. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (3):345 - 351.
  20. Helen Frowe (2008). Equating Innocent Threats and Bystanders. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (4):277-290.
    abstract Michael Otsuka claims that it is impermissible to kill innocent threats because doing so is morally equivalent to killing bystanders. I show that Otsuka's argument conflates killing as a means with treating a person herself as a means. The killing of a person can be a means only if that person is instrumental in the threat to Victim's life. A permission to kill a person as a means will not permit killing bystanders. I also defend a permission to kill (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Helen Frowe (2008). Threats, Bystanders and Obstructors. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):365-372.
    In this paper I argue that the widespread view that obstructors are a special sort of bystander is mistaken. Obstructors make Victim worse off by their presence, and thus are more properly described as innocent threats. Only those characters who do not make Victim worse off by their presence can be classified as bystanders.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Helen Frowe & Gerald Lang (eds.) (2014). How We Fight: Ethics in War. OUP.
    How We Fight: Ethics in War contains ten groundbreaking essays by some of the leading philosophers of war. The essays offer new perspectives on key debates including pacifism, punitive justifications for war, the distribution of risk between combatants and non-combatants, the structure of 'just war theory', and bases of individual liability in war.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Walter Glannon (2001). Persons, Lives, and Posthumous Harms. Journal of Social Philosophy 32 (2):127–142.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Mark Greene (2008). The Indeterminacy of Loss. Ethics 118 (4):633-658.
    Abstract: This paper argues that continua of both genetic and environmental manipulation give rise to cases in which it is indeterminate whether the non-identity problem arises. In clear non-identity cases, impersonal principles can underwrite intuitions of wrongdoing. In clear cases of ordinary personal harm, ordinary ethical thinking about personal compensation augments or supersedes impersonal considerations. Indeterminate cases raise a special problem because it is indeterminate whether personal ethical considerations apply. Might indeterminacy of identity preclude a determinate and ethically justified resolution (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. L. R. Haller (2005). Smoke and Mirrors: When Professional Discipline May Cause Harm. Legal Ethics 8 (1):70-86.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Matthew Hanser (2011). Still More on the Metaphysics of Harm. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):459-469.
  27. Matthew Hanser (2008). The Metaphysics of Harm. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):421-450.
  28. Matthew Hanser (2005). Where's the Harm in Dying? Philosophical Books 46 (1):4-10.
  29. Pilhong Hwang (2003). Liberal Pornographic Rights. International Journal of Applied Philosophy 17 (2):225-240.
    The conservative antipornographic premise (“defined and connected”) should be faulted for its groundlessness. Thus, conservative state censorship should be challenged by liberal individual rights to pornography and further by the value of moral harm. Along with the spirit of J. S. Mill’s harm principle, the right to free speech, including of course pornographic right, must prevail. And a number of feminist challenges to free pornographic rights are replied to in a variety of ways by some liberal thinkers who believe in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Guy Kahane & Julian Savulescu (2012). The Concept of Harm and the Significance of Normality. Journal of Applied Philosophy 29 (3):318.
    Many believe that severe intellectual impairment, blindness or dying young amount to serious harm and disadvantage. It is also increasingly denied that it matters, from a moral point of view, whether something is biologically normal to humans. We show that these two claims are in serious tension. It is hard explain how, if we do not ascribe some deep moral significance to human nature or biological normality, we could distinguish severe intellectual impairment or blindness from the vast list of seemingly (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Nancy E. Kass, Holly A. Taylor & Patricia A. King (1996). Harms of Excluding Pregnant Women From Clinical Research: The Case of HIV-Infected Pregnant Women. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 24 (1):36-46.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. John Kleinig (1986). Criminally Harming Others. Criminal Justice Ethics 5 (1):3-10.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Gerald P. Koocher (2002). Using the Cables Model to Assess and Minimize Risk in Research: Control Group Hazards. Ethics and Behavior 12 (1):75 – 86.
    CABLES is both an acronym and metaphor for conceptualizing research participation risk by considering 6 distinct domains in which risks of harm to research participants may exist: cognitive, affective, biological, legal, economic, and social/cultural. These domains are described and illustrated, along with suggestions for minimizing or eliminating the potential hazards to human participants in biomedical and behavioral science research. Adoption of a thoughtful ethical analysis addressing all 6 CABLES strands in designing research provides a strong protective step toward safeguarding and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Shiriki Kumanyika (1995). Truth and Confidentiality Without Harm. Ethics and Behavior 5 (2):199 – 202.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Antony Lamb (2008). Self-Determination, Wellbeing, and Threats of Harm. Journal of Applied Philosophy 25 (2):145–158.
    David Rodin argues that the right of national-defence as conceived in international law cannot be grounded in the end of defending the lives of individuals. Firstly, having this end is not necessary because there is a right of defence against an invasion that threatens no lives. However, in this context we are to understand that 'defending lives' includes defending against certain non-lethal threats. I will argue that threats to national-self determination and self-government are significant non-lethal threats to the wellbeing of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Seth Lazar (forthcoming). The Principle of Distinction Between Combatants and Noncombatants in War: A Defence (MS). Oxford University Press.
    The Principle of Distinction between combatants and noncombatants in war is, if not unique, then among a vanishingly small set of moral principles on which almost everybody agrees. And yet, despite this robust historical and cross-cultural support, Distinction is fundamentally fragile. It hinders the advancement of belligerents' interests when the stakes are as high as they can possibly be. Respecting Distinction, directing force at combatants rather than noncombatants, makes military defeat more likely. In protracted asymmetric conflicts, and arduous wars of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. David Lefkowitz (2008). On the Concept of a Morally Relevant Harm. Utilitas 20 (4):409-423.
    The author argues that only when the two harms are morally relevant to one another may an agent take into account the number of people he can save. He defends an orbital conception of morally relevant harm, according to which harms that fall within the of a given harm are relevant to it, while all other harms are not. The possibility of preventing a harm provides both a first-order reason to prevent that harm, and a second-order reason not to consider (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Sanford Leikin (1995). First, Do No Harm. Ethics and Behavior 5 (2):196 – 199.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Barbara Baum Levenbook (1982). Bibliographical Essay / Criminal Harm. Criminal Justice Ethics 1 (1):48-53.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (forthcoming). 'To Serve and Protect': The Ends of Harm by Victor Tadros. [REVIEW] Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-23.
    In The Ends of Harm Victor Tadros develops an alternative to consequentialist, and non-consequentialist retributivist, accounts of the justifiability of punishment: the duty view. Crucial to this view is the claim that wrongdoers incur an enforceable duty to remedy their wrongs. They cannot undo them, but they can do something that is almost as good—namely, by submitting to appropriate punishment, which will deter potential wrongdoers in the future, reduce their victim’s risk of suffering similar wrongs again. Admittedly, this involves harming (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Robert Mayer (2007). What's Wrong with Exploitation? Journal of Applied Philosophy 24 (2):137–150.
    This paper offers a new answer to an old question. Others have argued that exploitation is wrong because it is coercive, or degrading, or fails to protect the vulnerable. But these answers only work for certain cases; counterexamples are easily found. In this paper I identify a different answer to the question by placing exploitation within the larger family of wrongs to which it belongs. Exploitation is one species of wrongful gain, and exploiters always gain at the expense of others (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Thaddeus Metz (2012). Contemporary Anti-Natalism, Featuring Benatar's Better Never to Have Been. South African Journal of Philosophy 31 (1):1-9.
    A critical overview of the latest discussion of anti-natalism, with particular reference to David Benatar's work and three additional rationales for anti-natalism that differ from Benatar's.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Dan Moller (2006). Killing and Dying. American Philosophical Quarterly 43 (3):235 - 247.
    Everyone agrees that killing a fully developed person is normally wrong. And there is similar agreement that death is bad for the one who dies, though philosophers have been puzzled about how to explain this.2 But how is the wrongness of killing related to the badness of dying? The trivial answer is that killing is wrong precisely because it inflicts the badness of death upon the victim. Or, to put it another way, killing is wrong because it harms the victim (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Alastair Norcross (1997). Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives. Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (2):135–167.
  45. Paul Omoyefa (ed.) (2010). Basic Applied Ethics. VDM.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Isaac Prilleltensky, Amy Rossiter & Richard Walsh-Bowers (1996). Toward a Participatory Framework for Applied Ethics: Preventing Harm and Promoting Ethical Discourse in the Helping Professions: Conceptual, Research, Analytical, and Action Frameworks. Ethics and Behavior 6 (4):287 – 306.
    The first in a series of 4 articles, this article provides an overview of the concepts and methods developed by a team of researchers concerned with preventing harm and promoting ethical discourse in the helping professions. In this article we introduce conceptual, research, analytical, and action frameworks employed to promote the centrality of ethical discourse in mental health practice. We employ recursive processes whereby knowledge gained from case studies refines our emerging conceptual model of applied ethics. Our participatory conceptual framework (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Massimo Renzo (2010). A Criticism of the International Harm Principle. Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (3):267-282.
    According to the received view crimes like torture, rape, enslavement or enforced prostitution are domestic crimes if they are committed as isolated or sporadic events, but become crimes against humanity when they are committed as part of a ‘widespread or systematic attack’ against a civilian population. Only in the latter case can these crimes be prosecuted by the international community. One of the most influential accounts of this idea is Larry May’s International Harm Principle, which states that crimes against humanity (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. M. A. Roberts (2006). Supernumerary Pregnancy, Collective Harm, and Two Forms of the Nonidentity Problem. Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 34 (4):776-792.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Luke Russell (2007). Is Evil Action Qualitatively Distinct From Ordinary Wrongdoing? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (4):659 – 677.
    Adam Morton, Stephen de Wijze, Hillel Steiner, and Eve Garrard have defended the view that evil action is qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing. By this, they do not that mean that evil actions feel different to ordinary wrongs, but that they have motives or effects that are not possessed to any degree by ordinary wrongs. Despite their professed intentions, Morton and de Wijze both offer accounts of evil action that fail to identify a clear qualitative difference between evil and ordinary (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Anne Schwenkenbecher (2012). Is There an Obligation to Reduce One’s Individual Carbon Footprint? Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy (2):1-21.
    Moral duties concerning climate change mitigation are – for good reasons – conventionally construed as duties of institutional agents, usually states. Yet, in both scholarly debate and political discourse, it has occasionally been argued that the moral duties lie not only with states and institutional agents, but also with individual citizens. This argument has been made with regard to mitigation efforts, especially those reducing greenhouse gases. This paper focuses on the question of whether individuals in industrialized countries have duties to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 67