Related categories
Siblings:
183 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 183
  1. Erik Angner (2012). Fred Feldman, What is This Thing Called Happiness? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), Pp. Xv + 286. Utilitas 23 (04):458-461.
  2. Felix Arnold (1906). The So-Called Hedonist Paradox. International Journal of Ethics 16 (2):228-234.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Harriet Baber (2008). The Experience Machine Deconstructed. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 15 (1):133-138.
    Nozick’s Experience Machine thought experiment is generally taken to make a compelling, if not conclusive, case against philosophical hedonism. I argue that it does not and, indeed, that regardless of the results, it cannot provide any reason to accept or reject either hedonism or any other philosophical account of wellbeing since it presupposes preferentism, the desire-satisfaction account of wellbeing. Preferentists cannot take any comfort from the results of such thought experiments because they assume preferentism and therefore cannot establish it. Neither (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Emily Barranco (2011). Arthur Dobrin, The Lost Art of Happiness. Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (4):483-485.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Sandy Berkovski (2012). The Possibility of Modified Hedonism. Theoria 78 (3):186-212.
    A popular objection to hedonist accounts of personal welfare has been the experience machine argument. Several modifications of traditional hedonism have been proposed in response. In this article I examine two such responses, recently expounded by Feldman and Sumner respectively. I argue that both modifications make hedonism indistinguishable from anti-hedonism. Sumner's account, I claim, also fails to satisfy the demands of theoretical unity.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Mark Bernstein (2001). L. W. Sumner, Welfare, Happiness and Ethics:Welfare, Happiness and Ethics. Ethics 111 (2):441-443.
  7. Thomas Blackson (2009). On Feldman's Theory of Happiness. Utilitas 21 (3):393-400.
    Fred Feldman conceives of happiness in terms of the aggregation of attitudinal pleasure and displeasure, but he distinguishes intrinsic from extrinsic attitudinal pleasure and displeasure and excludes extrinsic attitudinal pleasure and displeasure from the aggregation that constitutes happiness. I argue that Feldman has not provided a strong reason for this exclusion.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Ralph M. Blake (1928). The Reinterment of Hedonism. International Journal of Ethics 39 (1):93-101.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Ralph Mason Blake (1926). Why Not Hedonism? A Protest. International Journal of Ethics 37 (1):1-18.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Greg Bognar (2010). Authentic Happiness. Utilitas 22 (3):272-284.
    This article discusses L. W. Sumner's theory of well-being as authentic happiness. I distinguish between extreme and moderate versions of subjectivism and argue that Sumner's characterization of the conditions of authenticity leads him to an extreme subjective theory. More generally, I also criticize Sumner's argument for the subjectivity of welfare. I conclude by addressing some of the implications of my arguments for theories of well-being in philosophy and welfare measurement in the social sciences.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Bernard Bosanquet (1903). Hedonism Among Idealists (I.). Mind 12 (46):202-224.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Bernard Bosanquet (1903). Hedonism Among Idealists (II.). Mind 12 (47):303-316.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Gwen Bradford (2012). Fred Feldman, What is This Thing Called Happiness? Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (2):269-273.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Ben Bradley (2010). Fred Feldman, Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties, and Plausibility of Hedonism (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 2004), Pp. XI + 221. Utilitas 22 (2):232-234.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Ben Bradley (2009). Well-Being and Death. Oxford University Press.
  16. F. H. Bradley (1895). "Rational Hedonism."-Note by Mr. Bradley. International Journal of Ethics 5 (3):383-384.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Ben Bramble (2013). The Distinctive Feeling Theory of Pleasure. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.
    In this article, I attempt to resuscitate the perennially unfashionable distinctive feeling theory of pleasure (and pain), according to which for an experience to be pleasant (or unpleasant) is just for it to involve or contain a distinctive kind of feeling. I do this in two ways. First, by offering powerful new arguments against its two chief rivals: attitude theories, on the one hand, and the phenomenological theories of Roger Crisp, Shelly Kagan, and Aaron Smuts, on the other. Second, by (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. David Brax (2009). Hedonism as the Explanation of Value. Dissertation, Lund University
    This thesis defends a hedonistic theory of value consisting of two main components. Part 1 offers a theory of pleasure. Pleasures are experiences distinguished by a distinct phenomenological quality. This quality is attitudinal in nature: it is the feeling of liking. The pleasure experience is also an object of this attitude: when feeling pleasure, we like what we feel, and part of how it feels is how this liking feels: Pleasures are Internally Liked Experiences. Pleasure plays a central role in (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. J. H. Burns (2005). Happiness and Utility: Jeremy Bentham's Equation. Utilitas 17 (1):46-61.
    Doubts about the origin of Bentham's formula, ‘the greatest happiness of the greatest number’, were resolved by Robert Shackleton thirty years ago. Uncertainty has persisted on at least two points. (1) Why did the phrase largely disappear from Bentham's writing for three or four decades after its appearance in 1776? (2) Is it correct to argue (with David Lyons in 1973) that Bentham's principle is to be differentially interpreted as having sometimes a ‘parochial’ and sometimes a ‘universalist’ bearing? These issues (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Gabriela Roxana Carone (2003). The Place of Hedonism in Plato's Laws. Ancient Philosophy 23 (2):283-300.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Gabriela Roxana Carone (2000). Hedonism and the Pleasureless Life in Plato's Philebus. Phronesis 45 (4):257-283.
    This paper re-evaluates the role that Plato confers to pleasure in the Philebus. I argue that the mixed life of pleasure and intelligence is presented in the Philebus as a first best and not just as a second best for humans, and that, accordingly, Socrates proposes to incorporate-rather than reject-pleasure as one of the intrinsically desirable aspects of the happy life. (edited).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Gabriela Roxana Carone (2000). Hedonism and the Pleasureless Life in Plato's Philebus. Phronesis 45 (4):257-283.
    This paper re-evaluates the role that Plato confers to pleasure in the "Philebus." According to leading interpretations, Plato there downplays the role of pleasure, or indeed rejects hedonism altogether. Thus, scholars such as D. Frede have taken the "mixed life" of pleasure and intelligence initially submitted in the "Philebus" to be conceded by Socrates only as a remedial good, second to a life of neutral condition, where one would experience no pleasure and pain. Even more strongly, scholars such as Irwin (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Paul Carus (1908). Mr. Spencer's Hedonism and Kant's Ethics of Duty. The Monist 18 (2):306-315.
  24. Roy C. Cave (1928). A Scientific Ethics and Hedonism. International Journal of Ethics 38 (4):443-449.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Hugh S. Chandler (1975). Hedonism. American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (3):223-233.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Shaoming Chen (2010). On Pleasure: A Reflection on Happiness From the Confucian and Daoist Perspectives. [REVIEW] Frontiers of Philosophy in China 5 (2):179-195.
    This paper discusses the structural relationship between ideals on pleasure and pleasure as a human psychological phenomenon in Chinese thought. It describes the psychological phenomenon of pleasure, and compares different approaches by pre-Qin Confucian and Daoist scholars. It also analyzes its development in Song and Ming Confucianism. Finally, in the conclusion, the issue is transferred to a general understanding of happiness, so as to demonstrate the modern value of the classical ideological experience.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. K. J. Clark (2010). Well-Being and Death * by Ben Bradley. Analysis 70 (3):592-593.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Samuel Clark (2012). Pleasure as Self-Discovery. Ratio 25 (3):260-276.
    This paper uses readings of two classic autobiographies, Edmund Gosse's Father & Son and John Stuart Mill's Autobiography, to develop a distinctive answer to an old and central question in value theory: What role is played by pleasure in the most successful human life? A first section defends my method. The main body of the paper then defines and rejects voluntarist, stoic, and developmental hedonist lessons to be taken from central crises in my two subjects' autobiographies, and argues for a (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Samuel Clark (2011). Love, Poetry, and the Good Life: Mill's Autobiography and Perfectionist Ethics. Inquiry 53 (6):565-578.
    I argue for a perfectionist reading of Mill’s account of the good life, by using the failures of development recorded in his Autobiography as a way to understand his official account of happiness in Utilitarianism. This work offers both a new perspective on Mill’s thought, and a distinctive account of the role of aesthetic and emotional capacities in the most choiceworthy human life. I consider the philosophical purposes of autobiography, Mill’s disagreements with Bentham, and the nature of competent judges and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Brenda Cohen (1962). Some Ambiguities in the Term `Hedonism'. Philosophical Quarterly 12 (48):239-247.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Elliot David Cohen (1980). J. S. Mill's Qualitative Hedonism: A Textual Analysis. Southern Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):151-158.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. R. G. Collingwood (1928). Hedonism and Art. By L. R. Farnell D.Litt., F.B.A. , (Proceedings of the British Academy. Oxford University Press: Humphrey Milford. 1928. Pp. 19, N.D. 1s. Net.). [REVIEW] Philosophy 3 (12):547-.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Roger Crisp (2011). Pleasure and Hedonism in Sidgwick. In Thomas Hurka (ed.), Underivative Duty: British Moral Philosophers From Sidgwick to Ewing. Oup Oxford.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Roger Crisp (2006). Hedonism Reconsidered. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):619–645.
    This paper is a plea for hedonism to be taken more seriously. It begins by charting hedonism's decline, and suggests that this is a result of two major objections: the claim that hedonism is the 'philosophy of swine', reducing all value to a single common denominator, and Nozick's 'experience machine' objection. There follows some elucidation of the nature of hedonism, and of enjoyment in particular. Two types of theory of enjoyment are outlined-intemalism, according to which enjoyment has some special 'feeling (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Roger Crisp (2004). Pleasure is All That Matters. Think 3 (7):21-30.
    Roger Crisp asks whether hedonism is quite as bad as is often supposed.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. David Crossley (2000). Early Criticisms of Mill's Qualitative Hedonism. Bradley Studies 6 (2):137-175.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Wayne Davis (1981). Pleasure and Happiness. Philosophical Studies 39 (3):305 - 317.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Felipe De Brigard (2010). If You Like It, Does It Matter If It's Real? Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):43-57.
    Most people's intuitive reaction after considering Nozick's experience machine thought-experiment seems to be just like his: we feel very little inclination to plug in to a virtual reality machine capable of providing us with pleasurable experiences. Many philosophers take this empirical fact as sufficient reason to believe that, more than pleasurable experiences, people care about “living in contact with reality.” Such claim, however, assumes that people's reaction to the experience machine thought-experiment is due to the fact that they value reality (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Peter de Marneffe (2003). An Objection to Attitudinal Hedonism. Philosophical Studies 115 (2):197 - 200.
    This article argues that attitudinal hedonism is false as atheory of what is intrinsically good for us because it impliesthat nothing is intrinsically good for someone who does nothave the psychological capacity for the propositional attitudeof enjoyment even if he has other important mental capacitiesthat humans have.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Michael R. DePaul (2002). A Half Dozen Puzzles Regarding Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (3):629-635.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Dale Dorsey (2011). The Hedonist's Dilemma. Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (2):173-196.
    In this paper, I argue that hedonism about well-being faces a powerful dilemma. However, as I shall try to show here, this choice creates a dilemma for hedonism. On a subjective interpretation, hedonism is open to the familiar objection that pleasure is not the only thing desired or the only thing for which we possess a pro-attitude. On an objective interpretation, hedonism lacks an independent rationale. In this paper, I do not claim that hedonism fails once and for all. However, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Dale Dorsey (2010). Hutcheson's Deceptive Hedonism. Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (4):445-467.
    Francis Hutcheson’s theory of value is often characterized as a precursor to the qualitative hedonism of John Stuart Mill. The interpretation of Mill as a qualitative hedonist has come under fire recently; some have argued that he is, in fact, a hedonist of no variety at all.1 Others have argued that his hedonism is as non-qualitative as Bentham’s.2 The purpose of this essay is not to critically engage the various interpretations of Mill’s value theory. Rather, I hope to show that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Edward A. Driscoll (1972). The Influence of Gassendi on Locke's Hedonism. International Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1):87-110.
  44. Matthew Evans (2008). Plato's Anti-Hedonism'. Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy 23:121-145.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Bill Faw (2008). Non-Drive-Reductive Hedonism and the Physiological Psychology of Inspiration. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 15 (2):114-128.
    Major strands of the history of scientific psychology proposed less mechanistic explanations of behavior than the “series of billiard ball reactions” that Ellis ascribes to them. I tease apart psychological systems based on hedonism and those based on stimulus-response mechanisms-and then tease apart basic hedonism and drive-reduction hedonism, to layout psychological and neuroscientific foundations for the active, dynamic, cognitive, emotive, and "spiritual" dynamics of human nature which Ellis calls us to affirm. I trace these distinctions through the drive-reduction psychoanalysis of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Fred Feldman, Happiness: Empirical Research; Philosophical Conclusions.
    In recent years there has been a tremendous surge of academic interest in happiness. It seems that just about every week there is an announcement of a new book on the nature of happiness, or the measurement of happiness2, or the causes of happiness, or the history of happiness3. Some of these books have been written by philosophers. Others have been written by psychologists, economists, sociologists, and other empirical scientists.4 The surge of interest in happiness is truly interdisciplinary.5 Everybody wants (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Fred Feldman (2010). What is This Thing Called Happiness? Oxford University Press.
    Some puzzles about happiness -- Pt. I. Some things that happiness isn't. Sensory hedonism about happiness -- Kahneman's "objective happiness" -- Subjective local preferentism about happiness -- Whole life satisfaction concepts of happiness -- Pt. II. What happiness is. What is this thing called happiness? -- Attitudinal hedonism about happiness -- Eudaimonism -- The problem of inauthentic happiness -- Disgusting happiness -- Our authority over our own happiness -- Pt. III. Implications for the empirical study of happiness. Measuring happiness -- (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Fred Feldman (2007). Precis of Pleasure and the Good Life: Concerning the Nature, Varieties, and Plausiblity of Hedonism. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 136 (3):405 - 408.
  49. Fred Feldman (2007). Reply to Elinor Mason and Alastair Norcross. Utilitas 19 (3):398-406.
    In comments originally presented at the ISUS conference at Dartmouth College in 2005, Elinor Mason and Alastair Norcross raised a number of objections to various things I said in Pleasure and the Good Life. One especially interesting objection concerns one of my central claims about the nature of pleasure. I distinguished between sensory pleasure and attitudinal pleasure. I said that a feeling counts as a sensory pleasure if the one who feels it takes intrinsic attitudinal pleasure in the fact that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Fred Feldman (2006). Timmermann's New Paradox of Hedonism: Neither New nor Paradoxical. Analysis 66 (289):76–82.
    ...there can be cases in which we reject pleasure because there is too much of it. Sometimes we decide that pleasure is bad, or not worth having, not because of an extrinsic factor like moral, aesthetic etc. constraints but rather because one is experiencing enough pleasure to the point that more would in itself be undesirable. (2005: 144).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 183