Hegel: Philosophy of Language

This paper deals with Walter Jaeschke’s Hegels Philosophie. It begins with Hegel’s early writings, focusing on the relationship between logic and metaphysics. It goes on to explore central moments of Hegel’s philosophy: the relationship with Kant, the nature of categories, the philosophy of history, and the concept of the State. Jaeschke’s interpretation of Hegel’s thought is that of a paradigmatic thinker, whose fundamental philosophical breakthrough lies in the concept of Geist.

I shall argue that Hegel’s concept [Begriff] has emancipatory power [Macht]. In the Science of Logic, Hegel rejects both essentialist conceptions of identity and historical necessity, and he shows that conceiving [begreifen] (or ‘grasping’) is an anticipatory self-movement of thought. The relation between ‘essence’ and ‘concept’ in Book II of the Science of Logic is unlike the relation between ‘essence’ and ‘form’ in Plato to Kant. I will defend this claim not by comparing Hegel’s ‘essence [Wesen]’ with similar categories in (...) the texts of Plato or Kant but, rather, by focusing more narrowly on two transitions in the Logic that illustrate Hegel’s break from prior philosophy with respect to his account of essence. The transition in Book I from ‘the ought [das Sollen]’ to infinity, in combination with the transitions in Book II from Existenz (‘concrete existence’) and appearance to actuality [Wirklichkeit] compose the core of Hegel’s rejection of a Platonic/Kantian normative model of essence. The category of actuality is the turning point of the Logic and shows that Hegel rejects all essentialist conceptions of form. For Herbert Marcuse, actuality is the core of thought’s self-movement, its motility (or, referring to Aristotle as Marcuse does, Hegelian thought’s being qua being). I shall extend Marcuse’s interpretation of the Logic to treat the category of actuality in the context of recent feminism and political theory. (shrink)

There are at least three interpretations that attempt to read from the Sense-Certainty Chapter a Hegelian theory of indexicals. First, the Impossibility of Singular Reference Reading understands Hegel as excluding in principle the possibility of any linguistic cognition of individuals. Second, the Theory of Reference Reading criticizes the first reading and interprets from Hegel the classical idea of direct reference theory. Third, Brandom’s Anaphoric Theory Reading suggests an alternative explanation while still defending the possibility of knowledge of individuals in Hegel. (...) I criticize the first two readings and argue that the third is the most exegetically and philosophically adequate interpretation. The first interpretation attempts to ascribe to Hegel a sort of skepticism, but this can be at most in a very restricted sense successful and the skepticism constructed in such a way is too trivial to refute Hegel’s position. The second reading is more adequate in that it does not fall into the error that the first one committed, but is still flawed because it introduces a subject-object or mind-world dualism that Hegel denies. The third reading has great advantages compared to the first two readings in terms that it provides a suitable account of indexical knowledge on individuals while avoiding skepticism and dualism which arise in the former readings. (shrink)

In our Introduction to the special issue on Hegel and Sellars, we explain why there needs to be a more detailed analysis of the similarities and differences between Hegel and Sellars. Sellars is usually regarded as closer to Kant than to Hegel, but this obscures the more Hegelian features of his theoretical and practical philosophy. We briefly describe each article in the special issue.

Both continental and analytic traditions have tended to associate Hegel’s idealism with metaphysics and therefore as divorced from and even pernicious to reality. Hence, contemporary Hegel studies have tended to concentrate on discrete elements of his philosophy while attempting to avoid its metaphysical dimensions and their systematic pretensions. I seek to show that rather than dwelling in abstraction, Hegel’s metaphysics, as presented in his Logics, recount the thought determinations through which being comes to be grounded and thus, scientifically knowable as (...) nature. Such categorical determining is essentially linguistic, taking place through the grammatical forms of judgment (Urteil) and their outcome in the syllogism. The centrality of these grammatical forms reveals the anthropological goal of Hegel’s metaphysics, where the fully determined copula of judgment presents itself as the object of natural science, for us. (shrink)

En la exposición de la filosofía del espíritu subjetivo teórico, la filosofía del Espíritu Absoluto no parece a primera vista jugar ningún rol. Sin embargo, las formas del Espíritu Absoluto son en el Sistema de Hegel la explicitación de los contenidos implicados por las formas cognitivas de la inteligencia. En este sentido, la filosofía del Espíritu Absoluto es la realización de las formas del espíritu subjetivo teórico; en el contexto del Espíritu Absoluto, pues, Hegel presupone en forma directa la primera (...) forma general de su Psicología y, consecuentemente, la exposición precedente de la misma en el contexto de la filosofía del espíritu subjetivo. Pero a diferencia de su proceder en el caso de la Estética enciclopédica y las lecciones correspondientes así como en el de los capítulos de la Enciclopedia dedicados a la Filosofía y en las lecciones sobre la Historia de la Filosofía, en el caso de la Filosofía de la Religión –o, más precisamente, en el de las Lecciones sobre Filosofía de la Religión– Hegel expone nuevamente en forma cuasi-sistemática y en un grado considerable de extensión y detalle la entera filosofía del espíritu subjetivo teórico. A pesar de las numerosas modificaciones de estructura general y en parte de contenido de las diferentes lecciones sobre filosofía de la religión, en todas ellas Hegel mantiene la división de la misma en tres partes, a saber: "Concepto de religión", "Religión determinada" y "Religión consumada"; es en el contexto de la primera de estas partes, esto es, en la dedicada al Concepto de religión, donde Hegel retoma y desarrolla la teoría de las diferentes formas del espíritu subjetivo teórico. En este nuevo contexto, Hegel no se limita a recordar las tesis que había presentado en la Psicología propiamente dicha, sino que en algunos puntos precisa y complementa dichas tesis con valiosas observaciones y comentarios. En esta medida, a pesar de que han pasado inadvertidas en los estudios sobre la filosofía del espíritu subjetivo teórico de Hegel, las Lecciones sobre Filosofía de la Religión ofrecen una base textual ulterior para la reconstrucción de esa disciplina central del Sistema hegeliano. El presente trabajo tiene por objeto exponer la teoría de los actos teóricos del sujeto tal como Hegel la desarrolla en la lección sobre filosofía de la religión de 1827, toda vez que es en esta lección donde, en su etapa madura, Hegel ofrece los desarrollos más detallados y sistemáticos sobre el espíritu subjetivo teórico fuera del contexto específico de la filosofía del espíritu subjetivo. (shrink)

Partant d ’ un commentaire de quelques lignes de la Préface à la Phénoménologie de l’esprit ou au Système de la Science de Hegel 1, que nous mettrons en perspective avec des extraits et des notes du Cours de linguistique générale de Saussure, nous voudrions montrer que : 1. La philosophie est un Discours écrit ou un Livre sui-réflexif et/ou systématique, soit un Méta -discours ; aussi répond-elle à l ’ essence du Langage qui ne se signifie jamais que soi-même. (...) 2. Puisqu ’ il se fonde sur ce dernier, comme lui, le discours-livre philosophique ne laisse rien en dehors de soi et parle de, ou plutôt du, tout ; en quoi il s ’ avère effectivement universel. 3. Tous les autres discours, scientifiques, moraux, artistiques, religieux, s ’ y enracinant, inutile de s ’ interroger sur un impensé ou un sens qui échapperait au discursif. La vérité (philosophique) se confond ainsi avec le procès linguistique dont elle partage et la prémisse – être c ’ est être dit – et la conclusion – on n ’ a rien dit, tant que l ’ on n ’ a pas tout dit. Elle en forme en quelque sorte l’Auto - Réflexion explicite, achevée et/ou cohérente. Si les philosophies préhégéliennes ont bien tendu vers cela, il appartenait au Système hégélien d ’ en tirer toutes les conséquences et d ’ accomplir ce que celles-là ont seulement esquissé. Quant au système de philosophie du langage de Saussure, il en reformulera techniquement les principes. (shrink)

In examining Hegel's and Kierkegaard's theories of language, I argue that both entail conceptions of the therapeutic power of language to heal us from madness and despair. I show that whereas Hegel quite straightforwardly celebrates the emancipatory power of language, Kierkegaard is more ambivalent; on the one hand, he devotes his life to a maieutic authorship in service of aiding the reader, but on the other, he believes that ultimately it is only faith in God that can cure us, and (...) that faith requires silence. I use Lacan's psychoanalytic account of the role of language to explore Hegel's view that language constitutes the self and Kierkegaard's experimentation with an indirect form of communication that he hopes will enable him to fulfill each of his apparently conflicting goals, to write and yet to remain silent. (shrink)

There exists a very particular grasp of the relation between language and objectivity in the work of G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831), one that rejects the idea of truth as the reflection between words and what they represent.Jeffrey Reid's Real ...

How is Hegel's scientific (systematic) language meant to be objective? Through an examination of Hegel's theory of language, as outlined in the Encyclopedia, we understand how thought inhabits signs to form words, gaining in objectivity. The words of the positive sciences of the understanding are then taken up (reflected upon) syllogistically, where the discourse of Science is informed by the relative objectivity of its linguistic contents. The Philosophy of Nature, for example, does not reflect directly on nature but rather gains (...) its truth and objectivity through reflection on the discourses of the natural sciences. (shrink)

The paper explores Hegel's earlier-than-supposed encounter with Kant's thought, at the Tuebingen Stift, where a reading group formed around the "radical" Kantian, C.I. Diez. The paper argues that Hegel avoided this group and its interpretation because its strictly anthropological interpretation of Kant and its eschewal of any reference to divine (absolute) revelation left it anchored in empirical understanding, leaving aside the speculative elements of Kantian philosophy, notably, the ideal agency of reason and the possibility of rational faith.

Within Hegel's system of science, judgement(Urteil)is thought's original dividing from identity into difference. In the same context, judgement is also an act of predication where “subject” must be understood in both a grammatical and psychical sense. Thus, judgement expresses a language act that is a self-positing into the difference of being. This article looks at two examples where Hegel's ontological notion of judgement obtains, then finds, the roots of this notion in Hölderlin and Fichte.

The paper explores Hegel's theory of language, from the Subjective Spirit book of his Encyclopedia. Hegel distinguishes between linguistic signs, as arbitrary signifiers and words, which occur when the signs are filled with thought or meaning. Words have greater objectivity than signs. The words of the positive, empirical sciences are taken up into Hegelian Science (system), affording it greater objectivity, which it, reciprocally re-confers on its linguistic contents.

RésuméBien que Hegel soit parfaitement conscient du fait que l'activité de penser nepuisse devenir ce qu'elle est que dans etpar le langage, on peut dire qu'ila préservé une distinction hiérarchisée entre la pensée et le langage dans lequel elle s'exprime. Dans le but de clarifier ce qu'il veut dire exactement lorsqu'il distingue entre, d'un côté, la totalité des concepts purs et, de l'autre, le langage, la première partie du présent article—qui en est aussi la plus longue—fournit une interprétation deplusieurs textes (...) de Hegel sur le rapport entre la pensée pure et le langage, et montre pourquoi la conception qu'il se fait de cette relation est plus difficile à critiquer qu'on ne l'a souvent cru. L'article part de la conception hégélienne du concept absolu et, après avoir briévement esquissé la relation entre la Logique et la philosophic de la nature et de l'esprit, examine divers passages sur le langage, tirés, entre autres, des leçons sur la philosophic de l'histoire mondiale. La deuxième partie de l'article propose—dans une veine heideggérienne—une perspective à partir de laquelle une déconstruction des présupposés de base de cette conception pourrait avoir quelque chance de succès. (shrink)

L'objectivité dont s'occupe la science hégélienne n'est pas celle d'une réalité détachée, mue selon les lois dialectiques, et le discours scientifique n'est pas vrai et objectif parce qu'il serait la réflexion adéquate d'une telle réalité. L'objectivité scientifique chez Hegel doit être saisie comme le logos , c'est-à-dire le discours de la science elle-même dans son actualité existante. Il s'agit d'un discours qui est son objet et qui est l'objectivité véritable. Ce type de langage est seulement possible s'il est compris comme (...) le moyen terme entre l'être et le penser, c'est-à-dire en termes du syllogisme hégélien et non pas de la prédication. Concrètement, les objets de la science, ou les contenus de l' Encyclopédie , sont eux-mêmes des discours objectifs, c'est-à-dire existants et vrais. Ainsi, par exemple, c'est seulement comme discours que l'Etat peut constituer un objet/contenu de la science hégélienne.The objectivity that Hegelian science deals with is not a detached reality running on dialectical laws, and scientific discourse is not true and objective because it is the faithful reflection of such a reality. Scientific objectivity, in Hegel, should be understood as logos, as existing scientific discourse. It is a discourse that is its object and is true objectivity. This type of language is only possible if it is grasped as the middle term between mere being and thought, in terms of the Hegelian syllogism rather than predication. Concretely, the objects of science, or the contents of the Encyclopedia, are themselves existing, true discourses. Thus, for example, only as discourse does the State become an object/content of science. (shrink)

This paper explores the thought of Hegel, Saussure and Derrida regarding the nature of the linguistic sign. It argues that Derrida is right to maintain that Hegel is an influence on Saussure. However, Derrida misrepresents both Hegel and Saussure by interpreting them as falling within the Platonic rather than the Aristotelian philosophical tradition.

Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel’s Idealism:Negotiation and Administration in Hegel’sAccount of the Structure and Content ofConceptual NormsRobert B. BrandomThis paper could equally well have been titled ‘Some Idealist Themes in Hegel’sPragmatism’. Both idealism and pragmatism are capacious concepts, encompassingmany distinguishable theses. I will focus on one pragmatist thesis and one ideal-ist thesis (though we will come within sight of some others). The pragmatistthesis (what I will call ‘the semantic pragmatist thesis’) is that the use of conceptsdetermines their content, that is, (...) that concepts can have no content apart from thatconferred on them by their use. The idealist thesis is that the structure and unityof the concept is the same as the structure and unity of the self. The semantic prag-matist thesis is a commonplace of our Wittgensteinean philosophical world. Theidealist thesis is, to say the least, not. I don’t believe there is any serious contem-porary semantic thinker who is pursuing the thought that concepts might best beunderstood by modelling them on selves. Indeed, from the point of view ofcontemporary semantics it is hard to know even what one could mean by such athought: what relatively unproblematic features of selves are supposed to illumi-nate what relatively problematic features of concepts? Why should we think thatunderstanding something about, say, personal identity would help us under-stand issues concerning the identity and individuation of concepts? From acontemporary point of view, the idealist semantic thesis is bound to appearinitially as something between unpromising and crazy.My interpretive claim here will be that the idealist thesis is Hegel’s way of makingthe pragmatist thesis workable, in the context of several other commitments andinsights. My philosophical claim here will be that we actually have a lot to learn fromthis strategy about contemporary semantic issues that we by no means see our wayto the bottom of otherwise. In the space of this essay, I cannot properly justify thefirst claim textually, nor the second argumentatively. I will confine myself of neces-sity to sketching the outlines and motivations for the complex, sophisticated, andinteresting view on the topic I find Hegel putting forward. (shrink)