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  1. Kent Bach (2000). A Puzzle About Belief Reports. In K. Jaszczolt (ed.), The Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports. Elsevier
    I'd like to present a puzzle about belief reports that's been nagging at me for several years. I've subjected many friends and audiences to various abortive attempts at solving it. Now it's time to get it off my chest and let others try their hand at it.<1>.
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  2. Kent Bach (1997). Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):215-241.
    The traditional puzzles about belief reports puzzles rest on a certain seemingly innocuous assumption, that 'that'-clauses specify belief contents. The main theories of belief reports also rest on this "Specification Assumption", that for a belief report of the form 'A believes that p' to be true,' the proposition that p must be among the things A believes. I use Kripke's Paderewski case to call the Specification Assumption into question. Giving up that assumption offers prospects for an intuitively more plausible approach (...)
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  3. Jonathan Berg (2012). Direct Belief: An Essay on the Semantics, Pragmatics, and Metaphysics of Belief. De Gruyter Mouton.
    Jonathan Berg argues for the Theory of Direct Belief, which treats having a belief about an individual as an unmediated relation between the believer and the individual the belief is about. After a critical review of alternative positions, Berg uses Grice's theory of conversational implicature to provide a detailed pragmatic account of substitution failure in belief ascriptions and goes on to defend this view against objections, including those based on an unwarranted "Inner Speech" Picture of Thought. The work serves as (...)
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  4. David J. Chalmers (2011). Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account. Noûs 45 (4):595-639.
    When I say ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to express a proposition. And when I say ‘Joan believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to ascribe to Joan an attitude to the same proposition. But what are propositions? And what is involved in ascribing propositional attitudes?
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  5. Leonard Clapp (1995). How to Be Direct and Innocent: A Criticism of Crimmins and Perry's Theory of Attitude Ascriptions. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 18 (5):529 - 565.
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  6. Mark Crimmins (1995). Contextuality, Reflexivity, Iteration, Logic. Philosophical Perspectives 9:381-399.
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  7. Mark Crimmins (1992). Talk About Beliefs. MIT Press.
    Talk about Beliefs presents a new account of beliefs and of practices of reporting them that yields solutions to foundational problems in the philosophies of...
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  8. Mark Crimmins & John Perry (1989). The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs. Journal of Philosophy 86 (12):685 - 711.
    Beliefs are concrete particulars containing ideas of properties and notions of things, which also are concrete. The claim made in a belief report is that the agent has a belief (i) whose content is a specific singular proposition, and (ii) which involves certain of the agent's notions and ideas in a certain way. No words in the report stand for the notions and ideas, so they are unarticulated constituents of the report's content (like the relevant place in "it's raining"). The (...)
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  9. Cian Dorr (2014). Transparency and the Context-Sensitivity of Attitude Reports. In Manuel García-Carpintero & Genoveva Martí (eds.), Empty Representations: Reference and Non-existence. Oxford University Press 25-66.
    This paper defends the claim that although ‘Superman is Clark Kent and some people who believe that Superman flies do not believe that Clark Kent flies’ is a logically inconsistent sentence, we can still utter this sentence, while speaking literally, without asserting anything false. The key idea is that the context-sensitivity of attitude reports can be - and often is - resolved in different ways within a single sentence.
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  10. Manuel García-Carpintero (2000). Token-Reflexivity and Indirect Discourse. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 2000:37-56.
    According to a Reichenbachian treatment, indexicals are token-reflexive. That is, a truth-conditional contribution is assigned to tokens relative to relational properties which they instantiate. By thinking of the relevant expressions occurring in “ordinary contexts” along these lines, I argue that we can give a more accurate account of their semantic behavior when they occur in indirect contexts. The argument involves the following: (1) A defense of theories of indirect discourse which allows that a reference to modes of presentation associated with (...)
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  11. Manuel García-Carpintero & Stephan Torre (eds.) (2016). About Oneself: De Se Thought and Communication. Oxford University Press.
    Inspired by Castañeda (1966, 1968), Perry (1979) and Lewis (1979) showed that a specific variety of singular thoughts, thoughts about oneself “as oneself” – de se thoughts, as Lewis called them – raise special issues, and they advanced rival accounts. Their suggestive examples raise the problem of de se thought – to wit, how to characterize it so as to give an accurate account of the data, tracing its relations to singular thoughts in general. After rehearsing the main tenets of (...)
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  12. Peter Ludlow (1996). The Adicity of 'Believes' and the Hidden Indexical Theory. Analysis 56 (2):97 - 101.
  13. Peter Ludlow (1995). Logical Form and the Hidden-Indexical Theory: A Reply to Schiffer. Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):102-107.
  14. Friederike Moltmann (forthcoming). Cognitive Products and the Semantics of Attitude Verbs and Deontic Modals. In Friederike Moltmann & Mark Textor (eds.), Act-Based Conceptions of Propositional Content. Contemporary and Historical Perspectives. Oxford University Press
    This paper outlines a semantic account of attitude reports and deontic modals based on cognitive and illocutionary products, mental states, and modal products, as opposed to the notion of an abstract proposition or a cognitive act.
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  15. Gary Ostertag (2009). A Problem for Russellian Theories of Belief. Philosophical Studies 146 (2):249 - 267.
    Russellianism is characterized as the view that ‘that’-clauses refer to Russellian propositions, familiar set-theoretic pairings of objects and properties. Two belief-reporting sentences, S and S*, possessing the same Russellian content, but differing in their intuitive truthvalue, are provided. It is argued that no Russellian explanation of the difference in apparent truthvalue is available, with the upshot that the Russellian fails to explain how a speaker who asserts S but rejects S* can be innocent of inconsistency, either in what she says (...)
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  16. Gary Ostertag (2005). A Puzzle About Disbelief. Journal of Philosophy 102 (11):573-93.
    According to the naive theory of belief reports, our intuition that “Lois believes that Kent flies” is false results from our mistakenly identifying what this sentence implicates, which is false, with what it says, which is true. Whatever the merits of this proposal, it is here argued that the naive theory’s analysis of negative belief reports—sentences such as “Lois doesn't believe that Kent flies”—gives rise to equally problematic clashes with intuition, but that in this case no “pragmatic” explanation is available. (...)
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  17. François Recanati (2015). Replies to the Papers in the Issue "Recanati on Mental Files". Inquiry 58 (4):408-437.
  18. François Recanati (2000). Relational Belief Reports. Philosophical Studies 100 (3):255-272.
  19. François Recanati & Mark Crimmins (1995). Quasi-Singular Propositions: The Semantics of Belief Reports. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 69 (1):175 - 209.
  20. Esa Saarinen (1978). Intentional Identity Interpreted: A Case Study of the Relations Among Quantifiers, Pronouns, and Propositional Attitudes. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (2):151 - 223.
  21. Nathan Salmon (2009). Points, Complexes, Complex Points, and a Yacht. In Nicholas Griffin & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Russell Vs. Meinong: The Legacy of "on Denoting". Routledge
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  22. Jennifer M. Saul (1999). The Road to Hell: Intentions and Propositional Attitude Ascription. Mind and Language 14 (3):356–375.
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  23. Jennifer M. Saul (1993). Still an Attitude Problem. Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (4):423 - 435.
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  24. Stephen Schiffer (1995). Descriptions, Indexicals, and Belief Reports: Some Dilemmas (but Not the Ones You Expect). Mind 104 (413):107-131.
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  25. Stephen Schiffer (1993). Belief Ascription and a Paradox of Meaning. Philosophical Issues 3:89-121.
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  26. Stephen Schiffer (1992). Belief Ascription. Journal of Philosophy 89 (10):499-521.
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  27. Isidora Stojanovic & Neftalí Villanueva Fernández (2015). Mental Files, Blown Up by Indexed Files. Inquiry 58 (4):393-407.
    Mental Files, Blown Up by Indexed Files. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/0020174X.2014.883746.
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