Related categories
Siblings:
22 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Kent Bach (2000). A Puzzle About Belief Reports. In K. Jaszczolt (ed.), The Pragmatics of Propositional Attitude Reports. Elsevier.
    I'd like to present a puzzle about belief reports that's been nagging at me for several years. I've subjected many friends and audiences to various abortive attempts at solving it. Now it's time to get it off my chest and let others try their hand at it.<1>.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Kent Bach (1997). Do Belief Reports Report Beliefs? Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 78 (3):215-241.
    The traditional puzzles about belief reports puzzles rest on a certain seemingly innocuous assumption, that 'that'-clauses specify belief contents. The main theories of belief reports also rest on this "Specification Assumption", that for a belief report of the form 'A believes that p' to be true,' the proposition that p must be among the things A believes. I use Kripke's Paderewski case to call the Specification Assumption into question. Giving up that assumption offers prospects for an intuitively more plausible approach (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Jonathan Berg (2012). Direct Belief: An Essay on the Semantics, Pragmatics, and Metaphysics of Belief. De Gruyter Mouton.
    Jonathan Berg argues for the Theory of Direct Belief, which treats having a belief about an individual as an unmediated relation between the believer and the individual the belief is about. After a critical review of alternative positions, Berg uses Grice's theory of conversational implicature to provide a detailed pragmatic account of substitution failure in belief ascriptions and goes on to defend this view against objections, including those based on an unwarranted "Inner Speech" Picture of Thought. The work serves as (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. David J. Chalmers (2011). Propositions and Attitude Ascriptions: A Fregean Account. Noûs 45 (4):595-639.
    When I say ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to express a proposition. And when I say ‘Joan believes that Hesperus is Phosphorus’, I seem to ascribe to Joan an attitude to the same proposition. But what are propositions? And what is involved in ascribing propositional attitudes?
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Leonard Clapp (1995). How to Be Direct and Innocent: A Criticism of Crimmins and Perry's Theory of Attitude Ascriptions. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 18 (5):529 - 565.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Mark Crimmins (2002). Talk About Beliefs. MIT Press.
    Talk about Beliefs presents a new account of beliefs and of practices of reporting them that yields solutions to foundational problems in the philosophies of...
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Mark Crimmins (1995). Contextuality, Reflexivity, Iteration, Logic. Philosophical Perspectives 9:381-399.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Mark Crimmins & John Perry (1989). The Prince and the Phone Booth: Reporting Puzzling Beliefs. Journal of Philosophy 86 (12):685 - 711.
  9. Cian Dorr (forthcoming). Transparency and the Context-Sensitivity of Attitude Reports. In Manuel García-Carpintero & Genoveva Martí (eds.), Empty Representations: Reference and Non-existence. Oxford University Press.
    This paper defends the claim that although ‘Superman is Clark Kent and some people who believe that Superman flies do not believe that Clark Kent flies’ is a logically inconsistent sentence, we can still utter this sentence, while speaking literally, without asserting anything false. The key idea is that the context-sensitivity of attitude reports can be, and often is, resolved in different ways within a single sentence.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. By Peter Ludlow (1996). The Adicity of 'Believes' and the Hidden Indexical Theory. Analysis 56 (2):97–101.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Peter Ludlow (1995). Logical Form and the Hidden-Indexical Theory: A Reply to Schiffer. Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):102-107.
  12. Friederike Moltmann (forthcoming). Cognitive Products and the Semantics of Attitude Verbs and Deontic Modals. In Friederike Moltmann & Mark Textor (eds.), Act-Based Conceptions of Propositional Content. Contemporary and Historical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
    This paper argues for a semantic account of attitude reports and deontic modals based on the notion of a cognitive product, as opposed to the notion of an abstract proposition or a cognitive act.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Gary Ostertag (2009). A Problem for Russellian Theories of Belief. Philosophical Studies 146 (2):249 - 267.
    Russellianism is characterized as the view that ‘that’-clauses refer to Russellian propositions, familiar set-theoretic pairings of objects and properties. Two belief-reporting sentences, S and S*, possessing the same Russellian content, but differing in their intuitive truthvalue, are provided. It is argued that no Russellian explanation of the difference in apparent truthvalue is available, with the upshot that the Russellian fails to explain how a speaker who asserts S but rejects S* can be innocent of inconsistency, either in what she says (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Gary Ostertag (2005). A Puzzle About Disbelief. Journal of Philosophy 102 (11):573-93.
    According to the naive theory of belief reports, our intuition that “Lois believes that Kent flies” is false results from our mistakenly identifying what this sentence implicates, which is false, with what it says, which is true. Whatever the merits of this proposal, it is here argued that the naive theory’s analysis of negative belief reports—sentences such as “Lois doesn't believe that Kent flies”—gives rise to equally problematic clashes with intuition, but that in this case no “pragmatic” explanation is available. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. François Recanati (2004). ‘That’-Clauses as Existential Quantifiers. Analysis 64 (283):229–235.
    Following Panaccio, 'John believes that p' is analysed as 'For some x such that x is true if and only if p, John believes x'. On this view the complement clause 'that p' acts as a restricted existential quantifier ('For some x such that x is true if and only if p') and it contributes a higher-order property.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Esa Saarinen (1978). Intentional Identity Interpreted: A Case Study of the Relations Among Quantifiers, Pronouns, and Propositional Attitudes. [REVIEW] Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (2):151 - 223.
  17. Nathan Salmon (2009). Points, Complexes, Complex Points, and a Yacht. In Nicholas Griffin & Dale Jacquette (eds.), Russell Vs. Meinong: The Legacy of "on Denoting". Routledge.
  18. Jennifer M. Saul (1999). The Road to Hell: Intentions and Propositional Attitude Ascription. Mind and Language 14 (3):356–375.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Jennifer M. Saul (1993). Still an Attitude Problem. Linguistics and Philosophy 16 (4):423 - 435.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Stephen Schiffer (1995). Descriptions, Indexicals, and Belief Reports: Some Dilemmas (but Not the Ones You Expect). Mind 104 (413):107-131.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Stephen Schiffer (1993). Belief Ascription and a Paradox of Meaning. Philosophical Issues 3:89-121.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Stephen Schiffer (1992). Belief Ascription. Journal of Philosophy 89 (10):499-521.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation