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Summary A catch-all for papers on various themes related to higher-order theories 
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  1. Thomas Bittner (2007). Consciousness: Essays From a Higher-Order Perspective - By Peter Carruthers. Philosophical Books 48 (1):84-86.
  2. Susan Brower-Toland (2012). Medieval Approaches to Consciousness: Ockham and Chatton. Philosophers' Imprint 12 (17):1-29.
    My aim in this paper is to advance our understanding of medieval approaches to consciousness by focusing on a particular but, as it seems to me, representative medieval debate. The debate in question is between William Ockham and Walter Chatton over the existence of what these two thinkers refer to as “reflexive intellective intuitive cognition”. Although framed in the technical terminology of late-medieval cognitive psychology, the basic question at issue between them is this: Does the mind (or “intellect”) cognize its (...)
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  3. Richard Brown (2009). Review of 'Consciousness and its Function' by David Rosenthal. [REVIEW] Philosopher's Digest.
    David Rosenthal is a well-known defender of a particular kind of theory of consciousness known as the higher-order thought theory (HOTT). Higher-order theories are united by what Rosenthal calls the Transitivity Principle (TP), which states that a mental state is conscious iff one is conscious of oneself, in some suitable way, as being in that mental state. Since there are various ways to implement TP and HOTT commits one to the view that any mental state could occur unconsciously it seems (...)
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  4. Gregg Caruso (2012). Free Will and Consciousness: A Determinist Account of the Illusion of Free Will. Lexington Books.
    In recent decades, with advances in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences, the idea that patterns of human behavior may ultimately be due to factors beyond our conscious control has increasingly gained traction and renewed interest in the age-old problem of free will. In this book I examine both the traditional philosophical problems long associated with the question of free will, such as the relationship between determinism and free will, as well as recent experimental and theoretical work directly related to consciousness (...)
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  5. Marc Champagne (2009). Some Semiotic Constraints on Metarepresentational Accounts of Consciousness. In John N. Deely & Leonard G. Sbrocchi (eds.), Semiotics 2008 (Proceedings of the 33rd annual meeting of the Semiotic Society of America, pp. 557-564. Legas Press. 557-564.
    "Representation" is one of those Janus-faced terms that seems blatantly obvious when used in a casual or pre-theoretic manner, but which reveals itself far more slippery when attentively studied. Any allusion to "metarepresentation", it would then seem, only compounds these difficulties. Taking the metarepresentationalist framework in its roughest outline as our point of departure, we thus articulate four key "structural" features that appear binding for any such theory.
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  6. Rocco J. Gennaro (2009). Animals, Consciousness, and I-Thoughts. In Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds. Cambridge University Press. 184--200.
    I argue that recent developments in animal cognition support the conclusion that HOT theory is consistent with animal consciousness. There seems to be growing evidence that many animals are indeed capable of having I-thoughts, including episodic memory, as well as have the ability to understand the mental states of others.
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  7. Benj Hellie (2007). 'There's Something It's Like' and the Structure of Consciousness. Philosophical Review 116 (3):441--63.
    I discuss the meaning of 'There's something e is like', in the context of a reply to Eric Lormand's 'The explanatory stopgap'. I argue that Lormand is wrong to think it has a specially perceptual meaning. Rather, it has one of at least four candidate meanings: (a) e is some way as regards its subject; (b) e is some way and e's being that way is in the possession of its subject; (c) e is some way in the awareness of (...)
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  8. Jakob Hohwy (forthcoming). Prediction Error Minimization, Mental and Developmental Disorder, and Statistical Theories of Consciousness. In Rocco Gennaro (ed.), Disturbed Consciousness: New Essays on Psychopathology and Theories of Consciousness. MIT Press.
    This chapter seeks to recover an approach to consciousness from a general theory of brain function, namely the prediction error minimization theory. The way this theory applies to mental and developmental disorder demonstrates its relevance to consciousness. The resulting view is discussed in relation to a contemporary theory of consciousness, namely the idea that conscious perception depends on Bayesian metacognition; this theory is also supported by considerations of psychopathology. This Bayesian theory is first disconnected from the higher-order thought theory, and (...)
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  9. René Jagnow (2012). Colour Discrimination And Monitoring Theories of Consciousness. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):57 - 74.
    According to the monitoring theory of consciousness, a mental state is conscious in virtue of being represented in the right way by a monitoring state. David Rosenthal, William Lycan, and Uriah Kriegel have developed three different influential versions of this theory. In order to explain colour experiences, each of these authors combines his version of the monitoring theory of consciousness with a specific account of colour representation. Even though Rosenthal, Lycan, and Kriegel disagree on the specifics, they all hold that (...)
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  10. R. Kirk (2006). Review: Consciousness: Essays From a Higher-Order Perspective. [REVIEW] Mind 115 (460):1107-1110.
  11. William G. Lycan, A Simple Point About an Alleged Objection to Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness.
    For purposes of this paper, a conscious state is a mental state whose subject is directly or at least nonevidentially aware of being in it. (The state does not count as conscious if the subject has only been told about it by a cognitive scientist or psychologist; introspectively would be better, but no one should say that a state is conscious only if its subject actively introspects it.). N.b., this usage is only one among several quite different though of course (...)
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  12. Jennifer Matey (2011). Reduction and the Determination of Phenomenal Character. Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):291-316.
    A central task of philosophy of mind in recent decades has been to come up with a comprehensive account of the mind that is consistent with materialism. To this end, philosophers have offered useful reductive accounts of mentality in terms that are ultimately explainable by neurobiology. Although these accounts have been useful for explaining some psychological states, one feature?phenomenality or consciousness?has proven to be particularly intractable. The Higher-Order Thought theory (HOT) has been offered as one reductive theory of consciousness. According (...)
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  13. Jennifer Matey (2006). Two HOTS to Handle: The Concept of State Consciousness in the Higher-Order Thought Theory of Consciousness. Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):151-175.
    David Rosenthal's higher-order thought (HOT) theory is one of the most widely argued for of the higher-order accounts of consciousness. I argue that Rosenthal vacillates between two models of the HOT theory. First, I argue that these models employ different concepts of 'state consciousness'; the two concepts each refer to mental state tokens, but in virtue of different properties. In one model, the concept of 'state consciousness' is more consistent with how the term is typically used, both by philosophers and (...)
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  14. Neil Mehta (2013). Is There a Phenomenological Argument for Higher-Order Representationalism? Philosophical Studies 164 (2):357-370.
    In his 2009 article “Self-Representationalism and Phenomenology,” Uriah Kriegel argues for self-representationalism about phenomenal consciousness primarily on phenomenological grounds. Kriegel’s argument can naturally be cast more broadly as an argument for higher-order representationalism. I examine this broadened version of Kriegel’s argument in detail and show that it is unsuccessful for two reasons. First, Kriegel’s argument (in its strongest form) relies on an inference to the best explanation from the claim that all experiences of normal adult human beings are accompanied by (...)
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  15. Riccardo Pozzo, Piero Giordanetti & Marco Sgarbi (eds.) (2012). Kant's Philosophy of the Unconscious. Walter de Gruyter.
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  16. Miguel Ángel Sebastián (2012). Experiential Awareness: Do You Prefer "It" to "Me" ? Philosophical Topics 40 (2):155-177.
    In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. -/- Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access (...)
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  17. Robert Van Gulick (2004). Higher-Order Global States (Hogs): An Alternative Higher-Order Model of Consciousness. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
  18. Gary Williams (2011). What is It Like to Be Nonconscious? A Defense of Julian Jaynes. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):217-239.
    I respond to Ned Block’s claim that it is ridiculous to suppose that consciousness is a cultural construction based on language and learned in childhood. Block is wrong to dismiss social constructivist theories of consciousness on account of it being ludicrous that conscious experience is anything but a biological feature of our animal heritage, characterized by sensory experience, evolved over millions of years. By defending social constructivism in terms of both Julian Jaynes’ behaviorism and J.J. Gibson’s ecological psychology, I draw (...)
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