Related categories
Siblings:
60 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 60
  1. Nicholas Asher, Josh Dever & Chris Pappas (2009). Supervaluations Debugged. Mind 118 (472):901-933.
    Supervaluational accounts of vagueness have come under assault from Timothy Williamson for failing to provide either a sufficiently classical logic or a disquotational notion of truth, and from Crispin Wright and others for incorporating a notion of higher-order vagueness, via the determinacy operator, which leads to contradiction when combined with intuitively appealing ‘gap principles’. We argue that these criticisms of supervaluation theory depend on giving supertruth an unnecessarily central role in that theory as the sole notion of truth, rather than (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Andrew Bacon, Vagueness at Every Order: The Prospects of Denying B.
    A number of arguments purport to show that vague properties determine sharp boundaries at higher orders. That is, although we may countenance vagueness concerning the location of boundaries for vague predicates, every predicate can instead be associated with precise knowable cut-off points deriving from precision in their higher order boundaries. -/- I argue that this conclusion is indeed paradoxical, and identify the assumption responsible for the paradox as the Brouwerian principle B for vagueness: that if p then it's completely determinate (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Andrew Bacon (forthcoming). Can The Classical Logician Avoid The Revenge Paradoxes? Philosophical Review.
    Most work on the semantic paradoxes within classical logic has centred around what I call `linguistic' accounts of the paradoxes: they attribute to sentences or utterances of sentences some property that is supposed to explain their paradoxical or non-paradoxical status. `No proposition' views are paradigm examples of linguistic theories, although practically all accounts of the paradoxes subscribe to some kind of linguistic theory. This paper shows that linguistic accounts of the paradoxes endorsing classical logic are subject to a particularly acute (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Andrew Bacon (2013). Non-Classical Metatheory for Non-Classical Logics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 42 (2):335-355.
    A number of authors have objected to the application of non-classical logic to problems in philosophy on the basis that these non-classical logics are usually characterised by a classical metatheory. In many cases the problem amounts to more than just a discrepancy; the very phenomena responsible for non-classicality occur in the field of semantics as much as they do elsewhere. The phenomena of higher order vagueness and the revenge liar are just two such examples. The aim of this paper is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Susanne Bobzien, A Model-Theoretic Account of Columnar Higher-Order Vagueness.
    ABSTRACT: Paper currently being revised.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Susanne Bobzien (2015). I—Columnar Higher‐Order Vagueness, or Vagueness is Higher‐Order Vagueness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):61-87.
    Most descriptions of higher-order vagueness in terms of traditional modal logic generate so-called higher-order vagueness paradoxes. The one that doesn't is problematic otherwise. Consequently, the present trend is toward more complex, non-standard theories. However, there is no need for this. In this paper I introduce a theory of higher-order vagueness that is paradox-free and can be expressed in the first-order extension of a normal modal system that is complete with respect to single-domain Kripke-frame semantics. This is the system QS4M+BF+FIN. It (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Susanne Bobzien (2014). Higher-Order Vagueness and Numbers of Distinct Modalities. Disputatio (39):131-137.
    This paper shows that the following common assumption is false: that in modal-logical representations of higher-order vagueness, for there to be borderline cases to borderline cases ad infinitum, the number of possible distinct modalities in a modal system must be infinite. (Open access journal).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Susanne Bobzien (2013). Higher-Order Vagueness and Borderline Nestings: A Persistent Confusion. Analytic Philosophy 54 (1):1-43.
    ABSTRACT: This paper argues that the so-called paradoxes of higher-order vagueness are the result of a confusion between higher-order vagueness and the distribution of the objects of a Sorites series into extensionally non-overlapping non-empty classes.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Susanne Bobzien (2012). If It's Clear, Then It's Clear That It's Clear, or is It? Higher-Order Vagueness and the S4 Axiom. In B. Morison K. Ierodiakonou (ed.), Episteme, etc. OUP UK.
    The purpose of this paper is to challenge some widespread assumptions about the role of the modal axiom 4 in a theory of vagueness. In the context of vagueness, axiom 4 usually appears as the principle ‘If it is clear (determinate, definite) that A, then it is clear (determinate, definite) that it is clear (determinate, definite) that A’, or, more formally, CA → CCA. We show how in the debate over axiom 4 two different notions of clarity are in play (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Susanne Bobzien (2011). In Defense of True Higher-Order Vagueness. Synthese 180 (3):317-335.
    ABSTRACT: Stewart Shapiro recently argued that there is no higher-order vagueness. More specifically, his thesis is: (ST) ‘So-called second-order vagueness in ‘F’ is nothing but first-order vagueness in the phrase ‘competent speaker of English’ or ‘competent user of “F”’. Shapiro bases (ST) on a description of the phenomenon of higher-order vagueness and two accounts of ‘borderline case’ and provides several arguments in its support. We present the phenomenon (as Shapiro describes it) and the accounts; then discuss Shapiro’s arguments, arguing that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Susanne Bobzien (2010). Higher-Order Vagueness, Radical Unclarity, and Absolute Agnosticism. Philosophers' Imprint 10 (10):1-30.
    The paper presents a new theory of higher-order vagueness. This theory is an improvement on current theories of vagueness in that it (i) describes the kind of borderline cases relevant to the Sorites paradox, (ii) retains the ‘robustness’ of vague predicates, (iii) introduces a notion of higher-order vagueness that is compositional, but (iv) avoids the paradoxes of higher-order vagueness. The theory’s central building-blocks: Borderlinehood is defined as radical unclarity. Unclarity is defined by means of competent, rational, informed speakers (‘CRISPs’) whose (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Susanne Bobzien (2002). Chrysippus and the Epistemic Theory of Vagueness. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (1):217-238.
    ABSTRACT: Recently a bold and admirable interpretation of Chrysippus’ position on the Sorites has been presented, suggesting that Chrysippus offered a solution to the Sorites by (i) taking an epistemicist position1 which (ii) made allowances for higher-order vagueness. In this paper I argue (i) that Chrysippus did not take an epistemicist position, but − if any − a non-epistemic one which denies truth-values to some cases in a Sorites-series, and (ii) that it is uncertain whether and how he made allowances (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. J. A. Burgess (1990). The Sorites Paradox and Higher-Order Vagueness. Synthese 85 (3):417-474.
    One thousand stones, suitably arranged, might form a heap. If we remove a single stone from a heap of stones we still have a heap; at no point will the removal of just one stone make sufficient difference to transform a heap into something which is not a heap. But, if this is so, we still have a heap, even when we have removed the last stone composing our original structure. So runs the Sorites paradox. Similar paradoxes can be constructed (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Pablo Cobreros (2011). Supervaluationism and Fara's Argument Concerning Higher-Order Vagueness. In Paul Egré & Klinedinst Nathan (eds.), Vagueness and Language Use, Palgrave Studies in Pragmatics, Language and Cognition. Palgrave Macmillan.
    This paper discusses Fara's so-called 'Paradox of Higher-Order Vagueness' concerning supervaluationism. In the paper I argue that supervaluationism is not committed to global validity, as it is largely assumed in the literature, but to a weaker notion of logical consequence I call 'regional validity'. Then I show that the supervaluationist might solve Fara's paradox making use of this weaker notion of logical consequence. The paper is discussed by Delia Fara in the same volume.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Pablo Cobreros (2011). Varzi on Supervaluationism and Logical Consequence. Mind 120 (479):833-43.
    Though it is standardly assumed that supervaluationism applied to vagueness is committed to global validity, Achille Varzi (2007) argues that the supervaluationist should take seriously the idea of adopting local validity instead. Varzi’s motivation for the adoption of local validity is largely based on two objections against the global notion: that it brings some counterexamples to classically valid rules of inference and that it is inconsistent with unrestricted higher-order vagueness. In this discussion I review these objections and point out ways (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Pablo Cobreros (2010). Paraconsistent Vagueness: A Positive Argument. Synthese 183 (2):211-227.
    Paraconsistent approaches have received little attention in the literature on vagueness (at least compared to other proposals). The reason seems to be that many philosophers have found the idea that a contradiction might be true (or that a sentence and its negation might both be true) hard to swallow. Even advocates of paraconsistency on vagueness do not look very convinced when they consider this fact; since they seem to have spent more time arguing that paraconsistent theories are at least as (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Cian Dorr (2015). How Vagueness Could Cut Out at Any Order. Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (1):1-10.
    Timothy Williamson has shown that the B axiom for 'definitely' (α → Δ¬Δ¬α) guarantees that if a sentence is second-order vague in a Kripke model, it is nth order vague for every n. More recently, Anna Mahtani has argued that Williamson's epistemicist theory of vagueness does not support the B axiom, and conjectured that if we consider models in which the “radius of accessibility” varies between different points, we will be able to find sentences that are nth-order vague but (n+1)th-order (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Cian Dorr (2009). Iterating Definiteness. In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press.
    The conclusion of this chapter is that higher-order vagueness is universal: no sentence whatsoever is definitely true, definitely definitely true, definitely definitely definitely true, and so on ad infinitum. The argument, of which there are several versions, turns on the existence of Sorites sequences of possible worlds connecting the actual world to possible worlds where a given sentence is used in such a way that its meaning is very different. The chapter attempts to be neutral between competing accounts of the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Dorothy Edgington (1993). Wright and Sainsbury on Higher-Order Vagueness. Analysis 53 (4):193-200.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Paul Égré & Denis Bonnay (2010). Vagueness, Uncertainty and Degrees of Clarity. Synthese 174 (1):47 - 78.
    In this paper we compare different models of vagueness viewed as a specific form of subjective uncertainty in situations of imperfect discrimination. Our focus is on the logic of the operator “clearly” and on the problem of higher-order vagueness. We first examine the consequences of the notion of intransitivity of indiscriminability for higher-order vagueness, and compare several accounts of vagueness as inexact or imprecise knowledge, namely Williamson’s margin for error semantics, Halpern’s two-dimensional semantics, and the system we call Centered semantics. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Delia Graff Fara (2003). Gap Principles, Penumbral Consequence, and Infinitely Higher-Order Vagueness. In J. C. Beall (ed.), New Essays on the Semantics of Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    Philosophers disagree about whether vagueness requires us to admit truth-value gaps, about whether there is a gap between the objects of which a given vague predicate is true and those of which it is false on an appropriately constructed sorites series for the predicate—a series involving small increments of change in a relevant respect between adjacent elements, but a large increment of change in that respect between the endpoints. There appears, however, to be widespread agreement that there is some sense (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Patrick Greenough (2005). Contextualism About Vagueness and Higher-Order Vagueness. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):167–190.
    To get to grips with what Shapiro does and can say about higher-order vagueness, it is first necessary to thoroughly review and evaluate his conception of (first-order) vagueness, a conception which is both rich and suggestive but, as it turns out, not so easy to stabilise. In Sections I–IV, his basic position on vagueness (see Shapiro [2003]) is outlined and assessed. As we go along, I offer some suggestions for improvement. In Sections V–VI, I review two key paradoxes of higher-order (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Patrick Greenough (2003). Vagueness: A Minimal Theory. Mind 112 (446):235-281.
    Vagueness is given a philosophically neutral definition in terms of an epistemic notion of tolerance. Such a notion is intended to capture the thesis that vague terms draw no known boundary across their range of signification and contrasts sharply with the semantic notion of tolerance given by Wright (1975, 1976). This allows us to distinguish vagueness from superficially similar but distinct phenomena such as semantic incompleteness. Two proofs are given which show that vagueness qua epistemic tolerance and vagueness qua borderline (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Steven Gross (2007). Trivalent Semantics and the Vaguely Vague. Synthese 156 (1):97-117.
    Michael Tye responds to the problem of higher-order vagueness for his trivalent semantics by maintaining that truth-value predicates are “vaguely vague”: it’s indeterminate, on his view, whether they have borderline cases and therefore indeterminate whether every sentence is true, false, or indefinite. Rosanna Keefe objects (1) that Tye’s argument for this claim tacitly assumes that every sentence is true, false, or indefinite, and (2) that the conclusion is any case not viable. I argue – contra (1) – that Tye’s argument (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Richard Heck (1993). A Note on the Logic of (Higher-Order) Vagueness. Analysis 53 (4):201-208.
    A discussion of Crispin Wright's 'paradox of higher-order vagueness', I suggest that the paradox may be resolved by careful attention to the logical principles used in its formulation. In particular, I focus attention on the rule of inference that allows for the inference from A to 'Definitely A', and argue that this rule, though valid, may not be used in subordinate deductions, e.g., in the course of a conditional proof. Wright's paradox uses the rule (or its equivalent) in this way.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Gerald Hull, The Eliminability of Higher Order Vagueness.
    It is generally supposed that borderline cases account for the tolerance of vague terms, yet cannot themselves be sharply bounded, leading to infinite levels of higher order vagueness. This higher order vagueness subverts any formal effort to make language precise. However, it is possible to show that tolerance must diminish at higher orders. The attempt to derive it from indiscriminability founders on a simple empirical test, and we learn instead that there is no limit to how small higher order tolerance (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Gerald Hull, Vagueness, Truth and Varzi.
    Is 'vague' vague? Is the meaning of 'true' vague? Is higher-order vagueness unavoidable? Is it possible to say precisely what it is to say something precisely? These questions, deeply interrelated and of fundamental importance to logic and semantics, have been addressed recently by Achille Varzi in articles focused on an ingenius attempt by Roy Sorensen ("An Argument for the Vagueness of 'Vague'") to demonstrate that 'vague' is vague.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Gerald Hull (2005). Vagueness and ‘Vague’: A Reply to Varzi. Mind 114 (455):689-693.
    Varzi has recently joined a thread of arguments originating in an attempt by Sorensen (1985) to demonstrate that the predicate ‘vague’ is itself vague. Sorensen's conclusion is significant in that it has provided the basis for a subsequent effort by Hyde (1994) to defend the legitimacy of supposing higher-order vagueness. Varzi's contribution to this debate is twofold. First, contra earlier criticism by Deas (1989), he claims that Sorensen's result is sound so far as it goes. Second, he argues that despite (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Dominic Hyde (2003). Higher-Orders of Vagueness Reinstated. Mind 112 (446):301-305.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Dominic Hyde (1994). Why Higher-Order Vagueness is a Pseudo-Problem. Mind 103 (409):35-41.
    Difficulties in arriving at an adequate conception of vagueness have led many writers to describe a phenomenon that has come to be known as "higher-order vagueness". Almost as many have found it to be a problem that needs to be addressed. In what follows I shall argue that, whilst we must acknowledge its presence, it is a pseudo-problem. The crucial point is the vagueness of "vague", which shows the phenomenon to be unproblematic though real enough.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Mark Jago (2013). The Problem with Truthmaker‐Gap Epistemicism. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):320-329.
    Epistemicism about vagueness is the view that vagueness, or indeterminacy, is an epistemic matter. Truthmaker-gap epistemicism is the view that indeterminate truths are indeterminate because their truth is not grounded by any worldly fact. Both epistemicism in general and truthmaker-gap epistemicism originated in Roy Sorensen's work on vagueness. My aim in this paper is to give a characterization of truthmaker-gap epistemicism and argue that the view is incompatible with higher-order vagueness: vagueness in whether some case of the form ‘it is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Anna Mahtani (2008). Can Vagueness Cut Out at Any Order? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):499 – 508.
    Could a sentence be, say, 3rd order vague, but 4th order precise? In Williamson 1999 we find an argument that seems to show that this is impossible: every sentence is either 1st order precise, 2nd order precise, or infinitely vague. The argument for this claim is unpersuasive, however, and this paper explains why.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Diana Raffman (2009). Demoting Higher-Order Vagueness. In Sebastiano Moruzzi & Richard Dietz (eds.), Cuts and Clouds. Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oxford University Press. 509--22.
    Higher-order vagueness is widely thought to be a feature of vague predicates that any adequate theory of vagueness must accommodate. It takes a variety of forms. Perhaps the most familiar is the supposed existence, or at least possibility, of higher-order borderline cases—borderline borderline cases, borderline borderline borderline cases, and so forth. A second form of higherorder vagueness, what I will call ‘prescriptive’ higher-order vagueness, is thought to characterize complex predicates constructed from vague predicates by attaching operators having to do with (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Diana Raffman (2005). Borderline Cases and Bivalence. Philosophical Review 114 (1):1-31.
    It is generally agreed that vague predicates like ‘red’, ‘rich’, ‘tall’, and ‘bald’, have borderline cases of application. For instance, a cloth patch whose color lies midway between a definite red and a definite orange is a borderline case for ‘red’, and an American man five feet eleven inches in height is (arguably) a borderline case for ‘tall’. The proper analysis of borderline cases is a matter of dispute, but most theorists of vagueness agree at least in the thought that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. David Ripley (forthcoming). Sorting Out the Sorites. In Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares & Koji Tanaka (eds.), Paraconsistent Logic (tentative title).
    Supervaluational theories of vagueness have achieved considerable popularity in the past decades, as seen in eg [5], [12]. This popularity is only natural; supervaluations let us retain much of the power and simplicity of classical logic, while avoiding the commitment to strict bivalence that strikes many as implausible. Like many nonclassical logics, the supervaluationist system SP has a natural dual, the subvaluationist system SB, explored in eg [6], [28].1 As is usual for such dual systems, the classical features of SP (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Enrique Romerales (2004). La Teoría Pragmática de la Vaguedad. Problemas Y Perspectivas (the Pragmatic Theory of Vagueness. Problems and Perspectives). Theoria 19 (1):49-75.
    Los dos grandes problemas del enfoque supervaluacionista para la vaguedad son determinar cuáles son las precisificaciones admisibles y la vaguedad de orden superior ilimitado. Apelando al uso de los términos vagos por la comunidad lingüística competente puede dividirse de forma tajante la extension de un término precisando en qué casos se aplica definidamente, en cuáles se aplica indefinidamente y en cuales es indeterminado si se aplica. Esto produce dos órdenes de vaguedad, con lo que se bloquean los argumentos sorites. Finalmente (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Mark Sainsbury (1991). Is There Higher-Order Vagueness? Philosophical Quarterly 41 (163):167-182.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. R. Sainsbury (1991). Mark: Is There Higher-Order Vagueness. Philosophical Quarterly 167:167-182.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. R. M. Sainsbury (1996). Concepts Without Boundaries. In Rosanna Keefe & Peter Smith (eds.), Vagueness: A Reader. Mit Press. 186-205.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. R. M. Sainsbury (1991). Is There Higher-Order Vagueness? Philosophical Quarterly 41 (163):167-182.
    I argue against a standard conception of classification, according to which concepts classify by drawing boundaries. This conception cannot properly account for "higher-order vagueness." I discuss in detail claims by Crispin Wright about "definitely," and its connection with higher-order vagueness. Contrary to Wright, I argue that the line between definite cases of red and borderline ones is not sharp. I suggest a new conception of classification: many concepts classify without drawing boundaries; they are boundaryless. Within this picture, there are no (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Jonathan James Salisbury, Sharp Boundaries and Supervaluationism.
    It is claimed to be a crucial advantage of supervaluationism over other theories of vagueness that it avoids any commitment to sharp boundaries. This thesis will challenge that claim and argue that almost all forms of supervaluationism are committed to infinitely sharp boundaries and that some of these boundaries are interesting enough to be problematic. I shall argue that only iterated supervaluationism can avoid any commitment to sharp boundaries, but on the other hand that is the model that Terrance Horgan (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. David H. Sanford (2002). Vague Numbers. Acta Analytica 17 (1):63-73.
    If there are vague numbers, it would be easier to use numbers as semantic values in a treatment of vagueness while avoiding precise cut-off points. When we assign a particular statement a range of values (less than 1 and greater than 0) there is no precise sharp cut-off point that locates the greatest lower bound or the least upper bound of the interval, I should like to say. Is this possible? “Vague Numbers” stands for awareness of the problem. I do (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. David H. Sanford (1975). Borderline Logic. American Philosophical Quarterly 12 (1):29-39.
    To accommodate vague statements and predicates, I propose an infinite-valued, non-truth-functional interpretation of logic on which the tautologies are exactly the tautologies of classical two-valued logic. iI introduce a determinacy operator, analogous to the necessity operator in alethic modal logic, to allow the definition of first-order and higher-order borderline cases. On the interpretation proposed for determinacy, every statement corresponding to a theorem of modal system T is a logical truth, and I conjecture that every logical truth on the interpretation corresponds (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Stewart Shapiro & Patrick Greenough (2005). Stewart Shapiro. Context, Conversation, and so-Called 'Higher-Order Vagueness'. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):147–165.
    After a brief account of the problem of higher-order vagueness, and its seeming intractability, I explore what comes of the issue on a linguistic, contextualist account of vagueness. On the view in question, predicates like ‘borderline red’ and ‘determinately red’ are, or at least can be, vague, but they are different in kind from ‘red’. In particular, ‘borderline red’ and ‘determinately red’ are not colours. These predicates have linguistic components, and invoke notions like ‘competent user of the language’. On my (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Nicholas J. J. Smith (2011). Fuzzy Logic and Higher-Order Vagueness. In Petr Cintula, Christian G. Fermüller, Lluis Godo & Petr Hájek (eds.), Understanding Vagueness: Logical, Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives. College Publications. 1--19.
    The major reason given in the philosophical literature for dissatisfaction with theories of vagueness based on fuzzy logic is that such theories give rise to a problem of higherorder vagueness or artificial precision. In this paper I first outline the problem and survey suggested solutions: fuzzy epistemicism; measuring truth on an ordinal scale; logic as modelling; fuzzy metalanguages; blurry sets; and fuzzy plurivaluationism. I then argue that in order to decide upon a solution, we need to understand the true nature (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Nicholas J. J. Smith (2004). Vagueness and Blurry Sets. Journal of Philosophical Logic 33 (2):165-235.
    This paper presents a new theory of vagueness, which is designed to retain the virtues of the fuzzy theory, while avoiding the problem of higher-order vagueness. The theory presented here accommodates the idea that for any statement S₁ to the effect that 'Bob is bald' is x true, for x in [0, 1], there should be a further statement S₂ which tells us how true S₁ is, and so on - that is, it accommodates higher-order vagueness without resorting to the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Scott Soames (2003). Higher-Order Vagueness for Partially Defined Predicates. In JC Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    A theory of higher-order vagueness for partially-defined, context-sensitive predicates like is blue is offered. According to the theory, the predicate is determinately blue means roughly is an object o such that the claim that o is blue is a necessary consequence of the rules of the language plus the underlying non-linguistic facts in the world. Because the question of which rules count as rules of the language is itself vague, the predicate is determinately blue is both vague and partial in (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. R. Sorensen (2010). Borderline Hermaphrodites: Higher-Order Vagueness by Example. Mind 119 (474):393-408.
    The Pyrrhonian sceptic Favorinus of Arelata personified indeterminacy, cultivating his (or her) borderline status to undermine dogmatism. Inspired by the techniques of Favorinus, I show, by example, that ‘vague’ has borderline cases. These concrete steps lead to a more abstract argument that ‘vague’ has borderline borderline cases and borderline borderline borderline cases. My specimens are intended supplement earlier non-constructive proofs of the vagueness of ‘vague’.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Roy Sorensen (2009). Meta-Agnosticism: Higher Order Epistemic Possibility. Mind 118 (471):777-784.
    In ‘Epistemic Modals’ (2007), Seth Yalcin proposes Stalnaker-style semantics for epistemic possibility. He is inspired by John MacFarlane’s ingenious defence of relativism, in which claims of epistemic possibility are made rigidly from the perspective of the assessor’s actual stock of information (rather than from the speaker’s knowledge base or that of his audience or community). The innovations of MacFarlane and Yalcin independently reinforce the modal collapse espoused by Jaakko Hintikka in his 1962 epistemic logic (which relied on the implausible KK (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Roy A. Sorensen (1985). An Argument for the Vagueness of 'Vague'. Analysis 45 (3):134 - 137.
    The argument proceeds by exploiting the gradually decreasing vagueness of a certain sequence of predicates. the vagueness of 'vague' is then used to show that the thesis that all vague predicates are incoherent is self-defeating. a second casualty is the view that the probems of vagueness can be avoided by restricting the scope of logic to nonvague predicates.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 60