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  1. Donald C. Abel (1993). Western Conceptions of the Individual. [REVIEW] Review of Metaphysics 46 (4):863-864.
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  2. Joe Barnhardt (1998). Dissociation. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 5 (2/3):33-37.
    My hypothesis is that human personhood has ancient biological roots which make it possible for social reinforcers to contribute to the gradual construction of real persons who are always deeper than the stories about them. Multiple persons do sometimes emerge from one human organism. Rather than try to prove they are real, I explore the consequences of assuming them to be genuine emergentsthat become social environment to one another. I suggest that the multiple-persons phenomenon has profoundly influenced the development of (...)
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  3. Stephan Blatti, Animalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Among the questions to be raised under the heading of “personal identity” are these: “What are we?” (fundamental nature question) and “Under what conditions do we persist through time?” (persistence question). Against the dominant neo-Lockean approach to these questions, the view known as animalism answers that each of us is an organism of the species Homo sapiens and that the conditions of our persistence are those of animals. Beyond describing the content and historical background of animalism and its rivals, this (...)
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  4. Ruth Boeker (2014). The Moral Dimension in Locke's Account of Persons and Personal Identity. History of Philosophy Quarterly 31 (3):229-247.
    I offer an interpretation of John Locke’s account of persons and personal identity that gives full credit to Locke’s claim that “person” is a forensic term, sheds new light on the relation between Locke’s characterizations of a person in sections 9 and 26, and explains how Locke links his moral and legal account of personhood to his account of personal identity in terms of sameness of consciousness. I show that Locke’s claim that sameness of consciousness is necessary for personal identity (...)
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  5. Ruth Boeker, John Locke: Identity, Persons, and Personal Identity. Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy.
    John Locke offered a very rich and influential account of persons and personal identity in “Of Identity and Diversity,” which is chapter 27 of Book 2 of his An Essay concerning Human Understanding. He added it to the second edition in 1694 upon the recommendation of his friend William Molyneux. Locke’s theory was soon after its publication discussed by his contemporaries and has influenced many present-day discussions of personal identity. Distinctive about Locke’s theory is that he argues that the notion (...)
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  6. Ruth Boeker (2013). Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment. [REVIEW] British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (4):803-6.
  7. Barry Dainton (2012). Self-Hood and the Flow of Experience. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):161-200.
    Analytic philosophy in the 20 th century was largely hostile territory to the self as traditionally conceived, and this tradition has been continued in two recent works: Mark Johnston’s Surviving Death , and Galen Strawson’s Selves . I have argued previously that it is perfectly possible to combine a naturalistic worldview with a conception of the self as a subject of experience , a thing whose only essential attribute is a capacity for unifi ed and continuous experience. I argue here (...)
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  8. Lloyd P. Gerson (1992). The Discovery of the Self in Antiquity. The Personalist Forum 8 (1):249-257.
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  9. Amihud Gilead (2008). A Humean Argument for Personal Identity. Metaphysica 9 (1):1-16.
    Considering various arguments in Hume’s Treatise, I reconstruct a Humean argument against personal identity or unity. According to this argument, each distinct perception is separable from the bundle of perceptions to which it belongs and is thus transferable either to the external, material reality or to another psychical reality, another bundle of perceptions. Nevertheless, such transference (Hume’s word!) is entirely illegitimate, otherwise Hume’s argument against causal inference would have failed; furthermore, it violates private, psychical accessibility. I suggest a Humean thought (...)
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  10. James Giles (1997). No Self to Be Found: The Search for Personal Identity. University Press of America.
    This book is a exploration of the notion of personal identity. Here it is shown how the various attempts to give an account of personal identity are all based on false assumptions and so inevitably run aground. One of the first Western thinkers to realize this was David Hume, the 18th century empiricist philosopher who argued that self was a fiction. A new interpretation of Hume's no-self theory is put forward by arguing for an eliminative rather than a reductive point (...)
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  11. Mihretu P. Guta (2015). 'Editorial Introduction' in Mihretu P. Guta and Sophie Gibb (Eds.). Insights Into the First-Person Perspective and the Self: An Interdisciplinary Approach. Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (11-22):8-19.
    The essays in this volume focus on the notion of the first-person pro-noun ‘I’, the notion of the self or person,1 and the notion of the first-person perspective. Let us call these the three notions. Ever since Descartes set the initial tone in his Meditations, modern philosophical controversies concerning the three notions have continued unabated. Part of the reason for ongoing debates has to do with the sorts of questions that the three notions give rise to.
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  12. Paul Helm (1979). Locke's Theory of Personal Identity. Philosophy 54 (208):173 - 185.
    It is widely held that Locke propounded a theory of personal identity in terms of consciousness and memory. By ‘theory’ here is meant a set of necessary and sufficient conditions indicating what personal identity consists in. It is also held that this theory is open to obvious and damaging objections, so much so that it has to be supplemented in terms of bodily continuity, either because memory alone is not sufficient, or because the concept of memory is itself dependent upon (...)
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  13. Robert S. Henderson (1990). David Hume on Personal Identity and the Indirect Passions. Hume Studies 16 (1):33-44.
  14. Ben Larson, Locke Against Himself: The Case For Re-Evaluating the "Lockean" Concept of Personal Identity.
  15. Alejandro Pérez (2016). La question métaphysique de l’identité d’un point de vue aristotélicien : L’hylémorphisme (d’Aristote), l’ADN (de Berti) et l’essence (de Lowe). Scientia Et Fides 4 (1):1-15.
    Can we reify the form of a substance? Is it possible to identify DNA as the principle of our personal and numerical identity? These questions will be studied through Berti’s reading of Aristotle’s hylomorphism. Indeed, Enrico Berti proposes the identification of the DNA to the Aristotelian notion of form, thesis which raises many questions from an exegetical point of view and a metaphysical perspective. We will present the sources of Berti’s reading and one of the main objections made by Aristotle. (...)
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  16. Markku Roinila (2015). Affects and Activity in Leibniz's De Affectibus. In Adrian Nita (ed.), Leibniz’s Metaphysics and Adoption of Substantial Forms: Between Continuity and Transformation. Springer 73-88.
    In this paper I will discuss the doctrine of substance which emerges from Leibniz’s unpublished early memoir De affectibus of 1679. The memoir marks a new stage in Leibniz’s views of the mind. The motivation for this change can be found in Leibniz’s rejection of the Cartesian theory of passion and action in the 1670s. His early Aristotelianism and some features of Cartesianism persisted to which Leibniz added influences from Hobbes and Spinoza. His nascent dynamical concept of substance is seemingly (...)
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  17. Abe Roth (2013). The Evident Connexion: Hume on Personal Identity by Galen Strawson. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 51 (3):491-492.
    Hume understands identity as “invariableness and uninterruptedness” through a supposed change in time, something true only of objects he calls steadfast. And Hume discerns nothing steadfast about the mind or self—nothing like a substance or soul underlying the changing and interrupted succession of perceptions we experience in ourselves. I nevertheless think of myself as the same person over time. A central concern of the Treatise discussion of personal identity is to give a psychological explanation of how we arrive at this (...)
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  18. Abraham Sesshu Roth (2000). What Was Hume's Problem with Personal Identity? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):91-114.
    An appreciation of Hume’s psychology of object identity allows us to recognize certain tensions in his discussion of the origin of our belief in personal identity---tensions which have gone largely unnoticed in the secondary literature. This will serve to provide a new solution to the problem of explaining why Hume finds that discussion of personal identity so problematic when he famously disavows it in the Appendix to the Treatise. It turns out that the two psychological mechanisms which respectively generate the (...)
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  19. Robert J. Roth (1990). Hume and James on Personal Identity. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 64 (2):233-247.
  20. Alan Schwerin (2012). Hume on the Self. Metaphysica 13 (1):65-85.
    In the Treatise Hume argues that a person is “nothing but a bundle of perceptions”. But what precisely is the meaning of this bundle thesis of a person? In my paper, an attempt is made to articulate two plausible interpretations of this controversial view and to identify and evaluate a number of problems for this thesis that is central to Hume’s account of the self.
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  21. Daniel R. Siakel (2014). The Dynamic Process of Being : Two Process-Ontological Theories of Personal Identity. Process Studies 43 (2):4-28.
    The purpose of this article is to introduce, interpret, and develop two incompatible process -ontological theories of personal identity that have received little attention in analytic metaphysics. The first theory derives from the notion of personal identity proposed in Alfred North Whitehead’s philosophy, but I interpret this notion differently from previous commentators. The Whiteheadian theory may appeal to those who believe that personal identity involves an entity or entities that (...)
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  22. Anne Sophie Spann (2012). Endlichkeit ohne Unendlichkeit? Anmerkungen zu Heideggers Wegkreuzung mit Hegel im Seinsproblem. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 119 119 (2):283-316.
    In destructing traditional metaphysics, Heidegger accuses German Idealism of eliminating the finite in favour of the infinite. Particularly Hegel is criticized for ignoring the true finitude of Dasein and thereby misinterpreting being as infinite absolute. The paper explores this criticism in three steps. First, the main features of Heidegger’s early metaphysics of finite Dasein as developed in Being and Time will be traced, followed, second, by an examination of Heidegger’s claim that Hegel’s absolute has a temporal-finite origin. Taking a closer (...)
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  23. Clay Davis Splawn, Parfit, Personal Identity, and What Matters.
    The problem of personal identity has vexed philosophers since its initial formulation by John Locke. He argued that "person" is a distinct ontological entity' y from "man." In so doing, he initiated a separation of the physical and psychological which nearly all later philosophers follow. Some, unsatisfied by Locke's preference for the psychological, argue that physicality is the essential feature of personhood. Others, more inclined to support Locke, argue that psychology is the essential feature. A large portion of the discussion (...)
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  24. Jim Stone (1981). Hume on Identity: A Defense. Philosophical Studies 40 (2):275 - 282.