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  1. Donald C. Abel (1993). Western Conceptions of the Individual. Review of Metaphysics 46 (4):863-864.
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  2. Joe Barnhardt (1998). Dissociation. Philosophy in the Contemporary World 5 (2/3):33-37.
    My hypothesis is that human personhood has ancient biological roots which make it possible for social reinforcers to contribute to the gradual construction of real persons who are always deeper than the stories about them. Multiple persons do sometimes emerge from one human organism. Rather than try to prove they are real, I explore the consequences of assuming them to be genuine emergentsthat become social environment to one another. I suggest that the multiple-persons phenomenon has profoundly influenced the development of (...)
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  3. Stephan Blatti, Animalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Among the questions to be raised under the heading of “personal identity” are these: “What are we?” (fundamental nature question) and “Under what conditions do we persist through time?” (persistence question). Against the dominant neo-Lockean approach to these questions, the view known as animalism answers that each of us is an organism of the species Homo sapiens and that the conditions of our persistence are those of animals. Beyond describing the content and historical background of animalism and its rivals, this (...)
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  4. Ruth Boeker (2014). The Moral Dimension in Locke's Account of Persons and Personal Identity. History of Philosophy Quarterly 31 (3):229-247.
    I offer an interpretation of John Locke’s account of persons and personal identity that gives full credit to Locke’s claim that “person” is a forensic term, sheds new light on the relation between Locke’s characterizations of a person in sections 9 and 26, and explains how Locke links his moral and legal account of personhood to his account of personal identity in terms of sameness of consciousness. I show that Locke’s claim that sameness of consciousness is necessary for personal identity (...)
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  5. Ruth Boeker, John Locke: Identity, Persons, and Personal Identity. Oxford Bibliographies in Philosophy.
  6. Ruth Boeker (2013). Locke on Personal Identity: Consciousness and Concernment. [REVIEW] British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (4):803-6.
  7. Barry Dainton (2012). Self-Hood and the Flow of Experience. Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):161-200.
    Analytic philosophy in the 20 th century was largely hostile territory to the self as traditionally conceived, and this tradition has been continued in two recent works: Mark Johnston’s Surviving Death , and Galen Strawson’s Selves . I have argued previously that it is perfectly possible to combine a naturalistic worldview with a conception of the self as a subject of experience , a thing whose only essential attribute is a capacity for unifi ed and continuous experience. I argue here (...)
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  8. Lloyd P. Gerson (1992). The Discovery of the Self in Antiquity. The Personalist Forum 8 (1):249-257.
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  9. Amihud Gilead (2008). A Humean Argument for Personal Identity. Metaphysica 9 (1):1-16.
    Considering various arguments in Hume’s Treatise, I reconstruct a Humean argument against personal identity or unity. According to this argument, each distinct perception is separable from the bundle of perceptions to which it belongs and is thus transferable either to the external, material reality or to another psychical reality, another bundle of perceptions. Nevertheless, such transference (Hume’s word!) is entirely illegitimate, otherwise Hume’s argument against causal inference would have failed; furthermore, it violates private, psychical accessibility. I suggest a Humean thought (...)
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  10. James Giles (1997). No Self to Be Found: The Search for Personal Identity. University Press of America.
    This book is a exploration of the notion of personal identity. Here it is shown how the various attempts to give an account of personal identity are all based on false assumptions and so inevitably run aground. One of the first Western thinkers to realize this was David Hume, the 18th century empiricist philosopher who argued that self was a fiction. A new interpretation of Hume's no-self theory is put forward by arguing for an eliminative rather than a reductive point (...)
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  11. Paul Helm (1979). Locke's Theory of Personal Identity. Philosophy 54 (208):173 - 185.
    It is widely held that Locke propounded a theory of personal identity in terms of consciousness and memory. By ‘theory’ here is meant a set of necessary and sufficient conditions indicating what personal identity consists in. It is also held that this theory is open to obvious and damaging objections, so much so that it has to be supplemented in terms of bodily continuity, either because memory alone is not sufficient, or because the concept of memory is itself dependent upon (...)
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  12. Robert S. Henderson (1990). David Hume on Personal Identity and the Indirect Passions. Hume Studies 16 (1):33-44.
  13. Ben Larson, Locke Against Himself: The Case For Re-Evaluating the "Lockean" Concept of Personal Identity.
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  14. Abe Roth (2013). The Evident Connexion: Hume on Personal Identity by Galen Strawson. [REVIEW] Journal of the History of Philosophy 51 (3):491-492.
    Hume understands identity as “invariableness and uninterruptedness” through a supposed change in time, something true only of objects he calls steadfast. And Hume discerns nothing steadfast about the mind or self—nothing like a substance or soul underlying the changing and interrupted succession of perceptions we experience in ourselves. I nevertheless think of myself as the same person over time. A central concern of the Treatise discussion of personal identity is to give a psychological explanation of how we arrive at this (...)
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  15. Abraham Sesshu Roth (2000). What Was Hume's Problem with Personal Identity? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):91-114.
    An appreciation of Hume’s psychology of object identity allows us to recognize certain tensions in his discussion of the origin of our belief in personal identity---tensions which have gone largely unnoticed in the secondary literature. This will serve to provide a new solution to the problem of explaining why Hume finds that discussion of personal identity so problematic when he famously disavows it in the Appendix to the Treatise. It turns out that the two psychological mechanisms which respectively generate the (...)
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  16. Robert J. Roth (1990). Hume and James on Personal Identity. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 64 (2):233-247.
  17. Alan Schwerin (2012). Hume on the Self. Metaphysica 13 (1):65-85.
    In the Treatise Hume argues that a person is “nothing but a bundle of perceptions”. But what precisely is the meaning of this bundle thesis of a person? In my paper, an attempt is made to articulate two plausible interpretations of this controversial view and to identify and evaluate a number of problems for this thesis that is central to Hume’s account of the self.
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  18. Anne Sophie Spann (2012). Endlichkeit ohne Unendlichkeit? Anmerkungen zu Heideggers Wegkreuzung mit Hegel im Seinsproblem. Philosophisches Jahrbuch 119 119 (2):283-316.
    In destructing traditional metaphysics, Heidegger accuses German Idealism of eliminating the finite in favour of the infinite. Particularly Hegel is criticized for ignoring the true finitude of Dasein and thereby misinterpreting being as infinite absolute. The paper explores this criticism in three steps. First, the main features of Heidegger’s early metaphysics of finite Dasein as developed in Being and Time will be traced, followed, second, by an examination of Heidegger’s claim that Hegel’s absolute has a temporal-finite origin. Taking a closer (...)
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  19. Clay Davis Splawn, Parfit, Personal Identity, and What Matters.
    The problem of personal identity has vexed philosophers since its initial formulation by John Locke. He argued that "person" is a distinct ontological entity' y from "man." In so doing, he initiated a separation of the physical and psychological which nearly all later philosophers follow. Some, unsatisfied by Locke's preference for the psychological, argue that physicality is the essential feature of personhood. Others, more inclined to support Locke, argue that psychology is the essential feature. A large portion of the discussion (...)
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  20. Jim Stone (1981). Hume on Identity: A Defense. Philosophical Studies 40 (2):275 - 282.