About this topic
Summary This sub-category contains works that primarily focus on the interpretation of the views on self-knowledge of historically important authors or philosophical traditions.
  Show all references
Related categories
Siblings:
22 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Shadi Bartsch (2006). The Mirror of the Self: Sexuality, Self-Knowledge, and the Gaze in the Early Roman Empire. University of Chicago Press.
    People in the ancient world thought of vision as both an ethical tool and a tactile sense, akin to touch. Gazing upon someone—or oneself—was treated as a path to philosophical self-knowledge, but the question of tactility introduced an erotic element as well. In The Mirror of the Self , Shadi Bartsch asserts that these links among vision, sexuality, and self-knowledge are key to the classical understanding of the self. Weaving together literary theory, philosophy, and social history, Bartsch traces this complex (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Hugh H. Benson (2003). A Note on Socratic Self-Knowledge in the Charmides. Ancient Philosophy 23 (1):31-47.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Deborah L. Black (1993). Consciousness and Self-Knowledge in Aquinas's Critique of Averroes's Psychology. Journal of the History of Philosophy 31 (3):349-385.
  4. Eva T. H. Brann (1998). Self-Knowledge in the Age of Theory. New Vico Studies 16:101-104.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Thomas C. Brickhouse (1992). Self-Knowledge in Plato's Phaedrus. Ancient Philosophy 12 (1):187-189.
  6. Sara Brill (2007). Review Articles. Research in Phenomenology 37 (3):456-463.
  7. William C. Chittick (2001). The Heart of Islamic Philosophy: The Quest for Self-Knowledge in the Teachings of Afḍal Al-Dīn Kāshānī. Oxford University Press.
    This book introduces the work of an important medieval Islamic philosopher who is little known outside the Persian world. Afdal al-Din Kashani was a contemporary of a number of important Muslim thinkers, including Averroes and Ibn al-Arabi. Kashani did not write for advanced students of philosophy but rather for beginners. In the main body of his work, he offers especially clear and insightful expositions of various philosophical positions, making him an invaluable resource for those who would like to learn the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. N. K. Gavrtushin & F. M. Dostoevsky (2000). Self-Knowledge as a Mystery. Russian Studies in Philosophy 39 (3):55-88.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Paul Katsafanas (forthcoming). Kant and Nietzsche on Self-Knowledge. In João Constâncio (ed.), Nietzsche and the Problem of Subjectivity.
    Kant recognizes two distinct forms of self-knowledge: introspection, which gives us knowledge of our sensations, and apperception, which is knowledge of our own activities. Both modes of self-knowledge can go astray, and are particularly prone to being distorted be selfish motives; thus, neither is guaranteed to provide us with comprehensive self-knowledge. Nietzsche departs from Kant in arguing that these two modes of self-knowledge (1) are not distinct and (2) are far more limited than Kant acknowledges. In addition, Nietzsche departs from (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Kiki Kennedy-Day (2006). The Heart of Islamic Philosophy: The Quest for Self-Knowledge in the Teachings of Afdal Al-Din Kashani (Review). Philosophy East and West 56 (1):180-182.
  11. Shinya Moriyama (2010). On Self-Awareness in the Sautrāntika Epistemology. Journal of Indian Philosophy 38 (3):261-277.
    This paper aims to examine the role of self-awareness ( svasaṃvedana ) for the Sautrāntika epistemological tenet known as the doctrine that cognition has a form ( sākārajñānavāda ). According to this theory, we perceive external objects indirectly through the mental forms that these objects throw into our minds, and this cognitive act is interpreted as self-awareness. However, if one were to interpret the cognitive act such that the subjective mental form ( grāhakākāra/svābhāsa ) grasps the objective mental form, the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Anna Mudde (2010). Thoughtful Theory and the Possibility of Reflexive Subjectivity. Dissertation, York University
    In this dissertation, I develop a post-reflexive philosophical account of self-knowing subjectivity. I argue that ambiguity, not clarity, is the hallmark of intersubjective being and knowing, and that ambiguous being is particularly evident precisely where subjectivity occupies a central place: in theory. To illustrate this claim, I turn to the ubiquitous and indispensable technology of the glassy mirror, a material object and discursive trope which I use to enliven the Beauvoirean concept of situation: a lived ambiguity of being both subject (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Anna Mudde (2008). Karen Barad's Agential Realism and Reflexive Epistemic Authority. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 25:65-75.
    Feminist and post-colonial epistemologists, philosophers of science, and thinkers more generally may find themselves in a distinct form of difficult situation regarding their access to and authority over knowledge within the academic world. Because feminist and post-colonial approaches to knowledge require an acute awareness of relations of domination and the ways in which these pervade the social and epistemic world, it is often difficult to know how to proceed in making theory. These theorists are in particularly ripe positions to benefit (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Catherine Osborne (1983). Aristotle, De Anima 3. 2: How Do We Perceive That We See and Hear? Classical Quarterly 33 (02):401-411.
    The second chapter of book three of the De anima marks the end of Aristotle's discussion of sense-perception. The chapter is a long one and apparently rambling in subject matter. It begins with a passage that is usually taken as a discussion of some sort of self-awareness, particularly awareness that one is perceiving, although such an interpretation raises some difficulties. This paper reconsiders the problems raised by supposing that the question discussed in the first paragraph is ‘how do we perceive (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Emer O.’Hagan (2009). Moral Self-Knowledge in Kantian Ethics. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):525 - 537.
    Kant’s duty of self-knowledge demands that one know one’s heart—the quality of one’s will in relation to duty. Self-knowledge requires that an agent subvert feelings which fuel self-aggrandizing narratives and increase self-conceit; she must adopt the standpoint of the rational agent constrained by the requirements of reason in order to gain information about her moral constitution. This is not I argue, contra Nancy Sherman, in order to assess the moral goodness of her conduct. Insofar as sound moral practice requires moral (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Stanley Rosen (1974). Self-Consciousness and Self-Knowledge in Plato and Hegel. Hegel-Studien 9:109-129.
  17. Preston Stovall (2007). Hegel's Realism: The Implicit Metaphysics of Self-Knowledge. Review of Metaphysics 61 (1):81-117.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Amie L. Thomasson (2005). First-Person Knowledge in Phenomenology. In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 115--138.
    An account of the source of first-person knowledge is essential not just for phenomenology, but for anyone who takes seriously the apparent evidence that we each have a distinctive access to knowing what we experience. One standard way to account for the source of first-person knowledge is by appeal to a kind of inner observation of the passing contents of one’s own mind, and phenomenology is often thought to rely on introspection. I argue, however, that Husserl’s method of phenomenological reduction (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. K. N. Upadhyaya (1991). Śa Dot Ndot Nkara on Reason, Scriptural Authority and Self-Knowledge. Journal of Indian Philosophy 19 (2):121-132.
  20. Jonathan Vogel (1993). The Problem of Self-Knowledge in Kant's "Refutation of Idealism": Two Recent Views. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):875-887.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Owen Ware (2009). The Duty of Self-Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):671-698.
    Kant is well known for claiming that we can never really know our true moral disposition. He is less well known for claiming that the injunction "Know Yourself" is the basis of all self-regarding duties. Taken together, these two claims seem contradictory. My aim in this paper is to show how they can be reconciled. I first address the question of whether the duty of self-knowledge is logically coherent (§1). I then examine some of the practical problems surrounding the duty, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. William/fnms> Wilkerson (2000). Knowledge of Self, Knowledge of Others, Error; and the Place of Consciousness. Continental Philosophy Review 33 (1):27-42.
    "Knowledge of self, knowledge of others, error and the place of consciousness" examines texts and problems from the phenomenological tradition to show that the other does not present her/himself as a consciousness enclosed in a merely material body. I discuss Merleau-Ponty''s attempt to supplant this view with the view that the other is always seen as an "incarnate consciousness" - a unity of mind and body in activity. This view faces a difficulty in that it seems to collapse the distinction (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation