This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
17 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Roberto Casati, Holes. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Roberto Casati & Achille Varzi (forthcoming). Holes. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi (2004). Counting the Holes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):23 – 27.
    Argle claimed that holes supervene on their material hosts, and that every truth about holes boils down to a truth about perforated things. This may well be right, assuming holes are perforations. But we still need an explicit theory of holes to do justice to the ordinary way of counting holes--or so says Cargle.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi (2004). Counting the Holes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):23 – 27.
    Argle claimed that holes supervene on their material hosts, and that every truth about holes boils down to a truth about perforated things. This may well be right, assuming holes are perforations. But we still need an explicit theory of holes to do justice to the ordinary way of counting holes--or so says Cargle.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi (2004). Counting the Holes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):23 – 27.
    Argle claimed that holes supervene on their material hosts, and that every truth about holes boils down to a truth about perforated things. This may well be right, assuming holes are perforations. But we still need an explicit theory of holes to do justice to the ordinary way of counting holes--or so says Cargle.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Roberto Casati & Achille C. Varzi (2000). Topological Essentialism. Philosophical Studies 100 (3):217-236.
    Your left and right hands are now touching each other. This could have been otherwise; but could your hands not be attached to the rest of your body? Sue is now putting the doughnut on the coffe table. She could have left it in the box; but could she have left only the hole in the box? Could her doughnut be holeless? Could it have two holes instead? Could the doughnut have a different hole than the one it has? Some (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Cody Gilmore (2013). Slots in Universals. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8:187-233.
    Slot theory is the view that (i) there exist such entities as argument places, or ‘slots’, in universals, and that (ii) a universal u is n-adic if and only if there are n slots in u. I argue that those who take properties and relations to be abundant, fine-grained, non-set-theoretical entities face pressure to be slot theorists. I note that slots permit a natural account of the notion of adicy. I then consider a series of ‘slot-free’ accounts of that notion (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. David Lewis & Stephanie Lewis (1996). Review of Roberto Casati and Achille Varzi, o Les. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 105 (1):77-79.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. David Lewis & Stephanie Lewis (1970). Holes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):206 – 212.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Phillip John Meadows (2013). What Angles Can Tell Us About What Holes Are Not. Erkenntnis 78 (2):319-331.
    In this paper I argue that holes are not objects, but should instead be construed as properties or relations. The argument proceeds by first establishing a claim about angles: that angles are not objects, but properties or relations. It is then argued that holes and angles belong to the same category, on the grounds that they share distinctive existence and identity conditions. This provides an argument in favour of categorizing holes as one categorizes angles. I then argue that a commitment (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Achille Varzi, Holes [Encyclopedia Entry].
    A brief introduction to the main philosophical problems and theories about the nature of holes and such-like nothingnesses.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Achille Varzi, Doughnuts.
    In classical topology the only part of a doughnut that matters is the edible part. Here I review some good reasons for reversing the order and focusing on the hole instead. By studying the topology of the hole one can learn interesting things about the morphology of the doughnut (its shape), and by studying the morphology of the hole in turn one can learn a lot about the doughnut’s dynamic properties (its patterns of interaction with the environment). The price--of course--is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Achille Varzi, Holes. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Holes are an interesting case-study for ontologists and epistemologists. Naive, untutored descriptions of the world treat holes as objects of reference, on a par with ordinary material objects. (‘There are as many holes in the cheese as there are cookies in the tin.’) And we often appeal to holes to account for causal interactions, or to explain the occurrence of certain events. (‘The water ran out because of the hole in the bucket.’) Hence there is..
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Achille Varzi (2004). Counting the Holes. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):23-27.
    Argle claimed that holes supervene on their material hosts, and that every truth about holes boils down to a truth about perforated things. This may well be right, assuming holes are perforations. But we still need an explicit theory of holes to do justice to the ordinary way of counting holes--or so says Cargle.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Achille Varzi (2003). Reasoning About Space: The Hole Story. Logic and Logical Philosophy 4:3-39.
    Much of our naive reasoning about space involves reasoning about holes and holed objects. We put things in holes, through holes, around them; we jump out of a hole or fall into one; we compare holes, measure them, enlarge them, fill them up.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Andrew Wake, Joshua Spencer & Gregory Fowler (2007). Holes as Regions of Spacetime. The Monist 90 (3):372-378.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Andrew Wake, Joshua Spencer & Gregory Fowler (2007). Holes as Regions of Spacetime. The Monist 90 (3):372-378.
    We discuss the view that a hole is identical to the region of spacetime at which it is located. This view is more parsimonious than the view that holes are sui generus entities located at those regions surrounded by their hosts and it is more plausible than the view that there are no holes. We defend the spacetime view from several objections.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation