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  1. A New Scene of Thought: On Waldow's Experience Embodied[REVIEW]Graham Clay - 2023 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (2):211-220.
    In her book Experience Embodied, Anik Waldow challenges and reimagines the traditional interpretative approach to the concept of experience in the early modern period. Traditionally, commentators have emphasized early moderns’ views on the first-person perspective and eschewed the relevance of our embodiment to their epistemological outlooks. My focus here is on Waldow’s chapter on Hume, wherein she analyzes Hume’s account of our capacity for reflective moral judgment, arguing that he understands it as natural despite the countless ways in which our (...)
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  2. Hume on Calm Passions, Moral Sentiments, and the "Common Point of View".James Chamberlain - 2022 - Hume Studies 47 (1):79-101.
    I argue for a thorough reinterpretation of Hume’s “common point of view” thesis, at least within his moral Enquiry. Hume is typically understood to argue that we correct for sympathetically produced variations in our moral sentiments, by undertaking an imaginative exercise. I argue that Hume cannot consistently claim this, because he argues that we automatically experience the same degree of the same moral sentiment towards all tokens of any one type of character trait. I then argue that, in his Enquiry (...)
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  3. Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, Hume, Passions, and Action (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2018). [REVIEW]Lorenzo Greco - 2021 - Rivista di Filosofia 112 (1):175-77.
  4. Hume's emotivist theory of moral judgements.James Chamberlain - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):1058-1072.
    Hume is believed by many to hold an emotivist thesis, according to which all expressions of moral judgements are expressions of moral sentiments. However, most specialist scholars of Hume either deny that this is Hume's position or believe that he has failed to argue convincingly for it. I argue that Hume is an emotivist, and that his true arguments for emotivism have been hitherto overlooked. Readers seeking to understand Hume's theory of moral judgements have traditionally looked to the first section (...)
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  5. Two Different Perspectives of MacIntyre on Hume: Revisiting Alasdair MacIntyre’s Approach to David Hume’s Moral Philosophy.Eli̇f Nur Erkan Balci - 2016 - Sakarya Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi 18 (34):31-31.
    Alasdair MacIntyre criticizes the modern morality for having emotivist features and in his cent- ral book After Virtue he points out that David Hume is the main personality who provides these emotivist contents to the modern morality. According to MacIntyre, Hume’s and the modern emotivist moral philosophy include fundamental contrasts generally with the classical moral tradition particularly with Aristotle’s moral philosophy. However, MacIntyre underlines these contrasts in After Virtue, he in his other texts out of After Virtue, distinguishably brings Hume (...)
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  6. Charles R. Pigden : Hume on Is and Ought: Palgrave Macmillan, Hampshire, 2010, xiv + 352 pp, ISBN: 978-0-230-20520-8, GBP 74.00.David Hommen - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1419-1422.
    Within a single paragraph in his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume prompted what has become one of the most central orthodoxies in ethical theory: the thesis that one cannot derive what ought to be from what there is. In the aftermath of Hume’s seminal discussion, the No-Ought-From-Is-thesis has obtained approval among moral theorists to the point that it has been assigned the status of an undisputed ‘law’. As common with commonplaces in philosophy, alas, both the exact content and argument (...)
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  7. Snare's puzzle/Hume's purpose: Non-cognitivism and what Hume was really up to with no-ought-from-is.Charles Pigden - 2010 - In Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Frank Snare had a puzzle. Noncognitivism implies No-Ought-From-Is but No- Ought-From-Is does not imply non-cognitivism. How then can we derive non-cognitivism from No-Ought-From-Is? Via an abductive argument. If we combine non-cognitivism with the conservativeness of logic (the idea that in a valid argument the conclusion is contained in the premises), this implies No-Ought-From-Is. Hence if No-Ought-From-Is is true, we can arrive at non-cognitivism via an inference to the best explanation. With prescriptivism we can make this argument more precise. I develop (...)
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  8. If not non-cognitivism, then what?Charles R. Pigden - 2009 - In Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Taking my cue from Michael Smith, I try to extract a decent argument for non-cognitivism from the text of the Treatise. I argue that the premises are false and that the whole thing rests on a petitio principi. I then re-jig the argument so as to support that conclusion that Hume actually believed (namely that an action is virtuous if it would excite the approbation of a suitably qualified spectator). This argument too rests on false premises and a begged question. (...)
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  9. The motivation argument for non-cognitivism.Michael Smith - 2009 - In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 105.
  10. Hume's moral philosophy.Rachel Cohon - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Hume's position in ethics, which is based on his empiricist theory of the mind, is best known for asserting four theses: (1) Reason alone cannot be a motive to the will, but rather is the slave of the passions (see Section 3) (2) Moral distinctions are not derived from reason (see Section 4). (3) Moral distinctions are derived from the moral sentiments: feelings of approval (esteem, praise) and disapproval (blame) felt by spectators who contemplate a character trait or action (see (...)
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  11. Hume's Metaethics: Is Hume a Moral Noncognitivist?Nicholas L. Sturgeon - 2008 - In Elizabeth Radcliffe (ed.), The Blackwell Companion to Hume. Blackwell.
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  12. "Hume's Reasons".Aaron Zimmerman - 2007 - Hume Studies 2 (33):211-256.
    Hume's claim that reason is a slave to the passions involves both a causal thesis: reason cannot cause action without the aid of the passions, and an evaluative thesis: it is improper to evaluate our actions in terms of their reasonableness. On my reading, Hume motivates his causal thesis by arguing that accurate representation is the function of reason, where a faculty of this kind cannot produce action on its own. (The interpretation helps vindicate Hume of the common charge that (...)
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  13. The Ethics of Performance in Shelley's "the Cenci".Scott Edward Boehnen - 2000 - Dissertation, Stanford University
    This thesis challenges a key assumption of criticism of Percy Bysshe Shelley since 1970; namely, that the poet's absorption of a philosophical skepticism implies an advocacy of a skeptical ethics. For Shelley the specifically epistemological skepticism developed within the first book of A Treatise of Human Nature by David Hume proves indispensable in clearing the mind of its "superstition" and in opening a "vacancy" in which a properly ethical faculty might be exercised. To assume that an epistemological skepticism serves as (...)
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  14. Is Hume a noncognitivist in the motivation argument?Rachel Cohon - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 85 (2-3):251-266.
  15. Hutcheson on Practical Reason.Stephen Darwall - 1997 - Hume Studies 23 (1):73-89.
    I describe the various ways in which Hume's critique of practical reason derives from Hutcheson and then consider a tension that arises between Hutcheson's (and Hume's) critique of noninstrumental reasons and his account of calm passions.
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  16. Hume and Humeanism in Ethics.Rachel Cohon - 1988 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 69 (2):99.
  17. J.L. Mackie Hume's Moral Theory (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980). [REVIEW]Páll S. Árdal - 1983 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (2):293-303.
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  18. Some misconceptions about Hume's moral theory.Nicholas Capaldi - 1966 - Ethics 76 (3):208-211.
    There are eight major misconceptions about Hume's moral theory. First,many believe that there is no essential difference between the Treatise and the Enquiry. Second, some commentators believe that Hume has an extraordinary theory about the moral point of view. Third, many assume that Hume has an explicit theory of moral judgment. Fourth, several commentators have attributed to Hume a multiple theory about the relationship between moral judgment and moral sentiment. Fifth, some assert that Hume has a qualified- or ideal-spectator theory (...)
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