Bookmark and Share

Humeanism and Nonhumeanism about Laws

Edited by Markus Schrenk (Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf)
Assistant editor: Florian Boge (University of Cologne, University of Cologne)
About this topic
Summary Anti-Humeans have the feeling that natural laws govern the events in the world: what a law says must happen (or, what a law forbids can’t happen). This intuition might partially originate in our actual day-to-day experiences when we feel resistance against some of our actions. Some goals are not merely difficult to achieve, they are  impossible: we cannot, unaided, jump 10m high. In concert with the facts about our current body mass, leg muscles, and the earth’s gravitational field, the laws of nature prohibit this kind of leap. For Humeans, laws have more of a descriptive character: the laws are (merely) accurate reports of what regularly happens or is universally the case. This intuition comes from the observation that nature seems to be uniform. Alleged laws like Boyle's law (which says that for a fixed amount of an ideal gas kept at a fixed temperature, pressure and volume are inversely proportional (pV=k)) or Einstein’s famous mass-energy equivalence (E=mc2)) record these universal regularities. Those who hold the anti-Humean, first intuition (that the laws necessitate what happens and prohibit what does not happen) do not think the second intuition is wrong. In fact, if, what the laws say, must happen, then it also does happen and we get the regularities for free. The necessities in nature supposedly produce the regularities and thus explain why they are there. Yet, those who subscribe to some kind of regularity view deny that laws necessitate anything because they usually agree with David Hume that the postulation of necessity in nature is suspect.
Key works The most important Humean view comes from David Lewis: Lewis 2001  (esp. pp73), Lewis 1999  (esp. papers 8-55 and 224-247). The orthodox anti-Humean accounts are in Armstrong, Tooley, and Dretske: Armstrong 1983Tooley 1997Dretske 1977. Modern anti-Humean accounts come, for example, from dispositionalists: Mumford & Anjum 2011, Bird 2007Ellis 2001
Introductions Psillos 2002
  Show all references
Related categories
Siblings:
97 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 97
  1. Joseph Agassi (1995). Blame Not the Laws of Nature. Foundations of Science 1 (1):131-154.
    1. Lies, Error and Confusion 2. Lies 3. The Demarcation of Science: Historical 4. The Demarcation of Science: Recent 5. Observed Regularities and Laws of Nature.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. A. J. Ayer (1956). What is a Law of Nature? Revue Internationale de Philosophie 10 (2=36):144.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Marius Backmann & Alexander Reutlinger (2014). Better Best Systems – Too Good To Be True. Dialectica 68 (3):375-390.
    Craig Callender, Jonathan Cohen and Markus Schrenk have recently argued for an amended version of the best system account of laws – the better best system account (BBSA). This account of lawhood is supposed to account for laws in the special sciences, among other desiderata. Unlike David Lewis's original best system account of laws, the BBSA does not rely on a privileged class of natural predicates, in terms of which the best system is formulated. According to the BBSA, a contingently (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Helen Beebee (2006). Does Anything Hold the Universe Together? Synthese 149 (3):509-533.
    According to ‘regularity theories’ of causation, the obtaining of causal relations depends on no more than the obtaining of certain kinds of regularity. Regularity theorists are thus anti-realists about necessary connections in nature. Regularity theories of one form or another have constituted the dominant view in analytic Philosophy for a long time, but have recently come in for some robust criticism, notably from Galen Strawson. Strawson’s criticisms are natural criticisms to make, but have not so far provoked much response from (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Helen Beebee (2000). The Non-Governing Conception of Laws of Nature. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):571-594.
    Recently several thought experiments have been developed which have been alleged to refute the Ramsey-Lewis view of laws of nature. The paper aims to show that two such thought experiments fail to establish that the Ramsey-Lewis view is false, since they presuppose a conception of laws of nature that is radically at odds with the Humean conception of laws embodied by the Ramsey-Lewis view. In particular, the thought experiments presuppose that laws of nature govern the behavior of objects. The paper (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Nora Berenstain & James Ladyman (2012). Ontic Structural Realism and Modality. In Elaine Landry & Dean Rickles (eds.), Structural Realism: Structure, Object, and Causality. Springer.
  7. Harjit Bhogal & Zee R. Perry (2015). What the Humean Should Say About Entanglement. Noûs 49 (2):n/a-n/a.
    Tim Maudlin has influentially argued that Humeanism about laws of nature stands in conflict with quantum mechanics. Specifically Humeanism implies the principle Separability: the complete physical state of a world is determined by the intrinsic physical state of each space-time point. Maudlin argues Separability is violated by the entangled states posited by QM. We argue that Maudlin only establishes that a stronger principle, which we call Strong Separability, is in tension with QM. Separability is not in tension with QM. Moreover, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. John Bigelow, John Collins & Robert Pargetter (1993). The Big Bad Bug: What Are the Humean's Chances? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (3):443-462.
    Humean supervenience is the doctrine that there are no necessary connections in the world. David Lewis identifies one big bad bug to the programme of providing Humean analyses for apparently non-Humean features of the world. The bug is chance. We put the bug under the microscope, and conclude that chance is no special problem for the Humean.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Alexander Bird (2008). The Epistemological Argument Against Lewis's Regularity View of Laws. Philosophical Studies 138 (1):73–89.
    I argue for the claim that if Lewis’s regularity theory of laws were true, we could not know any positive law statement to be true. Premise 1: According to that theory, for any law statement true of the actual world, there is always a nearby world where the law statement is false (a world that differs with respect to one matter of particular fact). Premise 2: One cannot know a proposition to be true if it is false in a nearby (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Roger Caldwell (2000). The Dappled World. [REVIEW] Philosophy Now 28:42-43.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. J. W. Carroll (2006). Review: Laws in Nature. [REVIEW] Mind 115 (459):780-784.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. John Carroll (1990). The Humean Tradition. Philosophical Review 99 (2):185-219.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. John William Carroll (1986). The Nature of Physical Laws. Dissertation, The University of Arizona
    A program for advancing a new philosophical account of physical laws is presented. The program is non-reductive in that it maintains that any correct account of physical laws must recognize law sentences as irreducible--that is, as not admitting of an analysis which does not invoke any unanalyzed nomic facts . The program has the unusual attraction of being consistent with Nominalism and epistemically in the spirit of Empiricism. ;Initially motivating my program is a two-stage attack in chapters two and three (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Nancy Cartwright (1983). How the Laws of Physics Lie. Oxford University Press.
    In this sequence of philosophical essays about natural science, the author argues that fundamental explanatory laws, the deepest and most admired successes of modern physics, do not in fact describe regularities that exist in nature. Cartwright draws from many real-life examples to propound a novel distinction: that theoretical entities, and the complex and localized laws that describe them, can be interpreted realistically, but the simple unifying laws of basic theory cannot.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Eduardo Castro (2013). On Induction: Time-Limited Necessity Vs. Timeless Necessity. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):67-82.
    Abstract: This paper defends David Armstrong’s solution to the problem of inductionb against Helen Beebee’s attack on that solution. To solve theproblem of induction, Armstrong contends that the timeless necessity explanation is the best explanation of our observed regularities, whereas Beebee attempts to demonstrate that the time-limited necessity explanation is an equally good explanation. Allegedly, this explanation blocks Armstrong’s solution. I demonstrate that even if the time-limited ecessity explanation were an equally good explanation of our observed regularities, this explanation does (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Alan Chalmers (1993). So the Laws of Physics Needn't Lie. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):196 – 205.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Gabriele Contessa (2015). Only Powers Can Confer Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):160-176.
    According to power theorists, properties are powers—i.e. they necessarily confer on their bearers certain dispositions. Although the power theory is increasingly gaining popularity, a vast majority of analytic metaphysicians still favors what I call ‘the nomic theory’—i.e. the view according to which what dispositions a property confers on its bearers is contingent on what the laws of nature happen to be. This paper argues that the nomic theory is inconsistent, for, if it were correct, then properties would not confer any (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Mauro Dorato (forthcoming). Laws of Nature and the Reality of the Wave Function. Synthese:1-23.
    In this paper I review three different positions on the wave function, namely: nomological realism, dispositionalism, and configuration space realism by regarding as essential their capacity to account for the world of our experience. I conclude that the first two positions are committed to regard the wave function as an abstract entity. The third position will be shown to be a merely speculative attempt to derive a primitive ontology from a reified mathematical space. Without entering any discussion about nominalism, I (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. John Earman & John T. Roberts (2005). Contact with the Nomic: A Challenge for Deniers of Humean Supervenience About Laws of Nature Part I: Humean Supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):1–22.
    This is the first part of a two-part article in which we defend the thesis of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature (HS). According to this thesis, two possible worlds cannot differ on what is a law of nature unless they also differ on the Humean base. The Humean base is easy to characterize intuitively, but there is no consensus on how, precisely, it should be defined. Here in Part I, we present and motivate a characterization of the Humean base (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. John Earman & John T. Roberts (2005). Contact with the Nomic: A Challenge for Deniers of Humean Supervenience About Laws of Nature Part II: The Epistemological Argument for Humean Supervenience. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):253–286.
    In Part I, we presented and motivated a new formulation of Humean Supervenience about Laws of Nature (HS). Here in Part II, we present an epistemological argument in defense of HS, thus formulated. Our contention is that one can combine a modest realism about laws of nature with a proper recognition of the importance of empirical testability in the epistemology of science only if one accepts HS.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Review author[S.]: John Earman (1993). In Defense of Laws: Reflections on Bas Van Fraassen's Laws and Symmetry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2):413-419.
  22. M. Eddon & Christopher J. G. Meacham (forthcoming). No Work For a Theory of Universals. In Jonathan Schaffer & Barry Loewer (eds.), A Companion to David Lewis.
    Several variants of Lewis's Best System Account of Lawhood have been proposed that avoid its commitment to perfectly natural properties. There has been little discussion of the relative merits of these proposals, and little discussion of how one might extend this strategy to provide natural property-free variants of Lewis's other accounts, such as his accounts of duplication, intrinsicality, causation, counterfactuals, and reference. We undertake these projects in this paper. We begin by providing a framework for classifying and assessing the variants (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Brian Ellis (2005). Marc Lange on Essentialism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):75 – 79.
    For scientific essentialists, the only logical possibilities of existence are the real (or metaphysical) ones, and such possibilities, they say, are relative to worlds. They are not a priori, and they cannot just be invented. Rather, they are discoverable only by the a posteriori methods of science. There are, however, many philosophers who think that real possibilities are knowable a priori, or that they can just be invented. Marc Lange [Lange 2004] thinks that they can be invented, and tries to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Michael Esfeld (2010). Humean Metaphysics Versus a Metaphysics of Powers. In Gerhard Ernst & Andreas Hüttemann (eds.), Time, Chance and Reduction: Philosophical Aspects of Statistical Mechanics. Cambridge University Press. 119.
  25. Ned Hall, Humean Reductionism About Laws of Nature.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. John F. Halpin (1994). Legitimizing Chance: The Best-System Approach to Probabilistic Laws in Physical Theory. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (3):317 – 338.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Toby Handfield (2008). Humean Dispositionalism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):113-126.
    Humean metaphysics is characterized by a rejection of necessary connections between distinct existences. Dispositionalists claim that there are basic causal powers. The existence of such properties is widely held to be incompatible with the Humean rejection of necessary connections. In this paper I present a novel theory of causal powers that vindicates the dispositionalist claim that causal powers are basic, without embracing brute necessary connections. The key assumptions of the theory are that there are natural types of causal processes, and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Toby Handfield (2005). Lange on Essentialism, Counterfactuals, and Explanation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (1):81 – 85.
    Marc Lange objects to scientific essentialists that they can give no better account of the counterfactual invariance of laws than Humeans. While conceding this point succeeds ad hominem against some essentialists, I show that it does not undermine essentialism in general. Moreover, Lange's alternative account of the relation between laws and counterfactuals is - with minor modification - compatible with essentialism.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. M. Hesse (1980). A Revised Regularity View of Scientific Laws. In D. H. Mellor (ed.), Science, Belief and Behaviour. Cambridge Up.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Michael Townsen Hicks & Peter van Elswyk (2015). Humean Laws and Circular Explanation. Philosophical Studies 172 (2):433-443.
    Humeans are often accused of accounting for natural laws in such a way that the fundamental entities that are supposed to explain the laws circle back and explain themselves. Loewer (Philos Stud 160(1):115–137, 2012) contends this is only the appearance of circularity. When it comes to the laws of nature, the Humean posits two kinds of explanation: metaphysical and scientific. The circle is then cut because the kind of explanation the laws provide for the fundamental entities is distinct from the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Tyler Hildebrand (2014). Can Bare Dispositions Explain Categorical Regularities? Philosophical Studies 167 (3):569-584.
    One of the traditional desiderata for a metaphysical theory of laws of nature is that it be able to explain natural regularities. Some philosophers have postulated governing laws to fill this explanatory role. Recently, however, many have attempted to explain natural regularities without appealing to governing laws. Suppose that some fundamental properties are bare dispositions. In virtue of their dispositional nature, these properties must be (or are likely to be) distributed in regular patterns. Thus it would appear that an ontology (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Tyler Hildebrand (2013). Tooley's Account of the Necessary Connection Between Law and Regularity. Philosophical Studies 166 (1):33-43.
    Fred Dretske, Michael Tooley, and David Armstrong accept a theory of governing laws of nature according to which laws are atomic states of affairs that necessitate corresponding natural regularities. Some philosophers object to the Dretske/Tooley/Armstrong theory on the grounds that there is no illuminating account of the necessary connection between governing law and natural regularity. In response, Michael Tooley has provided a reductive account of this necessary connection in his book Causation (1987). In this essay, I discuss an improved version (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Herbert Hochberg (1981). Natural Necessity and Laws of Nature. Philosophy of Science 48 (3):386-399.
    The paper considers recent proposals by Armstrong, Dretske, and Tooley that revive the view that statements of laws of nature are grounded by the existence of higher order facts relating universals. Several objections to such a view are raised and an alternative analysis, recognizing general facts, is considered. Such an alternative is shown to meet a number of the objections raised against the appeal to higher order facts and it is also related to views of Hume and Wittgenstein. Further objections (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Carl Hoefer (1997). On Lewis's Objective Chance: "Humean Supervenience Debugged". Mind 106 (422):321-334.
  35. Andreas Hüttemann (2014). Scientific Practice and Necessary Connections. Theoria 79 (1):29-39.
    In this paper I will introduce a problem for at least those Humeans who believe that the future is open.More particularly, I will argue that the following aspect of scientific practice cannot be explained by openfuture- Humeanism: There is a distinction between states that we cannot bring about (which are represented in scientific models as nomologically impossible) and states that we merely happen not to bring about. Open-future-Humeanism has no convincing account of this distinction. Therefore it fails to explain why (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Lydia Jaeger (2002). Humean Supervenience and Best-System Laws. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16 (2):141 – 155.
    David Lewis has proposed an analysis of lawhood in terms of membership of a system of regularities optimizing simplicity and strength in information content. This article studies his proposal against the broader background of the project of Humean supervenience. In particular, I claim that, in Lewis's account of lawhood, his intuition about small deviations from a given law in nearby worlds (in order to avoid backtracking and epiphenomena) leads to the conclusion that laws do not support (certain) counterfactuals and do (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Mehmet KamÖzÜt (2009). Doğa Yasalari İle Rastlantisal Genellemeler Ayrimi: Bütüncüllük YaklaşimiThe Distinction Of The Laws Of Nature And The Accidental Generalization: A Holistic Approach. Ethos: Journal of the Society for Psychological Anthropology 2 (2).
    Bu yazıda Titius-Bode Yasası örneğinde bir doğa yasası ile sıradan bir doğru genelleme arasındaki ayrım tartışılacak. Doğa yasalarının deney verilerini derli toplu aktaran formüller olmanın dışında nitelikleri olduğu gösterilecek. Rastlantısal genelleme ve doğa yasaları arasında yaptığımız –genellikle sezgisel olan—ayrımın, söz konusu önerilerin diğer bilimsel kuramlarımızla ilişkisinde yattığı savunulacak.In this paper the disticntion between a natural law and an accidental generalization will be considered by means of the Titius-Bode Law case. It will be shown that natural laws have qualities other than (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Joel Katzav (2002). Humean Metaphysics. Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):59-73.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Max Kistler (2005). Necessary Laws. In Jan Faye, Paul Needham, Uwe Scheffler & Max Urchs (eds.), Nature’s Principles. Springer. 201-227.
    In the first part of this paper, I argue against the view that laws of nature are contingent, by attacking a necessary condition for its truth within the framework of a conception of laws as relations between universals. I try to show that there is no independent reason to think that universals have an essence independent of their nomological properties. However, such a non-qualitative essence is required to make sense of the idea that different laws link the same universals in (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. William Kneale (1961). Universality and Necessity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 12 (46):89-102.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Kaave Lajevardi (2011). Laws and Counterfactuals: Defusing an Argument Against the Humean View of Laws. Dialogue 50 (04):751-758.
    ABSTRACT: Appealing to the failure of counterfactual support is a standard device in refuting a Humean view on laws of nature: some true generalisations do not support relevant counterfactuals; therefore not every true general fact is a law of nature—so goes the refutation. I will argue that this strategy does not work, for our understanding of the truth-value of any counterfactual is grounded in our understanding of the lawhood of some statements related to it.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Marc Lange (2013). Grounding, Scientific Explanation, and Humean Laws. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):255-261.
    It has often been argued that Humean accounts of natural law cannot account for the role played by laws in scientific explanations. Loewer (Philosophical Studies 2012) has offered a new reply to this argument on behalf of Humean accounts—a reply that distinguishes between grounding (which Loewer portrays as underwriting a kind of metaphysical explanation) and scientific explanation. I will argue that Loewer’s reply fails because it cannot accommodate the relation between metaphysical and scientific explanation. This relation also resolves a puzzle (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Marc Lange (2006). How to Account for the Relation Between Chancy Facts and Deterministic Laws. Mind 115 (460):917--946.
    Suppose that unobtanium-346 is a rare radioactive isotope. Consider: (1) Every Un346 atom, at its creation, decays within 7 microseconds (µs). (50%) Every Un346 atom, at its creation, has a 50% chance of decaying within 7µs. (1) and (50%) can be true together, but (1) and (50%) cannot together be laws of nature. Indeed, (50%)'s mere (non-vacuous) truth logically precludes (1)'s lawhood. A satisfactory analysis of chance and lawhood should nicely account for this relation. I shall argue first that David (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. David Lewis (1999). Zimmerman and the Spinning Sphere. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):209 – 212.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. David Lewis (1994). Humean Supervenience Debugged. Mind 103 (412):473-490.
    Tn this paper I explore and to an extent defend HS. The main philosophical challenges to HS come from philosophical views that say that nomic concepts-laws, chance, and causation-denote features of the world that fail to supervene on non-nomic features. Lewis rejects these views and has labored mightily to construct HS accounts of nomic concepts. His account of laws is fundamental to his program, since his accounts of the other nomic notions rely on it. Recently, a number of philosophers have (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. David Lewis (1986). Philosophical Papers Vol. II. Oxford University Press.
  47. Caroline Lierse (1996). The Jerrybuilt House of Humeanism. In P. Riggs (ed.), Natural Kinds, Laws of Nature and Scientific Methodology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 29--48.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Barry Loewer, Lawsandinduction(2000).
    "I have come to think that the laws of physics are real because my experience with the laws of physics does not seem to me to be very different in any fundamental way from my experience with rocks. For those who have not lived with the laws of physics, I can offer the obvious argument that the laws of physics as we know them work, and there is no other known way of looking at nature that works in anything like (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Ardon Lyon (1976). The Immutable Laws of Nature. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 77:107 - 126.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Dan Marshall (forthcoming). Humean Laws and Explanation. Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    A common objection to Humeanism about natural laws is that, given Humeanism, laws cannot help explain their instances, since, given the best Humean account of laws, facts about laws are explained by facts about their instances rather than vice versa. After rejecting a recent influential reply to this objection that appeals to the distinction between scientific and metaphysical explanation, I will argue that the objection fails by failing to distinguish between two types of facts, only one of which Humeans should (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 97