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  1. John Aach (1990). Psychologism Reconsidered: A Re-Evaluation of the Arguments of Frege and Husserl. Synthese 85 (2):315 - 338.
  2. Stefania Centrone (2013). Aspekte des Psychologismus-Streits: Husserl und Frage über Anzahlen und logische Gesetze. In , Versuche über Husserl. Meiner.
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  3. Larry Davidson (1988). Husserl's Refutation of Psychologism and the Possibility of a Phenomenological Psychology. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 19 (1):1-17.
  4. Maria Gyemant (2010). Object and Content: Husserlian Intentionality Against His Psychologist Heritage. Studia Phaenomenologica 10:77-90.
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  5. Allen S. Hance (1987). Husserl's Phenomenological Theory of Logic and the Overcoming of Psychologism. Philosophy Research Archives 13:189-215.
    By tracing the general evolution of HusserI’s theory of logic and mathematics, this essay explores Husserl’s identification and strategic overcoming of the two forms of psychologism--Iogical psychologism and transcendental psychologism--that bar the way to rigorous phenomenological inquiry. In the early works “On the Concept of Number” and the Philosophie der Arithmetik Husserl himself falls victim to a particular form of logical psychologism. By the time of the Logical Investigations this problem has been dealt with: the method of eidetic intuition enables (...)
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  6. Robert Hanna (2008). Husserl's Arguments Against Logical Psychologism (Prolegomena, §§ 17–61). In Verena Mayer (ed.), Edmund Husserl: Logische Untersuchungen. 27-42.
    According to Edmund Husserl in the Prolegomena to Pure Logic,<span class='Hi'></span> which constitutes the preliminary rational foundation for <span class='Hi'></span>– and also the entire first volume of <span class='Hi'></span>– his Logical Investigations,<span class='Hi'></span> pure logic is the a priori theoretical,<span class='Hi'></span> nomological science of <span class='Hi'></span>„demonstration“<span class='Hi'></span> (LI 1,<span class='Hi'></span> 57;<span class='Hi'></span> Hua XVIII,<span class='Hi'></span> 23)<span class='Hi'></span>.1 For him,<span class='Hi'></span> demonstration includes both consequence and provability.<span class='Hi'></span> Consequence is the defining property of all and only formally valid arguments,<span class='Hi'></span> i.<span (...)
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  7. Robert Hanna (1993). Logical Cognition: Husserl's Prolegomena and the Truth in Psychologism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2):251-275.
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  8. Kai Hauser (2003). Lotze and Husserl. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 85 (2):152-178.
  9. Burt C. Hopkins (2006). Husserl's Psychologism, and Critique of Psychologism, Revisited. Husserl Studies 22 (2):91-119.
  10. Wolfgang Huemer (2004). Husserl's Critique of Psychologism and His Relation to the Brentano School. In Arkadiusz Chrudzimski & Wolfgang Huemer (eds.), Phenomenology and Analysis: Essays on Central European Philosophy. Ontos.
  11. Carol A. Kates (1979). An Intentional Analysis of the Law of Contradiction. Research in Phenomenology 9 (1):108-126.
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  12. Martin Kusch (1995). Psychologism: A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge. Routledge.
    In the 1890's, when fields such as psychology and philosophy were just emerging, turf wars between the disciplines were common-place. Philosophers widely discounted the possibility that psychology's claim to empirical truth had anything relevant to offer their field. And psychologists, such as the crazed and eccentric Otto Weinegger, often considered themselves philosophers. Freud, it is held, was deeply influenced by his wife, Martha's, uncle, who was also a philosopher. The tension between the fields persisted, until the two fields eventually matured (...)
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  13. Jack W. Meiland (1976). Psychologism in Logic: Husserl's Critique. Inquiry 19 (1-4):325 – 339.
    Psychologism in logic holds that logic is a branch of psychology. This view has been vigorously defended by John Stuart Mill and by a number of German philosophers of logic, notably Erdmann. Its chief critics have been Husserl and Frege and, to a lesser extent, Russell. Husserl set forth a profound and detailed critique of psychologism in Logical Investigations. This paper examines this critique. First, I explain why the psychologistic theory is attractive. Then I show that Husserl's critique is not (...)
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  14. Remmel T. Nunn (1979). I. Psychologism, Functionalism, and the Modal Status of Logical Laws. Inquiry 22 (1-4):343-349.
    In a recent article (Inquiry, Vol. 19 [1976]), J. W. Meiland addresses the issue of psychologism in logic, which holds that logic is a branch of psychology and that logical laws (such as the Principle of Non?Contradiction) are contingent upon the nature of the mind. Meiland examines Husserl's critique of psychologism, argues that Husserl is not convincing, and offers two new objections to the psychologistic thesis. In this paper I attempt to rebut those objections. In question are the acceptable criteria (...)
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  15. John K. O.’Connor (2007). Anti-Psychologism and the Path Beyond Reductive Egology in Husserl. Philosophy Today 51 (Supplement):14-22.
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  16. John K. O.’Connor (2007). Anti-Psychologism and the Path Beyond Reductive Egology in Husserl. Philosophy Today 51 (Supplement):14-22.
  17. Herman Philipse (1987). Psychologism and the Prescriptive Function of Logic. Grazer Philosophische Studien 29:13-33.
    Husserl and Frege did not criticize psychologism on the ground that it deduced the norms of logic from non-normative premises (naturalistic fallacy), as is often supposed. Rather, their refutation of psychologism assumes that such a deduction is possible. Husserl compared the rules of logic to those of technology, on the supposition that they have a purely theoretical basis. This conception of logic is critically examined, and it is argued (contra Follesdal) that Frege held a similar view.
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  18. Eva Picardi (1997). Sigwart, Husserl and Frege on Truth and Logic, or is Psychologism Still a Threat? European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):162–182.
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  19. John Scanlon (2001). Is It or Isn't It? Phenomenology as Descriptive Psychology in the Logical Investigations. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 32 (1):1-11.
    This article looks back at some aspects of the heritage of Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations on the occasion of that work's centennial, following some clues Husserl offered in his own 1925 retrospective evaluation. The themes pursued are: Dilthey's surprisingly enthusiastic appreciation of the work; Husserl's subsequent recognition of the kernel of truth in psychologism; the complex question of phenomenology as descriptive psychology; and, finally, the distinctive view of mental life introduced in that work.
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  20. Roderick Milford Stewart (1979). Problem of Logical Psychologism for Husserl and the Early Heidegger. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 10 (3):184-193.
  21. Genki Uemura (2010). The Ontology of Propositions in Husserl's Prolegomena. Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique (9).
    L’ambition de cet article est de reformuler l’ontologie des propositions proposée par Husserl dans ses Prolegomena zur reinen Logik (1900). Dans cet ouvrage, Husserl affirme que les propositions, auxquelles a trait ce qu’il appelle la “logique pure”, sont des propriétés (des “species”) d’actes, mettons d’actes de jugement. En outre, il considère les propriétés comme circonscrivant toutes leurs instantiations possibles. Sur cette base, on comprend mieux en quel sens la réflexion de Husserl sur la nature de la logique dépend de son (...)
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  22. Peter Andras Varga (2010). Psychologism as Positive Heritage of Husserl's Phenomenological Philosophy. Studia Phaenomenologica 10:135-161.
    Husserl is famous for his critique of foundational psychologism. However, his relationship to psychologism is not entirely negative. His conception of philosophy is indebted also to nineteenth-century ideas of a psychological foundation of logic and philosophy. This is manifest both in historical influences on Husserl and in debates between Husserl and his contemporaries. These areas are to be investigated, with a particular focus on the Logical Investigations and the works from the period of Husserl’s transition to the transcendental phenomenology. It (...)
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  23. Andreas Vrahimis (2013). Encounters Between Analytic and Continental Philosophy. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Twentieth-century philosophy has often been pictured as divided into two camps, analytic and continental. This study challenges this depiction by examining encounters between some of the leading representatives of either side. Starting with Husserl and Frege's fin-de-siècle turn against psychologism, it turns to Carnap's 1931 attack on Heidegger's metaphysics (together with its background in the Cassirer-Heidegger dispute of 1929), moving on to Ayer's 1951 meeting with Bataille and Merleau-Ponty at a Parisian bar, followed by the 'dialogue of the deaf' between (...)
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  24. Dallas Willard (2003). A Realist Analysis of the Relationship Between Logic and Experience. Topoi 22 (1):69-78.
    I undertake to explain how the well known laws of formal logic – Barbara Syllogism, modus ponens, etc. – relate to experience by developing Edmund Husserl's critique ofFormalism and Psychologism in logical theory and then briefly explaining his positive views of the laws of logic. His view rests upon his understanding of the proposition as a complex, intentional property. The laws of formal logic are, on his view (and mine), statements about the truth values of propositions as determined by their (...)
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  25. Dallas Willard (1980). Husserl on a Logic That Failed. Philosophical Review 89 (1):46-64.