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  1. John Aach (1990). Psychologism Reconsidered: A Re-Evaluation of the Arguments of Frege and Husserl. Synthese 85 (2):315 - 338.
  2. John Dennis Aach (1987). Behaviorism and Normativity: The Prospect of a Skinnerian Psychologism. Dissertation, Boston University
    The thesis attempts to formulate a behavioristc definition of normativity based on proposals by B. F. Skinner in the context of a general analysis of the problem of reconciling psychology with normative science, especially logic. An introduction states the problem and briefly traces its historical roots. Chapter 1 traces modern acceptance of the view that psychology is irrelevant to normative science to Husserl's and Frege's victorious arguments against nineteenth century psychologism, and aims to show them inconclusive against modern psychologies through (...)
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  3. Jens Cavallin (1997). Content and Object Husserl, Twardowski, and Psychologism.
  4. Stefania Centrone (2013). Aspekte des Psychologismus-Streits: Husserl und Frage über Anzahlen und logische Gesetze. In Versuche über Husserl. Meiner
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  5. Larry Davidson (1988). Husserl's Refutation of Psychologism and the Possibility of a Phenomenological Psychology. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 19 (1):1-17.
  6. Arnaud Dewalque (2008). Validité du sens ou idéalité des significations ?: Rickert et Husserl : deux variétés de « logique pure ». Les Etudes Philosophiques (1):97-115.
    Résumé — Dans cet article, je postule qu’il y a plusieurs variétés d’antipsychologisme logique, auxquelles correspondent différents concepts de « logique pure ». Deux conceptions sont ici confrontées : la « logique de l’idéalité » de Husserl et la « logique de la validité » de Rickert. Contrairement à l’emploi équivoque des termes « validité » et « idéalité » chez Heidegger, je montre d’abord que ces deux conceptions, bien que très proches, ne sont pas parfaitement superposables, car (...) partage l’antipsychologisme de Husserl mais rejette sa théorie des significations. Il apparaît ensuite que cette divergence – particulièrement visible dans la recension inédite, par Rickert, du livre très controversé de Palágyi – touche en réalité un « point faible » des Recherches logiques de Husserl : la confusion entre les objets logiques et les idéalités mathématiques. L’alternative « axiologique » proposée par Rickert évite d’emblée cette confusion en soutenant que le sens logique des propositions, fondé sur de pures « valeurs théoriques », est irréductible à un objet idéal.— In this article, I postulate that there are several varieties of logical antipsychologism, to which correspond various concepts of “pure logic”. Two conceptions are here under discussion : Husserl’s “logic of ideality” and Rickert’s “logic of validity”. Against the equivocal use of “validity” and “ideality” by Heidegger, I first show that none of those conceptions can be exactly superimposed on the other one, because Rickert agrees with Husserl’s antipsychologism but rejects his theory of significations. It then appears that this difference – which is particularly obvious in Rickert’s unpublished review of Palágyi’s very controversial book –, reveals in fact a “weak point” in Husserl’s Logical Investigations : the confusion between logical and mathematical objects . Rickert’s “axiological” alternative avoids directly this confusion by asserting the irreducibility of the propositional sense – which is grounded on pure “theoretical values” – to an ideal object. (shrink)
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  7. Maria Gyemant (2010). Object and Content: Husserlian Intentionality Against His Psychologist Heritage. Studia Phaenomenologica 10:77-90.
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  8. Guillermo Haddock (2000). The Structure of Husserl's 'Prolegomena'. Manuscrito 23 (2):61-100.
    Husserl’s refutation of psychologism one hundred years ago in his opus mag-num Logische Untersuchungen is a painfully detailed enterprise. After justi-fying the existence of logic as a separate practical discipline, Husserl first shows that normative and a fortiori practical disciplines are founded on theoretical ones. He then formulates the psychologistic theses, extracts empirical consequences from them and shows how psychologism distorts the content of logical laws. The nucleus of the refutation consists in six arguments showing that specific relativism and, in (...)
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  9. Charles B. Hamblet, An Analysis of Husserlian Phenomenologys Resistance Towards Psychologism: Its Understanding of the Natural Attitude and its Relationship with the Cognitive Behavioural Psychotherapies.
    Husserlian phenomenology has often been cited as having influenced research methodologies within nursing research and psychology. However, at the same time, Husserl is explicitly opposed to what he termed as psychologism. The following thesis argues that Husserl’s opposition to the psychology of his day was based specifically upon his opposition of naturalism’s treatment of consciousness. Moreover, the thesis argues that there is a tendency within the Social Sciences to misread Husserlian Phenomenology as a type of introspectionists’ account of subjective states. (...)
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  10. Allen S. Hance (1987). Husserl's Phenomenological Theory of Logic and the Overcoming of Psychologism. Philosophy Research Archives 13:189-215.
    By tracing the general evolution of HusserI’s theory of logic and mathematics, this essay explores Husserl’s identification and strategic overcoming of the two forms of psychologism--Iogical psychologism and transcendental psychologism--that bar the way to rigorous phenomenological inquiry. In the early works “On the Concept of Number” and the Philosophie der Arithmetik Husserl himself falls victim to a particular form of logical psychologism. By the time of the Logical Investigations this problem has been dealt with: the method of eidetic intuition enables (...)
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  11. Robert Hanna (2015). Transcendental Normativity and the Avatars of Psychologism: Section I, Chapter 2, Naturalistic Misconceptions. In Andrea Staiti (ed.), Commentary on Husserl's. De Gruyter 51-68.
  12. Robert Hanna (2008). Husserl's Arguments Against Logical Psychologism. In Verena Mayer (ed.), Edmund Husserl: Logische Untersuchungen. 27-42.
    According to Edmund Husserl in the Prolegomena to Pure Logic, which constitutes the preliminary rational foundation for – and also the entire first volume of – his Logical Investigations, pure logic is the a priori theoretical, nomological science of „demonstration“.1 For him, demonstration includes both consequence and provability. Consequence is the defining property of all and only formally valid arguments, i. e., arguments that cannot lead from true premises to false conclusions. And provability is the property of a logical system (...)
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  13. Robert Hanna (1993). Logical Cognition: Husserl's Prolegomena and the Truth in Psychologism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (2):251-275.
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  14. Kai Hauser (2003). Lotze and Husserl. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 85 (2):152-178.
  15. Burt C. Hopkins (2006). Husserl's Psychologism, and Critique of Psychologism, Revisited. Husserl Studies 22 (2):91-119.
  16. Wolfgang Huemer (2004). Husserl's Critique of Psychologism and His Relation to the Brentano School. In Arkadiusz Chrudzimski & Wolfgang Huemer (eds.), Phenomenology and Analysis: Essays on Central European Philosophy. Ontos 199-214.
  17. Carol A. Kates (1979). An Intentional Analysis of the Law of Contradiction. Research in Phenomenology 9 (1):108-126.
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  18. Tomasz Kubalica (2007). \"Ważność\" a naturalizm. Antypsychologizm Wilhelma Windelbanda. Idea 19 (19).
  19. Martin Kusch (1995). Psychologism: A Case Study in the Sociology of Philosophical Knowledge. Routledge.
    In the 1890's, when fields such as psychology and philosophy were just emerging, turf wars between the disciplines were common-place. Philosophers widely discounted the possibility that psychology's claim to empirical truth had anything relevant to offer their field. And psychologists, such as the crazed and eccentric Otto Weinegger, often considered themselves philosophers. Freud, it is held, was deeply influenced by his wife, Martha's, uncle, who was also a philosopher. The tension between the fields persisted, until the two fields eventually matured (...)
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  20. Michael Halpin Mccarthy (1970). Psychologism, an Historical and Critical Study. Dissertation, Yale University
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  21. Jack W. Meiland (1976). Psychologism in Logic: Husserl's Critique. Inquiry 19 (1-4):325 – 339.
    Psychologism in logic holds that logic is a branch of psychology. This view has been vigorously defended by John Stuart Mill and by a number of German philosophers of logic, notably Erdmann. Its chief critics have been Husserl and Frege and, to a lesser extent, Russell. Husserl set forth a profound and detailed critique of psychologism in Logical Investigations. This paper examines this critique. First, I explain why the psychologistic theory is attractive. Then I show that Husserl's critique is not (...)
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  22. J. N. Mohanty (1984). Husserl, Frege and the Overcoming of Psychologism. In Kah Kyung Cho (ed.), Philosophy and Science in Phenomenological Perspective. Distributors for the United States and Canada, Kluwer Academic Publishers 143--152.
  23. Remmel T. Nunn (1979). I. Psychologism, Functionalism, and the Modal Status of Logical Laws. Inquiry 22 (1-4):343-349.
    In a recent article (Inquiry, Vol. 19 [1976]), J. W. Meiland addresses the issue of psychologism in logic, which holds that logic is a branch of psychology and that logical laws (such as the Principle of Non?Contradiction) are contingent upon the nature of the mind. Meiland examines Husserl's critique of psychologism, argues that Husserl is not convincing, and offers two new objections to the psychologistic thesis. In this paper I attempt to rebut those objections. In question are the acceptable criteria (...)
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  24. John K. O.’Connor (2007). Anti-Psychologism and the Path Beyond Reductive Egology in Husserl. Philosophy Today 51 (Supplement):14-22.
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  25. John K. O.’Connor (2007). Anti-Psychologism and the Path Beyond Reductive Egology in Husserl. Philosophy Today 51 (Supplement):14-22.
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  26. Herman Philipse (1987). Psychologism and the Prescriptive Function of Logic. Grazer Philosophische Studien 29:13-33.
    Husserl and Frege did not criticize psychologism on the ground that it deduced the norms of logic from non-normative premises (naturalistic fallacy), as is often supposed. Rather, their refutation of psychologism assumes that such a deduction is possible. Husserl compared the rules of logic to those of technology, on the supposition that they have a purely theoretical basis. This conception of logic is critically examined, and it is argued (contra Follesdal) that Frege held a similar view.
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  27. Eva Picardi (1997). Sigwart, Husserl and Frege on Truth and Logic, or is Psychologism Still a Threat? European Journal of Philosophy 5 (2):162–182.
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  28. Venanzio Raspa (2002). Sul superamento dello psicologismo secondo Theodor Lipps: ovvero su contenuto e oggetto, psicologia e logica. Discipline Filosofiche 12 (2):233-274.
    The paper discusses critically the evolution of Lipps's view on logic and psychology. According to Lipps, psychology is the fundamental science on which the other sciences are grounded, and "logic is a special discipline of psychology". Husserl criticizes such conception, which falls into a confusion of domains, and proposes the idea of a pure logic on the basis of the distinction between ideal and real. Lipps replies to Husserl maintaining that the overcoming of psychologism requires both a sharp separation of (...)
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  29. John Scanlon (2001). Is It or Isn't It? Phenomenology as Descriptive Psychology in the Logical Investigations. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 32 (1):1-11.
    This article looks back at some aspects of the heritage of Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations on the occasion of that work's centennial, following some clues Husserl offered in his own 1925 retrospective evaluation. The themes pursued are: Dilthey's surprisingly enthusiastic appreciation of the work; Husserl's subsequent recognition of the kernel of truth in psychologism; the complex question of phenomenology as descriptive psychology; and, finally, the distinctive view of mental life introduced in that work.
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  30. Janusz Sidorek (2010). Edmund Husserl’s Polemic Over Relativism and Skepticism. Early Phase. Archiwum Historii Filozofii I Myśli Społecznej 55.
    Danger of skeptic consequences of relativism was one of the main motives which led Edmund Husserl to taking up polemic with psychologism. This polemic was discussed and analyzed repeatedly, so instead of speculating on validity and importance of each of the arguments used, I rather focus on the structure of argumentation articulated in Prolegomena to pure logic and to consider the role of frequently dismissed thread of the epistemological absolutism’s apology. For Husserl this absolutism is strictly connected with a conception (...)
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  31. Tomas Sodeika (1991). Psychologism and Description in Husserl's Phenomenology. Analecta Husserliana 34:219.
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  32. Gianfranco Soldati (2000). Frühe Phänomenologie und die Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 54 (3):313 - 340.
    It is by now common knowledge that analytic philosophy has its roots, at least partially, in phenomenology. It is less known that analytic philosophy has inherited part of its original antipsychologism precisely from phenomenology, or rather from early phenomenology. The present article traces the historical brackground of antipsychologism, starting with the debate on the philosophical foundations of psychology during the 19th century. It appears that naturalistic antipsychologism, the early phenomenologists position, has to be distinguished from transcendental antipsychologism, as it was (...)
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  33. Roderick Milford Stewart (1979). Problem of Logical Psychologism for Husserl and the Early Heidegger. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 10 (3):184-193.
  34. Michael Sukale (1988). Logik Und Psychologismus. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 19 (1):62-85.
    Since Quine has claimed that there is no absolute distinction between analytical and synthetical sentences the question whether logical laws might not be high order empirical laws about the ways humans actually think has become once more relevant. The affirmative answer was defended in the nineteenth century as the doctrine of psychologism. Frege and Husserl were vehemently opposed to this doctrine and many believe that they have destroyed it once and for all. This essay restates the doctrine of psychologism and (...)
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  35. David Sullivan (2002). The Further Question: Frege, Husserl and the Neo-Kantian Paradigm. Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy 5.
    Once upon a time, Frege influenced Husserl. More precisely, Frege's scathing review of Philosophie der Arithmetik induced Husserl to abandon his commitment to logical psychologism. There are many different reasons for dismissing this traditional tale. Yet at least one widely circulated claim cannot be upheld, for it is rooted in the false belief that Frege held logic to be an essentially normative science. Rather, Frege and Husserl are united by their shared conception of logic as the maximally general theoretical science. (...)
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  36. Genki Uemura (2010). The Ontology of Propositions in Husserl's Prolegomena. Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique (9).
    L’ambition de cet article est de reformuler l’ontologie des propositions proposée par Husserl dans ses Prolegomena zur reinen Logik (1900). Dans cet ouvrage, Husserl affirme que les propositions, auxquelles a trait ce qu’il appelle la “logique pure”, sont des propriétés (des “species”) d’actes, mettons d’actes de jugement. En outre, il considère les propriétés comme circonscrivant toutes leurs instantiations possibles. Sur cette base, on comprend mieux en quel sens la réflexion de Husserl sur la nature de la logique dépend de son (...)
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  37. Peter Andras Varga (2010). Psychologism as Positive Heritage of Husserl's Phenomenological Philosophy. Studia Phaenomenologica 10:135-161.
    Husserl is famous for his critique of foundational psychologism. However, his relationship to psychologism is not entirely negative. His conception of philosophy is indebted also to nineteenth-century ideas of a psychological foundation of logic and philosophy. This is manifest both in historical influences on Husserl and in debates between Husserl and his contemporaries. These areas are to be investigated, with a particular focus on the Logical Investigations and the works from the period of Husserl’s transition to the transcendental phenomenology. It (...)
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  38. Andreas Vrahimis (2013). Encounters Between Analytic and Continental Philosophy. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    Twentieth-century philosophy has often been pictured as divided into two camps, analytic and continental. This study challenges this depiction by examining encounters between some of the leading representatives of either side. Starting with Husserl and Frege's fin-de-siècle turn against psychologism, it turns to Carnap's 1931 attack on Heidegger's metaphysics (together with its background in the Cassirer-Heidegger dispute of 1929), moving on to Ayer's 1951 meeting with Bataille and Merleau-Ponty at a Parisian bar, followed by the 'dialogue of the deaf' between (...)
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  39. Dallas Willard (2003). A Realist Analysis of the Relationship Between Logic and Experience. Topoi 22 (1):69-78.
    I undertake to explain how the well known laws of formal logic – Barbara Syllogism, modus ponens, etc. – relate to experience by developing Edmund Husserl's critique ofFormalism and Psychologism in logical theory and then briefly explaining his positive views of the laws of logic. His view rests upon his understanding of the proposition as a complex, intentional property. The laws of formal logic are, on his view (and mine), statements about the truth values of propositions as determined by their (...)
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  40. Dallas Willard (1980). Husserl on a Logic That Failed. Philosophical Review 89 (1):46-64.
  41. Dallas Willard (1977). The Paradox of Logical Psychologism: Husserl's Way Out. In Jitendranath Mohanty (ed.), American Philosophical Quarterly. Nijhoff 43--54.
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  42. Dallas Willard (1972). The Paradox of Logical Psychologism: Husserl's Way Out. American Philosophical Quarterly 9 (1):94 - 100.
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