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  1. John B. Brough (2008). Consciousness is Not a Bag: Immanence, Transcendence, and Constitution in the Idea of Phenomenology. [REVIEW] Husserl Studies 24 (3):177-191.
    A fruitful way to approach The Idea of Phenomenology is through Husserl’s claim that consciousness is not a bag, box, or any other kind of container. The bag conception, which dominated much of modern philosophy, is rooted in the idea that philosophy is restricted to investigating only what is really immanent to consciousness, such as acts and sensory contents. On this view, what Husserl called the riddle of transcendence can never be solved. The phenomenological reduction, as Husserl develops it in (...)
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  2. Suzanne Cunningham (1986). Representation: Rorty Vs. Husserl. Synthese 66 (2):273 - 289.
    Richard Rorty in his recent book, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 1 offers a wide ranging critique of that version of modern philosophy which understands itself fundamentally as a theory of knowledge. He attacks analytic philosophy as well as phenomenology for falling into a sort of trap laid for us in the period of classical modern philosophy by most everyone from Descartes and Locke to Kant. I want to focus on just one element in Rorty's critique - namely, that (...)
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  3. John Davenport, The Phenomenological Critique of Representationalism: Husserl's and Heidegger's Arguments for a Qualified Realism.
    This paper begins by tracing the Hobbesian roots of `representationalism:' the thesis that reality is accessible to mind only through representations, images, signs or appearances that indicate a reality lying `behind' them (e.g. as unperceived causes of perceptions). This is linked to two kinds of absolute realism: the `naive' scientific realism of British empiricism, which provoked Berkeley's idealist reaction, and the noumenal realism of Kant. I argue that Husserl defined his position against both Berkeleyian idealism and these forms of absolute (...)
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  4. Ryan Hickerson (2005). Getting the Quasi-Picture: Twardowskian Representationalism and Husserl's Argument Against It. Journal of the History of Philosophy 43 (4):461-480.
    : This paper advances an account of Twardowski as a representationalist. In particular, Twardowskian representationalism is a blend of what I call resemblance representationalism and mediator-content representationalism. It was not, I argue here, proxy-percept representationalism. Twardowski treated mental contents as "signs" or "quasi-pictures." Husserl was a well-known critic of this view. I additionally argue that Husserl's criticism is grounded in the claim that Twardowski conflated representational content with sensations. The distinction on which this Husserlian criticism rests is between the psychological (...)
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  5. Thane Martin Naberhaus (2006). Does Husserl Have an Argument Against Representationalism? Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):43-68.
    It is often said that by rejecting the representationalist model of mind, phenomenology makes a decisive advance over empiricism. Yet despite such pronouncements, the arguments Husserl uses to refute representationalism have received scant critical attention, and upon examination many turn out to be obscure. I argue here that some of Husserl's best known anti-representationalist arguments fail. I end the paper, however, by suggesting that if these unsuccessful arguments are paired with certain methodological considerations taken from Husserl's mature philosophy, they may (...)
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  6. Beth Preston (1994). Husserl's Non-Representational Theory of Mind. Southern Journal of Philosophy 32 (2):209-232.
  7. Michael Shim (2011). Representationalism and Husserlian Phenomenology. Husserl Studies 27 (3):197-215.
    According to contemporary representationalism, phenomenal qualia—of specifically sensory experiences—supervene on representational content. Most arguments for representationalism share a common, phenomenological premise: the so-called “transparency thesis.” According to the transparency thesis, it is difficult—if not impossible—to distinguish the quality or character of experiencing an object from the perceived properties of that object. In this paper, I show that Husserl would react negatively to the transparency thesis; and, consequently, that Husserl would be opposed to at least two versions of contemporary representationalism. First, (...)
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