Husserl distinguishes between the human body, as experienced from a first-person perspective (Leib, rendered in English as “the Body” or “lived body”), and the human body, as it is experienced from a third-person, especially from a scientific, perspective (Körper). The Body plays important roles in his discussions of self-awareness, other-awareness, and perceptual experience. Thus, the Body, with its kinaesthetic systems, shapes the ways in which I can come into perceptual contact with objects, or the “horizons” in terms of which objects are given to me (See Husserl: Horizonality.). In the experience of encountering the other, the constitutive empathy could not set to work, were it not for the other’s embodiment, enabling one to experience the relevant similarities and differences between oneself and the other. Also, the Husserlian ego is not to be regarded as akin to a Cartesian mental substance, but is constituted as embodied. This accounts not only for our perceptual abilities, but also for our capacity to will and act. Thus, our experiences have passive and active aspects, and these are interwoven in complex ways.
|Key works||Zahavi 1994, Gallagher 1986, Mensch 2003, Dodd 1997, Lee 2002, Lotz 2007, Waldenfels 2000, Behnke 1996|
|Introductions||Zahavi 2003, Ch. 3, Moran 2005, Ch. 7|
- Husserl: Consciousness (200)
- Husserl: Intentionality (277)
- Husserl: Intersubjectivity (142)
- Husserl: The Self (84)
- Husserl: Perception (109)
- Husserl: Phenomenology (407 | 11)
- Husserl: Philosophy of Mind, Misc (298)
Graduate studies at Western
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
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