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Characteristically for Husserlian phenomenology, whatever we can legitimately say about the self is closely paralleled by an account of the data and workings of self-awareness. On the one hand, Husserl speaks about the self (“the monad”) as the experienced totality of one’s life. Within it, we can abstractively distinguish constitutive levels, all the way down to the pre-egological flow of time-consciousness, quite unlike our ordinary experiences of ourselves. On the other hand, Husserl’s later account of intentional acts involves the idea of an ego-pole, an aspect of intentional experiences, conceived as the opposite of an object-pole. In our intentional lives, the ego-pole is the source and center of performance and activity, including the action of predication. One way in which we can be aware of our selves is by regarding them reflectively, as in phenomenological reflection. However, for Husserl, the primary self-awareness is pre-reflective. In Husserl-scholarship, this pre-reflective self-awareness has been identified with the absolute flow of time-consciousness.

Key works A classic treatment, Held 1966 discusses the “living present” as the original mode of subjective life. Marbach 1974 explores the reasons that led Husserl, in Ideas I, to abandon his earlier view that there is only an empirical self, and to introduce the idea of a pure I. Marbach also discusses this Husserlian notion in relation to ideas in contemporary psychology, as well as Kant’s views. Zahavi 1999 engages with a variety of approaches to self-awareness, drawing attention to the promise of the phenomenological, especially the Husserlian, approach, with an emphasis on the idea of a pre-reflective self-awareness. Carr 1999 investigates subjectivity in the transcendental tradition, especially Kant and Husserl, upholding the idea and the tradition against Heideggerian and other criticisms. With a view to accounting for the possibility of intersubjectivity from the standpoint of Husserl’s transcendental idealism, Mensch 1988 grounds intersubjectivity in a pre-individual “primal subjectivity”. Lotz 2007 studies affectivity and subjectivity, as well as Husserl’s phenomenological method, based on Husserl’s later texts, arguing that Husserl’s views are rooted in a central concern with concrete human activities and experiences. Taguchi 2006 explores the notion of an “original I” (Ur-Ich), considered as a phenomenological topic.
Introductions Bernet et al 1993, Ch. 8, Moran 2005, Ch. 7
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Husserl: Self-Awareness
  1. Andrea Borsato (2009). Ist Das Erleben Teil des Erlebten? Phänomenologische Forschungen (2009):37-59.
    If the inner consciousness of a mental state is a part of the mental state itself, then one is forced to admit an 'inner consciousness of the inner consciousness'. This counterintuitive consequence can however be avoided, if we conceive of the inner consciousness of the mental state as a 'mode of giveness' of the state itself. This paper discusses Brentano's theory of inner consciousness from the point of view of Husserl's philosophy.
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  2. Andrea Borsato (2009). Innere Wahrnehmung Und Innere Vergegenwärtigung. Koenigshausen-Neumann.
  3. John Brough (2005). Husserl's Ego. Philosophy Today 49 (Supplement):222-231.
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  4. Neal DeRoo (2011). Revisiting the Zahavi–Brough/Sokolowski Debate. Husserl Studies 27 (1):1-12.
    In 1999, Dan Zahavi’s Self Awareness and Alterity: A Phenomenological Investigation initiated a critique of the standard interpretation of the distinction between the second and third levels of Husserl’s analysis of time-constituting consciousness. At stake was the possibility of a coherent account of self-awareness (Zahavi’s concern), but also the possibility of prereflectively distinguishing the acts of consciousness (Brough and Sokolowski’s rebuttal of Zahavi’s critique). Using insights gained from Husserl’s Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis rather than the work on time-consciousness, this paper (...)
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  5. John J. Drummond (2006). The Case(s) of (Self-)Awareness. In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press.
  6. Alfredo Ferrarin (1994). Husserl on the Ego and its Eidos (. Journal of the History of Philosophy 32 (4):645-659.
    Husserl on the Ego and its Eidos (Cartesian Meditations, IV) ALFREDO FERRARIN THE THEORY OF the intentionality of consciousness is essential for Husserl's philosophy, and in particular for his mature theory of the ego. But it runs into serious difficulties when it has to account for consciousness's transcendental constitution of its own reflective experience and its relation to immanent time. This intricate knot, the inseparability of time and constitution, is most visibly displayed in Husserl's writings from the 192os up to (...)
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  7. Peter Hadreas (2010). Husserlian Self-Awareness and Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 17 (1):43-51.
    The goal of the paper is to offer a model of self-awareness that fits the testimony of both good and bad responders to selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), of which fluoxetine (Prozac; Lilly, Indianapolis, IN) is probably the most well known. After a review of troubling current uncertainties concerning how and for whom SSRIs are therapeutic, it is argued that SSRIs, as a rule, lessen the emotionality of SSRI subjects in favor of an increased cognitive and volitional orientation. Traditional empiricist (...)
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  8. Errol E. Harris (1977). The Problem of Self-Constitution For Idealism and Phenomenology. Idealistic Studies 7 (1):1-27.
    Following kant, idealists establish the transcendental unity of the subject as the prior condition of experience of objects. this is necessarily all-inclusive and the finite self becomes one of its phenomena, which cannot be identified with the transcendental ego, nor yet be wholly divorced from it. this is the basis of kant's paralogism of reason. t h green, f h bradley and edmund husserl are all victims of this paralogism, each in his own way. green fails to avoid it by (...)
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  9. Klaus Held (1966). Lebendige Gegenwart: Die Frage nach der Seinsweise des Transzendentalen Ich bei Edmund Husserl, Entwickelt am Leitfaden der Zeitproblematik. Springer.
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  10. Hans-Ulrich Hoche (1971). Bemerkungen zum Problem der Selbst- und Fremderfahrung bei Husserl und Sartre. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 25 (2):172 - 186.
    The goal of the paper is to offer a model of self-awareness that fits the testimony of both good and bad responders to selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), of which fluoxetine (Prozac; Lilly, Indianapolis, IN) is probably the most well known. After a review of troubling current uncertainties concerning how and for whom SSRIs are therapeutic, it is argued that SSRIs, as a rule, lessen the emotionality of SSRI subjects in favor of an increased cognitive and volitional orientation. Traditional empiricist (...)
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  11. Gisbert Hoffman (1997). Die Zweideutigkeit der Reflexion Als Wahrnehmung Von Anonymität. Husserl Studies 14 (2):95-123.
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  12. G. Hoffmann (1997). The Ambiguity of Reflection as Perception of Anonymity (Husserl, Consciousness, and Identity). Husserl Studies 14 (2).
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  13. Burt C. Hopkins (1989). Husserl's Account of Phenomenological Reflection and Four Paradoxes of Reflexivity. Research in Phenomenology 19 (1):180-194.
  14. Emmanuel Housset (2007). La dramatique de la personne ou l'ipséité comme paradoxe. Les Études Philosophiques 2 (2):215-233.
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  15. Kl E. Kaehler (1995). Die Monade in Husserls Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 57 (4):692 - 709.
    Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is not a mere egology, but gets its concrete accomplishment only as a phenomenology of 'transcendental intersubjectivity'. However, the subjective centers of any transcendentality and thus of every constitution — even of intersubjectivity itself — have to be such unities as Leibniz' 'monads', that is, individually concrete subjects producing all their representations of one another completely out of themselves, respectively. Thus the problem arises, how the genuine transcendental status of each monadic subject in all its constitutive achievements (...)
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  16. Valérie Kokoszka (1996). La conception husserlienne de la temporalité entre 1905 et 1910. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 58 (2):314 - 341.
    The phenomenological study of time, as Husserl conceives its progression, should make accessible, through reduction, the appearing time of the temporal objects and the temporality of intentional acts, but also the origin of those 'times': the flow of absolute consciousness. A number of major interpretations, such as those of J.-P. Sartre and R. Bernet, question the achievement of phenomenological reduction and the absoluity of absolute consciousness; they insist on the fact that absolute consciousness, the ultimate constitutive consciousness, seems to require (...)
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  17. T. Kortooms (2000). Over de zelfconstitutie Van de absolute bewustzijnsstroom: De restitutie Van een leerstuk Van Brentano in husserls analyse Van het tijdbewustzijn. Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 62 (1):91 - 124.
    This article focuses on one of the attempts Edmund Husserl undertakes in the hitherto unpublished, so-called L-manuscripts, dating mainly from 1917 and 1918, to describe the structure of the consciousness of internal time. The focus on this attempt is motivated by the fact that in it Husserl offers a supplement to a notion that plays a fundamental role in his earlier analysis of time-consciousness, viz. the notion of the self-constitution of the absolute flow of consciousness. In his elaboration of this (...)
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  18. Stephen Langfur (2013). The You-I Event: On the Genesis of Self-Awareness. [REVIEW] Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):769-790.
    I present empirical evidence suggesting that an infant first becomes aware of herself as the focal center of a caregiver's attending. Yet that does not account for her awareness of herself as agent. To address this question, I bring in research on neonatal imitation, as well as studies demonstrating the existence of a neural system in which parts of the same brain areas are activated when observing another's action and when executing a similar one. Applying these findings, I consider gestural (...)
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  19. Holger Maaß (2001). Dan Zahavi, Self-Awareness and Alterity. A Phenomenological Investigation. Husserl Studies 17 (3):243-253.
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  20. Eduard Marbach (1974). Das Problem des Ich in der Phänomenologie Husserls. Springer.
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  21. Thomas Natsoulas (1990). Reflective Seeing: An Exploration in the Company of Edmund Husserl and James J. Gibson. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 21 (1):1-31.
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  22. Søren Overgaard (2009). S. Taguchi, Das Problem Des 'Ur-Ich' Bei Edmund Husserl: Die Frage Nach der Selbstverständlichen 'Nähe' Des Selbst. [REVIEW] Husserl Studies 25 (1):89-95.
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  23. Pierre-Jean Renaudie (2013). Me, Myself and I: Sartre and Husserl on Elusiveness of the Self. [REVIEW] Continental Philosophy Review 46 (1):99-113.
    In his early essay on transcendence of the ego, Sartre attempted to follow Husserl’s Logical Investigations and to draw the consequences of his phenomenological criticism of subjectivity. Both authors have emphasized the elusiveness of the self as a result of intentionality of consciousness. However, Sartre’s analysis of ego led him quite far from Husserl’s philosophical project, insofar as it was somehow already raising the question about the moral nature of the self, and was thus establishing the basis of the conception (...)
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  24. T. Sakakibara (1997). The Problem of the Ego and the Origins of Genetic Phenomenology in the Works of Husserl. Husserl Studies 14 (1).
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  25. Michael Shim (2009). Dan Zahavi. Subjectivity and Selfhood. Cambridge/London: The Mit Press, 2005, 265 Pp., $21.00/£13.95 (Paper). [REVIEW] Husserl Studies 25 (3):261-266.
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  26. Andrea Staiti (2013). A Grasp From Afar: Überschau and the Givenness of Life in Husserlian Phenomenology. [REVIEW] Continental Philosophy Review 46 (1):21-36.
    In this paper I explore the issue of how our personal life is given to us in experience as a whole to be actively shaped and determined. I examine in detail Husserl’s analysis of the kind of experience responsible for this achievement, which he terms Überschau and which thus far has never been addressed by scholars of phenomenology. First, I locate Überschau in the context of self-determination and highlight the difference between the unthematic pre-givenness of life in the phenomenon of (...)
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  27. Thomas Szanto (2012). Bewusstsein, Intentionalität und Mentale Repräsentation. Husserl und die Analytische Philosophie des Geistes. De Gruyter.
    Until now, a systematic new evaluation of transcendental phenomenology that gives due attention to the analytic philosophy of mind has been lacking, despite several recent studies in this area. With an emphasis on Husserl’s anti-representationalist theory of the intentionality of consciousness, the present study demonstrates phenomenology’s descriptive and explanatory potential and presents it as a serious interlocutor not only for the philosophy of mind and cognition but also for contemporary language philosophy and epistemology.
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  28. Toru Tani (1986). Life and the Life-World. Husserl Studies 3 (1):57-78.
    This paper will deal with the relationship between 'life' (Leben) and the 'life-world' (Lebenswelt) 1 as we find these concepts in the writings of Husserl's last years. The emphasis will be upon elucidating this relation- ship from the transcendental point of view. It is well known that Husserl initially introduced the concept of the life-world into his philosophy in connection with the problem of founding the sciences: accordingly, most studies up to date have dealt with the concept within this context (...)
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  29. Dan Zahavi, Self-Awareness and Affection.
    Manfred Frank has in recent publications criticized a number of prevailing views concerning the nature of self-awareness,1 and it is the so-called reflection theory of self-awareness which has been particularly under fire. That is, the theory which claims that self-awareness only comes about when consciousness directs its 'gaze' at itself, thereby taking itself as its own object. But in his elaboration of a position originally developed by Dieter Henrich (and, to a lesser extent, by Cramer and Pothast) Frank has also (...)
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  30. Dan Zahavi (2011). Objects and Levels: Reflections on the Relation Between Time-Consciousness and Self-Consciousness. [REVIEW] Husserl Studies 27 (1):13-25.
    The text surveys the development of the debate between Zahavi and Brough/Sokolowski regarding Husserl’s account of inner time-consciousness. The main arguments on both sides are reconsidered, and a compromise is proposed.
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  31. Dan Zahavi (2004). Time and Consciousness in the Bernau Manuscripts. Husserl Studies 20 (2):99-118.
    Even a cursory glance in Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein makes it evident that one of Husserl’s major concerns in his 1917-18 reflections on time-consciousness was how to account for the constitution of time without giving rise to an infinite regress. Not only does Husserl constantly refer to this problem in Husserliana XXXIII – as he characteristically writes at one point “Überall drohen, scheint es, unendliche Regresse”(Hua 33/81) but he also (...)
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  32. Dan Zahavi (2003). Inner Time-Consciousness and Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness. In Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 157--180.
    If one looks at the current discussion of self-awareness there seems to be a general agreement that whatever valuable philosophical contributions Husserl might have made, his account of self-awareness is not among them. This prevalent appraisal is often based on the claim that Husserl was too occupied with the problem of intentionality to ever really pay attention to the issue of self-awareness. Due to his interest in intentionality Husserl took object-consciousness as the paradigm of every kind of awareness and therefore (...)
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  33. Dan Zahavi (2000). Self and Consciousness. In , Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-Experience. John Benjamins. 55--74.
    In his recent book ‘Kant and the Mind’ Andrew Brook makes a distinction between two types of selfawareness. The first type, which he calls empirical self-awareness, is an awareness of particular psychological states such as perceptions, memories, desires, bodily sensations etc. One attains this type of self-awareness simply by having particular experiences and being aware of them. To be in possession of empirical self-awareness is, in short, simply to be conscious of one’s occurrent experience. The second type of self-awareness he (...)
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  34. Dan Zahavi (1998). Brentano and Husserl on Self-Awareness. Études Phénoménologiques 14 (27-28):127-168.
  35. Dan Zahavi (ed.) (1998). Self-Awareness, Temporality, and Alterity. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
  36. Dan Zahavi, Inner (Time-)Consciousness.
    In the introduction to Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, Husserl remarks that “we get entangled in the most peculiar difficulties, contradictions, and confusions” (Hua X, 4) the moment we seek to account for time-consciousness. I think most scholars of Husserl’s writings on these issues would agree. Attempting to unravel the inner workings of time-consciousness can indeed easily induce a kind of intellectual vertigo. Let us consequently start with some of the basic questions that motivated Husserl’s inquiry.
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Husserl: The Self, Misc
  1. Flor Emilce Cely Á (2011). El yo como tema de análisis fenomenológico. Ideas y Valores 60 (146):59-72.
    Husserl comenzó oponiéndose a la posibilidad de considerar el yo como centro de referencia esencial de los actos intencionales. Sin embargo, luego aceptó incluirlo en la descripción fenomenológica como centro de referencia de las vivencias intencionales. Se analizan esos dos momentos y se estudia su..
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  2. Lilian Alweiss (2009). The Bifurcated Subject. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (3):415 - 434.
    Michel Henry wishes to salvage Descartes?s first principle ?I think, I am? by claiming that there is no need to appeal to the world or others to make sense of the self. One of his main targets is Edmund Husserl, who claims that thought is necessarily intentional and thus necessarily about something that is other to thought. To show that this is not so, Henry draws on passages from Descartes?s texts which emphasize that we should not equate the cogito with (...)
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  3. Van Meter Ames (1955). Mead and Husserl on the Self. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 15 (3):320 - 331.
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  4. Wayne K. Andrew (1982). The Givenness of Self and Others in Husserl's Transcendental Phenomenology. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 13 (1):85-100.
    Husserl's explication of "self" and "others" occurs within his founding science of pure possibilities or "bracketed" consciousness and experience. His analysis of self and others seeks, in part, to demonstrate that "personal" or "self-experience" is not the only possibility of immanent consciousness but that "other persons" are also given as possibilities. The possibility of others, though in a form of givenness different from that of self, provides a basis for inter-subjectivity. Thus, Husserl's phenomenological analysis can, if it does avoid solipsism (...)
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  5. Christiane Bailey (2013). Le partage du monde: Husserl et la constitution des animaux comme "autres moi". Chiasmi International: Trilingual Studies Concerning Merleau-Ponty’s Thought 15:219-250.
    Alors que les phénoménologues prétendent avoir dépassé le solipsisme, la plupart n’ont en fait que repousser les frontières de l’intersubjectivité des individus humains aux individus des autres espèces. Pourtant, Husserl reconnaît l’existence d’une intersubjectivité interspécifique, c’est-à-dire d’une intersubjectivité dépassant les limites de l’espèce. Il va même jusqu’à affirmer qu’on comprend parfois mieux un animal familier qu’un humain étranger. Toutefois, même s’il admet que plusieurs animaux sont capables d’une vie de conscience subjective et qu’ils vivent dans un monde de sens partagé, (...)
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  6. Jocelyn Benoist (1995). Egología y Donación: Primera Aproximación a la Cuestión de la Presencia. Anuario Filosófico 28 (1):109-142.
    Husserl's theory of "transcendental ego" is often read as a metaphysical absolute idealism. The author attempts to fight this view and to give its phenomenological meaning to the "ego". It is the name of the "presence" the consciousness-life owns, beyond all metaphysical construction. So Husserl gives a new chance to egology, related to the frame of phenomenality itself. In this way a non-metaphysical re-reading of the cartesian cogito seems authorized.
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  7. Werner Bergmann & Gisbert Hoffmann (1989). Selbstreferenz Und Zeit: Die Dynamische Stabilität des Bewusstseins. [REVIEW] Husserl Studies 6 (2):155-175.
    Dieser Beitrag stellt die Zeitlichkeit des Bewusstseins und ihre Folgeprobleme in einer neuen Perspektive vor, die sich aus der Verknüpfung der empirischen Theorie selbstreferentieller Systeme mit der transzendentalen Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls ergibt. -/- .
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  8. Christian Beyer (2012). 4 Husserl on Understanding Persons. In Christel Fricke & Dagfinn Føllesdal (eds.), Intersubjectivity and Objectivity in Adam Smith and Edmund Husserl. Ontos Verlag. 8--93.
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  9. Roland Breeur (2001). Bergson's and Sartre's Account of the Self in Relation to the Transcendental Ego. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (2):177 – 198.
    In The Transcendence of the Ego Sartre deals with the idea of the self and of its relation to what he calls 'pure consciousness'. Pure consciousness is an impersonal transcendental field, in which the self is produced in such a way that consciousness thereby disguises its 'monstrous spontaneity'. I want to explore to what extent the ego is to be understood as a result of absolute consciousness. I also claim that the idea of the self Sartre has in mind is (...)
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  10. David Carr (1999). The Paradox of Subjectivity: The Self in the Transcendental Tradition. Oxford University Press.
    Challenging prevailing interpretations of the development of modern philosophy, this book proposes a reinterpretation of the transcendental tradition, as represented primarily by Kant and Husserl, and counters Heidegger's influential reading of these philosophers. Author David Carr defends their subtle and complex transcendental investigations of the self and the life of subjectivity, and seeks to revive an understanding of what Husserl calls "the paradox of subjectivity"--an appreciation for the rich and sometimes contradictory character of experience.
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  11. Barry Dainton (2002). Book Review: The Subject in Question—Sartre's Critique of Husserl in the Transcendence of the Ego. [REVIEW] Mind 111 (442):473-478.
  12. Roberta De Monticelli (2011). Alles Leben ist Stellungnehmen - Die Person als praktisches Subjekt. In Verena Mayer, Christopher Erhard, Marisa Scherini & Uwe Meixner (eds.), Die Aktualität Husserls. Karl Alber.
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  13. Robert M. Doran (1967). Sartre's Critique of the Husserlian Ego. The Modern Schoolman 44 (4):307-317.
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  14. Denis Fisette (1998). The Horizon of the Self: Husserl on Indexicals. In. In Dan Zahavi (ed.), Self-Awareness, Temporality, and Alterity. Dordrecht: Kluwer. 119--135.
    One of the questions raised by the conference’s topic, in particular the relationship between the self and the other, a matter much discussed since Merleau-Ponty’s death, is the question of husserlian phenomenology’s cartesianism. Some believe that despite his reservations towards cartesianism, Husserl never disavowed his commitment to the Cartesian program of a first philosophy.
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