Husserl’s account of time-consciousness closely interconnects with his account of the givenness of sensuous objectivity. It centers on the idea of an extended or “living” present, which involves not only the momentary now but also retentions and protentions, extending it into the past and into the future. Retentions and protentions are not intentional acts in their own right; that distinguishes them from acts of recollection and expectation, of which they are conditions of possibility. When I sensuously experience an object, the appearance it presents now is not sufficient for me to experience an object. Instead, roughly, I must always have retained some of the previous appearances and have some tacit anticipations (or protentions) in regard to the appearances to come. Husserl discusses time consciousness at three levels. First, at the level of intentional experiences (or their non-intentional contents). Second, at the level of the experienced objects (or the intentional contents). Third, at the level of the absolute flow of time-constituting consciousness, the most fundamental stratum of experience discoverable by phenomenological investigation.
|Key works||de Warren 2009, Brough 1972, Miller 1984, Mensch 2010, Kortooms 2002, Rinofner-Kreidl 2000, Held 1966, Bernet 2002, Lohmar & Yamaguchi 2010, Rodemeyer 2006|
|Introductions||Zahavi 2003, Ch. 3, Smith 2006, Ch. 5, Bernet et al 1993, Ch. 3|
Graduate studies at Western
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David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
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