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  1. Peter Achinstein (1987). Scientific Discovery and Maxwell's Kinetic Theory. Philosophy of Science 54 (3):409-434.
    By reference to Maxwell's kinetic theory, one feature of hypothetico-deductivism is defended. A scientist need make no inference to a hypothesis when he first proposes it. He may have no reason at all for thinking it is true. Yet it may be worth considering. In developing his kinetic theory there were central assumptions Maxwell made (for example, that molecules are spherical, that they exert contact forces, and that their motion is linear) that he had no reason to believe true. In (...)
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  2. Robert Ackermann (1965). Deductive Scientific Explanation. Philosophy of Science 32 (2):155-167.
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  3. Greg Bamford (2002). From Analysis/Synthesis to Conjecture/Analysis: A Review of Karl Popper’s Influence on Design Methodology in Architecture. [REVIEW] Design Studies 23 (3):245-61.
    The two principal models of design in methodological circles in architecture—analysis/synthesis and conjecture/analysis—have their roots in philosophy of science, in different conceptions of scientific method. This paper explores the philosophical origins of these models and the reasons for rejecting analysis/synthesis in favour of conjecture/analysis, the latter being derived from Karl Popper’s view of scientific method. I discuss a fundamental problem with Popper’s view, however, and indicate a framework for conjecture/analysis to avoid this problem.
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  4. Greg Bamford (1996). Popper and His Commentators on the Discovery of Neptune: A Close Shave for the Law of Gravitation? Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 27 (2):207-232.
    Knowledge of residual perturbations in Uranus's orbit led to Neptune's discovery in 1846 rather than the refutation of Newton's law of gravitation. Karl Popper asserts that this case is untypical of science and that the law was at least prima facie falsified. I argue that these assertions are the product of a false, a priori methodological position, 'Weak Popperian Falsificationism' (WPF), and that on the evidence the law was not, and was not considered, prima facie false. Many of Popper's commentators (...)
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  5. Pierre Duhem (1994). German Science. Philosophy of Science 61 (2):313.
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  6. Danny Frederick, Haack's Defective Discussion of Popper and the Courts.
    Susan Haack criticises the US courts' use of Karl Popper's epistemology in discriminating acceptable scientific testimony. She claims that acceptable testimony should be reliable and that Popper's epistemology is useless in discriminating reliability. She says that Popper's views have been found acceptable only because they have been misunderstood and she indicates an alternative epistemology which she says can discriminate reliable theories. However, her account of Popper's views is a gross and gratuitous misrepresentation. Her alternative epistemology cannot do what she claims (...)
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  7. Ken Gemes (1994). Schurz on Hypothetico-Deductivism. Erkenntnis 41 (2):171 - 181.
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  8. Gary Hatfield (1988). Science, Certainty, and Descartes. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:249 - 262.
    During the 1630s Descartes recognized that he could not expect all legitimate claims in natural science to meet the standard of absolute certainty. The realization resulted from a change in his physics, which itself arose not through methodological reflections, but through developments in his substantive metaphysical doctrines. Descartes discovered the metaphysical foundations of his physics in 1629-30; as a consequence, the style of explanation employed in his physical writings changed. His early methodological conceptions, as preserved in the Rules and sketched (...)
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  9. Urs Hofmann & Michael Baumgartner (2011). Determinism and the Method of Difference. Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 26 (2):155-176.
    The first part of this paper reveals a conflict between the core principles of deterministic causation and the standard method of difference, which is widely seen (and used) as a correct method of causally analyzing deterministic structures. We show that applying the method of difference to deterministic structures can giverise to causal inferences that contradict the principles of deterministic causation. The second part then locates the source of this conflict in an inference rule implemented in the method of difference according (...)
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  10. Wayne C. Myrvold & Joy Christian (eds.) (2009). Quantum Reality, Relativistic Causality, and Closing the Epistemic Circle. Springer.
    Part I Introduction -/- Passion at a Distance (Don Howard) -/- Part II Philosophy, Methodology and History -/- Balancing Necessity and Fallibilism: Charles Sanders Peirce on the Status of Mathematics and its Intersection with the Inquiry into Nature (Ronald Anderson) -/- Newton’s Methodology (William Harper) -/- Whitehead’s Philosophy and Quantum Mechanics (QM): A Tribute to Abner Shimony (Shimon Malin) -/- Bohr and the Photon (John Stachel) -/- Part III Bell’s Theorem and Nonlocality A. Theory -/- Extending the Concept of an (...)
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  11. José Ortega Y. Gasset (1971). The Idea of Principle in Leibnitz and the Evolution of Deductive Theory. W. W. Norton.
    This book, an exploration of the work of Leibnitz, is Ortega’s most systematic contribution to philosophy. Ortega begins with a detailed definition of a principle and with an examination of the specific principles formulated by Leibnitz. He goes on to examine Leibnitz. He goes on to examine Leibnitz’s complex and mercurial attitudes towards principles and discusses the effects of these attitudes on his philosophy and on contributions to mathematics and logic.
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  12. Ray Scott Percival (2015). Confirmation Versus Falsificationism. In Robin L. Cautin & Scott O. Lilienfeld (eds.), Encyclopedia of Clinical Psychology.
    Confirmation and falsification are different strategies for testing theories and characterizing the outcomes of those tests. Roughly speaking, confirmation is the act of using evidence or reason to verify or certify that a statement is true, definite, or approximately true, whereas falsification is the act of classifying a statement as false in the light of observation reports. After expounding the intellectual history behind confirmation and falsificationism, reaching back to Plato and Aristotle, I survey some of the main controversial issues and (...)
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  13. Darrell P. Rowbottom & R. McNeill Alexander (2012). The Role of Hypotheses in Biomechanical Research. Science in Context 25 (2):247-262.
    This paper investigates whether there is a discrepancy between the stated and actual aims in biomechanical research, particularly with respect to hypothesis testing. We present an analysis of one hundred papers recently published in The Journal of Experimental Biology and Journal of Biomechanics, and examine the prevalence of papers which (a) have hypothesis testing as a stated aim, (b) contain hypothesis testing claims that appear to be purely presentational (i.e. which seem not to have influenced the actual study), and (c) (...)
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  14. Luigi Scorzato (2016). A Simple Model of Scientific Progress - with Examples. In Laura Felline, Antonio Ledd, Francesco Paoli & Emanuele Rossanese (eds.), SILFS 3 - New Directions in Logic and Philosophy of Science. College Publications 45-56.
    One of the main goals of scientific research is to provide a description of the empirical data which is as accurate and comprehensive as possible, while relying on as few and simple assumptions as possible. In this paper, I propose a definition of the notion of few and simple assumptions that is not affected by known problems. This leads to the introduction of a simple model of scientific progress that is based only on empirical accuracy and conciseness. An essential point (...)
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