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Idealism

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  1. Murat Baç & Renée Elio (2004). Scheme-Based Alethic Realism: Agency, the Environment, and Truthmaking. Minds and Machines 14 (2).
    This paper presents a position called Scheme-based Alethic Realism, which reconciles a realist position on the nature of truth with a pluralistic Kantian perspective that allows for multiple environments in which truthmaking relationships are established. We argue that truthmaking functions are constrained by a stable phenomenal world and a stable cognitive architecture. This account takes truth as normatively distinct from epistemic justification while relativizing the truth conditions of our statements to what we call Frameworks. The pluralistic aspect allows that these (...)
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  2. John Bolender (2001). An Argument for Idealism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 8 (4):37-61.
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  3. John Bolender (1998). Factual Phenomenalism: A Supervenience Theory. Sorites 9 (9):16-31.
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  4. Ralph W. Church (1935). On Dr. Ewing's Neglect of Bradley's Theory of Internal Relations. Journal of Philosophy 32 (10):264-273.
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  5. Giuseppina D.'Oro (2005). Idealism and the Philosophy of Mind. Inquiry 48 (5):395-412.
    This paper defends an idealist form of non-reductivism in the philosophy of mind. I refer to it as a kind of conceptual dualism without substance dualism. I contrast this idealist alternative with the two most widespread forms of non-reductivism: multiple realisability functionalism and anomalous monism. I argue first, that functionalism fails to challenge seriously the claim for methodological unity since it is quite comfortable with the idea that it is possible to articulate a descriptive theory of the mind. Second, that (...)
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  6. A. C. Ewing (1935). On Dr. Ewing's Neglect of Bradley's Theory of Internal Relations: Reply. Journal of Philosophy 32 (10):273.
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  7. John Foster (2008). A World for Us: The Case for Phenomenalistic Idealism. Oxford University Press.
    A World for Us aims to refute physical realism and establish in its place a form of idealism. Physical realism, in the sense in which John Foster understands it, takes the physical world to be something whose existence is both logically independent of the human mind and metaphysically fundamental. Foster identifies a number of problems for this realist view, but his main objection is that it does not accord the world the requisite empirical immanence. The form of idealism that he (...)
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  8. James Franklin (2002). Stove's Discovery of the Worst Argument in the World. Philosophy 77 (4):615-624.
    The winning entry in David Stove's Competition to Find the Worst Argument in the World was: “We can know things only as they are related to us/insofar as they fall under our conceptual schemes, etc., so, we cannot know things as they are in themselves.” That argument underpins many recent relativisms, including postmodernism, post-Kuhnian sociological philosophy of science, cultural relativism, sociobiological versions of ethical relativism, and so on. All such arguments have the same form as ‘We have eyes, therefore we (...)
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  9. Paul Guyer (1983). Kant's Intentions in the Refutation of Idealism. Philosophical Review 92 (3):329-383.
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  10. Daniel D. Hutto (1998). An Ideal Solution to the Problems of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (3):328-43.
    This paper distinguishes three conceptual problems that attend philosophical ac- counts of consciousness. The first concerns the problem of properly characterizing the nature of consciousness itself, the second is the problem of making intelligible the relation between consciousness and the.
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  11. Peter Lloyd, Berkelian Ontology as a Fundamental Approach to Consciousness.
    George Berkeley (1685-1753) put forward a doctrine of mental monism, claiming that reality is fundamentally mental, and the physical world is a derived construct. This paper puts forward a defence of this theory, using a version of Berkeley.
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  12. Peter Lloyd, Berkeley Revisited: The Hard Problem Considered Easy.
    The philosophical mind-body problem, which Chalmers has named the 'Hard Problem', concerns the nature of the mind and the body. Physicalist approaches have been explored intensively in recent years but have brought us no consensual solution. Dualistic approaches have also been scrutinised since Descartes, but without consensual success. Mentalism has received little attention, yet it offers an elegantly simple solution to the hard problem.
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  13. John McTaggart Ellis McTaggart (1900/1968). The Nature of Existence. Cambridge University Press.
    The remainder of thi8 work will have a different object from that of the four preceding books, which were contained in the first volume. ...
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  14. Axel Randrup, Idealist Philosophy: What is Real? Conscious Experience Seen as Basic to All Ontology. An Overview.
    The idealist attitude followed in this paper is based on the assumption that only conscious experience in the Now is real. Conscious experience in the Now is supposed to be known directly or intuitively, it can not be explained. I think it constitutes t he basis of all ontology. Consciousness is conceived as the total of conscious experience in the Now, the ontology of consciousness is thus derived directly from the basis. The ontology of nature is derived more indirectly from (...)
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  15. Sydney C. Rome (1943). The Scottish Refutation of Berkeley's Immaterialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 3 (3):313-325.
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  16. Newton P. Stallknecht (1941). Mind and its Environment: Toward a Naturalistic Idealism. Journal of Philosophy 38 (November):617-622.
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