Related categories
Siblings:
29 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
  1. Thomas Baldwin (1991). The Identity Theory of Truth. Mind 100 (1):35-52.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   10 citations  
  2. JC Beall (2000). On the Identity Theory of Truth. Philosophy 75 (1):127-130.
    According to the so-called identity theory of truth. A proposition is true if the given proposition is identical to some fact. But with which fact must a proposition be identical if it is to be true? This question, according to some philosophers (notably Stewart Candlish), raises serious problems for the identity theory of truth. The worry is that the identity must specify the "right fact" if it is to be an acceptable theory. The current paper aims to help the identity (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Daniel Brigham (2014). The Metaphysics of Thought: A Response to Fish and Macdonald. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 22 (1):106-112.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Stewart Candlish, The Identity Theory of Truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    is true, there is a truth-maker (e.g., a fact) with which it is identical and the truth of the former consists in its identity with the latter. The theory is best understood as a reaction to the correspondence theory, according to which the relation of truth-bearer to truth-maker is correspondence. A correspondence theory is vulnerable to the nagging suspicion that if the best we can do is make statements that merely correspond to the truth, then we inevitably fail to capture (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  5. Stewart Candlish (1999). A Prolegomenon to an Identity Theory of Truth. Philosophy 74 (2):199-220.
    Most recent discussions of truth ignore the fact that a few philosophers, past and present, have flirted with and sometimes openly subscribed to an identity theory, according to which a proposition's being true consists in its identity with the reality it is supposedly about. This neglect is probably due to the theory's counter-intuitiveness: it faces obvious and fundamental objections. The aim of this paper is to consider these objections and decide if there is a version of the theory which can (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Stewart Candlish (1999). Identifying the Identity Theory of Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (2):233–240.
    This is a response to Jennifer Hornsby's Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society in 1996 (published 1997) and to Julian Dodd's defences of an identity theory. Both authors explain their versions of the theory through its rejection of a correspondence theory and its insistence on the indefinability of truth. I ask what more there is to the identity theory to justify its title and argue that the investigation of this matter reveals difficulties which neither author resolves.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  7. Stewart Candlish (1995). Resurrecting the Identity Theory of Truth. Bradley Studies 1 (2):116-124.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  8. J. M. N. Dodd (1994). Fact and Thought in Defence of an Identity Theory of Truth.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. Julian Dodd (2008). McDowell's Identity Conception of Truth: A Reply to Fish and MacDonald. Analysis 68 (297):76–85.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (9 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  10. Julian Dodd (2000). An Identity Theory of Truth. St. Martin's Press.
    This book argues that correspondence theories of truth fail because the relation that holds between a true thought and a fact is that of identity, not correspondence. Facts are not complexes of worldly entities which make thoughts true they are merely true thoughts. According to Julian Dodd, the resulting modest identity theory, while not defining truth, correctly diagnoses the failure of correspondence theories, and thereby prepares the ground for a defensible deflation of the concept of truth.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   17 citations  
  11. Julian Dodd (1999). Hornsby on the Identity Theory of Truth. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (2):225–232.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  12. Julian Dodd (1996). Resurrecting the Identity Theory of Truth. Bradley Studies 2 (1):42-50.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. Julian Dodd (1995). McDowell and Identity Theories of Truth. Analysis 55 (3):160 - 165.
    The main thesis of this paper is that John McDowell (in his Mind and World) tries to occupy a position that is not coherently statable; namely, that facts have objects and properties as constituents and are yet identical with true (Fregean) Thoughts. This position is contrasted with two other identity theories of truth: the robust theory, in which true propositions are identified with facts (which are understood to have objects and properties as constituents); and the modest theory, in which facts (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  14. Julian Dodd & Jennifer Hornsby (1992). The Identity Theory of Truth: Reply to Baldwin. Mind 101 (402):319-322.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  15. Pascal Engel (2005). The Unimportance of Being Modest: A Footnote to McDowell's Note. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (1):89 – 93.
    (2005). The unimportance of being modest: a footnote to McDowell’s note. International Journal of Philosophical Studies: Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 89-93. doi: 10.1080/0967255042000324362.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  16. Pascal Engel (2001). The False Modesty of the Identity Theory of Truth. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (4):441 – 458.
    The identity theory of truth, according to which true thoughts are identical with facts, is very hard to formulate. It oscillates between substantive versions, which are implausible, and a merely truistic version, which is difficult to distinguish from deflationism about truth. This tension is present in the form of identity theory that one can attribute to McDowell from his views on perception, and in the conception defended by Hornsby under that name.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  17. William Fish & Cynthia Macdonald (2011). McDowell's Alternative Conceptions of the World. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (1):87-94.
  18. William Fish & Cynthia Macdonald (2009). The Identity Theory of Truth and the Realm of Reference: Where Dodd Goes Wrong. Analysis 69 (2):297-304.
    In ‘On McDowell's identity conception of truth’ , we suggested that McDowell's Identity Theory, according to which a proposition is true if and only if it is identical with a fact, is only fully understood when we realize that there are two identity claims involved. The first is that, when one thinks truly, the content of a whole thought is identical with a Tractarian Tatsachen – a complex fact constituted by simple Sachverhalte – and the second is that these simple (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  19. William Fish & Cynthia Macdonald (2007). On McDowell's Identity Conception of Truth. Analysis 67 (293):36-41.
  20. Adrian Haddock (2008). McDowell and Idealism. Inquiry 51 (1):79 – 96.
    John McDowell espouses a certain conception of the thinking subject: as an embodied, living, finite being, with a capacity for experience that can take in the world, and stand in relations of warrant to subjects' beliefs. McDowell presents this conception of the subject as requiring a related conception of the world: as not located outside the conceptual sphere. In this latter conception, idealism and common-sense realism are supposed to coincide. But I suggest that McDowell's conception of the subject scuppers this (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21. Jennifer Hornsby (1997). The Presidential Address: Truth: The Identity Theory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 (1):1–24.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  22. Colin Johnston (2013). Judgment and the Identity Theory of Truth. Philosophical Studies 166 (2):381-397.
    The identity theory of truth takes on different forms depending on whether it is combined with a dual relation or a multiple relation theory of judgment. This paper argues that there are two significant problems for the dual relation identity theorist regarding thought’s answerability to reality, neither of which takes a grip on the multiple relation identity theory.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. Cynthia Macdonald, The Identity Theory of Truth and the Realm of Reference: Where Dodd Goes Wrong.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24. John McDowell (2005). The True Modesty of an Identity Conception of Truth: A Note in Response to Pascal Engel (2001). International Journal of Philosophical Studies 13 (1):83 – 88.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  25. Friederike Moltmann (2015). 'Truth Predicates' in Natural Language. In Dora Achourioti, Henri Galinon & José Martinez (eds.), Unifying Theories of Truth. Springer 57-83.
    This takes a closer look at the actual semantic behavior of apparent truth predicates in English and re-evaluates the way they could motivate particular philosophical views regarding the formal status of 'truth predicates' and their semantics. The paper distinguishes two types of 'truth predicates' and proposes semantic analyses that better reflect the linguistic facts. These analyses match particular independently motivated philosophical views.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  26. Lorenz B. Puntel (1999). The 'Identity Theory of Truth': Semantic and Ontological Aspects. In Julian Nida-Rümelin (ed.), Rationality, Realism and Revision. 351--8.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Gila Sher (2013). Introduction and Commentary on Jennifer Hornsby's "Truth: The Identity Theory". Aristotelian Society 1:204-213.
    Remove from this list  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. Robert Stern (1993). Did Hegel Hold an Identity Theory of Truth? Mind 102 (408):645-647.
    The aim of this paper is to criticize Thomas Baldwin's claim, that in developing an identity theory of truth, F H Bradley was following Hegel. It is argued that Baldwin has incorrectly understood certain passages from Hegel which he cites in defense of this view, and that Hegel's conception of truth was primarily material, not propositional.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. Peter M. Sullivan (2005). Identity Theories of Truth and the Tractatus. Philosophical Investigations 28 (1):43–62.
    The paper is concerned with the idea that the world is the totality of facts, not of things – with what is involved in thinking of the world in that way, and why one might do so. It approaches this issue through a comparison between Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and the identity theory of truth proposed by Hornsby and McDowell.The paper’s positive conclusion is that there is a genuine affinity between these two. A negative contention is that the modern identity theory is (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations