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Illusion and Hallucination

Edited by Benj Hellie (University of Toronto, University of Toronto at Scarborough)
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  1. Dominic Alford-Duguid & Michael Arsenault (forthcoming). On the Explanatory Power of Hallucination. Synthese:1-21.
    Pautz has argued that the most prominent naive realist account of hallucination—negative epistemic disjunctivism—cannot explain how hallucinations enable us to form beliefs about perceptually presented properties. He takes this as grounds to reject both negative epistemic disjunctivism and naive realism. Our aims are two: First, to show that this objection is dialectically ineffective against naive realism, and second, to draw morals from the failure of this objection for the dispute over the nature of perceptual experience at large.
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  2. Rami Ali (2016). Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias , Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):455-460.
    Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology is an edited MIT press collection that contributes to the philosophy of perception. This collection is a significant addition to the literature both for its excellent choice of texts, and its emphasis on the case of hallucinations. Dedicating a volume to hallucinatory phenomena may seem somewhat peculiar for those not entrenched in the analytic philosophy of perception, but it is easy enough to grasp their significance. Theories of perception aim to give a fundamental characterization of perceptual (...)
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  3. Murray Alpert (1986). Language Process and Hallucination Phenomenology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (3):518.
  4. Joseph Anderson & Barbara Anderson (1993). The Myth of Persistence of Vision Revisited. Journal of Film and Video 45:3--12.
  5. Tim Andrews & Dale Purves (2005). The Wagon-Wheel Illusion in Continuous Light. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (6):261-263.
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  6. Louise Antony (2011). The Openness of Illusions. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):25-44.
    Illusions are thought to make trouble for the intuition that perceptual experience is "open" to the world. Some have suggested, in response to the this trouble, that illusions differ from veridical experience in the degree to which their character is determined by their engagement with the world. An understanding of the psychology of perception reveals that this is not the case: veridical and falsidical perceptions engage the world in the same way and to the same extent. While some contemporary vision (...)
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  7. István Aranyosi (forthcoming). Silencing the Argument From Hallucination. In Fiona MacPherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination (MIT Press).
    Ordinary people tend to be realists regarding perceptual experience, that is, they take perceiving the environment as a direct, unmediated, straightforward access to a mindindependent reality. Not so for (ordinary) philosophers. The empiricist influence on the philosophy of perception, in analytic philosophy at least, made the problem of perception synonymous with the view that realism is untenable. Admitting the problem (and trying to offer a view on it) is tantamount to rejecting ordinary people’s implicit realist assumptions as naive. So what (...)
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  8. David M. Armstrong (1955). Illusions of Sense. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 33 (August):88-106.
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  9. Keith Augustine (2015). Near-Death Experiences Are Hallucinations. In Keith Augustine & Michael Martin (eds.), The Myth of an Afterlife: The Case against Life After Death. Rowman & Littlefield 529-569.
    Reports of near-death experiences (NDEs) with suggestive or manifestly hallucinatory features strongly imply that NDEs are not glimpses of an afterlife, but rather internally generated fantasies. Such features include discrepancies between what is seen in the seemingly physical environment of “out-of-body” NDEs and what is actually happening in the physical world at the time, bodily sensations felt after near-death experiencers (NDErs) have ostensibly departed the physical world altogether and entered a transcendental realm, encounters with living persons and fictional characters while (...)
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  10. Jean Pierre Bâeland (2003). La Crise de l'Art Contemporain Illusion Ou R'ealit'e? Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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  11. Clare Batty (2010). What the Nose Doesn't Know: Non-Veridicality and Olfactory Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3-4):10-17.
    We can learn much about perceptual experience by thinking about how it can mislead us. In this paper, I explore whether, and how, olfactory experience can mislead. I argue that, in the case of olfactory experience, the traditional distinction between illusion and hallucination does not apply. Integral to the traditional distinction is a notion of ‘object-failure’—the failure of an experience to present objects accurately. I argue that there are no such presented objects in olfactory experience. As a result, olfactory experience (...)
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  12. Aaron Ben-Zeev (1984). What is a Perceptual Mistake? Journal of Mind and Behavior 5 (3):261-278.
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  13. Alfred Binet (1884). Visual Hallucinations in Hypnotism. Mind 9 (35):413-415.
  14. Max Black (1971). Philosophical Analysis. Freeport, N.Y.,Books for Libraries Press.
    Introduction MAX BLACK Nothing of any value can be said on method except through examples; but now, at the end of our course, we may collect certain general ...
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  15. S. V. Bokil (2005). The Argument From Illusion: All Appearance and No Reality. Indian Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1-2):147-158.
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  16. Philip Bretzel (1974). Cornman, Sensa, and the Argument From Hallucination. Philosophical Studies 26 (5-6):443-445.
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  17. Philip Bretzevonl (1974). Cornman, Sensa, and the Argument From Hallucination. Philosophical Studies 26 (December):443-445.
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  18. Bill Brewer (2008). How to Account for Illusion. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press 168-180.
    The question how to account for illusion has had a prominent role in shaping theories of perception throughout the history of philosophy. Prevailing philosophical wisdom today has it that phenomena of illusion force us to choose between the following two options. First, reject altogether the early modern empiricist idea that the core subjective character of perceptual experience is to be given simply by citing the object presented in that experience. Instead we must characterize perceptual experience entirely in terms of its (...)
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  19. Robert Briscoe (2010). Perceiving the Present: Systematization of Illusions or Illusion of Systematization? Cognitive Science 34 (8):1530-1542.
    Mark Changizi et al. (2008) claim that it is possible systematically to organize more than 50 kinds of illusions in a 7 × 4 matrix of 28 classes. This systematization, they further maintain, can be explained by the operation of a single visual processing latency correction mechanism that they call “perceiving the present” (PTP). This brief report raises some concerns about the way a number of illusions are classified by the proposed systematization. It also poses two general problems—one empirical and (...)
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  20. Berit Brogaard (forthcoming). Synesthetic Binding and the Reactivation Model of Memory. In Ophelia Deroy (ed.), Sensory Blendings: New essays on synaesthesia. Oxford University Press
    Despite the recent surge in research on, and interest in, synesthesia, the mechanism underlying this condition is still unknown. Feedforward mechanisms involving overlapping receptive fields of sensory neurons as well as feedback mechanisms involving a lack of signal disinhibition have been proposed. Here I show that a broad range of studies of developmental synesthesia indicate that the mechanism underlying the phenomenon may involve reinstatement of brain activity in different sensory or cognitive streams in a way that is similar to what (...)
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  21. Berit Brogaard (ed.) (2014). Does Perception Have Content? OUP Usa.
    This volume of new essays brings together philosophers representing many different perspectives to address central questions in the philosophy of perception.
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  22. Jason W. Brown (2004). The Illusory and the Real. Mind and Matter 2 (1):37-59.
    This contribution explores the psychological basis of illusion and the feeling of what is real in relation to a process theory (microgenesis) of mind/brain states. The varieties of illusion and the alterations in the feeling of realness are illustrated in cases of clinical pathology, as well as in everyday life. The basis of illusion does not rest in a comparison of appearance to reality nor in the relation of image to object, since these are antecedent and consequent phases in the (...)
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  23. Marc Burock, Falsehood: An Analysis of Illusion's Singularity.
    It is a common tactic, going back to the beginnings of religion and philosophy, to presume that we are enveloped in a world of untruth and illusion, thereby fueling our movement toward truth. In more modern times, Descartes demonstrates this process clearly with his Meditations. This work extends the Cartesian skeptical position by challenging the concept of illusion itself, asking those who have ever called something ‘an illusion’ to question the meaning of these assertions. This broader skepticism partially annihilates itself (...)
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  24. Alex Byrne (2009). Experience and Content. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):429-451.
    The 'content view', in slogan form, is 'Perceptual experiences have representational content'. I explain why the content view should be reformulated to remove any reference to 'experiences'. I then argue, against Bill Brewer, Charles Travis and others, that the content view is true. One corollary of the discussion is that the content of perception is relatively thin (confined, in the visual case, to roughly the output of 'mid-level' vision). Finally, I argue (briefly) that the opponents of the content view are (...)
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  25. Dan Cavedon-Taylor (2011). The Space of Seeing-In. British Journal of Aesthetics 51 (3):271-278.
    Recent work on seeing-in has taken a pluralist turn. There is variety among pictures, so we should expect variety among seeing-in. Dominic Lopes’s taxonomy of seeing-in is arguably the most thorough that is currently available. Lopes identifies five varieties of seeing-in. In this paper I identify a sixth: pseudo-actualism. This paper improves our current best taxonomy of seeing-in.
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  26. Pravas Jivan Chaudhury (1955). Truth and Error. Review of Metaphysics 8 (4):569 - 573.
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  27. Roderick M. Chisholm (1950). The Theory of Appearing. In Max Black (ed.), Philosophical Analysis. Prentice Hall
  28. Paul Coates (2000). Deviant Causal Chains and Hallucinations: A Problem for the Anti-Causalist. Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):320-331.
    The subjective character of a given experience leaves open the question of its precise status. If it looks to a subject K as if there is an object of a kind F in front of him, the experience he is having could be veridical, or hallucinatory. Advocates of the Causal Theory of perception (whom I shall call.
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  29. Jonathan Dancy (1995). Arguments From Illusion. Philosophical Quarterly 45 (181):421-438.
  30. Fabian Dorsch (forthcoming). Perceptual Acquaintance and the Seeeming Relationality of Hallucinations. Journal of Consciousness Studies.
    In recent years, it has become popular again to endorse relationalism about perception.1 According to this view, perceptions are essentially relational experiences and thus di er in nature from non-relational hallucinations. In this article, I assume that relationalism is true. The issue that I am generally interested in is rather which version of relationalism we should endorse, given that perceptions are relational. The standard answer to this question is Acquaintance Relationalism, the view that perceptions are relational in so far as (...)
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  31. Fabian Dorsch (forthcoming). The Phenomenal Presence of Perceptual Reasons. In Fabian Dorsch & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Phenomenal Presence. Oxford University Press
    Doxasticism about our awareness of normative (i.e. justifying) reasons – the view that we can recognise reasons for forming attitudes or performing actions only by means of normative judgements or beliefs – is incompatible with the following triad of claims: -/- (1) Being motivated (i.e. forming attitudes or performing actions for a motive) requires responding to and, hence, recognising a relevant reason. -/- (2) Infants are capable of being motivated. -/- (3) Infants are incapable of normative judgement or belief. -/- (...)
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  32. Fabian Dorsch (2013). Experience and Introspection. In Fiona Macpherson & Dimitris Platchias (eds.), Hallucination. The MIT Press 175-220.
    One central fact about hallucinations is that they may be subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions. Indeed, it has been argued that the hallucinatory experiences concerned cannot— and need not—be characterized in any more positive general terms. This epistemic conception of hallucinations has been advocated as the best choice for proponents of experiential (or “naive realist”) disjunctivism—the view that perceptions and hallucinations differ essentially in their introspectible subjective characters. In this chapter, I aim to formulate and defend an intentional alternative to experiential (...)
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  33. Fabian Dorsch (2010). The Unity of Hallucinations. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 9 (2):171-191.
    My primary aim in this article is to provide a philosophical account of the unity of hallucinations, which can capture both perceptual hallucinations (which are subjectively indistinguishable from perceptions) and non-perceptual hallucinations (all others). Besides, I also mean to clarify further the division of labour and the nature of the collaboration between philosophy and the cognitive sciences. Assuming that the epistemic conception of hallucinations put forward by M. G. F. Martin and others is largely on the right track, I will (...)
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  34. Jeffrey Dunn (2008). The Obscure Act of Perception. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):367-393.
    Finding disjunctivist versions of direct realism unexplanatory, Mark Johnston [(2004). Philosophical Studies, 120, 113–183] offers a non-disjunctive version of direct realism in its place and gives a defense of this view from the problem of hallucination. I will attempt to clarify the view that he presents and then argue that, once clarified, it either does not escape the problem of hallucination or does not look much like direct realism.
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  35. S. Benjamin Fink (2010). Review of Jan Westerhoff's „12 Examples of Illusion“. [REVIEW] Metapsychology 14 (50).
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  36. Roderick Firth (1964). Austin and the Argument From Illusion. Philosophical Review 73 (July):372-382.
    Firth argues that austin's criticisms of the argument from illusion do not destroy the argument. We can reformulate it in two ways so that it succeeds as a method of ostensibly defining terms denoting the sensory constituent of perceptual experience. One way maintains the act-Object distinction of the cartesian tradition and the other uses the language of "looks." (staff).
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  37. Eugen Fischer & Paul E. Engelhardt (2016). Intuitions' Linguistic Sources: Stereotypes, Intuitions and Illusions. Mind and Language 31 (1):67-103.
    Intuitive judgments elicited by verbal case-descriptions play key roles in philosophical problem-setting and argument. Experimental philosophy's ‘sources project’ seeks to develop psychological explanations of philosophically relevant intuitions which help us assess our warrant for accepting them. This article develops a psycholinguistic explanation of intuitions prompted by philosophical case-descriptions. For proof of concept, we target intuitions underlying a classic paradox about perception, trace them to stereotype-driven inferences automatically executed in verb comprehension, and employ a forced-choice plausibility-ranking task to elicit the relevant (...)
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  38. William Fish (2013). Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion: Reply to My Critics. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 163 (1):57-66.
    This book provides the first full-length treatment of disjunctivism about visual experiences in the service of defending a naive realist theory of veridical visual perception. It includes detailed theories of hallucination and illusion that show how such states can be indistinguishable from veridical experiences without sharing any common character.
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  39. Marina Folescu (2015). Perceptual and Imaginative Conception: The Distinction Reid Missed. In Todd Buras & Rebecca Copenhaver (eds.), Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge and Value. Oxford University Press 52-74.
    The present investigation concerns Reid’s explanation of how objects (be they real or nonexistent) are conceived. This paper shows that there is a deep-rooted tension in Reid’s understanding of conception: although the type of conception employed in perception is closely related to the one employed in imagination, three fundamental features distinguish perceptual conception (as the former will be referred to throughout this paper) from imaginative conception (as the latter will be called henceforth). These features would have been ascribed by Reid (...)
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  40. Bryan Frances (forthcoming). The Ontology of Some Afterimages. In Manuel Curado & Steven Gouvei (eds.), Untitled Philosophy of Mind Book.
    A good portion of the work in the ontology of color focuses on color properties, trying to figure out how they are related to more straightforwardly physical properties. Another focus is realism: are ordinary material objects such as pumpkins really colored? A third emphasis is the nature of what is referred to by the terms ‘what it’s like’ or ‘phenomenal character’, as applied to color. In contrast, this essay is exclusively about select color tokens. I will be arguing that whether (...)
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  41. Bryan Frances (forthcoming). Why Afterimages Are Metaphysically Mysterious. Think.
    A short essay for a popular audience on why afterimages are difficult to fit into any ontology.
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  42. Craig French (2015). Hallucination: Philosophy and Psychology By Fiona Macpherson and Dimitris Platchias. [REVIEW] Analysis 75 (3):528-530.
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  43. Craig French & Lee Walters (forthcoming). The Invalidity of the Argument From Illusion. American Philosophical Quarterly.
    The argument from illusion attempts to establish the bold claim that we are never perceptually aware of ordinary material objects. The argument has rightly received a great deal critical of scrutiny. But here we develop a criticism that, to our knowledge, has not hitherto been explored. We consider the canonical form of the argument as it is captured in contemporary expositions. There are two stages to our criticism. First, we show that the argument is invalid. Second, we identify premises that (...)
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  44. E. J. Furlong (1954). Memory and the Argument From Illusion. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 54:131-144.
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  45. James Genone (2014). Appearance and Illusion. Mind 123 (490):339-376.
    Recent debates between representational and relational theories of perceptual experience sometimes fail to clarify in what respect the two views differ. In this essay, I explain that the relational view rejects two related claims endorsed by most representationalists: the claim that perceptual experiences can be erroneous, and the claim that having the same representational content is what explains the indiscriminability of veridical perceptions and phenomenally matching illusions or hallucinations. I then show how the relational view can claim that errors associated (...)
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  46. A. R. Greenberg (1977). Defending the Argument From Illusion. Personalist 58 (April):124-130.
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  47. Stephen Grossberg (2002). Neural Substrates of Visual Percepts, Imagery, and Hallucinations. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2):194-195.
    Recent neural models clarify many properties of mental imagery as part of the process whereby bottom-up visual information is influenced by top-down expectations, and how these expectations control visual attention. Volitional signals can transform modulatory top-down signals into supra-threshold imagery. Visual hallucinations can occur when the normal control of these volitional signals is lost.
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  48. York H. Gunther (2001). Content, Illusion, Partition. Philosophical Studies 102 (2):185-202.
    Philosophers of mind have recently sought to establish a theoret- ical use for nonconceptual content. Although there is disagreement about what nonconceptual content is supposed to be, this much is clear. A state with nonconceptual content is mental. Hence, while one may deny that refrigerators and messy rooms have conceptual capacities, their states, as physical and not mental, do not have nonconceptual content. A state with nonconceptual content is also intentional, which is to say that it represents a feature of (...)
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  49. Edmund Gurney (1885). Supplementary Note on Hallucinations. Mind 10 (38):316-317.
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  50. Edmund Gurney (1885). Hallucinations. Mind 10 (38):161-199.
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