Imagination and Imagery Edited by Amy Kind (Claremont McKenna College)

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  1. Catharine Abell & Gregory Currie (1999). Internal and External Pictures. Philosophical Psychology 12 (4):429-445.
    What do pictures and mental images have in common? The contemporary tendency to reject mental picture theories of imagery suggests that the answer is: not much. We show that pictures and visual imagery have something important in common. They both contribute to mental simulations: pictures as inputs and mental images as outputs. But we reject the idea that mental images involve mental pictures, and we use simulation theory to strengthen the anti-pictorialist's case. Along the way we try to account for (...)
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  2. Alex Byrne (2010). Recollection, Perception, Imagination. Philosophical Studies 148 (1).
    Remembering a cat sleeping (specifically, recollecting the way the cat looked), perceiving (specifically, seeing) a cat sleeping, and imagining (specifically, visualizing) a cat sleeping are of course importantly different. Nonetheless, from the first-person perspective they are palpably alike. Our first question is.
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  3. Edward S. Casey (1971). Imagination: Imagining and the Image. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (June):475-490.
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  4. Frederick C. Copleston (1950). The Psychology of Imagination. By Jean-Paul Sartre. Philosophical Library. (New York. 1948. Pp. 285. Price $3.75.). Philosophy 25 (92):89-.
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  5. Timothy M. Costelloe (2007). Hume's Phenomenology of the Imagination. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5 (1):31-45.
    This paper examines the role of the imagination in Hume's epistemology. Three specifi c powers of the imagination are identifi ed – the imagistic, conceptual, and productive – as well as three corresponding kinds of fi ctions based on the degree of belief contained in each class of ideas the imagination creates. These are generic fi ctions, real and mere fi ctions, and necessary fi ctions, respectively. Through these manifestations, (...)
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  6. Gregory Currie & Nicholas Jones (2006). McGinn on Delusion and Imagination. Philosophical Books 47 (4):306-313.
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  7. Sylvain Delcomminette (2003). False Pleasures, Appearance and Imagination in the Philebus. Phronesis 48 (3):215-237.
    This paper examines the discussion about false pleasures in the "Philebus" (36 c3-44 a11). After stressing the crucial importance of this discussion in the economy of the dialogue, it attempts to identify the problematic locus of the possibility of true or false pleasures. Socrates points to it by means of an analogy between pleasure and doxa. Against traditional interpretations, which reduce the distinction drawn in this passage to a distinction between doxa and pleasure on the one hand and their object (...)
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  8. Fabian Dorsch (2011). Transparency and Imagining Seeing. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):173-200.
    One of the most powerful arguments against intentionalism and in favour of disjunctivism about perceptual experiences has been formulated by M. G. F. Martin in his paper The Transparency of Experience. The overall structure of this argument may be stated in the form of a triad of claims which are jointly inconsistent.
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  9. Graeme P. Earl (2009). Rome (L.) Haselberger, (J.) Humphrey (Edd.) Imaging Ancient Rome. Documentation – Visualization – Imagination. Proceedings of the Third Williams Symposium on Classical Architecture, 2004. (JRA Supplementary Series 61.) Pp. 337, B/W & Colour Ills, B/W & Colour Maps. Portsmouth, Rhode Island: Journal of Roman Archaeology, 2006. Cased, US$125. ISBN: 978-1-887829-61-. The Classical Review 59 (01):255-.
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  10. Andreas Elpidorou (2010). Imagination in Non-Representational Painting. In Jonathan Webber (ed.), Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. Routledge.
  11. Tamar Szabó Gendler (2006). Imaginative Contagion. Metaphilosophy 37 (2):183-203.
    The aim of this article is to expand the diet of examples considered in philosophical discussions of imagination and pretense, and to offer some preliminary observations about what we might learn about the nature of imagination as a result. The article presents a number of cases involving imaginative contagion: cases where merely imagining or pretending that P has effects that we would expect only perceiving or believing that P to have. Examples are offered that involve visual imagery, motor imagery, fictional (...)
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  12. Dominic Gregory (2010). Imagery, the Imagination and Experience. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):735-753.
    Visualizings, the simplest imaginings which employ visual imagery, have certain characteristic features; they are perspectival, for instance. Also, it seems that some but not all of our visualizings are imaginings of seeings. But it has been forcefully argued, for example by M.G.F. Martin and Christopher Peacocke, that all visualizings are imaginings of visual sensations. I block these arguments by providing an account of visualizings which allows for their perspectival nature and other features they typically have, but which also explains how (...)
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  13. Robert Hopkins (2006). With Sight Too Much in Mind, Mind Too Little in Sight? Philosophical Books 47 (4):293-305.
    This is a critical notice of Colin McGinn's 'Mindsight'.
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  14. Mostyn W. Jones (1995). Inadequacies in Current Theories of Imagination. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):313-333.
    Interest in imagination dates back to Plato and Aristotle, but full-length works have been devoted to it only relatively recently by Sartre, McKellar, Furlong, Casey, Johnson, Warnock, Brann, and others. Despite their length and variety, however, these current theories take overly narrow views of this complex phenomenon. (1) Their definitions of “imagination” neglect the multiplicity of its meanings and tend to focus narrowly on the power of imaging alone (which produces images and imagery). But imagination in the fullest, most (...)
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  15. P. Joyce (2003). Imagining Experiences Correctly. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):361-370.
    According to Mellor, we know what an experience is like if we can imagine it correctly, and we will do so if we recognise the experience as it is imagined. This paper identifies a constraint on adequate accounts of how we ordinarily imagine experiences correctly: the capacities to imagine and to recognise the experience must be jointly operative at the point of forming an intention to imagine the experience. The paper develops an account of imagining experiences correctly that meets this (...)
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  16. Amy Kind (2001). Putting the Image Back in Imagination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):85-110.
    Despite their intuitive appeal and a long philosophical history, imagery-based accounts of the imagination have fallen into disfavor in contemporary discussions. The philosophical pressure to reject such accounts seems to derive from two distinct sources. First, the fact that mental images have proved difficult to accommodate within a scientific conception of mind has led to numerous attempts to explain away their existence, and this in turn has led to attempts to explain the phenomenon of imagining without reference to such ontologically (...)
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  17. Amy Kind, Imagery and Imagination. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Both imagery and imagination play an important part in our mental lives. This article, which has three main sections, discusses both of these phenomena, and the connection between them. The first part discusses mental images and, in particular, the dispute about their representational nature that has become known as the _imagery debate_ . The second part turns to the faculty of the imagination, discussing the long philosophical tradition linking mental imagery and the imagination—a tradition that came under attack in the (...)
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  18. Peter Langland-Hassan (forthcoming). Pretense, Imagination, and Belief: The Single Attitude Theory. Philosophical Studies.
    A popular view has it that the mental representations underlying human pretense are not beliefs, but are “belief-like” in important ways. This view typically posits a distinctive cognitive attitude (a “DCA”) called “imagination” that is taken toward the propositions entertained during pretense, along with correspondingly distinct elements of cognitive architecture. This paper argues that the characteristics of pretense motivating such views of imagination can be explained without positing a DCA, or other cognitive architectural features beyond those regulating normal belief and (...)
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  19. Peter Langland-Hassan (2011). A Puzzle About Visualization. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):145-173.
    Visual imagination (or visualization) is peculiar in being both free, in that what we imagine is up to us, and useful to a wide variety of practical reasoning tasks. How can we rely upon our visualizations in practical reasoning if what we imagine is subject to our whims? The key to answering this puzzle, I argue, is to provide an account of what constrains the sequence in which the representations featured in visualization unfold—an account that is consistent with its freedom. (...)
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  20. K. Lennon (2010). Re-Enchanting the World: The Role of Imagination in Perception. Philosophy 85 (3):375-389.
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  21. James Mensch, Imagination and Machine Intelligence.
    The question of the imagination is rather like the question Augustine raised with regard to the nature of time. We all seem to know what it involves, yet find it difficult to define. For Descartes, the imagination was simply our faculty for producing a mental image. He distinguished it from the understanding by noting that while the notion of a thousand sided figure was comprehensible—that is, was sufficiently clear and distinct to be differentiated from a thousand and one sided figure—the (...)
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  22. Bence Nanay (2010). Perception and Imagination: Amodal Perception as Mental Imagery. Philosophical Studies.
    When we see an object, we also represent those parts of it that are not visible. The question is how we represent them: this is the problem of amodal perception. I will consider three possible accounts: (a) we see them, (b) we have non-perceptual beliefs about them and (c) we have immediate perceptual access to them, and point out that all of these views face both empirical and conceptual objections. I suggest and defend a fourth account, according to which we (...)
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  23. Paul Noordhof (2002). Imagining Objects and Imagining Experiences. Mind and Language 17 (4):426-455.
    A number of philosophers have argued in favour of the Dependency Thesis: if a subject sensorily imagines an F then he or she sensorily imagines from the inside perceptually experiencing an F in the imaginary world. They claim that it explains certain important features of imaginative experience, in brief: the fact that it is perspectival, the fact that it does not involve presentation of sensory qualities and the fact that mental images can serve a number of different imaginings. I argue (...)
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  24. Lilly-Marlene Russow (1978). Some Recent Work on Imagination. American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (January):57-66.
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  25. J. M. Shorter (1952). Imagination. Mind 61 (October):528-542.
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  26. Beata Stawarska (2001). Pictorial Representation or Subjective Scenario? Sartre on Imagination. Sartre Studies International 7 (2):87-111.
    The major thesis developed in Sartre's L'imaginaire is that all imaginary acts can be subsumed under the heading of one "image family" and, therefore, that imagination as a whole can be theorized in terms of pictorial representation. Yet this theory fails to meet the objective of Sartre's study, to demonstrate that imaginary activity is not a derivative of perception but an attitude with a character and dignity of its own. The subsidiary account of imagination in terms of neutralization of belief (...)
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  27. Nigel Thomas, The Study of Imagination as an Approach to Consciousness.
    The concept of consciousness appears to have had little currency before the 17th century. Not only did philosophers before Descartes fail to worry about how consciousness fitted into the natural world, they did not even claim to be conscious. If we are conscious, however, we must assume that they were too, and it hardly seems plausible that they could have been unaware of it. In fact, when the mind was discussed in former ages, both before and within the work of (...)
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  28. Nigel J. T. Thomas, Coding Dualism: Conscious Thought Without Cartesianism or Computationalism.
    The principal temptation toward substance dualisms, or otherwise incorporating a question begging homunculus into our psychologies, arises not from the problem of consciousness in general, nor from the problem of intentionality, but from the question of our awareness and understanding of our own mental contents, and the control of the deliberate, conscious thinking in which we employ them. Dennett has called this "Hume's problem". Cognitivist philosophers have generally either denied the experiential reality of thought, as did the Behaviorists, or have (...)
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  29. Nigel J. T. Thomas, The Multidimensional Spectrum of Imagination: Images, Dreams, Hallucinations, and Active, Imaginative Perception.
    A comprehensive theory of the structure and cognitive function of the human imagination, and its relationship to perceptual experience, is developed, largely through a critique of the account propounded in Colin McGinn's Mindsight. McGinn eschews the highly deflationary (and unilluminating) views of imagination common amongst analytical philosophers, but fails to develop his own account satisfactorily because (owing to a scientifically outmoded understanding of visual perception) he draws an excessively sharp, qualitative distinction between imagination and perception (following Wittgenstein, Sartre, and others), (...)
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  30. Nigel J. T. Thomas, Are There People Who Do Not Experience Imagery? (And Why Does It Matter?).
    To the best of my knowledge, with the exception of Galton's original work (1880, 1883), Sommer's brief case study (1978), and Faw's (1997, 2009) articles, this is the only really substantial discussion of the phenomenon of non-brain-damaged "non-imagers" available anywhere.
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  31. Nigel J. T. Thomas, Attitude and Image, or, What Will Simulation Theory Let Us Eliminate?
    Stich & Ravenscroft (1994) have argued that (contrary to most people's initial assumptions) a simulation account of folk psychology may be consistent with eliminative materialism, but they fail to bring out the full complexity or the potential significance of the relationship. Contemporary eliminativism (particularly in the Churchland version) makes two major claims: the first is a rejection of the orthodox assumption that realistically construed propositional attitudes are fundamental to human cognition; the second is the suggestion that with the advancement of (...)
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  32. Nigel J. T. Thomas (2005). Mental Imagery, Philosophical Issues About. In Lynn Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Volume 2, pp. 1147-1153.
    An introduction to the science and philosophy of mental imagery.
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  33. Nigel J. T. Thomas (2003). Imagining Minds. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (11):79-84.
    The concepts of imagination and consciousness have, very arguably, been inextricably intertwined at least since Aristotle initiated the systematic study of human cognition (Thomas, 1998). To imagine something is ipso facto to be conscious of it (even if the wellsprings of imaginative creativity are in the unconscious), and many have held that our conscious thinking consists largely or entirely in a succession of mental images, the products of imagination (see, e.g., Damasio, 1994 -- or, come to that, see Aristotle, or (...)
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  34. Nigel J. T. Thomas (1999). Are Theories of Imagery Theories of Imagination? An Active Perception Approach to Conscious Mental Content. Cognitive Science 23 (2):207-245.
    Can theories of mental imagery, conscious mental contents, developed within cognitive science throw light on the obscure (but culturally very significant) concept of imagination? Three extant views of mental imagery are considered: quasi-pictorial, description, and perceptual activity theories. The first two face serious theoretical and empirical difficulties. The third is (for historically contingent reasons) little known, theoretically underdeveloped, and empirically untried, but has real explanatory potential. It rejects the "traditional" symbolic computational view of mental contents, but is compatible with recent (...)
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  35. Nigel J. T. Thomas, Imagination. Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind.
    A brief historical and conceptual account of the concept of imagination.
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  36. Nigel J. T. Thomas (1997). A Stimulus to the Imagination: A Review of Questioning Consciousness: The Interplay of Imagery, Cognition and Emotion in the Human Brain by Ralph D. Ellis. [REVIEW] Psyche 3 (4).
    Twentieth century philosophy and psychology have been peculiarly averse to mental images. Throughout nearly two and a half millennia of philosophical wrangling, from Aristotle to Hume to Bergson, images (perceptual and quasi-perceptual experiences), sometimes under the alias of "ideas", were almost universally considered to be both the prime contents of consciousness, and the vehicles of cognition. The founding fathers of experimental psychology saw no reason to dissent from this view, it was commonsensical, and true to the lived experience of conscious (...)
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  37. Alan R. White (1987). Visualizing and Imagining Seeing. Analysis 47 (October):221-224.
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