About this topic
Summary Historically, philosophers tended to view imagination as tightly bound up with the notion of mental imagery.  Although this tradition came under attack amidst the verificationism and behaviorism of the early to mid 20th century, most philosophers today continue to see an important connection between imagery and imagination.  Exactly what that connection is, however, has been much disputed.  Important questions include the following:  Must imagination involve imagery, or can there be non-imagistic imagining?  How can we account for the difference between imagination and other mental activities (such as memory) that involve imagery?  What is the role of imagery in imagination?
Key works Ryle 1960 famously argues against the existence of mental imagery and, relatedly, that there is no such thing as a faculty of imagination.  Kind 2001 and Casey 1971 explicitly take up the connection between mental imagery and imagination.  Byrne 2010 and Noordhof 2002 each take up the connection between imagining and related activities like perceiving.  Block 1981 is a useful collection of articles about mental imagery; Tye 1991 discusses the nature of imagistic representation.  
Introductions Kind 2005
  Show all references
Related categories
Siblings:
53 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 53
  1. Catharine Abell & Gregory Currie (1999). Internal and External Pictures. Philosophical Psychology 12 (4):429-445.
    What do pictures and mental images have in common? The contemporary tendency to reject mental picture theories of imagery suggests that the answer is: not much. We show that pictures and visual imagery have something important in common. They both contribute to mental simulations: pictures as inputs and mental images as outputs. But we reject the idea that mental images involve mental pictures, and we use simulation theory to strengthen the anti-pictorialist's case. Along the way we try to account for (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Alex Byrne (2010). Recollection, Perception, Imagination. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):15 - 26.
    Remembering a cat sleeping (specifically, recollecting the way the cat looked), perceiving (specifically, seeing) a cat sleeping, and imagining (specifically, visualizing) a cat sleeping are of course importantly different. Nonetheless, from the first-person perspective they are palpably alike. Our first question is.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Edward S. Casey (1971). Imagination: Imagining and the Image. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 31 (June):475-490.
  4. Frederick C. Copleston (1950). The Psychology of Imagination. By Jean-Paul Sartre. Philosophical Library. (New York. 1948. Pp. 285. Price $3.75.). Philosophy 25 (92):89-.
  5. Timothy M. Costelloe (2007). Hume's Phenomenology of the Imagination. Journal of Scottish Philosophy 5 (1):31-45.
    This paper examines the role of the imagination in Hume's epistemology.<span class='Hi'></span> Three specifi c powers of the imagination are identifi ed <span class='Hi'></span>– the imagistic,<span class='Hi'></span> conceptual,<span class='Hi'></span> and productive <span class='Hi'></span>– as well as three corresponding kinds of fi ctions based on the degree of belief contained in each class of ideas the imagination creates.<span class='Hi'></span> These are generic fi ctions,<span class='Hi'></span> real and mere fi ctions,<span class='Hi'></span> and necessary fi ctions,<span class='Hi'></span> respectively.<span class='Hi'></span> Through these manifestations,<span class='Hi'></span> (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Gregory Currie & Nicholas Jones (2006). McGinn on Delusion and Imagination. Philosophical Books 47 (4):306-313.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Sylvain Delcomminette (2003). False Pleasures, Appearance and Imagination in the Philebus. Phronesis 48 (3):215-237.
    This paper examines the discussion about false pleasures in the "Philebus" (36 c3-44 a11). After stressing the crucial importance of this discussion in the economy of the dialogue, it attempts to identify the problematic locus of the possibility of true or false pleasures. Socrates points to it by means of an analogy between pleasure and doxa. Against traditional interpretations, which reduce the distinction drawn in this passage to a distinction between doxa and pleasure on the one hand and their object (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Fabian Dorsch (2012). The Unity of Imagining. Ontos.
    In this highly ambitious, wide ranging, immensely impressive and ground-breaking work Fabian Dorsch surveys just about every account of the imagination that has ever been proposed. He identifies five central types of imagining that any unifying theory must accommodate and sets himself the task of determining whether any theory of what imagining consists in covers these five paradigms. Focussing on what he takes to be the three main theories, and giving them each equal consideration, he faults the first two and (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Fabian Dorsch (2011). Transparency and Imagining Seeing. Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):173-200.
    One of the most powerful arguments against intentionalism and in favour of disjunctivism about perceptual experiences has been formulated by M. G. F. Martin in his paper The Transparency of Experience. The overall structure of this argument may be stated in the form of a triad of claims which are jointly inconsistent.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Graeme P. Earl (2009). Rome (L.) Haselberger, (J.) Humphrey (Edd.) Imaging Ancient Rome. Documentation – Visualization – Imagination. Proceedings of the Third Williams Symposium on Classical Architecture, 2004. (JRA Supplementary Series 61.) Pp. 337, B/W & Colour Ills, B/W & Colour Maps. Portsmouth, Rhode Island: Journal of Roman Archaeology, 2006. Cased, US$125. ISBN: 978-1-887829-61-. [REVIEW] The Classical Review 59 (01):255-.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Andreas Elpidorou (2010). Imagination in Non-Representational Painting. In Jonathan Webber (ed.), Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. Routledge.
  12. Tamar Szabó Gendler (2006). Imaginative Contagion. Metaphilosophy 37 (2):183-203.
    The aim of this article is to expand the diet of examples considered in philosophical discussions of imagination and pretense, and to offer some preliminary observations about what we might learn about the nature of imagination as a result. The article presents a number of cases involving imaginative contagion: cases where merely imagining or pretending that P has effects that we would expect only perceiving or believing that P to have. Examples are offered that involve visual imagery, motor imagery, fictional (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Dominic Gregory (2010). Imagery, the Imagination and Experience. Philosophical Quarterly 60 (241):735-753.
    Visualizings, the simplest imaginings which employ visual imagery, have certain characteristic features; they are perspectival, for instance. Also, it seems that some but not all of our visualizings are imaginings of seeings. But it has been forcefully argued, for example by M.G.F. Martin and Christopher Peacocke, that all visualizings are imaginings of visual sensations. I block these arguments by providing an account of visualizings which allows for their perspectival nature and other features they typically have, but which also explains how (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Robert Hopkins (2010). Imagination and Affective Response. In Jonathan Webber (ed.), Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism. Routledge.
    What is the relation between affective states, such as emotions and pleasure, and imagining? Do the latter cause the former, just as perceptual states do? Or are the former merely imagined, along with suitable objects? I consider this issue against the backdrop of Sartre’s theory of imagination, and drawing on his highly illuminating discussion of it. I suggest that, while it is commonly assumed that imaginative states cause affective responses much as do perceptions, the alternatives merit more careful consideration than (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Robert Hopkins (2006). With Sight Too Much in Mind, Mind Too Little in Sight? Philosophical Books 47 (4):293-305.
    This is a critical notice of Colin McGinn's 'Mindsight'.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Mostyn W. Jones (1995). Inadequacies in Current Theories of Imagination. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):313-333.
    Interest in imagination dates back to Plato and Aristotle, but full-length works have been devoted to it only relatively recently by Sartre, McKellar, Furlong, Casey, <span class='Hi'>Johnson</span>, Warnock, Brann, and others. Despite their length and variety, however, these current theories take overly narrow views of this complex phenomenon. (1) Their definitions of “imagination” neglect the multiplicity of its meanings and tend to focus narrowly on the power of imaging alone (which produces images and imagery). But imagination in the fullest, most (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Mostyn W. Jones (1994). The Roots of Imagination. Dissertation, The University of Manchester
    This work presents a new theory of imagination which tries to overcome the overly narrow perpectives that current theories take upon this enigmatic, multi-faceted phenomenon. Current theories are narrowly preoccupied with images and imagery. This creates problems in explaining (1) what imagination is, (2) how it works, and (3) what its strengths and limitations are. (1) Ordinary language identifies imagination with both imaging (image-making) and creativity, but most current theories identify imagination narrowly with imaging while neglecting creativity. Yet imaging is (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. P. Joyce (2003). Imagining Experiences Correctly. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):361-370.
    According to Mellor, we know what an experience is like if we can imagine it correctly, and we will do so if we recognise the experience as it is imagined. This paper identifies a constraint on adequate accounts of how we ordinarily imagine experiences correctly: the capacities to imagine and to recognise the experience must be jointly operative at the point of forming an intention to imagine the experience. The paper develops an account of imagining experiences correctly that meets this (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Robert Kilwardby (1987). On Time and Imagination =. Published for the British Academy by the Oxford University Press.
    The second volume in this series devoted to the writings of the English Dominican Robert Kilwardby, this work presents the Latin text of two Oxford treatises from the 1250s--one on time, the other on imagination. The treatise on time discusses its reality, connection with change, unity and beginning, the instant and time's relationship to eternity; the one on imagination examines the way imagery is acquired, retained and transmitted, and the relation between heart and head in the workings of common sense.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Amy Kind, Imagery and Imagination. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Both imagery and imagination play an important part in our mental lives. This article, which has three main sections, discusses both of these phenomena, and the connection between them. The first part discusses mental images and, in particular, the dispute about their representational nature that has become known as the _imagery debate_ . The second part turns to the faculty of the imagination, discussing the long philosophical tradition linking mental imagery and the imagination—a tradition that came under attack in the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Amy Kind (2001). Putting the Image Back in Imagination. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1):85-110.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (13 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Peter Langland-Hassan (forthcoming). On Choosing What to Imagine. In P. Kung (ed.), Knowledge Through Imagination. Oxford University Press.
    If imagination is subject to the will, in the sense that people choose the content of their own imaginings, how is it that one nevertheless can learn from what one imagines? This chapter argues for a way forward in addressing this perennial puzzle, both with respect to propositional imagination and sensory imagination. Making progress requires looking carefully at the interplay between one’s intentions and various kinds of constraints that may be operative in the generation of imaginings. Lessons are drawn from (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Peter Langland-Hassan (2012). Pretense, Imagination, and Belief: The Single Attitude Theory. Philosophical Studies 159 (2):155-179.
    A popular view has it that the mental representations underlying human pretense are not beliefs, but are “belief-like” in important ways. This view typically posits a distinctive cognitive attitude (a “DCA”) called “imagination” that is taken toward the propositions entertained during pretense, along with correspondingly distinct elements of cognitive architecture. This paper argues that the characteristics of pretense motivating such views of imagination can be explained without positing a DCA, or other cognitive architectural features beyond those regulating normal belief and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Peter Langland-Hassan (2011). A Puzzle About Visualization. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (2):145-173.
    Visual imagination (or visualization) is peculiar in being both free, in that what we imagine is up to us, and useful to a wide variety of practical reasoning tasks. How can we rely upon our visualizations in practical reasoning if what we imagine is subject to our whims? The key to answering this puzzle, I argue, is to provide an account of what constrains the sequence in which the representations featured in visualization unfold—an account that is consistent with its freedom. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Peter Langland‐Hassan (2014). Imaginative Attitudes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3).
    The point of this paper is to reveal a dogma in the ordinary conception of sensory imagination, and to suggest another way forward. The dogma springs from two main sources: a too close comparison of mental imagery to perceptual experience, and a too strong division between mental imagery and the traditional propositional attitudes (such as belief and desire). The result is an unworkable conception of the correctness conditions of sensory imaginings—one lacking any link between the conditions under which an imagining (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. K. Lennon (2010). Re-Enchanting the World: The Role of Imagination in Perception. Philosophy 85 (3):375-389.
    This paper defends what the philosopher Merleau Ponty coins 'the imaginary texture of the real'. It is suggested that the imagination is at work in the everyday world which we perceive, the world as it is for us. In defending this view a concept of the imagination is invoked which has both similarities with and differences from, our everyday notion. The everyday notion contrasts the imaginary and the real. The imaginary is tied to the fictional or the illusory. Here it (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Dominic McIver Lopes (2003). Out of Sight, Out of Mind. In Matthew Kieran & Dominic McIver Lopes (eds.), Imagination, Philosophy, and the Arts.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. James Mensch, Imagination and Machine Intelligence.
    The question of the imagination is rather like the question Augustine raised with regard to the nature of time. We all seem to know what it involves, yet find it difficult to define. For Descartes, the imagination was simply our faculty for producing a mental image. He distinguished it from the understanding by noting that while the notion of a thousand sided figure was comprehensible—that is, was sufficiently clear and distinct to be differentiated from a thousand and one sided figure—the (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Junichi Murata (1999). The Indeterminacy of Images: An Approach to a Phenomenology of the Imagination. In Phenomenology: Japanese and American Perspectives. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Bence Nanay (forthcoming). Perceptual Content and the Content of Mental Imagery. Philosophical Studies.
    The aim of this paper is to argue that the phenomenal similarity between perceiving and visualizing can be explained by the similarity between the structure of the content of these two different mental states. And this puts important constraints on how we should think about perceptual content and the content of mental imagery.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Bence Nanay (2010). Perception and Imagination: Amodal Perception as Mental Imagery. Philosophical Studies 150 (2):239 - 254.
    When we see an object, we also represent those parts of it that are not visible. The question is how we represent them: this is the problem of amodal perception. I will consider three possible accounts: (a) we see them, (b) we have non-perceptual beliefs about them and (c) we have immediate perceptual access to them, and point out that all of these views face both empirical and conceptual objections. I suggest and defend a fourth account, according to which we (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Paul Noordhof (2002). Imagining Objects and Imagining Experiences. Mind and Language 17 (4):426-455.
    A number of philosophers have argued in favour of the Dependency Thesis: if a subject sensorily imagines an F then he or she sensorily imagines from the inside perceptually experiencing an F in the imaginary world. They claim that it explains certain important features of imaginative experience, in brief: the fact that it is perspectival, the fact that it does not involve presentation of sensory qualities and the fact that mental images can serve a number of different imaginings. I argue (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Lilly-Marlene Russow (1978). Some Recent Work on Imagination. American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (January):57-66.
    This article tries to provide an overview of work on imagination in the last twenty years. The discussion section examines such areas as arguments for and against mental images, The problem of reference in imagination, And theories of imagination such as those formulated by dennett, Hannay, Scruton, And others; I also outline some related questions (e.G., Imaginability) which seem closely tied to questions about imagination itself. There is also an extensive bibliography concentrating on works which appeared between 1957 and 1977.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Susanna Schellenberg (2013). Belief and Desire in Imagination and Immersion. Journal of Philosophy 110 (9):497-517.
    I argue that any account of imagination should satisfy the following three desiderata. First, imaginations induce actions only in conjunction with beliefs about the environment of the imagining subject. Second, there is a continuum between imaginations and beliefs. Recognizing this continuum is crucial to explain the phenomenon of imaginative immersion. Third, the mental states that relate to imaginations in the way that desires relate to beliefs are a special kind of desire, namely desires to make true in fiction. These desires (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Gregor Schiemann (1998). The Loss of World in the Image. Origin and Development of the Concept of Image in the Thought of Hermann von Helmholtz and Heinrich Hertz. In D. Baird (ed.), Heinrich Hertz. Classical Physicist, Modern Philosopher. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Kluwer.
    In searching for the origins of current conceptions of science in the history of physics, one encounters a remarkable phenomenon. A typical view today is that theoretical knowledge-claims have only relativized validity. Historically, however, this thesis was supported by proponents of a conception of nature that today is far from typical, a mechanistic conception within which natural phenomena were to be explained by the action of mechanically moved matter. Two of these proponents, Hermann von Helmholtz and his pupil Heinrich Hertz, (...)
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Joerg R. J. Schirra & Klaus Sachs-Hombach (2013). The Anthropological Function of Pictures. In Klaus SachsHombach & Joerg R. J. Schirra (eds.), Origins of Pictures. Anthropological Discourses in Image Science. Halem. 132-159.
    There has been a long tradition of characterizing man as the animal that is capable of propositional language. However, the remarkable ability of using pictures also only belongs to human beings. Both faculties however depend conceptually on the ability to refer to absent situations by means of sign acts called 'context building'. The paper investigates the combined roles of quasi-pictorial sign acts and proto-assertive sign acts in the situation of initial context building, which, in the context of “concept-genetic” considerations, aims (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. J. M. Shorter (1952). Imagination. Mind 61 (October):528-542.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Don Sievert (2003). Reply to Recker's “Imagination and Images in Descartes' Science”. Southwest Philosophy Review 19 (2):61-64.
  39. Beata Stawarska (2001). Pictorial Representation or Subjective Scenario? Sartre on Imagination. Sartre Studies International 7 (2):87-111.
    The major thesis developed in Sartre's L'imaginaire is that all imaginary acts can be subsumed under the heading of one "image family" and, therefore, that imagination as a whole can be theorized in terms of pictorial representation. Yet this theory fails to meet the objective of Sartre's study, to demonstrate that imaginary activity is not a derivative of perception but an attitude with a character and dignity of its own. The subsidiary account of imagination in terms of neutralization of belief (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Dustin R. Stokes (2006). The Evaluative Character of Imaginative Resistance. British Journal of Aesthetics 46 (4):287-405.
    A fiction may prescribe imagining that a pig can talk or tell the future. A fiction may prescribe imagining that torturing innocent persons is a good thing. We generally comply with imaginative prescriptions like the former, but not always with prescriptions like the latter: we imagine non-evaluative fictions without difficulty but sometimes resist imagining value-rich fictions. Thus arises the puzzle of imaginative resistance. Most analyses of the phenomenon focus on the content of the relevant imaginings. The present analysis focuses instead (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Nigel Thomas, The Study of Imagination as an Approach to Consciousness.
    The concept of consciousness appears to have had little currency before the 17th century. Not only did philosophers before Descartes fail to worry about how consciousness fitted into the natural world, they did not even claim to be conscious. If we are conscious, however, we must assume that they were too, and it hardly seems plausible that they could have been unaware of it. In fact, when the mind was discussed in former ages, both before and within the work of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Nigel J. T. Thomas, Are There People Who Do Not Experience Imagery? (And Why Does It Matter?).
    To the best of my knowledge, with the exception of Galton's original work (1880, 1883), Sommer's brief case study (1978), and Faw's (1997, 2009) articles, this is the only really substantial discussion of the phenomenon of non-brain-damaged "non-imagers" available anywhere.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Nigel J. T. Thomas, Coding Dualism: Conscious Thought Without Cartesianism or Computationalism.
    The principal temptation toward substance dualisms, or otherwise incorporating a question begging homunculus into our psychologies, arises not from the problem of consciousness in general, nor from the problem of intentionality, but from the question of our awareness and understanding of our own mental contents, and the control of the deliberate, conscious thinking in which we employ them. Dennett has called this "Hume's problem". Cognitivist philosophers have generally either denied the experiential reality of thought, as did the Behaviorists, or have (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Nigel J. T. Thomas, Attitude and Image, or, What Will Simulation Theory Let Us Eliminate?
    Stich & Ravenscroft (1994) have argued that (contrary to most people's initial assumptions) a simulation account of folk psychology may be consistent with eliminative materialism, but they fail to bring out the full complexity or the potential significance of the relationship. Contemporary eliminativism (particularly in the Churchland version) makes two major claims: the first is a rejection of the orthodox assumption that realistically construed propositional attitudes are fundamental to human cognition; the second is the suggestion that with the advancement of (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Nigel J. T. Thomas (2014). The Multidimensional Spectrum of Imagination: Images, Dreams, Hallucinations, and Active, Imaginative Perception. Humanities 3 (2):132-184.
    A theory of the structure and cognitive function of the human imagination that attempts to do justice to traditional intuitions about its psychological centrality is developed, largely through a detailed critique of the theory propounded by Colin McGinn. Like McGinn, I eschew the highly deflationary views of imagination, common amongst analytical philosophers, that treat it either as a conceptually incoherent notion, or as psychologically trivial. However, McGinn fails to develop his alternative account satisfactorily because (following Reid, Wittgenstein and Sartre) he (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Nigel J. T. Thomas (2005). Mental Imagery, Philosophical Issues About. In Lynn Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, Volume 2, pp. 1147-1153. Nature Publishing Group.
    An introduction to the science and philosophy of mental imagery.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Nigel J. T. Thomas (2003). Imagining Minds. Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (11):79-84.
    The concepts of imagination and consciousness have, very arguably, been inextricably intertwined at least since Aristotle initiated the systematic study of human cognition (Thomas, 1998). To imagine something is ipso facto to be conscious of it (even if the wellsprings of imaginative creativity are in the unconscious), and many have held that our conscious thinking consists largely or entirely in a succession of mental images, the products of imagination (see, e.g., Damasio, 1994 -- or, come to that, see Aristotle, or (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Nigel J. T. Thomas (1999). Are Theories of Imagery Theories of Imagination? An Active Perception Approach to Conscious Mental Content. Cognitive Science 23 (2):207-245.
  49. Nigel J. T. Thomas, Imagination. Dictionary of Philosophy of Mind.
    A brief historical and conceptual account of the concept of imagination.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Nigel J. T. Thomas (1997). A Stimulus to the Imagination: A Review of Questioning Consciousness: The Interplay of Imagery, Cognition and Emotion in the Human Brain by Ralph D. Ellis. [REVIEW] Psyche 3 (4).
    Twentieth century philosophy and psychology have been peculiarly averse to mental images. Throughout nearly two and a half millennia of philosophical wrangling, from Aristotle to Hume to Bergson, images (perceptual and quasi-perceptual experiences), sometimes under the alias of "ideas", were almost universally considered to be both the prime contents of consciousness, and the vehicles of cognition. The founding fathers of experimental psychology saw no reason to dissent from this view, it was commonsensical, and true to the lived experience of conscious (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 53