Imaging and Localization Edited by Pete Mandik (William Paterson University)

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  • Michael L. Anderson (2007). Massive Redeployment, Exaptation, and the Functional Integration of Cognitive Operations. Synthese 159 (3).
    Abstract: The massive redeployment hypothesis (MRH) is a theory about the functional topography of the human brain, offering a middle course between strict localization on the one hand, and holism on the other. Central to MRH is the claim that cognitive evolution proceeded in a way analogous to component reuse in software engineering, whereby existing components-originally developed to serve some specific purpose-were used for new purposes and combined to support new capacities, without disrupting their participation in existing programs. If the (...)
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  • Michael L. Anderson (2007). The Massive Redeployment Hypothesis and the Functional Topography of the Brain. Philosophical Psychology 21 (2):143-174.
    This essay introduces the massive redeployment hypothesis, an account of the functional organization of the brain that centrally features the fact that brain areas are typically employed to support numerous functions. The central contribution of the essay is to outline a middle course between strict localization on the one hand, and holism on the other, in such a way as to account for the supporting data on both sides of the argument. The massive redeployment hypothesis is supported by case studies (...)
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  • William P. Bechtel (2002). Decomposing the Brain: A Long Term Pursuit. Brain and Mind 3 (1):229-242.
    This paper defends cognitive neuroscience’s project of developing mechanistic explan- ations of cognitive processes through decomposition and localization against objections raised by William Uttal in The New Phrenology. The key issue between Uttal and researchers pursuing cognitive neuroscience is that Uttal bets against the possibility of decomposing mental operations into component elementary operations which are localized in distinct brain regions. The paper argues that it is through advancing and revising what are likely to be overly simplistic and incorrect decompositions that (...)
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  • William P. Bechtel & Robert S. Stufflebeam (1997). PET: Exploring the Myth and the Method. Philosophy Of Science 64 (4).
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  • James R. Blair & Karina S. Perschardt (2001). Empathy: A Unitary Circuit or a Set of Dissociable Neuro-Cognitive Systems? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (1):27-28.
    We question whether empathy is mediated by a unitary circuit. We argue that recent neuroimaging data indicate dissociable neural responses for different facial expressions as well as for representing others' mental states (Theory of Mind, TOM). We also argue that the general empathy disorder considered characteristic of autism and psychopathy is not general but specific for each disorder.
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  • James Bogen (2002). Epistemological Custard Pies From Functional Brain Imaging. Philosophy of Science 69 (3):S59-S71.
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  • David J. Buller & Valerie Gray Hardcastle (2000). Evolutionary Psychology, Meet Developmental Neurobiology: Against Promiscuous Modularity. Brain and Mind 1 (3):307-25.
    Evolutionary psychologists claim that the mind contains “hundreds or thousands” of “genetically specified” modules, which are evolutionary adaptations for their cognitive functions. We argue that, while the adult human mind/brain typically contains a degree of modularization, its “modules” are neither genetically specified nor evolutionary adaptations. Rather, they result from the brain’s developmental plasticity, which allows environmental task demands a large role in shaping the brain’s information-processing structures. The brain’s developmental plasticity is our fundamental psychological adaptation, and the “modules” that result (...)
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  • Kim Celone & Chantal Stern (2009). A Neuroimaging Perspective on the Use of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (Fmri) in Educational and Legal Systems. American Journal of Bioethics 9 (1):28 – 29.
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  • Axel Cleeremans (2006). Computational Correlates of Consciousness. In Steven Laureys (ed.), The Boundaries of Consciousness: Neurobiology and Neuropathology: Progress in Brain Research. Elsevier.
    Over the past few years numerous proposals have appeared that attempt to characterize consciousness in terms of what could be called its computational correlates: Principles of information processing with which to characterize the differences between conscious and unconscious processing. Proposed computational correlates include architectural specialization (such as the involvement of specific regions of the brain in conscious processing), properties of representations (such as their stability in time or their strength), and properties of specific processes (such as resonance, synchrony, interactivity, or (...)
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  • Axel Cleeremans & Tiago V. Maia (2005). Consciousness: Converging Insights From Connectionist Modeling and Neuroscience. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (8):397-404.
    Over the past decade, many findings in cognitive about the contents of consciousness: we will not address neuroscience have resulted in the view that selective what might be called the ‘enabling factors’ for conscious- attention, working memory and cognitive control ness (e.g. appropriate neuromodulation from the brain- stem, etc.). involve competition between widely distributed rep-.
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  • Ronald E. Cranford & Barbara Killpatrick (1981). Tests in the Diagnosis of Brain Death: The Role of the Radioisotope Brain Scan. Bioethics Quarterly 3:67-72.
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  • Jocelyn Downie & Michael Hadskis (2005). Finding the Right Compass for Issue-Mapping in Neuroimaging. American Journal of Bioethics 5 (2):27 – 29.
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  • Paul J. Ford & Cynthia S. Kubu (2005). Caution in Leaping From Functional Imaging to Functional Neurosurgery. American Journal of Bioethics 5 (2):23 – 25.
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  • Philip Gerrans & Valerie E. Stone (2008). Generous or Parsimonious Cognitive Architecture? Cognitive Neuroscience and Theory of Mind. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (2).
    Recent work in cognitive neuroscience on the child's Theory of Mind (ToM) has pursued the idea that the ability to metarepresent mental states depends on a domain-specific cognitive subystem implemented in specific neural circuitry: a Theory of Mind Module. We argue that the interaction of several domain-general mechanisms and lower-level domain-specific mechanisms accounts for the flexibility and sophistication of behavior, which has been taken to be evidence for a domain-specific ToM module. This finding is of more general interest since it (...)
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  • Valerie Gray Hardcastle & C. Matthew Stewart (2004). Neuroscience and the Art of Single-Cell Recordings. Biology and Philosophy 18 (1):195-208.
    This article examines how scientists move from physical measurementsto actual observation of single-cell recordings in the brain. We highlight how easy it is to change the fundamental nature of ourobservations using accepted methodological techniques for manipulatingraw data. Collecting single-cell data is thoroughly pragmatic. Weconclude that there is no deep or interesting difference betweenaccounting for observations by measurements and accounting forobservations by theories.
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  • Valerie Gray Hardcastle & C. Matthew Stewart (2002). What Do Brain Data Really Show? Philosophy of Science 69 (3):572-582.
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  • Kevin A. Johnson, F. Andrew Kozel, Steven J. Laken & Mark S. George (2007). The Neuroscience of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Fmri for Deception Detection. American Journal of Bioethics 7 (9):58 – 60.
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  • Donald Kennedy (2005). Neuroimaging: Revolutionary Research Tool or a Post-Modern Phrenology? American Journal of Bioethics 5 (2):19.
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  • Anthony Landreth & Robert C. Richardson (2004). Localization and the New Phrenology: A Review Essay on William Uttal's the New Phrenology. Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):107-123.
    William Uttal's The new phrenology is a broad attack on localization in cognitive neuroscience. He argues that even though the brain is a highly differentiated organ, "high level cognitive functions" should not be localized in specific brain regions. First, he argues that psychological processes are not well-defined. Second, he criticizes the methods used to localize psychological processes, including imaging technology: he argues that variation among individuals compromises localization, and that the statistical methods used to construct activation maps are flawed. Neither (...)
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  • Dan Lloyd (2002). Studying the Mind From the Inside Out. Brain and Mind 3 (1):243-59.
    Good research requires, among other virtues,(i) methods that yield stable experimentalobservations without arbitrary (post hoc)assumptions, (ii) logical interpretations ofthe sources of observations, and (iii) soundinferences to general causal mechanismsexplaining experimental results by placing themin larger explanatory contexts. In TheNew Phrenology , William Uttal examines theresearch tradition of localization, and findsit deficient in all three virtues, whetherbased on lesion studies or on new technologiesfor functional brain imaging. In this paper Iconsider just the arguments concerning brainimaging, especially functional MagneticResonance Imaging. I think (...)
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  • Dan Lloyd (2000). Terra Cognita: From Functional Neuroimaging to the Map of the Mind. Brain and Mind 1 (1):93-116.
    For more than a century the paradigm inspiringcognitive neuroscience has been modular and localist.Contemporary research in functional brain imaginggenerally relies on methods favorable to localizingparticular functions in one or more specific brainregions. Meanwhile, connectionist cognitive scientistshave celebrated the computational powers ofdistributed processing, and pioneered methods forinterpreting distributed representations. This papertakes a connectionist approach to functionalneuroimaging. A tabulation of 35 PET (positronemission tomography) experiments strongly indicatesdistributed function for at least the ''medium sized''anatomical units, the cortical Brodmann areas. Moreimportant, when these PET (...)
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  • Christopher Mole, Corey Kubatzky, Jan Plate, Rawdon Waller, Marilee Dobbs & Marc Nardone (2007). Faces and Brains: The Limitations of Brain Scanning in Cognitive Science. Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):197 – 207.
    The use of brain scanning now dominates the cognitive sciences, but important questions remain to be answered about what, exactly, scanning can tell us. One corner of cognitive science that has been transformed by the use of neuroimaging, and that a scanning enthusiast might point to as proof of scanning's importance, is the study of face perception. Against this view, we argue that the use of scanning has, in fact, told us rather little about the information processing underlying face perception (...)
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  • Jennifer Mundale (2002). Concepts of Localization: Balkanization in the Brain. Brain and Mind 3 (3):313-30.
    A spate of recent anti-localizationist publications have re-ignited the old debate about the localization of function. Many of the recent attacks on localization, however, are directed at what I will argue to be a narrow and outmoded view of localization, and thus have little conceptual or empirical impact. What I hope to present here is an analysis of functional localization that more adequately reflects the sophistication and complexity of its use in neuroscientific research, both historically and recently. Proceeding first by (...)
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  • Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie (1999). Putting Content Into a Vehicle Theory of Consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):175-196.
    The connectionist vehicle theory of phenomenal experience in the target article identifies consciousness with the brain’s explicit representation of information in the form of stable patterns of neural activity. Commentators raise concerns about both the conceptual and empirical adequacy of this proposal. On the former front they worry about our reliance on vehicles, on representation, on stable patterns of activity, and on our identity claim. On the latter front their concerns range from the general plausibility of a vehicle theory to (...)
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  • Jonathan Opie (1998). Consciousness: A Connectionist Perspective. Dissertation, University of Adelaide
    To my father, who got me thinking, and to Tricia, who provided the love, support, and encouragement that enabled me to see this through.
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  • Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien (1999). A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22:127-148.
    When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches _vehicle_ and _process_ theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space (...)
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  • Adina L. Roskies (2008). Neuroimaging and Inferential Distance. Neuroethics 1 (1).
    Brain images are used both as scientific evidence and to illustrate the results of neuroimaging experiments. These images are apt to be viewed as photographs of brain activity, and in so viewing them people are prone to assume that they share the evidential characteristics of photographs. Photographs are epistemically compelling, and have a number of characteristics that underlie what I call their inferential proximity. Here I explore the aptness of the photography analogy, and argue that although neuroimaging does bear important (...)
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  • Adina L. Roskies (2007). Are Neuroimages Like Photographs of the Brain? Philosophy of Science 74 (5).
    Images come in many varieties, but for evidential purposes, photographs are privileged. Recent advances in neuroimaging provide us with a new type of image that is used as scientific evidence. Brain images are epistemically compelling, in part because they are liable to be viewed as akin to photographs of brain activity. Here I consider features of photography that underlie the evidential status we accord it, and argue that neuroimaging diverges from photography in ways that seriously undermine the photographic analogy. While (...)
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  • D. Schutter, J. van Honk & Jaak Panksepp (2004). Introducing Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) and its Property of Causal Inference in Investigating Brain-Function Relationships. Synthese 141 (2):155-73.
    Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is a method capable of transiently modulating neural excitability. Depending on the stimulation parameters information processing in the brain can be either enhanced or disrupted. This way the contribution of different brain areas involved in mental processes can be studied, allowing a functional decomposition of cognitive behavior both in the temporal and spatial domain, hence providing a functional resolution of brain/mind processes. The aim of the present paper is to argue that TMS with its ability to (...)
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  • Robert S. Stufflebeam & William P. Bechtel (1997). PET: Exploring the Myth and the Method. Philsophy of Science 64 (4):95-106.
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  • William R. Uttal (2002). Response to Bechtel and Lloyd. Brain and Mind 3 (1):261-273.
    The field of cognitive imaging is explodingboth in terms of the amount of our scientificresources dedicated to it and the associatedpublication rate. However, all of this effortis based on a critical question – Do cognitivemodules exist? Both of the reviewers of my book(Uttal, 2001) and I agree that this questionhas not yet been satisfactorily answered and,depending on the ultimate answer, the cognitiveimaging approach as well as some other parts ofthe quest for mechanistic models of mind mightnot be successful. Our views (...)
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  • William R. Uttal (2001). The New Phrenology: The Limits of Localizing Cognitive Processes in the Brain. MIT Press.
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