@book{Anderson2007-ANDHCT, author = {John R. Anderson}, abstract = {"The question for me is how can the human mind occur in the physical universe? We now know that the world is governed by physics. We now understand the way biology nestles comfortably within that. The issue is how will the mind do that as well?" Alan Newell, 4 December 1991, Carnegie Mellon University The argument John Anderson gives in this book was inspired by the passage above, from the last lecture by one of the pioneers of cognitive science. Alan Newell describes what, for him, is the pivotal question of scientific inquiry, and Anderson gives an answer that is emerging from the study of brain and behaviour. Humans share the same basic cognitive architecture with all primates, but they have evolved abilities to exercise abstract control over cognition and process more complex relational patterns. The human cognitive architecture consists of a set of largely independent modules associated with different brain regions. This book discusses in detail how these various modules can combine to produce behaviors as varied as driving a car and solving an algebraic equation, but focuses principally on two of the modules: the declarative and procedural. The declarative module involves a memory system that, moment by moment, attempts to give each person the most appropriate possible window into his or her past. The procedural module involves a central system that strives to develop a set of productions that will enable the most adaptive response from any state of the modules. Newell argued that the answer to his question must take the form of a cognitive architecture, and Anderson organizes his answer around the ACT-R architecture, but broadens it by bringing in research from all areas of cognitive science, including how recent work in brain imaging maps onto the cognitive architecture.}, title = {How Can the Human Mind Occur in the Physical Universe?}, publisher = {OUP USA}, year = {2007} } @article{Anderson2007-ANDMRE, volume = {159}, number = {3}, author = {Michael L. Anderson}, abstract = { Abstract: The massive redeployment hypothesis (MRH) is a theory about the functional topography of the human brain, offering a middle course between strict localization on the one hand, and holism on the other. Central to MRH is the claim that cognitive evolution proceeded in a way analogous to component reuse in software engineering, whereby existing components-originally developed to serve some specific purpose-were used for new purposes and combined to support new capacities, without disrupting their participation in existing programs. If the evolution of cognition was indeed driven by such exaptation, then we should be able to make some specific empirical predictions regarding the resulting functional topography of the brain. This essay discusses three such predictions, and some of the evidence supporting them. Then, using this account as a background, the essay considers the implications of these findings for an account of the functional integration of cognitive operations. For instance, MRH suggests that in order to determine the functional role of a given brain area it is necessary to consider its participation across multiple task categories, and not just focus on one, as has been the typical practice in cognitive neuroscience. This change of methodology will motivate (even perhaps necessitate) the development of a new, domain-neutral vocabulary for characterizing the contribution of individual brain areas to larger functional complexes, and direct particular attention to the question of how these various area roles are integrated and coordinated to result in the observed cognitive effect. Finally, the details of the mix of cognitive functions a given area supports should tell us something interesting not just about the likely computational role of that area, but about the nature of and relations between the cognitive functions themselves. For instance, growing evidence of the role of \textquotedblleft{}motor\textquotedblright areas like M1, SMA and PMC in language processing, and of \textquotedblleft{}language\textquotedblright areas like Broca\textquoteright{}s area in motor control, offers the possibility for significantly reconceptualizing the nature both of language and of motor control}, title = {Massive Redeployment, Exaptation, and the Functional Integration of Cognitive Operations}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2007}, pages = {329--345} } @article{Anderson2007-ANDTMR, volume = {21}, number = {2}, author = {Michael L. Anderson}, abstract = {This essay introduces the massive redeployment hypothesis, an account of the functional organization of the brain that centrally features the fact that brain areas are typically employed to support numerous functions. The central contribution of the essay is to outline a middle course between strict localization on the one hand, and holism on the other, in such a way as to account for the supporting data on both sides of the argument. The massive redeployment hypothesis is supported by case studies of redeployment, and compared and contrasted with other theories of the localization of function}, title = {The Massive Redeployment Hypothesis and the Functional Topography of the Brain}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {2007}, pages = {143--174} } @article{Arbib2000-ARBOTB, volume = {23}, number = {4}, author = {Michael A. Arbib and Peter \'E{}rdi}, abstract = {We clarify the arguments in Neural organization: Structure, function, and dynamics, acknowledge important contributions cited by our critics, and respond to their criticisms by charting directions for further development of our integrated approach to theoretical and empirical studies of neural organization. We first discuss functional organization in general (behavior versus cognitive functioning, the need to study body and brain together, function in ontogeny and phylogeny) and then focus on schema theory (noting that schema theory is not just a top-down theory and discussing the transition from action-oriented perception to cognition). We then turn to dynamical organization, with a focus first on neural modeling and dynamics (clarifying the multiple functions of neurons and brain regions, and looking further at various forms of dynamics) and second on learning, development, and self-organization (looking at monoaminergic systems, reinforcement, self-organization, postnatal development, and disease). We close with a brief philosophical discussion of postmodernism and reductionism.}, title = {Organizing the Brain's Diversities}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {551--565} } @article{Arbib2000-ARBPON, volume = {23}, number = {4}, author = {Michael A. Arbib and P\'e{}ter \'E{}rdi}, abstract = {Neural organization: Structure, function, and dynamics shows how theory and experiment can supplement each other in an integrated, evolving account of the brain's structure, function, and dynamics. (1) Structure: Studies of brain function and dynamics build on and contribute to an understanding of many brain regions, the neural circuits that constitute them, and their spatial relations. We emphasize Szent\'a{}gothai's modular architectonics principle, but also stress the importance of the microcomplexes of cerebellar circuitry and the lamellae of hippocampus. (2) Function: Control of eye movements, reaching and grasping, cognitive maps, and the roles of vision receive a functional decomposition in terms of schemas. Hypotheses as to how each schema is implemented through the interaction of specific brain regions provide the basis for modeling the overall function by neural networks constrained by neural data. Synthetic PET integrates modeling of primate circuitry with data from human brain imaging. (3) Dynamics: Dynamic system theory analyzes spatiotemporal neural phenomena, such as oscillatory and chaotic activity in both single neurons and (often synchronized) neural networks, the self-organizing development and plasticity of ordered neural structures, and learning and memory phenomena associated with synaptic modification. Rhythm generation involves multiple levels of analysis, from intrinsic cellular processes to loops involving multiple brain regions. A variety of rhythms are related to memory functions. The Pr\'e{}cis presents a multifaceted case study of the hippocampus. We conclude with the claim that language and other cognitive processes can be fruitfully studied within the framework of neural organization that the authors have charted with John Szent\'a{}gothai. Key Words: cognitive maps; computational neuroscience; dynamics; hippocampus; memory; modular architectonics; neural modeling; neural organization; neural plasticity; rhythmogenesis; Szent\'a{}gothai.}, title = {Pr\'e{}cis of Neural Organization: Structure, Function, and Dynamics}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {513--533} } @article{Arnason2010-RNANUA, volume = {19}, number = {02}, author = {Gardar \'A{}rnason}, title = {Neuroimaging, Uncertainty, and the Problem of Dispositions}, journal = {Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics}, year = {2010}, pages = {188-} } @book{Ash2007-ASHPTH, author = {Mitchell G. Ash and Thomas Sturm}, abstract = {This is an interdisciplinary collection of new essays by philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists and historians on the question: What has determined and what should determine the territory or the boundaries of the discipline named "psychology"? Both the contents - in terms of concepts - and the methods - in terms of instruments - are analyzed. Among the contributors are Mitchell Ash, Paul Baltes, Jochen Brandtst\"a{}dter, Gerd Gigerenzer, Michael Heidelberger, Gerhard Roth, and Thomas Sturm.}, title = {Psychology\textquoteright{}s Territories: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives From Different Disciplines}, publisher = {Erlbaum}, year = {2007} } @unpublished{AtmanspacherManuscript-ATMMSA, author = {Harald Atmanspacher}, abstract = {Psychophysiological correlations form the basis for different medical and scientific disciplines, but the nature of this relation has not yet been fully understood. One conceptual option is to understand the mental as \textquotedblleft{}emerging\textquotedblright from neural processes in the specific sense that psychology and physiology provide two different descriptions of the same system. Stating these descriptions in terms of coarser- and finer-grained system states macro- and microstates , the two descriptions may be equally adequate if the coarse-graining preserves the possibility to obtain a dynamical rule for the system. To $<$span class='Hi'$>$test$<$/span$>$ the empirical viability of our approach, we describe an algorithm to obtain a specific form of such a coarse-graining from data, and illustrate its operation using a simulated dynamical system. We then apply the method to an electroencephalographic recording, where we are able to identify macrostates from the physiological data that correspond to mental states of the subject. \textcopyright 2009 American Institute of Physics. DOI: 10.1063/1.3072788..}, title = {Mental States as Macrostates Emerging From Brain Electrical Dynamics} } @article{Avison2002-AVIFBM, volume = {3}, number = {3}, author = {M. J. Avison}, title = {Functional Brain Mapping: What is It Good For? Absolutely Nothing}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2002}, pages = {367--73} } @article{Avison2002-AVIFBM-2, volume = {3}, number = {3}, author = {Malcolm J. Avison}, title = {Functional Brain Mapping -- What is It Good For? Absolutely Nothing? (Comments on the New Phrenology, by William R. Uttal)}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2002}, pages = {367--373} } @incollection{Bayne2012-BAYHTR, author = {Tim Bayne}, booktitle = {I Know What You're Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy}, title = {How to Read Minds}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2012} } @article{Bechtel2002-BECDTB, volume = {3}, number = {1}, author = {William P. Bechtel}, abstract = {This paper defends cognitive neuroscience\textquoteright{}s project of developing mechanistic explan- ations of cognitive processes through decomposition and localization against objections raised by William Uttal in The New Phrenology. The key issue between Uttal and researchers pursuing cognitive neuroscience is that Uttal bets against the possibility of decomposing mental operations into component elementary operations which are localized in distinct brain regions. The paper argues that it is through advancing and revising what are likely to be overly simplistic and incorrect decompositions that the goals of cognitive neuroscience are likely to be achieved}, title = {Decomposing the Brain: A Long Term Pursuit}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2002}, pages = {229--242} } @incollection{Bechtel2001-BECDAL, author = {William P. Bechtel}, booktitle = {Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader}, title = {Decomposing and Localizing Vision: An Exemplar for Cognitive Neuroscience}, publisher = {Blackwell}, year = {2001} } @book{Bechtel2001-BECPAT-2, author = {William P. Bechtel and Pete Mandik and Jennifer Mundale and Robert S. Stufflebeam}, abstract = {2. Daugman, J. G. Brain metaphor and brain theory 3. Mundale, J. Neuroanatomical Foundations of Cognition: Connecting the Neuronal Level with the Study of Higher Brain Areas}, title = {Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader}, publisher = {Blackwell}, year = {2001} } @article{Bechtel1997-BECPET, volume = {64}, number = {4}, author = {William P. Bechtel and Robert S. Stufflebeam}, title = {PET: Exploring the Myth and the Method}, journal = {Philosophy Of Science}, year = {1997} } @article{Berns2003-BERNGT, volume = {26}, number = {2}, author = {Gregory S. Berns}, abstract = {The advent of functional brain imaging has revolutionized the ability to understand the biological mechanisms underlying decision-making. Although it has been amply demonstrated that assumptions of rationality often break down in experimental games, there has not been an overarching theory of why this happens. I describe recent advances in functional brain imaging and suggest a framework for considering the function of the human reward system as a discrete agent.}, title = {Neural Game Theory and the Search for Rational Agents in the Brain}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2003}, pages = {155--156} } @article{Bischof1997-BISLMA, volume = {20}, number = {3}, author = {Horst Bischof}, title = {Locality, Modularity, and Computational Neural Networks}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1997}, pages = {516--517} } @article{Blair2001-BLAEAU, volume = {25}, number = {1}, author = {James R. Blair and Karina S. Perschardt}, abstract = {We question whether empathy is mediated by a unitary circuit. We argue that recent neuroimaging data indicate dissociable neural responses for different facial expressions as well as for representing others' mental states (Theory of Mind, TOM). We also argue that the general empathy disorder considered characteristic of autism and psychopathy is not general but specific for each disorder.}, title = {Empathy: A Unitary Circuit or a Set of Dissociable Neuro-Cognitive Systems?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2001}, pages = {27--28} } @article{Bluhm2013-BLUNRO, volume = {6}, number = {2}, author = {Robyn Bluhm}, abstract = {Neuroscience research examining sex/gender differences aims to explain behavioral differences between men and women in terms of differences in their brains. Historically, this research has used ad hoc methods and has been conducted explicitly in order to show that prevailing gender roles were dictated by biology. I examine contemporary fMRI research on sex/gender differences in emotion processing and argue that it, too, both uses problematic methods and, in doing so, reinforces gender stereotypes}, title = {New Research, Old Problems: Methodological and Ethical Issues in fMRI Research Examining Sex/Gender Differences in Emotion Processing}, journal = {Neuroethics}, year = {2013}, pages = {319--330} } @article{Boag2007-BOARPA, volume = {20}, number = {3}, author = {Simon Boag}, abstract = {The recent interest in neuroscientific psychodynamic research ('neuropsychoanalysis') has meant that empirical findings are emerging which allow greater public scrutiny of psychodynamic concepts. However, Malcolm Macmillan has claimed that the psychoanalytic cornerstone, repression, is a circular explanatory concept and incapable of referring to a "real process." This paper discusses Macmillan's criticism and finds that repression is a coherent explanatory term and is not precluded from referring to real processes. Specifically, 'neural inhibition,' triggered by social factors, can account for Freudian repression, without succumbing to circular explanation. Recent developments in neuroscience suggest that a plausible mechanism of inhibition exists, providing testable avenues for the 'cornerstone' of psychoanalysis. Evidence of the role of the frontal lobes, a brain area that appears to mediate the influence of social factors upon impulse control, demonstrates that repression is plausible within a dynamic neural framework.}, title = {'Real Processes' and the Explanatory Status of Repression and Inhibition}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {2007}, pages = {375--392} } @incollection{Bogen2002-BOGEAO, author = {James Bogen}, booktitle = {The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science}, title = {Experiment and Observation}, publisher = {Cambridge: Blackwell}, year = {2002} } @article{Bogen2002-BOGECP, volume = {69}, number = {3}, author = {James Bogen}, title = {Epistemological Custard Pies From Functional Brain Imaging}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2002}, pages = {59--71} } @book{Bogen2002-BOGTBG, author = {James Bogen}, title = {The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science}, publisher = {Cambridge: Blackwell}, year = {2002} } @incollection{Bogen2001-BOGFIE, author = {James Bogen}, booktitle = {Theory and Method in the Neurosciences}, title = {Functional Imaging Evidence: Some Epistemic Hotspots}, publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Press}, year = {2001} } @incollection{Borgelt2012-BORPVO, author = {Emily Borgelt and Daniel Buchman and Judy Illes}, booktitle = {I Know What You're Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy}, title = {Practicioners' Views on Neuroimaging : Mental Health, Patient Consent, and Choice}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2012} } @article{Borgelt2011-BORTI, volume = {8}, number = {1}, author = {Emily Borgelt and Daniel Buchman and Judy Illes}, abstract = {Erratum: \textquotedblleft This is Why you\textquoteright{}ve Been Suffering\textquotedblright: Reflections of Providers on Neuroimaging in Mental Health Care Content Type Journal Article Pages 107-107 DOI 10.1007/s11673-011-9284-4 Authors Emily Borgelt, National Core for Neuroethics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada Daniel Z. Buchman, National Core for Neuroethics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada Judy Illes, National Core for Neuroethics, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, Canada Journal Journal of Bioethical Inquiry Online ISSN 1872-4353 Print ISSN 1176-7529 Journal Volume Volume 8 Journal Issue Volume 8, Number 1}, title = {Erratum: \textquotedblleft This is Why You've Been Suffering\textquotedblright: Reflections of Providers on Neuroimaging in Mental Health Care}, journal = {Journal of Bioethical Inquiry}, year = {2011}, pages = {107--107} } @book{Brook2005-BROCAT, author = {Andrew Brook and Kathleen Akins}, abstract = {This volume provides an up to date and comprehensive overview of the philosophy and neuroscience movement, which applies the methods of neuroscience to traditional philosophical problems and uses philosophical methods to illuminate issues in neuroscience. At the heart of the movement is the conviction that basic questions about human cognition, many of which have been studied for millennia, can be answered only by a philosophically sophisticated grasp of neuroscience's insights into the processing of information by the human brain. Essays in this volume are clustered around five major themes: data and theory in neuroscience; neural representation and computation; visuomotor transformations; color vision; and consciousness}, title = {Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, year = {2005} } @incollection{Brownsword2012-BRORBI, author = {Roger Brownsword}, booktitle = {I Know What You're Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy}, title = {Regulating Brain Imaging : Questions of Privacy, Informed Consent, and Human Dignity}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2012} } @article{Buller2000-BULEPM, volume = {1}, number = {3}, author = {David J. Buller and Valerie Gray Hardcastle}, abstract = {Evolutionary psychologists claim that the mind contains \textquotedblleft{}hundreds or thousands\textquotedblright of \textquotedblleft{}genetically speci{}ed\textquotedblright modules, which are evolutionary adaptations for their cognitive functions. We argue that, while the adult human mind/brain typically contains a degree of modularization, its \textquotedblleft{}modules\textquotedblright are neither genetically speci{}ed nor evolutionary adaptations. Rather, they result from the brain\textquoteright{}s developmental plasticity, which allows environmental task demands a large role in shaping the brain\textquoteright{}s information-processing structures. The brain\textquoteright{}s developmental plasticity is our fundamental psychological adaptation, and the \textquotedblleft{}modules\textquotedblright that result from it are adaptive responses to local conditions, not past evolutionary environments. If different individuals share common environ- ments, however, they may develop similar \textquotedblleft{}modules,\textquotedblright and this process can mimic the development of genetically speci{}ed modules in the evolutionary psychologist\textquoteright{}s sense}, title = {Evolutionary Psychology, Meet Developmental Neurobiology: Against Promiscuous Modularity}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2000}, pages = {307--25} } @article{Burklund2012-BURAIF-3, volume = {18}, number = {4}, author = {Lisa J. Burklund and Matthew D. Lieberman}, abstract = {In their paper "Conceptual Challenges in the Neuroimaging of Psychiatric Disorders," Kanaan and McGuire (2011) review a number of methodological and analytical obstacles associated with the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to study psychiatric disorders. Although we agree that there are challenges and limitations to this end, it would be a shame for those without a background in neuroimaging to walk away from this article with the impression that such work is too daunting, and thus not worth pursuing. On the contrary, despite a number of challenges (which are an inevitable part of all research), fMRI has already contributed many important insights into the nature and mechanisms of ..}, title = {Advances in Functional Neuroimaging of Psychopathology}, journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology}, year = {2012} } @unpublished{BurockManuscript-BUREFI, author = {Marc Burock}, abstract = {Many cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, and philosophers of science consider it uncontroversial that the brain processes information. In this work we broadly consider the types of experimental evidence that would support this claim, and find that although physical features of specific brain areas selectively covary with external stimuli or abilities, there is no direct evidence supporting an information processing function of any particular brain area.}, title = {Evidence for Information Processing in the Brain} } @unpublished{BurockManuscript-BUROFN, author = {Marc Burock}, abstract = {Cognitive neuroscientists use functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to measure properties of a participant\textquoteright{}s brain during a cognitive task. These imaging results are transformed into compelling pictures of brain activity using statistical models. I will argue that, for a broad class of experiments, neuroimaging experts have a tendency to over{}interpret the functional significance of their data. This over{}interpretation appears to follow from contentious theoretical assumptions about the mind{}brain connection, and from a propensity to conflate the anatomical location of a statistically{}significant correlation with knowledge of the mechanistic functioning at that location.}, title = {Over{}Interpreting Functional Neuroimages} } @incollection{Campbell2012-CAMTNO-3, author = {Colin Campbell and Nigel Eastman}, booktitle = {I Know What You're Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy}, title = {The Neurobiology of Violence : Science and Law}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2012} } @article{Cappa2000-CAPBAB, volume = {23}, number = {1}, author = {Stefano F. Cappa and Andrea Moro and Daniela Perani and Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini}, abstract = {Three types of problems are raised in this commentary: On the linguistic side, we emphasize the importance of an appropriate definition of the different domains of linguistics. This is needed to define the domains (lexicon-syntax-semantics) to which transformational relations apply. We then question the concept of Broca's aphasia as a \textquotedblleft{}functional\textquotedblright syndrome, associated with a specific lesion. Finally, we discuss evidence from functional brain imaging. The breadth and potential impact of such evidence has grown considerably in the last few years, expanding our knowledge of the multiple contributions of the \textquotedblleft{}Broca's region\textquotedblright to phonological, lexical-semantic, and syntactic processing. \textquotedblleft{}Lumping\textquotedblright under diagnostic labels, such as Broca's aphasia, should be replaced by more detailed linguistic and neurological descriptions of the clinical cases.}, title = {Broca's Aphasia, Broca's Area, and Syntax: A Complex Relationship}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {27--28} } @article{Celone2009-CELANP, volume = {9}, number = {1}, author = {Kim Celone and Chantal Stern}, title = {A Neuroimaging Perspective on the Use of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (Fmri) in Educational and Legal Systems}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2009}, pages = {28--2013} } @article{Chaminade2001-CHAACF-4, volume = {24}, number = {5}, author = {Thierry Chaminade and Jean Decety}, abstract = {In recent years, neurophysiological evidence has accumulated in favor of a common coding between perception and execution of action. We review findings from recent neuroimaging experiments in the action domain with three complementary perspectives: perception of action, covert action triggered by perception, and reproduction of perceived action (imitation). All studies point to the parietal cortex as a key region for body movement representation, both observed and performed.}, title = {A Common Framework for Perception and Action: Neuroimaging Evidence}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2001}, pages = {879--882} } @article{ChristensenForthcoming-CHRIAM-2, author = {Wayne Christensen and John Michael}, title = {Ian Apperly, Mindreaders: The Cognitive Basis of Theory of Mind}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, year = {forthcoming}, pages = {-} } @incollection{Cleeremans2006-CLECCO, author = {Axel Cleeremans}, booktitle = {The Boundaries of Consciousness: Neurobiology and Neuropathology: Progress in Brain Research}, abstract = {Over the past few years numerous proposals have appeared that attempt to characterize consciousness in terms of what could be called its computational correlates: Principles of information processing with which to characterize the differences between conscious and unconscious processing. Proposed computational correlates include architectural specialization (such as the involvement of specific regions of the brain in conscious processing), properties of representations (such as their stability in time or their strength), and properties of specific processes (such as resonance, synchrony, interactivity, or information integration). In exactly the same way as one can engage in a search for the neural correlates of consciousness, one can thus search for the computational correlates of consciousness. The most direct way of doing is to contrast models of conscious versus unconscious information processing. In this paper, I review these developments and illustrate how computational modeling of specific cognitive processes can be useful in exploring and in formulating putative computational principles through which to capture the differences between conscious and unconscious cognition. What can be gained from such approaches to the problem of consciousness is an understanding of the function it plays in information processing and of the mechanisms that subtend it. Here, I suggest that the central function of consciousness is to make it possible for cognitive agents to exert ?exible, adaptive control over behavior. From this perspective, consciousness is best characterized as involving (1) a graded continuum de?ned over quality of representation, such that availability to consciousness and to cognitive control correlates with properties of representation, and (2) the implication of systems of meta-representations}, title = {Computational Correlates of Consciousness}, publisher = {Elsevier}, year = {2006} } @article{Cleeremans2005-CLECCI, volume = {9}, number = {8}, author = {Axel Cleeremans and Tiago V. Maia}, abstract = {Over the past decade, many {}ndings in cognitive about the contents of consciousness: we will not address neuroscience have resulted in the view that selective what might be called the \textquoteleft{}enabling factors\textquoteright for conscious- attention, working memory and cognitive control ness (e.g. appropriate neuromodulation from the brain- stem, etc.). involve competition between widely distributed rep-}, title = {Consciousness: Converging Insights From Connectionist Modeling and Neuroscience}, journal = {Trends in Cognitive Sciences}, year = {2005}, pages = {397--404} } @book{Clifford2005-CLIFTM, author = {Colin W. G. Clifford and Gillian Rhodes}, abstract = {Adaptation phenomena provide striking examples of perceptual plasticity and offer valuable insight into the mechanisms of visual coding. The technique of psychophysical adaptation has aptly been termed the psychologist's microelectrode because of its usefulness in investigating the coding of sensory information in the human brain. Its broader relevance though is illustrated by the increasing use of adaptation to study more cognitive aspects of vision such as the mechanisms of face perception and the neural substrates of visual awareness. This book brings together a collection of studies from international researchers, which demonstrate the brain's remarkable capacity to adapt its representation of the visual world in response to changes in its environment. A major theme throughout is that adaptation at all stages of visual processing serves a functional role in the efficient representation of the prevailing visual environment. Information about the visual world is coded in the rate at which neurons fire. However, neurons can only respond over a certain range of firing rates. Adaptation of the way in which neurons code visual information tends to make optimal use of this limited response range. Though these principles are well established at the level of light adaptation in the retina, it is only relatively recently that researchers have started to look for analogous behaviour at the higher levels of the visual system. This book is the first to bring together evidence that adaptation in high-level vision, as at the lower levels, serves to fit the mind to the world. }, title = {Fitting the Mind to the World: Adaptation and After-Effects in High-Level Vision}, publisher = {OUP Oxford}, year = {2005} } @article{Coco2012-COCSPP, volume = {36}, number = {7}, author = {Moreno I. Coco and Frank Keller}, abstract = {Most everyday tasks involve multiple modalities, which raises the question of how the processing of these modalities is coordinated by the cognitive system. In this paper, we focus on the coordination of visual attention and linguistic processing during speaking. Previous research has shown that objects in a visual scene are fixated before they are mentioned, leading us to hypothesize that the scan pattern of a participant can be used to predict what he or she will say. We test this hypothesis using a data set of cued scene descriptions of photo-realistic scenes. We demonstrate that similar scan patterns are correlated with similar sentences, within and between visual scenes; and that this correlation holds for three phases of the language production process (target identification, sentence planning, and speaking). We also present a simple algorithm that uses scan patterns to accurately predict associated sentences by utilizing similarity-based retrieval}, title = {Scan Patterns Predict Sentence Production in the Cross-Modal Processing of Visual Scenes}, journal = {Cognitive Science}, year = {2012}, pages = {1204--1223} } @article{Costafreda2012-COSMMA, volume = {18}, number = {4}, author = {Sergi G. Costafreda}, abstract = {Lloyd (2011) presents highly suggestive results regarding the specificity of the link between particular brain areas and cognitive tasks. Some of his evidence is derived from the analysis of data from the BrainMap database (available: www.brainmap.org), which has become a fundamental resource for the conduct of functional neuroimaging meta-analysis. In the present note, some observations regarding the possibilities and pitfalls of meta-analysis of functional neuroimaging data are given as a complement to Lloyd's excellent exposition of the topic. Additionally, some comments are made on the particular meta-analytic results presented by Lloyd.Functional neuroimaging studies usually present their findings in the form ..}, title = {Meta-Analysis, Mega-Analysis, and Task Analysis in fMRI Research}, journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology}, year = {2012} } @article{Cranford1981-CRATIT, volume = {3}, author = {Ronald E. Cranford and Barbara Killpatrick}, title = {Tests in the Diagnosis of Brain Death: The Role of the Radioisotope Brain Scan}, journal = {Bioethics Quarterly}, year = {1981}, pages = {67--72} } @article{Crusio1997-CRUNIU, volume = {20}, number = {3}, author = {Wim E. Crusio}, title = {Neuropsychological Inference Using a Microphrenological Approach Does Not Need a Locality Assumption}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1997}, pages = {517--518} } @unpublished{Dang-VuManuscript-DANHCD, author = {Thanh Dang-Vu and Martin Desseilles}, abstract = {In this chapter, we aimed at further characterizing the functional neuroanatomy of the human rapid eye movement (REM) sleep at the population level. We carried out a meta-analysis of a large dataset of positron emission tomography (PET) scans acquired during wakefulness, slow wave sleep and REM sleep, and focused especially on the brain areas in which the activity diminishes during REM sleep. Results show that quiescent regions are con{}ned to the inferior and middle frontal cortex and to the inferior parietal lobule. Providing a plausible explanation for some of the features of dream reports, these {}ndings may help in re{}ning the concepts, which try to account for human cognition during REM sleep. In particular, we discuss the significance of these results to explain the alteration in executive processes, episodic memory retrieval and self representation during REM sleep dreaming as well as the incorporation of external stimuli into the dream narrative.}, title = {Human Cognition During REM Sleep and the Activity Pro{}le Within Frontal and Parietal Cortices: A Reappraisal of Functional Neuroimaging Data} } @article{deJong1996-DEJBWA-2, volume = {9}, number = {2}, author = {H. Looren de Jong}, abstract = {In this comment, a picture of ERP research is sketched that is slightly different from Hardcastle's account, in that it emphasises the functional characterisation of ERP components rather than the neurophysiological connections. It is suggested that selection pressure of ERP work on cognitive and neurophysiological theories and vice versa is a more apt metaphor for intertheoretical relations in this field than explanatory extension. Secondly, it is argued that the temporal characteristics of ERP components do not support Hardcastle's claim that they may be used to fix timing in phenomenal consciousness. Although I agree that ERP components, cautiously interpreted, can contribute to the identification of substages of information processing, rather than refuting Dennett and Kinsbourne, her ERP data seem compatible with a multiple drafts model.}, title = {Brain Waves and Bridges: Comments on Hardcastle's \textquotedblleft{}Discovering the Moment of Consciousness?\textquotedblleft}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {1996}, pages = {197--209} } @incollection{Demertzi2012-DEMWIT-3, author = {Athena Demertzi and Steven Laureys}, booktitle = {I Know What You're Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy}, title = {Where in the Brain is Pain? : Evaluating Painful Experiences in Non-Communicative Patients}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2012} } @article{Downie2005-DOWFTR, volume = {5}, number = {2}, author = {Jocelyn Downie and Michael Hadskis}, abstract = {This Article does not have an abstract}, title = {Finding the Right Compass for Issue-Mapping in Neuroimaging}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2005}, pages = {27--2013} } @incollection{Edwards2012-EDWPPI, author = {Sarah J. L. Edwards}, booktitle = {I Know What You're Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy}, title = {Protecting Privacy Interests in Brain Images : The Limits of Consent}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2012} } @incollection{Edwards2012-EDWC-2, author = {Sarah J. L. Edwards and Geraint Rees}, booktitle = {I Know What You're Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy}, title = {Conclusion}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2012} } @article{Egan2007-EGANAE, volume = {7}, number = {9}, author = {Erin A. Egan}, title = {Neuroimaging as Evidence}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2007}, pages = {62--63} } @article{Erana2012-ERADPT, volume = {25}, number = {6}, author = {Angeles Era\~n{}a}, abstract = {Two prevailing accounts of the structure of the mind have been provided, respectively, by the Dual System Theory and by the Massive Modularity Hypothesis. It has been claimed, however, that they cannot both be true at the same time, i.e., that they are incompatible and, thus, that one of them must be abandoned. I will offer some arguments to challenge this claim. I will show that a plausible understanding of each theory makes it possible for them both to be true at the same time. Moreover, I will argue that by appealing to each other they can offer a more complete and detailed account of the architecture of the mind}, title = {Dual Process Theories Versus Massive Modularity Hypotheses}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {2012}, pages = {855--872} } @book{Erneling2005-ERNMAA, author = {Christina E. Erneling and D. Johnson}, abstract = {Printbegr\ae{}nsninger: Der kan printes 10 sider ad gangen og max. 40 sider pr. session.}, title = {Mind As a Scientific Object}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2005} } @article{Figdor2011-FIGSAM, volume = {3}, number = {2}, author = {Carrie Figdor}, abstract = {This article clarifies three principles that should guide the development of any cognitive ontology. First, that an adequate cognitive ontology depends essentially on an adequate task ontology; second, that the goal of developing a cognitive ontology is independent of the goal of finding neural implementations of the processes referred to in the ontology; and third, that cognitive ontologies are neutral regarding the metaphysical relationship between cognitive and neural processes}, title = {Semantics and Metaphysics in Informatics: Toward an Ontology of Tasks}, journal = {Topics in Cognitive Science}, year = {2011}, pages = {222--226} } @article{Figdor2010-FIGNAT, volume = {77}, number = {3}, author = {Carrie Figdor}, abstract = {Many empirically minded philosophers have used neuroscientific data to argue against the multiple realization of cognitive functions in existing biological organisms. I argue that neuroscientists themselves have proposed a biologically based concept of multiple realization as an alternative to interpreting empirical findings in terms of one{}to{}one structure{}function mappings. I introduce this concept and its associated research framework and also how some of the main neuroscience{}based arguments against multiple realization go wrong. *Received October 2009; revised December 2009. \dag{}To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, 260 English{}Philosophy Building, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242; e{}mail: carrie{}figdor@uiowa.edu.}, title = {Neuroscience and the Multiple Realization of Cognitive Functions}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2010}, pages = {419--456} } @article{Fisher2010-CARDCN, volume = {38}, number = {2}, author = {Carl E. Fisher and Paul S. Appelbaum}, abstract = {In this paper, we review recent neuroimaging investigations of disorders of consciousness and different disciplines' understanding of consciousness itself. We consider potential tests of consciousness, their legal significance, and how they map onto broader themes in U.S. statutory law pertaining to advance directives and surrogate decision-making. In the process, we outline a taxonomy of themes to illustrate and clarify the variance in state-law definitions of consciousness. Finally, we discuss broader scientific, ethical, and legal issues associated with the advent of neuroimaging for disorders of consciousness and conclude with policy recommendations that could help to mitigate confusion in this realm}, title = {Diagnosing Consciousness: Neuroimaging, Law, and the Vegetative State}, journal = {Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics}, year = {2010}, pages = {374--385} } @article{Ford2005-FORCIL, volume = {5}, number = {2}, author = {Paul J. Ford and Cynthia S. Kubu}, abstract = {This Article does not have an abstract}, title = {Caution in Leaping From Functional Imaging to Functional Neurosurgery}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2005}, pages = {23--2013} } @article{Fortune2011-FOREOS, volume = {3}, author = {Luann D. Fortune}, abstract = {Somatic awareness is bodily sensation imbued with consciousness. Directing and cultivating somatic awareness is a practice fundamental to many therapeutic and spiritual enterprises. Recent developments in neuroscience attempt to explain the operational aspects of somatic awareness. But it has long been a topic of conversation in other paradigms, from philosophy to health care. Somatic input provides information for use in wellness treatment applications, including therapeutic bodywork. Yet few massage therapy scholarly investigations aim to capture the quality of body awareness experience. The essence of the experience and its associated language remain imprecise and under-explored holistically.This article implements the therapeutic practice technique of the Body Scan to capture the essence of an inner body exploration (proprioception and interoception). Based on a narrative collected during a verbally self-directed exercise, a phenomenological description is explicated to represent one incidentof internal body experience. The pilot study suggests that the Body Scan offers potential as a research tool, as well as a modality for therapeutic intervention}, title = {Essences of Somatic Awareness as Captured in a Verbally Directed Body Scan}, journal = {Schutzian Research}, year = {2011}, pages = {107--119} } @article{Foster1997-FOSTLA, volume = {20}, number = {3}, author = {Jonathan K. Foster}, title = {The \textquotedblleft{}Locality Assumption\textquotedblright: Lessons From History and Neuroscience?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1997}, pages = {518--519} } @book{Fotopoulu2012-FOTFTC, author = {A. Fotopoulu and D. Pfaff and M. Conway}, title = {From the Couch to the Lab: Psychoanalysis, Neuroscience and Cognitive Psychology in Dialoge}, publisher = {OUP}, year = {2012} } @book{Gazzaniga1995-GAZTCN, author = {Michael S. Gazzaniga}, abstract = {The third edition of a work that defines the field of cognitive neuroscience, with extensive new material including new chapters and new contributors.}, title = {The Cognitive Neurosciences}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {1995} } @unpublished{Georgiev2010-GEOSPA, author = {Danko D. Georgiev and James F. Glazebrook}, abstract = {In the beginning of the 20th century the groundbreaking work of Ramon y Cajal firmly established the neuron doctrine, according to which neurons are the basic structural and functional units of the nervous system. Von Weldeyer coined the term \textquotedblleft{}neuron\textquotedblright in 1891, but the huge leap forward in neuroscience was due to Cajal\textquoteright{}s meticulous microscopic observations of brain sections stained with an improved version of Golgi\textquoteright{}s la reazione nera (black reaction). The latter improvement of Golgi\textquoteright{}s technique made it possible to visualize the arborizations of single neurons that were \textquotedblleft{}colored brownish black even to their finest branchlets, standing out with unsurpassable clarity upon a transparent yellow background. All was sharp as a sketch with Chinese ink\textquotedblright. The high quality of both the visualization of individual nerve cells and the work performed on studying the anatomy of the central nervous system lead Ramon y Cajal to the conclusion that axons output the nervous impulses to the dendrites or the soma of other target neurons}, title = {SNARE Proteins as Molecular Masters of Interneuronal Communication}, year = {2010} } @article{Gerrans2008-GERGOP, volume = {59}, number = {2}, author = {Philip Gerrans and Valerie E. Stone}, abstract = {Recent work in cognitive neuroscience on the child's Theory of Mind (ToM) has pursued the idea that the ability to metarepresent mental states depends on a domain-specific cognitive subystem implemented in specific neural circuitry: a Theory of Mind Module. We argue that the interaction of several domain-general mechanisms and lower-level domain-specific mechanisms accounts for the flexibility and sophistication of behavior, which has been taken to be evidence for a domain-specific ToM module. This finding is of more general interest since it suggests a parsimonious cognitive architecture can account for apparent domain specificity. We argue for such an architecture in two stages. First, on conceptual grounds, contrasting the case of language with ToM, and second, by showing that recent evidence in the form of fMRI and lesion studies supports the more parsimonious hypothesis. Theory of Mind, Metarepresentation, and Modularity Developmental Components of ToM The Analogy with Modularity of Language Dissociations without Modules The Evidence from Neuroscience Conclusion CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?}, title = {Generous or Parsimonious Cognitive Architecture? Cognitive Neuroscience and Theory of Mind}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {2008}, pages = {121--141} } @article{Gilbert2011-GILTIP, volume = {2}, number = {4}, author = {Frederic Gilbert and Lawrence Burns and Timothy Krahn}, abstract = {Purpose With the increasing sophistication of neuroimaging technologies in medicine, new language is being sought to make sense of the findings. The aim of this paper is to explore whether the brain-reading metaphor used to convey current medical or neurobiological findings imports unintended significations that do not necessarily reflect the genuine findings made by physicians and neuroscientists. Methods First, the paper surveys the ambiguities of the readability metaphor, drawing from the history of science and medicine, paying special attention to the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries. Next, the paper addresses more closely the issue of how metaphors may be confusing when used in medicine in general, and neuroscience in particular. The paper then explores the possible misleading effects associated with the contemporary use of the brain-reading metaphor in neuroimaging research. Results Rather than breaking new ground, what we see in current scientific language is a persistence of both a constraining and expansive set of language practices forming a relatively continuous tradition linking current neuroimaging to past scientific investigations into the brain. Conclusions The use of the readability metaphor thus carries with it both positive and negative effects. Physicians and neuroscientists must resort to the use of terms already laden with abstracted meanings, and often burdened by tradition, at the risk of importing through these words connotations that do not tally with the sought-after objectivity of empirical science}, title = {The Inheritance, Power and Predicaments of the \textquotedblleft{}Brain-Reading\textquotedblright Metaphor}, journal = {Medicine Studies}, year = {2011}, pages = {229--244} } @article{Glover2004-GLOSVR, volume = {27}, number = {1}, author = {Scott Glover}, abstract = {Evidence for a dichotomy between the planning of an action and its on-line control in humans is reviewed. This evidence suggests that planning and control each serve a specialized purpose utilizing distinct visual representations. Evidence from behavioral studies suggests that planning is influenced by a large array of visual and cognitive information, whereas control is influenced solely by the spatial characteristics of the target, including such things as its size, shape, orientation, and so forth. Evidence from brain imaging and neuropsychology suggests that planning and control are subserved by separate visual centers in the posterior parietal lobes, each constituting part of a larger network for planning and control. Planning appears to rely on phylogenetically newer regions in the inferior parietal lobe, along with the frontal lobes and basal ganglia, whereas control appears to rely on older regions in the superior parietal lobe, along with the cerebellum. Key Words: action; apraxia; control; illusions; optic ataxia; PET; planning; reaching;.}, title = {Separate Visual Representations in the Planning and Control of Action}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2004}, pages = {3--24} } @article{Gouras2000-GOUATB, volume = {23}, number = {4}, author = {Peter Gouras}, abstract = {Neural organization describes an approach to analyzing neural function in anatomically defined subsystems in the brain, the hippocampus, cerebellum, sensory systems, thalamus, basal ganglia, and cerebral cortex, combining information on neurocircuitry with mathematical models that link structure with function. It is an up-to-date source on the major schemes and background for neural modeling of the central nervous system and is combined with a Web site that includes tutorials and on-line modeling possibilities.}, title = {Analyzing the Brain}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {540--541} } @article{GreenwoodForthcoming-GRECTA, author = {Jennifer Greenwood}, abstract = {Contingent transcranialists claim that the physical mechanisms of mind are not exclusively intracranial and that genuine cognitive systems can extend into cognizers' physical and socio-cultural environments. They further claim that extended cognitive systems must include the deep functional integration of external environmental resources with internal neural resources. They have found it difficult, however, to explicate the precise nature of such deep functional integration and provide compelling examples of it. Contingent intracranialists deny that extracranial resources can be components of genuine extended cognitive systems. They claim that transcranialists fallaciously conflate coupling with constitution and construe cognition as extending always from brains into world rather than world into brains. By using insights from recent research in developmental psychology and by explicating the nature of one form that deep functional integration can take, I argue that (i) transcranialists do not fallaciously conflate coupling wth constitution, and (ii) human emotional ontogenesis is a world-to-brain transcranial achievement. Jennifer Greenwood is a PhD Candidate in Philosophy at the School of History, Philosophy, Religion, and Classics, University of Queensland.}, title = {Contingent Transcranialism and Deep Functional Cognitive Integration: The Case of Human Emotional Ontogenesis}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {forthcoming}, pages = {1--17} } @article{Grunbaum2012-GRNBIA, volume = {18}, number = {4}, author = {Thor Gr\"u{}nbaum and Andrea Raballo}, abstract = {Fielding and Marwede attempt to lay down directions for an applied onto-psychiatry. According to their proposal, such an enterprise requires us to accept certain metaphysical and methodological claims about how brain and experience are related. To put it in one sentence, our critique is that we find their metaphysics questionable and their methodology clinically impracticable.A first fundamental problem for their project, as it is expressed in their paper, is that their overall aim is unclear. At least three different aims might be read as motivating their efforts, here listed according to their strength:They aim to develop tools for the development of knowledge representational systems that can be used by ..}, title = {Brain Imaging and Psychiatric Classification}, journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology}, year = {2012} } @article{Habeck2000-HABNST, volume = {23}, number = {3}, author = {Christian G. Habeck and Ramesh Srinivasan}, abstract = {Current EEG research emphasizes gamma band coherence as a signature of functional integration, that is, the solution to the binding problem. We note that spatial patterns of coherent neural activity are also observed at other EEG frequencies. If these oscillations reflect Nunez's resonant modes, they offer a solution to the binding problem that emerges naturally from the architecture of cortical connections.}, title = {Natural Solutions to the Problem of Functional Integration}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {402--403} } @article{Hagendoorn2012-HAGITB, volume = {11}, number = {1}, author = {Ivar Hagendoorn}, abstract = {The present paper briefly reviews recent advances in spatial cognition. A central tenet in spatial cognition is that spatial information is simultaneously encoded in multiple formats. It also appears that at the level of neural processing there is no clear distinction between the representation of space and the control of action. I will argue that these findings offer novel insight into the nature of dance and choreography and that the concepts used by cognitive neuroscientists to frame their findings can be fruitfully applied in a choreographic setting. Finally, I will speculate that both dancing oneself and watching dance may enhance one\textquoteright{}s experience of space}, title = {Inscribing the Body, Exscribing Space}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, year = {2012}, pages = {69--78} } @article{Hanakawa2004-HANAII, volume = {27}, number = {3}, author = {Takashi Hanakawa and Manabu Honda and Mark Hallett}, abstract = {Inspired by Rick Grush's emulation theory, we reinterpreted a series of our neuroimaging experiments which were intended to examine the representations of complex movement, modality-specific imagery, and supramodal imagery. The emulation theory can explain motor and cognitive activities observed in cortical motor areas, through the speculation that caudal areas relate to motor-specific imagery and rostral areas embrace an emulator for amodal imagery.}, title = {Amodal Imagery in Rostral Premotor Areas}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2004}, pages = {406--407} } @incollection{Hardcastle2005-HARLIT-2, author = {Valerie Gray Hardcastle and C. Matthew Stewart}, booktitle = {Cognition and the Brain}, title = {Localization in the Brain and Other Illusions}, publisher = {Cambridge: Cambridge University Press}, year = {2005} } @article{Hardcastle2004-HARNAT, volume = {18}, number = {1}, author = {Valerie Gray Hardcastle and C. Matthew Stewart}, abstract = {This article examines how scientists move from physical measurementsto actual observation of single-cell recordings in the brain. We highlight how easy it is to change the fundamental nature of ourobservations using accepted methodological techniques for manipulatingraw data. Collecting single-cell data is thoroughly pragmatic. Weconclude that there is no deep or interesting difference betweenaccounting for observations by measurements and accounting forobservations by theories}, title = {Neuroscience and the Art of Single-Cell Recordings}, journal = {Biology and Philosophy}, year = {2004}, pages = {195--208} } @article{Hardcastle2002-HARWDB, volume = {69}, number = {3}, author = {Valerie Gray Hardcastle and C. Matthew Stewart}, title = {What Do Brain Data Really Show?}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2002}, pages = {572--582} } @article{Hatfield2010-HATROJ-2, volume = {2010}, number = {5}, author = {Gary Hatfield}, title = {Review of John Bickle (Ed.), \_The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience\_}, journal = {Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews}, year = {2010} } @incollection{Haynes2012-HAYBR-5, author = {John-Dylan Haynes}, booktitle = {I Know What You're Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy}, title = {Brain Reading}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2012} } @article{Henke1993-HENSPO, volume = {2}, number = {3}, author = {Katharina Henke and Theodor Landis and Hans J. Markowitsch}, title = {Subliminal Perception of Pictures in the Right Hemisphere}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, year = {1993}, pages = {225--236} } @article{Huber2009-HUBIOT, volume = {6}, number = {3-4}, author = {Christian G. Huber}, abstract = {Traditionally, discussion about neuroimaging focuses on methodological improvement and neurobiological findings. In current psychiatric neuroimaging, the research focus broadens and includes concepts such as the self, personality, well-being, and psychiatric disease. This calls for the inclusion of disciplines like psychology and philosophy in a dialogue with neuroscience. Furthermore, it raises the question of how theories from these areas relate to neuroimaging findings: are results generated by objective data independent of theories? Is there an epistemological priority for the theories used for generating hypotheses and for interpreting the results? Or do theoretical concepts and neuroimaging data influence each other? In this paper, we will discuss these positions concerning the priority of concepts and data in neuroimaging and provide arguments for an interdependence of concepts and data. An awareness of these considerations may help professionals from the life sciences and humanities as well as laypersons to avoid misunderstandings and oversimplifications.}, title = {Interdependence of Theoretical Concepts and Neuroimaging Data}, publisher = {Springer Berlin / Heidelberg}, journal = {Poiesis and Praxis}, year = {2009}, pages = {203--217} } @article{Johnson2007-JOHTNO-2, volume = {7}, number = {9}, author = {Kevin A. Johnson and F. Andrew Kozel and Steven J. Laken and Mark S. George}, title = {The Neuroscience of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Fmri for Deception Detection}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2007}, pages = {58--2013} } @article{Joseph2000-JOSMOS-2, volume = {1}, number = {3}, author = {S. King Joseph and Bibo Zheng Mix Xie and H. Pribram Karl}, abstract = {This study describes the results of experiments motivated by an attempt to understand spectral processing in the cerebral cortex (DeValois and DeValois, 1988; Pribram, 1971, 1991). This level of inquiry concerns processing within a restricted cortical area rather than that by which spatially separate circuits become synchronized during certain behavioral and experiential processes. We recorded neural responses for 55 locations in the somatosensory (barrel) cortex of the rat to various combinations of spatial frequency (texture) and temporal frequency stimulation of their vibrissae. The recordings obtained from single and multi-unit bursts of spikes were mapped as surface distributions of local dendritic potentials. The distributions showed a variety of patterns that are asymmetric with respect to the spatial and temporal parameters of stimulation, and were, therefore, not simply reflecting whisker flick rate. Next, a simulation of our results showed that these surface distributions of local dendritic potentials can be described by Gabor-like functions much as in the visual system. The results provide support for a model of distributed cortical processing that imposes a physiologically derived frame (the limited extent of a dendritic patch) and an anatomically derived (axonal) sampling of the distributed process. This combination provides a complex Gabor wavelet that encodes phase, which is necessary to processing such details as edges and texture in a scene. The synchronization across cortical areas that make the Gabor wavelet processes within restricted cortical areas available to one another (the binding problem) proceed at a ''higher order'' level of integration. Both levels of distributed processing accomplish computation in the conjoint spacetime and spectral domain.}, title = {Maps of Surface Distributions of Electrical Activity in Spectrally Derived Receptive Fields of the Rat's Somatosensory Cortex}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2000} } @article{Kaas2000-KAAWIB, volume = {1}, number = {1}, author = {Jon H. Kaas}, abstract = {As bridges or brains become bigger or smaller,$<$span class='Hi'$>$$<$/span$>$ the changes pose problems of design thatneed to be solved.$<$span class='Hi'$>$$<$/span$>$ Larger brains could have larger or more neurons,$<$span class='Hi'$>$$<$/span$>$ or both.$<$span class='Hi'$>$$<$/span$>$ With largerneurons,$<$span class='Hi'$>$$<$/span$>$ it becomes difficult to maintain conduction times over longer axons andelectrical cable properties over longer dendrites.$<$span class='Hi'$>$$<$/span$>$ With more neurons,$<$span class='Hi'$>$$<$/span$>$ it becomes difficultfor each neuron to maintain its proportion of connections with other neurons.$<$span class='Hi'$>$$<$/span$>$ Theseproblems are addressed by making brains more modular,$<$span class='Hi'$>$$<$/span$>$ thereby reducing the lengths ofmany connections,$<$span class='Hi'$>$$<$/span$>$ and by altering functions.$<$span class='Hi'$>$$<$/span$>$ Smaller brains may not have enoughneurons for all circuits,$<$span class='Hi'$>$$<$/span$>$ and they may lose modules and functions.$<$span class='Hi'$>$$<$/span$>$ Mammals with moreneocortex tend to have more cortical areas and more columns and types of columnswithin the larger areas.}, title = {Why is Brain Size so Important:Design Problems and Solutions as Neocortex Gets Biggeror Smaller}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2000}, pages = {7--23} } @article{Kadosh2008-KADFMT, volume = {31}, number = {6}, author = {Roi Cohen Kadosh and Vincent Walsh}, title = {From Magnitude to Natural Numbers: A Developmental Neurocognitive Perspective}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2008}, pages = {647--648} } @article{Kanaan2012-KANCCI-3, volume = {18}, number = {4}, author = {Richard A. A. Kanaan and Philip K. McGuire}, abstract = {The brain scanner is a piece of philosophical fiction made fact. It was among the most common creations of thought experiments, along with the brain-vat and the mindless robot. With the imaginary scanner, readings were taken of each other's brain activity, thereby learning everything about other minds, or very little, depending on the outcome of the thought experiment. The scanners that are now in use---{}those that allow us to do functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), for example---{}are a little different to those imagined, perhaps, but they have very much arrived. They are in daily use in hundreds of laboratories, and for the past 15 years or so have been grabbing headlines the world over with breakthrough ..}, title = {Conceptual Challenges in the Neuroimaging of Psychiatric Disorders}, journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology}, year = {2012} } @incollection{Kelly2012-KELBII, author = {Brendan D. Kelly}, booktitle = {I Know What You're Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy}, title = {Brain Imaging in Clinical Psychiatry : Why?}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2012} } @article{Kennedy2005-KENNRR, volume = {5}, number = {2}, author = {Donald Kennedy}, abstract = {This Article does not have an abstract}, title = {Neuroimaging: Revolutionary Research Tool or a Post-Modern Phrenology?}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2005}, pages = {19} } @article{King2000-KINMOS, volume = {1}, number = {3}, author = {Joseph S. King and Mix Xie and Bibo Zheng and Karl H. Pribram}, abstract = {This study describes the results of experiments motivated by an attempt to understand spectral processing in the cerebral cortex (DeValois and DeValois, 1988; Pribram, 1971, 1991). This level of inquiry concerns processing within a restricted cortical area rather than that by which spatially separate circuits become synchronized during certain behavioral and experiential processes. We recorded neural responses for 55 locations in the somatosensory (barrel) cortex of the rat to various combinations of spatial frequency (texture) and temporal frequency stimulation of their vibrissae. The recordings obtained from single and multi-unit bursts of spikes were mapped as surface distributions of local dendritic potentials. The distributions showed a variety of patterns that are asymmetric with respect to the spatial and temporal parameters of stimulation, and were, therefore, not simply reflecting whisker flick rate. Next, a simulation of our results showed that these surface distributions of local dendritic potentials can be described by Gabor-like functions much as in the visual system. The results provide support for a model of distributed cortical processing that imposes a physiologically derived frame (the limited extent of a dendritic patch) and an anatomically derived (axonal) sampling of the distributed process. This combination provides a complex Gabor wavelet that encodes phase, which is necessary to processing such details as edges and texture in a scene. The synchronization across cortical areas that make the Gabor wavelet processes within restricted cortical areas available to one another (the binding problem) proceed at a ''higher order'' level of integration. Both levels of distributed processing accomplish computation in the conjoint spacetime and spectral domain.}, title = {Maps of Surface Distributions of Electrical Activity in Spectrally Derived Receptive Fields of the Rat's Somatosensory Cortex}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2000}, pages = {327--349} } @article{Klein2010-KLEIAN, volume = {61}, number = {2}, author = {Colin Klein}, abstract = {fMRI promises to uncover the functional structure of the brain. I argue, however, that pictures of \textquoteleft{}brain activity' associated with fMRI experiments are poor evidence for functional claims. These neuroimages present the results of null hypothesis significance tests performed on fMRI data. Significance tests alone cannot provide evidence about the functional structure of causally dense systems, including the brain. Instead, neuroimages should be seen as indicating regions where further data analysis is warranted. This additional analysis rarely involves simple significance testing, and so justified skepticism about neuroimages does not provide reason for skepticism about fMRI more generally}, title = {Images Are Not the Evidence in Neuroimaging}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {2010}, pages = {265--278} } @article{Klein2011-KLETDT, volume = {4}, number = {2}, author = {Colin Klein}, abstract = {The dual-track theory of moral reasoning has received considerable attention due to the neuroimaging work of Greene et al. Greene et al. claimed that certain kinds of moral dilemmas activated brain regions specific to emotional responses, while others activated areas specific to cognition. This appears to indicate a dissociation between different types of moral reasoning. I re-evaluate these claims of specificity in light of subsequent empirical work. I argue that none of the cortical areas identified by Greene et al. are functionally specific: each is active in a wide variety of both cognitive and emotional tasks. I further argue that distinct activation across conditions is not strong evidence for dissociation. This undermines support for the dual-track hypothesis. I further argue that moral decision-making appears to activate a common network that underlies self-projection: the ability to imagine oneself from a variety of viewpoints in a variety of situations. I argue that the utilization of self-projection indicates a continuity between moral decision-making and other kinds of complex social deliberation. This may have normative consequences, but teasing them out will require careful attention to both empirical and philosophical concerns}, title = {The Dual Track Theory of Moral Decision-Making: A Critique of the Neuroimaging Evidence}, journal = {Neuroethics}, year = {2011}, pages = {143--162} } @article{Klein2010-KLEPII-2, volume = {5}, number = {2}, author = {Colin Klein}, abstract = {Functional neuroimaging (NI) technologies like Positron Emission Tomography and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) have revolutionized neuroscience, and provide crucial tools to link cognitive psychology and traditional neuroscientific models. A growing discipline of 'neurophilosophy' brings fMRI evidence to bear on traditional philosophical issues such as weakness of will, moral psychology, rational choice, social interaction, free will, and consciousness. NI has also attracted critical attention from psychologists and from philosophers of science. I review debates over the evidential status of fMRI, including the differences between brain scans and ordinary images, the legitimacy of forward inference and reverse inference, and deductive versus probabilistic accounts of NI evidence. I conclude with a discussion of fMRI as exploratory rather than confirmatory evidence, linking this debate to the growing literature on cognitive ontology.}, title = {Philosophical Issues in Neuroimaging}, journal = {Philosophy Compass}, year = {2010}, pages = {186--198} } @article{Kopp2009-KOPHTO, volume = {1}, number = {4}, author = {Nicolas Kopp}, abstract = {How Technologies of Imaging are Shaping Clinical Research and Practice in Neurology Content Type Journal Article Category Past \& Present Pages 315-328 DOI 10.1007/s12376-010-0037-1 Authors $<$span class='Hi'$>$Nicolas$<$/span$>$ Kopp, H\^o{}pital de l\textquoteright{}HotelDieu Lyon University Hospitals, EspaceEthique Inter-r\'e{}gional 69288 Lyon, Cedex 02 France Journal Medicine Studies Online ISSN 1876-4541 Print ISSN 1876-4533 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 4.}, title = {How Technologies of Imaging Are Shaping Clinical Research and Practice in Neurology}, journal = {Medicine Studies}, year = {2009}, pages = {315--328} } @article{Korman2005-KORRTI, volume = {28}, number = {1}, author = {Maria Korman and Tamar Flash and Avi Karni}, abstract = {The progressive multistage stabilization of memory (consolidation) relies on post-acquisition neural reorganization. We hypothesize that two processes subserve procedural memory consolidation and are reflected in delayed post-acquisition performance gains: (1) synaptic consolidation, which is classical Hebbian, and (2) in some tasks, concurrently or consequently, \textquotedblleft{}system consolidation,\textquotedblright which might in some skills be sleep-dependent. Behavioral interference may affect either type of consolidation.}, title = {Resistance to Interference and the Emergence of Delayed Gains in Newly Acquired Procedural Memories: Synaptic and System Consolidation?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2005}, pages = {74--75} } @article{LaasikForthcoming-LAACSA-2, author = {Kristjan Laasik}, abstract = {In his paper, \textquotedblleft{}The Dorsal Stream and the Visual Horizon,\textquotedblright Michael Madary argues that \textquotedblleft{}dorsal stream processing plays a main role in the spatiotemporal limits of visual perception, in what Husserl identified as the visual horizon\textquotedblright (Madary 2011, p. 424). Madary regards himself as thereby providing a theoretical framework \textquotedblleft{}sensitive to basic Husserlian phenomenology\textquotedblright (Madary 2011). In particular, Madary draws connections between perceptual anticipations and the experience of the indeterminate spatial margins, on the one hand, and the Husserlian spatiotemporal visual horizons, on the other. I argue that Madary\textquoteright{}s arguments, for a Husserlian view of the two visual systems, are not convincing. When the notion of visual horizon is adequately understood as a constitutive notion, there will be reason to regard the connections between dorsal processing and the Husserlian spatiotemporal horizons as tenuous at best}, title = {Constitutive Strata and the Dorsal Stream}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, year = {forthcoming}, pages = {1--17} } @article{Landreth2004-LANLAT, volume = {17}, number = {1}, author = {Anthony Landreth and Robert C. Richardson}, abstract = {William Uttal's The new phrenology is a broad attack on localization in cognitive neuroscience. He argues that even though the brain is a highly differentiated organ, "high level cognitive functions" should not be localized in specific brain regions. First, he argues that psychological processes are not well-defined. Second, he criticizes the methods used to localize psychological processes, including imaging technology: he argues that variation among individuals compromises localization, and that the statistical methods used to construct activation maps are flawed. Neither criticism is compelling. First, as we illustrate, there are behavioral measures which offer at least weak constraints on psychological attribution. Second, though imaging does face methodological difficulties associated with variation among individuals, these are broadly acknowledged; moreover, his specific criticisms of the imaging work, and in particular of fMRI, misrepresent the methodology. In concluding, we suggest a way of framing the issues that might allow us to resolve differences between localizationist models and more distributed models empirically}, title = {Localization and the New Phrenology: A Review Essay on William Uttal's the New Phrenology}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {2004}, pages = {107--123} } @article{LaneForthcoming-LANTMP, author = {Justin E. Lane and Nora Parren}, abstract = {Philosophical Psychology, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-5, Ahead of Print}, title = {The Moral Psychology Handbook}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {forthcoming}, pages = {1--5} } @book{Laureys2005-LAUTBO-3, author = {Steven Laureys}, title = {The Boundaries of Consciousness: Neurobiology and Neuropathology: Progress in Brain Research}, publisher = {Elsevier}, year = {2005} } @article{Leo2003-LEOBBO, volume = {24}, number = {1}, author = {John R. Leo and D. Cohen}, title = {Broken Brains or Flawed Studies? A Critical Review of ADHD Neuroimaging Research}, journal = {Journal of Mind and Behavior}, year = {2003}, pages = {29--55} } @article{Levelt2004-LEVROL, volume = {27}, number = {2}, author = {Willem J. M. Levelt and Antje S. Meyer and Ardi Roelofs}, abstract = {How can one conceive of the neuronal implementation of the processing model we proposed in our target article? In his commentary (Pulverm\"u{}ller 1999, reprinted here in this issue), Pulverm\"u{}ller makes various proposals concerning the underlying neural mechanisms and their potential localizations in the brain. These proposals demonstrate the compatibility of our processing model and current neuroscience. We add further evidence on details of localization based on a recent meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies of word production (Indefrey \& Levelt 2000). We also express some minor disagreements with respect to Pulverm\"u{}ller's interpretation of the \textquotedblleft{}lemma\textquotedblright notion, and concerning his neural modeling of phonological code retrieval. Branigan \& Pickering discuss important aspects of syntactic encoding, which was not the topic of the target article. We discuss their well-taken proposal that multiple syntactic frames for a single verb lemma are represented as independent nodes, which can be shared with other verbs, such as accounting for syntactic priming in speech production. We also discuss how, in principle, the alternative multiple-frame-multiple-lemma account can be tested empirically. The available evidence does not seem to support that account. Footnotes1 BBS Note: The original manuscript of this Response article was received on January 14, 2000.}, title = {Relations of Lexical Access to Neural Implementation and Syntactic Encoding}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2004}, pages = {299--301} } @incollection{Lever2012-LEVNVP, author = {Annabelle Lever}, booktitle = {I Know What You're Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy}, title = {Neuroscience V. Privacy? : A Democratic Perspective}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2012} } @incollection{Linden2012-LINOS, author = {David Linden}, booktitle = {I Know What You're Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy}, title = {Overcoming Self-Report : Possibilities and Limitations of Brain Imaging in Psychiatry}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2012} } @article{Lloyd2012-LLOTAG, volume = {18}, number = {4}, author = {Dan Lloyd}, abstract = {To william james, conscious life was a stream; to Edmund Husserl, a flow. These metaphors point to the marvelous continuity of experience as it weaves through the world of thought and things. We might similarly talk about the flow of the body, as I reach for my cup of coffee. A physiologist could decompose the action, isolating the contribution of each muscle and joint to the whole. This functional analysis would constitute one form of explanation of the movement. As we replace "I grab the cup" with the physiologist's account, there is a shift in level of description and a turn toward underlying processes, but the physiologist has added nothing to nature. Explanation of this sort, functional reduction, is simply a ..}, title = {Through a Glass Darkly: Schizophrenia and Functional Brain Imaging}, journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology}, year = {2012} } @article{Lloyd2002-LLOSTM, volume = {3}, number = {1}, author = {Dan Lloyd}, abstract = {Good research requires, among other virtues,(i) methods that yield stable experimentalobservations without arbitrary (post hoc)assumptions, (ii) logical interpretations ofthe sources of observations, and (iii) soundinferences to general causal mechanismsexplaining experimental results by placing themin larger explanatory contexts. In TheNew Phrenology , William Uttal examines theresearch tradition of localization, and findsit deficient in all three virtues, whetherbased on lesion studies or on new technologiesfor functional brain imaging. In this paper Iconsider just the arguments concerning brainimaging, especially functional MagneticResonance Imaging. I think that Uttal is tooharsh in his methodological critique, butcorrect in his assessment of the conceptuallimitations of localist evidence. I proposeinstead a data-driven test for assessingrelative modularity in brain images, and showits use in a secondary analysis of fMRI datafrom the National fMRI Data Center(www.fmridc.org). Although the analysis is alimited pilot study, it offers additionalempirical challenge to localism}, title = {Studying the Mind From the Inside Out}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2002}, pages = {243--59} } @article{Lloyd2000-LLOTCF, volume = {1}, number = {1}, author = {Dan Lloyd}, abstract = {For more than a century the paradigm inspiringcognitive neuroscience has been modular and localist.Contemporary research in functional brain imaginggenerally relies on methods favorable to localizingparticular functions in one or more specific brainregions. Meanwhile, connectionist cognitive scientistshave celebrated the computational powers ofdistributed processing, and pioneered methods forinterpreting distributed representations. This papertakes a connectionist approach to functionalneuroimaging. A tabulation of 35 PET (positronemission tomography) experiments strongly indicatesdistributed function for at least the ''medium sized''anatomical units, the cortical Brodmann areas. Moreimportant, when these PET experiments were interpretedas distributed representations, multidimensionalscaling revealed a ''brain activation space'' with asalient structure organized primarily by the sensorymodality of the stimulus, and secondarily by the typeof motor response. These results suggest that currentanalytical techniques in functional neuroimagingshould be augmented by distributed processinganalyses, and that these analyses may lead to manydiscoveries about the structure of ''inner space.''}, title = {Terra Cognita: From Functional Neuroimaging to the Map of the Mind}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2000}, pages = {93--116} } @unpublished{LogothetisManuscript-LOGIAH, author = {Nikos Logothetis}, abstract = {Despite considerable evidence that neural activity in monkeys reflects various aspects of face perception, relatively little is known about monkeys\textquoteright face processing abilities. Two characteristics of face processing observed in humans are a subordinate-level entry point, here, the default recognition of faces at the subordinate, rather than basic, level of categorization, and holistic effects, i.e. perception of facial displays as an integrated whole. The present study used an adaptation paradigm to test whether untrained rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta) display these hallmarks of face processing. In experiments 1 and 2, macaques showed greater rebound from adaptation to conspecific faces than to other animals at the individual or subordinate level. In experiment 3, exchanging only the bottom half of a monkey face produced greater rebound in aligned than in misaligned composites, indicating that for normal, aligned faces, the new bottom half may have influenced the perception of the whole face. Scan path analysis supported this assertion: during rebound, fixation to the unchanged eye region was renewed, but only for aligned stimuli. These experiments show that macaques naturally display the distinguishing characteristics of face processing seen in humans and provide the first clear demonstration that holistic information guides scan paths for conspecific faces.}, title = {Individuation and Holistic Processing of Faces in Rhesus Monkeys} } @unpublished{LogothetisManuscript-LOGIVB, author = {Nikos Logothetis}, abstract = {manganese (Mn2+) enhanced MRI (MEMRI) to study neuronal connectivity in vivo opens the possibility to these studies. However, several drawbacks exist that challenge its applicability. High Mn2+ concentrations produce cytotoxic effects that can perturb the circuits under study. In the other hand, the MR signal is..}, title = {In Vivo Brain Connectivity: Optimization of Manganese Enhanced MRI for Neuronal Tract Tracing} } @article{Ludwig2012-LUDLAH, volume = {48}, number = {1}, author = {David Ludwig}, title = {Language and Human Nature. Kurt Goldstein's Neurolinguistic Foundation of a Holistic Philosophy}, journal = {Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences}, year = {2012}, pages = {40--54} } @article{LymerForthcoming-LYMIIA, author = {Jane Lymer}, abstract = {Talia Welsh (2006) argues that Shaun Gallagher and Andrew Meltzoff's (1996) application of neonatal imitation research is insufficient grounds for their claim that neonates are born with a primitive body image and thus an innate self-awareness. Drawing upon an understanding of the self that is founded upon a ?theory of mind,? Welsh challenges the notion that neonates have the capacity for self-awareness and charges the supposition with an essentialism which threatens to disrupt more social constructionist understandings of the self. In this paper, I initially defend Gallagher and Meltzoff's (1996) application of infant imitation to understandings of neonatal self-awareness by explaining how body image schemas can be understood as non-representational embodied cognitive phenomena that challenge ?theory of mind? theory. I then further develop the claim that neonates are born self-aware with reference to my own work in fetal development. I conclude that Welsh's political concerns are unfounded by showing how the conclusion that a neonate is self-aware does not signal a return to an essentialist understanding of self-awareness, but rather introduces into philosophical and psychological discourse possible alternate understandings of an embodied sense of self that are embedded within intersubjective contexts}, title = {Infant Imitation and the Self---{}A Response to Welsh}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {forthcoming}, pages = {1--23} } @article{Lyons2003-LYOLSS, volume = {39}, number = {1}, author = {Jack C. Lyons}, abstract = {The term \textquoteleft{}module\textquoteright has -- to my ear -- too many associations with Fodor\textquoteright{}s (1983) seminal book, and I will concentrate here on the more general notion of a cognitive system. The latter, as I will understand the term, is -- roughly -- a computational mechanism which can operate independently of all other computational mechanisms (for a much fuller and more precise treatment, see Lyons, 2001). To say that there is a face recognition system, for example, is to say, at least in part, that there is a mechanism which by itself is capable of effecting a transformation from some set of inputs to face identification outputs. If there is one such system, there are likely to be several. Since systems may contain various subsystems, it is generally impossible to specify a system uniquely without specifying a set of inputs. The largest system that would count as a face recognition system would be the one that takes retinal irradiation arrays as inputs and delivers face identifications as outputs, but the last subsystem in this system would map high level representations to face identifications. For any task (where a task is construed as an input/output mapping), take away all cortical regions whose absence does not affect the ability of what is left to perform the task, and you are left with the system that performs that task}, title = {Lesion Studies, Spared Performance, and Cognitive Systems}, journal = {Cortex}, year = {2003}, pages = {145--7} } @article{Lyons2001-LYOCTM, volume = {52}, number = {2}, author = {Jack C. Lyons}, abstract = {The cognitive neuropsychological understanding of a cognitive system is roughly that of a \textquoteleft{}mental organ\textquoteright, which is independent of other systems, specializes in some cognitive task, and exhibits a certain kind of internal cohesiveness. This is all quite vague, and I try to make it more precise. A more precise understanding of cognitive systems will make it possible to articulate in some detail an alternative to the Fodorian doctrine of modularity (since not all cognitive systems are modules), but it will also provide a better understanding of what a module is (since all modules are cognitive systems).}, title = {Carving the Mind at its (Not Necessarily Modular) Joints}, journal = {British Journal for the Philosophy of Science}, year = {2001}, pages = {277--302} } @book{Machamer2001-MACTAM-2, author = {Peter K. Machamer and Peter McLaughlin and Rick Grush}, abstract = {Surveys theories in contemporary neuroscience, exploring many of its methodological techniques and problems.}, title = {Theory and Method in the Neurosciences}, publisher = {University of Pittsburgh Press}, year = {2001} } @unpublished{MartinManuscript-MARTRO-10, author = {Alex Martin}, abstract = {Evidence from functional neuroimaging of the human brain indicates that information about salient properties of an object\textquestiondown{}such as what it looks like, how it moves, and how it is used\textquestiondown{}is stored in sensory and motor systems active when that information was acquired. As a result, object concepts belonging to different categories like animals and tools are represented in partially distinct, sensory- and motor property-based neural networks. This suggests that object concepts are not explicitly represented, but rather emerge from weighted activity within property-based brain regions. However, some property-based regions seem to show a categorical organization, thus providing evidence consistent with category-based, domain-specific formulations as well.Acronyms and DefinitionsBiological motion: motion of animate agents characterized by highly flexible, fully articulated motion vectors, in contrast to the rigid, unarticulated motion vectors associated with most tools.Category-specific disorder: a relatively greater impairment in retrieving information about members of one superordinate object category (e.g., animals) as compared with other categories following brain injury or diseaseIPS: intraparietal sulcusLO: lateral occipital cortexObject concept: memory representations of a class or category of objects. Necessary for numerous cognitive functions including identifying an object as a member of a specific category and drawing inferences about object propertiespMTG: posterior middle temporal gyruspSTS: posterior superior temporal sulcusRepetition suppression: decreased neural response associated with repeated presentation of an identical, or a semantically/conceptually related, stimulusSD: semantic dementiaSemantic memory: a large division of long-term memory containing knowledge about the world including facts, ideas, beliefs, and conceptsSemantic priming: a short-lasting facilitation in processing a stimulus due to the prior presentation of a semantically related stimulusTMS: transcranial magnetic stimulationVPMC: ventral premotor cortex.}, title = {The Representation of Object Concepts in the Brain} } @article{McMonagle2007-MCMFNA, volume = {7}, number = {9}, author = {Ethan McMonagle}, title = {Functional Neuroimaging and the Law: A Canadian Perspective}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2007}, pages = {69--70} } @article{Meegan2008-MEERTO, volume = {8}, number = {1}, author = {Daniel Meegan}, title = {Response to Open Peer Commentaries on "Neuroimaging Techniques for Memory Detection: Scientific, Ethical and Legal Issues"}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2008}, pages = {1--4} } @article{Meegan2008-MEENTF, volume = {8}, number = {1}, author = {Daniel V. Meegan}, abstract = {There is considerable interest in the use of neuroimaging techniques for forensic purposes. Memory detection techniques, including the well-publicized Brain Fingerprinting technique (Brain Fingerprinting Laboratories, Inc., Seattle WA), exploit the fact that the brain responds differently to sensory stimuli to which it has been exposed before. When a stimulus is specifically associated with a crime, the resulting brain activity should differentiate between someone who was present at the crime and someone who was not. This article reviews the scientific literature on three such techniques: priming, old/new, and P300 effects. The forensic potential of these techniques is evaluated based on four criteria: specificity, automaticity, encoding flexibility, and longevity. This article concludes that none of the techniques are devoid of forensic potential, although much research is yet to be done. Ethical issues, including rights to privacy and against self-incrimination, are discussed. A discussion of legal issues concludes that current memory detection techniques do not yet meet United States standards of legal admissibility.}, title = {Neuroimaging Techniques for Memory Detection: Scientific, Ethical, and Legal Issues}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2008}, pages = {9--2013} } @article{Mole2007-MOLFAB, volume = {20}, number = {2}, author = {Christopher Mole and Corey Kubatzky and Jan Plate and Rawdon Waller and Marilee Dobbs and Marc Nardone}, abstract = {The use of brain scanning now dominates the cognitive sciences, but important questions remain to be answered about what, exactly, scanning can tell us. One corner of cognitive science that has been transformed by the use of neuroimaging, and that a scanning enthusiast might point to as proof of scanning's importance, is the study of face perception. Against this view, we argue that the use of scanning has, in fact, told us rather little about the information processing underlying face perception and that it is not likely to tell us much more}, title = {Faces and Brains: The Limitations of Brain Scanning in Cognitive Science}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {2007}, pages = {197--207} } @article{Molnar2001-MOLLVH, volume = {24}, number = {5}, author = {M\'a{}rk Moln\'a{}r}, abstract = {We discuss whether low-dimensional chaos and even nonlinear processes can be traced in the electrical activity of the brain. Experimental data show that the dimensional complexity of the EEG decreases during event-related potentials associated with cognitive effort. This probably represents increased nonlinear cooperation between different neural systems during sensory information processing.}, title = {Low-Dimensional Versus High-Dimensional Chaos in Brain Function -- is It an and/or Issue?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2001}, pages = {823--824} } @incollection{Moreno2012-MORNSB, author = {Jonathan D. Moreno and Sonya Prashar}, booktitle = {I Know What You're Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy}, title = {National Security, Brain Imaging, and Privacy}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2012} } @incollection{Morse2012-MORDCN, author = {Stephen J. Morse}, booktitle = {I Know What You're Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy}, title = {Diminished Capacity, Neuroscience, and Just Punishment}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2012} } @article{Mundale2002-MUNCOL, volume = {3}, number = {3}, author = {Jennifer Mundale}, abstract = {A spate of recent anti-localizationist publications have re-ignited the old debate about the localization of function. Many of the recent attacks on localization, however, are directed at what I will argue to be a narrow and outmoded view of localization, and thus have little conceptual or empirical impact. What I hope to present here is an analysis of functional localization that more adequately reflects the sophistication and complexity of its use in neuroscientific research, both historically and recently. Proceeding first by way of contrast, I examine theanti-localizationist positions of holism andequipotentiationism. Then, I present a four-fold analysis of localization according to physical scope, physical kind, functional scope, and functional kind. Next, I turn to a discussion of the heuristic value oflocalization in deciphering structure-functionrelationships. Finally, I hope to show that the overall view of functional localization that emerges from these considerations constitutes a much more elusive target than its critics assume. It serves to mitigate, and insome instances even defeat, some forms ofanti-localizationist criticisms}, title = {Concepts of Localization: Balkanization in the Brain}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2002}, pages = {313--30} } @incollection{Mundale2001-MUNNFO, author = {Jennifer Mundale}, booktitle = {Philosophy and the Neurosciences: A Reader}, title = {Neuroanatomical Foundations of Cognition: Connecting the Neuronal Level with the Study of Higher Brain Areas}, publisher = {Blackwell}, year = {2001} } @article{Muthukumaraswamy2007-MUTADM, volume = {20}, number = {1}, author = {Suresh D. Muthukumaraswamy and Blake W. Johnson}, abstract = {In this paper a theoretical framework is proposed for how the brain processes the information necessary for us to achieve the understanding of others that we experience in our social worlds. Our framework attempts to expand several previous approaches to more fully account for the various data on interpersonal understanding and to respond to theoretical critiques in this area. Specifically, we propose that social understanding must be achieved by at least two mechanisms in the brain that are capable of parallel information processing. The first mechanism, based on research into mirror matching systems in the brain, suggests that representations of others are mapped onto an observer's representations of these same schemas in order to understand them. The second mechanism requires semantic analysis of a given social situation in order to understand the actions of others and most likely involves conscious processes. We suggest that experimental correlates of these systems should be dissociable using both behavioral and neuroimaging techniques.}, title = {A Dual Mechanism Neural Framework for Social Understanding}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {2007}, pages = {43--63} } @article{Naneix2008-NANTFO, volume = {6}, number = {1-2}, author = {Benjamin Naneix}, abstract = {During the nineteenth century, neuroanatomical knowledge and the clinical practice of treating mental illnesses develop at the same time. Some practitioners of mental medicine try to combine the clinical practice of treating mental diseases with neuroanatomical knowledge using the idea of cerebral localisations. This point of view is advocated by Gall and the field of phrenology. But there is no obvious success of such a localisationist project before Broca and Wernicke\^a€{}s works on aphasia. This discovery will provoke a revival of the desire to localise the cerebral zones involved in mental diseases. However, the cerebral localisation project progressively decreases during the end of the nineteenth century while neurological clinical practice emerges. Moreover, neurological clinical practice aims to localise anatomical lesions through clinical examination. From a philosophy of science point of view, this segment of history brings into question the relation between a scientific object (the cerebral localisation of zones involved in diseases) and a scientific subject (psychiatry and neurology). It stresses how a scientific project can migrate from one subject to another}, title = {The Failure of the \textquotedblleft{}Localisationist Project\textquotedblright in Mental Medicine in Nineteenth Century France and the Emergence of the Neurological Clinic}, publisher = {Springer Berlin / Heidelberg}, journal = {Poiesis and Praxis}, year = {2008}, pages = {57--63} } @article{OBrien1999-OBRPCI, volume = {22}, number = {1}, author = {Gerard O'Brien and Jonathan Opie}, abstract = {The connectionist vehicle theory of phenomenal experience in the target article identifies consciousness with the brain\textquoteright{}s explicit representation of information in the form of stable patterns of neural activity. Commentators raise concerns about both the conceptual and empirical adequacy of this proposal. On the former front they worry about our reliance on vehicles, on representation, on stable patterns of activity, and on our identity claim. On the latter front their concerns range from the general plausibility of a vehicle theory to our specific attempts to deal with the dissociation studies. We address these concerns, and then finish by considering whether the vehicle theory we have defended has a coherent story to tell about the active, unified subject to whom conscious experiences belong}, title = {Putting Content Into a Vehicle Theory of Consciousness}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {175--196} } @article{OMara1997-OMALPD, volume = {20}, number = {4}, author = {Shane M. O'Mara and Sean Commins and Colin Gemmell and John Gigg}, abstract = {Shors \& Matzel's target article is a thought-provoking attempt to reconceptualise long-term potentiation as an attentional or arousal mechanism rather than a memory storage mechanism. This is incompatible with the facts of the neurobiology of attention and of the behavioural neurophysiological properties of hippocampal neurons.}, title = {Long-Term Potentiation: Does It Deserve Attention?}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1997}, pages = {625--626} } @article{OReillyForthcoming-ORECLS, author = {Randall C. O.\textquoteright{}Reilly and Rajan Bhattacharyya and Michael D. Howard and Nicholas Ketz}, abstract = {This paper reviews the fate of the central ideas behind the complementary learning systems (CLS) framework as originally articulated in McClelland, McNaughton, and O\textquoteright{}Reilly (1995). This framework explains why the brain requires two differentially specialized learning and memory systems, and it nicely specifies their central properties (i.e., the hippocampus as a sparse, pattern-separated system for rapidly learning episodic memories, and the neocortex as a distributed, overlapping system for gradually integrating across episodes to extract latent semantic structure). We review the application of the CLS framework to a range of important topics, including the following: the basic neural processes of hippocampal memory encoding and recall, conjunctive encoding, human recognition memory, consolidation of initial hippocampal learning in cortex, dynamic modulation of encoding versus recall, and the synergistic interactions between hippocampus and neocortex. Overall, the CLS framework remains a vital theoretical force in the field, with the empirical data over the past 15 years generally confirming its key principles}, title = {Complementary Learning Systems}, journal = {Cognitive Science}, year = {forthcoming} } @phdthesis{Opie1998-OPICAC, author = {Jonathan Opie}, abstract = {To my father, who got me thinking, and to Tricia, who provided the love, support, and encouragement that enabled me to see this through}, title = {Consciousness: A Connectionist Perspective}, school = {University of Adelaide}, year = {1998} } @article{Opie1999-OPIACT, volume = {22}, author = {Jonathan Opie and Gerard O'Brien}, abstract = {When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches \_vehicle\_ and \_process\_ theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research which purports to show that the explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are \_dissociable\_, and on the other, by the \_classical\_ computational theory of mind -- the theory that takes human cognition to be a species of symbol manipulation. But two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the experimental methodologies employed in the dissociation studies -- so critical, in fact, it\textquoteright{}s no longer reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in cognitive science as it once was. It now has a lively competitor in the form of \_connectionism; \_and connectionism, unlike classicism, does have the computational resources to support a robust vehicle theory of consciousness. In this paper we develop and defend this connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness. It takes the form of the following simple empirical hypothesis: \_phenomenal experience consists in the explicit\_ \_representation of information in neurally realized PDP networks\_..}, title = {A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {1999}, pages = {127--148} } @article{Orden1997-ORDFNF, volume = {64}, number = {S1}, author = {Guy C. Orden and Kenneth R. Paap}, abstract = {The method of positron emission tomography (PET imaging) illustrates the circular logic popular in subtractive neuroimaging and linear reductive cognitive psychology. Both require that strictly feed-forward, modular, cognitive components exist, before the fact, to justify the inference of particular components from images (or other observables) after the fact. Also, both require a "true" componential theory of cognition and laboratory tasks, before the fact, to guarantee reliable choices for subtractive contrasts. None of these possibilities are likely. Consequently, linear reductive analysis has failed to yield general, reliable, componential accounts}, title = {Functional Neuroimages Fail to Discover Pieces of Mind in the Parts of the Brain}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1997}, pages = {85--94} } @article{Ordevann1997-ORDFNF-2, volume = {64}, number = {S1}, author = {Guy C. Ordevann and Kenneth R. Paap}, title = {Functional Neuroimages Fail to Discover Pieces of Mind in the Parts of the Brain}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {1997}, pages = {S85-} } @incollection{Owen2012-OWEWTB, author = {Adrian M. Owen}, booktitle = {I Know What You're Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy}, title = {When Thoughts Become Actions : Neuroimaging in Non-Responsive Patients}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2012} } @article{Platek2002-PLAASF, volume = {25}, number = {5}, author = {Steven M. Platek and Gordon G. Gallup}, abstract = {Aspects of Northoff's argument lend themselves to the ongoing investigation of localizing the self in the brain. Recent data from the fields of neuropsychology and cognitive neuroscience provide evidence that the right hemisphere is a candidate for localization of self. The data on catatonia further that proposition and add insight into the continuing investigation of self in the brain across sensory and motor domains.}, title = {A Self Frozen in Time and Space: Catatonia as a Kinesthetic Analog to Mirrored Self-Misidentification}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2002}, pages = {589--590} } @article{Posner1997-POSBMO, volume = {6}, number = {2-3}, author = {Michael I. Posner and Gregory J. DiGirolamo and Diego Fernandez-Duque}, title = {Brain Mechanisms of Cognitive Skills}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, year = {1997}, pages = {267--290} } @article{Rangel2010-RANTMO-5, volume = {38}, number = {1}, author = {Erica K. Rangel}, title = {The Management of Incidental Findings in Neuro-Imaging Research: Framework and Recommendations}, journal = {Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics}, year = {2010}, pages = {117--126} } @book{Rapp2001-RAPTHO-2, author = {B. Rapp}, abstract = {Indeed, data from impaired performance have often played a central role in our understanding of the skills and abilities of the human mind/brain This volume ...}, title = {The Handbook of Cognitive Neuropsychology: What Deficits Reveal About the Human Mind}, publisher = {Psychology Press/Taylor \& Francis}, year = {2001} } @article{Read2012-REAIMT, volume = {11}, number = {1}, author = {Rupert Read}, abstract = {Iain McGilchrist, The master and his emissary: the divided brain and the making of the Western world (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2010) Content Type Journal Article Category Book Review Pages 119-124 DOI 10.1007/s11097-011-9235-x Authors Rupert Read, University of East Anglia, Norwich, UK Journal Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences Online ISSN 1572-8676 Print ISSN 1568-7759 Journal Volume Volume 11 Journal Issue Volume 11, Number 1}, title = {Iain McGilchrist, The Master and His Emissary: The Divided Brain and the Making of the Western World (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2010)}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, year = {2012}, pages = {119--124} } @article{Rees2001-REENOV, volume = {11}, number = {2}, author = {Geraint Rees}, title = {Neuroimaging of Visual Awareness in Patients and Normal Subjects}, journal = {Current Opinion in Neurobiology}, year = {2001}, pages = {150--156} } @incollection{Rees2012-REEPHB, author = {Geraint Rees and Ryota Kanai}, booktitle = {I Know What You're Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy}, title = {Predicting Human Behaviour From Brain Structure}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2012} } @incollection{Richmond2012-RICBIA, author = {Sarah Richmond}, booktitle = {I Know What You're Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy}, title = {Brain Imaging and the Transparency Scenario}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2012} } @incollection{Richmond2012-RICI-10, author = {Sarah Richmond}, booktitle = {I Know What You're Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy}, title = {Introduction}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2012} } @book{Richmond2012-RICIKW, author = {Sarah Richmond and Geraint Rees and Sarah J. L. Edwards}, abstract = {'I know what you're thinking' is a fascinating exploration into the neuroscientific evidence on 'mind reading'.}, title = {I Know What You're Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2012} } @book{Rolls2007-ROLEE-2, author = {Edmund T. Rolls}, abstract = {What produces emotions? Why do we have emotions? How do we have emotions? Why do emotional states feel like something? This book seeks explanations of emotion by considering these questions. Emotion continues to be a topic of enormous scientific interest. 'Emotion Explained' describes the nature, functions, and brain mechanisms that underlie both emotion and motivation. However it goes beyond examining brain mechanisms of emotion, by proposing a theory of what emotions are, and an evolutionary, Darwinian, theory of the adaptive value of emotion. It also shows that there is a clear relationship between motivation and emotion. The book also examines how cognitive states can modulate emotions, and in turn, how emotions can influence cognitive states. It considers the role of sexual selection in the evolution of affective behaviour. It also examines emotion and decision making, with links to the burgeoning field of neuroeconomics. The book is also unique in considering emotion at several levels - the neurophysiological, neuroimaging, neuropsychological, behavioural, and computational neuroscience levels.}, title = {Emotion Explained}, publisher = {OUP Oxford}, year = {2007} } @incollection{Rosenberger2009-ROSQPA, author = {Robert Rosenberger}, booktitle = {New Waves in Philosophy of Technology}, title = {Quick-Freezing Philosophy: An Analysis of Imaging Technologies in Neurobiology}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, year = {2009} } @unpublished{RoskiesManuscript-ROSVHB, author = {Adina Roskies}, abstract = {Running head: Functional neuroimaging Abstract Several recently developed techniques enable the investigation of the neural basis of cognitive function in the human brain. Two of these, PET and fMRI, yield whole-brain images reflecting regional neural activity associated with the performance of specific tasks. This article explores the spatial and temporal capabilities and limitations of these techniques, and discusses technical, biological, and cognitive issues relevant to understanding the goals and methods of neuroimaging studies. The types of advances in understanding cognitive and brain function made possible with these methods are illustrated with examples from the neuroimaging literature.}, title = {Visualizing Human Brain Function} } @article{Roskies2008-ROSNAI, volume = {1}, number = {1}, author = {Adina L. Roskies}, abstract = {Brain images are used both as scientific evidence and to illustrate the results of neuroimaging experiments. These images are apt to be viewed as photographs of brain activity, and in so viewing them people are prone to assume that they share the evidential characteristics of photographs. Photographs are epistemically compelling, and have a number of characteristics that underlie what I call their inferential proximity. Here I explore the aptness of the photography analogy, and argue that although neuroimaging does bear important similarities to photography, the details of the generation and analysis of neuroimages significantly complicate the relation of the image to the data. Neuroimages are not inferentially proximate, but their seeming so increases the potential for misinterpretation. This suggests caution in appealing to such images in the public domain.}, title = {Neuroimaging and Inferential Distance}, journal = {Neuroethics}, year = {2008} } @article{Roskies2007-ROSANL, volume = {74}, number = {5}, author = {Adina L. Roskies}, abstract = {Images come in many varieties, but for evidential purposes, photographs are privileged. Recent advances in neuroimaging provide us with a new type of image that is used as scientific evidence. Brain images are epistemically compelling, in part because they are liable to be viewed as akin to photographs of brain activity. Here I consider features of photography that underlie the evidential status we accord it, and argue that neuroimaging diverges from photography in ways that seriously undermine the photographic analogy. While neuroimaging remains an important source of scientific evidence, proper interpretation of brain images is much more complex than it appears. \ddag{}This work was supported in part by a grant from the Leslie Humanities Center at Dartmouth College. I thank John Kulvicki for helpful comments, and Kim Sterelny, for making it possible for me to spend some time at the ANU with a grant from the Australian Research Council. \dag{}To contact the author, please write to: Dartmouth College, Department of Philosophy, Hanover, NH 03755; e-mail: adina.roskies@dartmouth.edu.}, title = {Are Neuroimages Like Photographs of the Brain?}, journal = {Philosophy of Science}, year = {2007}, pages = {860--872} } @article{Rubin2012-RUBFTM, volume = {18}, number = {4}, author = {Daniel L. Rubin}, abstract = {Biomedical images and ontologies are closely related conceptually, yet currently they are studied in isolation. Biomedical ontologies provide a representation of the canonical entities considered in biomedical research and clinical observations, and the relations among them. Images reveal instances of those entities and, taken in aggregate, inform the construction of ontologies describing the pertinent domain content revealed in the images. The article by Fielding and Marwede (2011) notes the differences between the ontology of the body and the ontology of the image, developing toward an application of ontology of the psychiatric domain. Although such ontology development is important for knowledge representation ..}, title = {Finding the Meaning in Images: Annotation and Image Markup}, journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology}, year = {2012} } @article{Rypma2001-RYPFNO, volume = {24}, number = {1}, author = {Bart Rypma and John D. E. Gabrieli}, abstract = {Cowan argues that the true short-term memory (STM) capacity limit is about 4 items. Functional neuroimaging data converge with this conclusion, indicating distinct neural activity patterns depending on whether or not memory task-demands exceed this limit. STM for verbal information within that capacity invokes focal prefrontal cortical activation that increases with memory load. STM for verbal information exceeding that capacity invokes widespread prefrontal activation in regions associated with executive and attentional processes that may mediate chunking processes to accommodate STM capacity limits.}, title = {Functional Neuroimaging of Short-Term Memory: The Neural Mechanisms of Mental Storage}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2001}, pages = {143--144} } @article{Schutter2004-SCHITM, volume = {141}, number = {2}, author = {D. Schutter and J. van Honk and Jaak Panksepp}, abstract = {~~{}Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is a method capable of transiently modulating neural excitability. Depending on the stimulation parameters information processing in the brain can be either enhanced or disrupted. This way the contribution of different brain areas involved in mental processes can be studied, allowing a functional decomposition of cognitive behavior both in the temporal and spatial domain, hence providing a functional resolution of brain/mind processes. The aim of the present paper is to argue that TMS with its ability to draw causal inferences on function and its neural representations is a valuable neurophysiological tool for investigating the causal basis of neuronal functions and can provide substantive insight into the modern interdisciplinary and (anti)reductionist neurophilosophical debates concerning the relationships between brain functions and mental abilities. Thus, TMS can serve as a heuristic method for resolving causal issues in an arena where only correlative tools have traditionally been available}, title = {Introducing Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) and its Property of Causal Inference in Investigating Brain-Function Relationships}, journal = {Synthese}, year = {2004}, pages = {155--73} } @article{Schwender1994-SCHACO-11, volume = {3}, number = {2}, author = {Dierk Schwender and Christian Madler and Sven Klasing and Klaus Peter and Ernst P\"o{}ppel}, title = {Anesthetic Control of 40-Hz Brain Activity and Implicit Memory}, journal = {Consciousness and Cognition}, year = {1994}, pages = {129--147} } @book{Shallice2011-SHATOO-4, author = {Tim Shallice and Rick Cooper}, abstract = {Brain imaging has been immensely valuable in showing us how the mind works. However, many of our ideas about how the mind works come from disciplines like experimental psychology, artificial intelligence and linguistics, which in their modern form date back to the computer revolution of the 1940s, and are not strongly linked to the subdisciplines of biomedicine. Cognitive science and neuroscience thus have very separate intellectual roots, and very different styles. Unfortunately, these two areas of knowledge have not been well integrated as far as higher mental processes are concerned. So how can these two be reconciled in order to develop a full understanding of the mind and brain? This is the focus of this landmark book from leaders in the field. Coming more than two decades after Shallice's classic 'From neuropsychology to mental structure', 'The Organisation of Mind' establishes a strong historical, empirical, and theoretical basis for cognitive neuroscience. The book starts by reviewing the history and intellectual roots of the field, looking at some of the researchers who guided and influenced it. The basic principles - theoretical and empirical and the inferential relation between them - are then considered with particular emphasis being placed on inferences to the organisation of the cognitive system from two empirical methodologies - neuropsychology and functional imaging. The core skeleton of the cognitive system is then analysed for the areas most critical for understanding rational thought. In the third section the components of simple cognitive acts are described, namely semantic processing, working memory, and cognitive operations. In the final section, more complex higher-level modulating processes are considered, including, supervisory processing, episodic memory, consciousness and problem-solving. This will be a seminal publication on the interface between the brain sciences and the cognitive sciences and essential reading for all students and researchers in related fields.}, title = {The Organisation of Mind}, publisher = {OUP Oxford}, year = {2011} } @article{Shukla2011-SHUTMS, volume = {4}, number = {3}, author = {Vinay K. Shukla}, title = {Magnetic Resonance Imaging}, journal = {Neuroethics}, year = {2011}, pages = {271--271} } @incollection{Shultz2012-SHUTSB, author = {Susanne Shultz and R. I. M. Dunbar}, booktitle = {I Know What You're Thinking: Brain Imaging and Mental Privacy}, title = {The Social Brain Hypothesis : An Evolutionary Perspective on the Neurobiology of Social Behaviour}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2012} } @incollection{Simons2007-SIMBNA, author = {Daniel J. Simons and Deborah E. Hannula and David E. Warren and Steven W. Day}, booktitle = {The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness}, title = {Behavioral, Neuroimaging, and Neuropsychological Approaches to Implicit Perception}, publisher = {Cambridge}, year = {2007} } @article{SlorsForthcoming-SLONRB, author = {Marc Slors}, abstract = {Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi have recently argued against a simulationist interpretation of neural resonance. Recognizing intentions and emotions in the facial expressions and gestures of others may be subserved by e.g. mirror neuron activity, but this does not mean that we first experience an intention or emotion and then project it onto the other. Mirror neurons subserve social cognition, according to Gallagher and Zahavi, by being integral parts of processes of enactive social perception. I argue that the notion of enactive social perception does not yet explain why social perception is subserved by mirroring. I also argue that this problem cannot be avoided by means of an appeal to multiple realization. Instead, I propose a holistic model of neural resonance-based social cognition that does give an explanatory role to mirroring by allowing for a partial experiential overlap between experiencing and recognizing emotions and intentions. This account avoids the simulationist step-wise conception of social cognition and recognizes the qualitative difference between first- and third-person emotion and intention attribution. It does capture too much of the simulationist intuitions, however, to warrant the label \textquoteleft{}social perception\textquoteright.}, title = {Neural Resonance: Between Implicit Simulation and Social Perception}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, year = {forthcoming} } @article{SprevakForthcoming-SPRCOC, author = {Mark Sprevak}, abstract = {Kanaan and McGuire elegantly describe three challenges facing the use of fMRI to uncover cognitive mechanisms. They shows how these challenges ramify in the case of identifying the mechanisms responsible for psychiatric disorders. In this commentary, I would like to raise another difficulty for fMRI that also appears to ramify in similar cases. This is that there are good reasons for doubting one of the assumptions on which many fMRI studies are based: that neural mechanisms are always and everywhere sufficient for cognition. I suggest that in the case of the mechanisms underlying psychiatric disorders, this assumption should be doubted. I do not dispute that a malfunctioning neural mechanism is likely to be a necessary component of a psychiatric disorder---{}as Kanaan and McGuire say, the experimental evidence from cognitive neuropsychiatry gives us excellent reasons to think that this is so. My question is whether a story only in terms of these neural mechanisms is sufficient to explain the mechanism of a psychiatric disorder. Is the reduction, projected by cognitive neuropsychiatry, of psychiatric disorders to disorders in neural functioning even in principle possible? Drawing on recent concerns about the location of mental states, I argue that such a reduction is likely to fail. Even if the considerable problems raised by Kanaan and McGuire for fMRI could be addressed, we have no reason to think that the mechanisms involved in psychiatric disorders are entirely neural, and that fMRI, or even a perfect science-fiction brain-scanner, would be capable of uncovering them. Psychiatric disorders, like numerous other cognitive processes, are liable to cross the brain--{}world boundary in such a promiscuous way as to be resistant to neural reduction.}, title = {Commentary on 'Conceptual Challenges in the Neuroimaging of Psychiatric Disorders'}, journal = {Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology}, year = {forthcoming} } @unpublished{SprevakManuscript-SPRNSR, author = {Mark Sprevak}, abstract = {Kanaan and McGuire elegantly describe three challenges facing the use of fMRI to uncover cognitive mechanisms. They shows how these challenges ramify in the case of identifying the mechanisms responsible for psychiatric disorders. In this commentary, I would like to raise another di{}culty for fMRI that also appears to ramify in similar cases. This is that there are good reasons for doubting one of the assumptions on which..}, title = {Neural Sufficiency, Reductionism, and Cognitive Neuropsychiatry} } @article{Stinson2009-STISFT, volume = {15}, number = {1}, author = {Catherine Stinson}, abstract = {William James presaged, and Alan Allport voiced criticisms of cause theories of executive attention for involving a homunculus who directs attention. I review discussions of this problem, and argue that existing philosophical denials of the problem depend on equivocations between different senses of \textquotedblleft{}Cartesian error\textquotedblright. Another sort of denial tries to get around the problem by offering empirical evidence that such an executive attention director exists in prefrontal cortex. I argue that the evidence does not warrant the conclusion that an executive director can be localized in prefrontal cortex unless dubious assumptions are made, and that computational models purporting to support these assumptions either beg the question, or fail to model executive attention in terms of cause theories.}, title = {Searching for the Source of Executive Attention}, journal = {PSYCHE}, year = {2009}, pages = {137--154} } @article{Stufflebeam1997-STUPET, volume = {64}, number = {4}, author = {Robert S. Stufflebeam and William P. Bechtel}, abstract = {New research tools such as PET can produce dramatic results. But they can also produce dramatic artifacts. Why is PET to be trusted? We examine both the rationale that justifies interpreting PET as measuring brain activity and the strategies for interpreting PET results functionally. We show that functional ascriptions with PET make important assumptions and depend critically on relating PET results to those secured through other research techniques}, title = {PET: Exploring the Myth and the Method}, journal = {Philsophy of Science}, year = {1997}, pages = {95--106} } @article{Szymanik2007-SZYANO, volume = {45}, number = {9}, author = {Jakub Szymanik}, abstract = {We discuss McMillan et al. (2005) paper devoted to study brain activity during comprehension of sentences with generalized quanti{}ers. According to the authors their results verify a particular computational model of natural language quanti{}er comprehension posited by several linguists and logicians (e. g. see van Benthem, 1986). We challenge this statement by invoking the computational di{}erence between {}rst-order quanti{}ers and divisibility quanti{}ers (e. g. see Mostowski, 1998). Moreover, we suggest other studies on quanti{}er comprehension, which can throw more light on the role of working memory in processing quanti{}ers}, title = {A Note on Some Neuroimaging Study of Natural Language Quantifiers Comprehension}, journal = {Neuropsychologia}, year = {2007}, pages = {2158--2160} } @article{Tovino2007-TOVFNA, volume = {7}, number = {9}, author = {Stacey A. Tovino}, abstract = {Under the umbrella of the burgeoning neurotransdisciplines, scholars are using the principles and research methodologies of their primary and secondary fields to examine developments in neuroimaging, neuromodulation and psychopharmacology. The path for advanced scholarship at the intersection of law and neuroscience may clear if work across the disciplines is collected and reviewed and outstanding and debated issues are identified and clarified. In this article, I organize, examine and refine a narrow class of the burgeoning neurotransdiscipline scholarship; that is, scholarship at the interface of law and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).}, title = {Functional Neuroimaging and the Law: Trends and Directions for Future Scholarship}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2007}, pages = {44--2013} } @book{Trehub1991-TRETCB, author = {Arnold Trehub}, abstract = {This monograph explains in terms of specified neuronal brain mechanisms and systems, how the human brain does its cognitive work. It elucidates functions such as declarative and episodic learning, imagery, spatial representation, object recognition, semantic processing, narrative comprehension, planning, and motivation. Neurophysiological, psychological, and clinical findings are presented in support of the theoretical model, and a variety of computer simulation tests demonstrate its competence. }, title = {The Cognitive Brain}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {1991} } @book{Tucker2007-TUCMFB, author = {Don M. Tucker}, abstract = {The neural structures of the brain exist to construct information. They do this by creating concepts that relate internal, personal need to external, environmental reality. Meaning is formed in the brain by neural network patterns that traverse these two structures of experience: the visceral nervous system (representing personal need) and the somatic nervous system (interfacing with external reality). How exactly does the brain get from constructing information to creating meaning, and what can this process tell us about the nature of experience? This book addresses both of these questions, making an important contribution to both neuroscience and philosophy.}, title = {Mind From Body: Experience From Neural Structure}, publisher = {OUP USA}, year = {2007} } @article{Tucker2000-TUCRBW, volume = {23}, number = {3}, author = {Don M. Tucker}, abstract = {Metaphors, particularly the implicit ones, constrain imagination. If we think of the brain as a collection of centers of cognitive activations, lighting up on demand, then this becomes all we can imagine. By thinking of the cortex as propagating its functional work through physical waves, Nunez offers us a new, rich model for distributed representation. Now let's add real anatomy.}, title = {Real Brain Waves}, journal = {Behavioral and Brain Sciences}, year = {2000}, pages = {412--413} } @article{Uithol2011-HASWDM, volume = {24}, number = {5}, author = {Sebo Uithol and Iris van Rooij and Harold Bekkering and Pim Haselager}, abstract = {Single cell recordings in monkeys provide strong evidence for an important role of the motor system in action understanding. This evidence is backed up by data from studies of the (human) mirror neuron system using neuroimaging or TMS techniques, and behavioral experiments. Although the data acquired from single cell recordings are generally considered to be robust, several debates have shown that the interpretation of these data is far from straightforward. We will show that research based on single-cell recordings allows for unlimited content attribution to mirror neurons. We will argue that a theoretical analysis of the mirroring process, combined with behavioral and brain studies, can provide the necessary limitations. A complexity analysis of the type of processing attributed to the mirror neuron system can help formulate restrictions on what mirroring is and what cognitive functions could, in principle, be explained by a mirror mechanism. We argue that processing at higher levels of abstraction needs assistance of non-mirroring processes to such an extent that subsuming the processes needed to infer goals from actions under the label ?mirroring? is not warranted}, title = {What Do Mirror Neurons Mirror?}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {2011}, pages = {607--623} } @article{Uttal2002-UTTFBM, volume = {3}, number = {3}, author = {William R. Uttal}, title = {Functional Brain Mapping: What is It Good For? Plenty, but Not Everything}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2002}, pages = {375--79} } @article{Uttal2002-UTTFBM-2, volume = {3}, number = {3}, author = {William R. Uttal}, title = {Functional Brain Mapping -- What is It Good For? Plenty, but Not Everything! (Reply to Malcolm J. Avison)}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2002}, pages = {375--379} } @article{Uttal2002-UTTPOT, volume = {3}, number = {2}, author = {William R. Uttal}, title = {Pr\'e{}cis of the New Phrenology: The Limits of Localizing Cognitive Processes in the Brain}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2002}, pages = {221--228} } @article{Uttal2002-UTTRTB, volume = {3}, number = {1}, author = {William R. Uttal}, abstract = {The field of cognitive imaging is explodingboth in terms of the amount of our scientificresources dedicated to it and the associatedpublication rate. However, all of this effortis based on a critical question -- Do cognitivemodules exist? Both of the reviewers of my book(Uttal, 2001) and I agree that this questionhas not yet been satisfactorily answered and,depending on the ultimate answer, the cognitiveimaging approach as well as some other parts ofthe quest for mechanistic models of mind mightnot be successful. Our views of how our scienceshould respond to this serious problem,however, are quite different. Both ProfessorBechtel and Lloyd argue for an optimisticattack on the problem of the localization ofcognitive processes in the brain based on thehistory of other sciences. I argue that arealistic appreciation of the limits of thisapproach should temper the enthusiasm for whatultimately will go the way of other attempts tounravel the mind-brain problem}, title = {Response to Bechtel and Lloyd}, publisher = {Springer Netherlands}, journal = {Brain and Mind}, year = {2002}, pages = {261--273} } @book{Uttal2001-UTTTNP, author = {William R. Uttal}, title = {The New Phrenology: The Limits of Localizing Cognitive Processes in the Brain}, publisher = {MIT Press}, year = {2001} } @book{Vacariu2012-VACCNV, author = {Gabriel Vacariu}, abstract = {From the \textquotedblleft{}epistemologically different worlds\textquotedblright perspective, I analyze the status of cognitive neuroscience today. I investigate the main actual topics in cognitive neuroscience: localization and the brain imaging, the binding problem (Treisman\textquoteright{}s feature integration theory and synchronized oscillations approach), differentiation and integration, optimism versus skepticism approaches, perception and object recognition, space and the mind, crossmodal interactions, and the holistic view against localization. I want to show that these problems are pseudo-problems and this \textquotedblleft{}science\textquotedblright has \textquotedblleft{}No ontology landscape\textquotedblright.}, title = {Cognitive Neuroscience Versus Epistemologically Different Worlds}, publisher = {University of Bucharest Press}, year = {2012} } @book{Vacariu2012-VACCNV-2, author = {Gabriel Vacariu}, abstract = {From the \textquotedblleft{}epistemologically different worlds\textquotedblright perspective, I analyze the status of cognitive neuroscience today. I investigate the main actual topics in cognitive neuroscience: localization and the brain imaging, the binding problem (Treisman\textquoteright{}s feature integration theory and synchronized oscillations approach), differentation and integration, optimism versus skepticism approaches, perception and object recognition, space and the mind, crossmodal interactions, and the holistic view against localization. The conclusion is that this \textquotedblleft{}science\textquotedblright has \textquotedblleft{}No ontology landscape\textquotedblright and, therefore, cognitive neuroscience is a pseudo-science.}, title = {Cognitive Neuroscience Versus Epistemologically Different Worlds}, publisher = {University of Bucharest Press}, year = {2012} } @book{Vacariu2012-VACCNV-3, author = {Gabriel Vacariu}, abstract = {From the \textquotedblleft{}epistemologically different worlds\textquotedblright perspective, I analyze the status of cognitive neuroscience today. I investigate the main actual topics in cognitive neuroscience: localization and the brain imaging, the binding problem (Treisman\textquoteright{}s feature integration theory and synchronized oscillations approach), differentation and integration, optimism versus skepticism approaches, perception and object recognition, space and the mind, crossmodal interactions, and the holistic view against localization. The conclusion is that this \textquotedblleft{}science\textquotedblright has \textquotedblleft{}No ontology landscape\textquotedblright and, therefore, cognitive neuroscience is a pseudo-science.}, title = {Cognitive Neuroscience Versus Epistemologically Different Worlds}, publisher = {Bucharest University Press}, year = {2012} } @article{vanHooff2008-VANNTF, volume = {8}, number = {1}, author = {Johanna C. van Hooff}, abstract = {This Article does not have an abstract}, title = {Neuroimaging Techniques for Memory Detection: Scientific, Ethical, and Legal Issues}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2008}, pages = {25--2013} } @article{vanOrden1997-VANFNF, volume = {64}, number = {4}, author = {G. C. van Orden}, title = {Functional Neuroimages Fail to Discover Pieces of Mind in the Parts of the Brain}, journal = {Philosophy of Science Supplement}, year = {1997}, pages = {85--94} } @article{Verguts2008-VERSAN, volume = {21}, number = {4}, author = {Tom Verguts and Wim Fias}, abstract = {Recent years have witnessed an enormous increase in behavioral and neuroimaging studies of numerical cognition. Particular interest has been devoted toward unraveling properties of the representational medium (mental number line) on which numbers are thought to be represented. We have argued that a correct inference concerning these properties requires distinguishing between different input modalities (symbolic vs. nonsymbolic stimuli; e.g., Verguts \& $<$span class='Hi'$>$Fias$<$/span$>$, 2004) and different decision/output structures (task requirements; e.g., parity judgment task versus magnitude comparison task; Verguts, $<$span class='Hi'$>$Fias$<$/span$>$, \& Stevens, 2005). To back up this claim, we have trained computational (neural network) models with either symbolic or nonsymbolic input and with different task requirements, and showed that this allowed for an integration of the existing data in a consistent manner. In later studies, predictions from the models were derived and tested with behavioral and neuroimaging methods. Here we present an integrative review of this work.}, title = {Symbolic and Nonsymbolic Pathways of Number Processing}, journal = {Philosophical Psychology}, year = {2008}, pages = {539--2013} } @article{Viens2007-VIETUO, volume = {7}, number = {9}, author = {A. M. Viens}, title = {The Use of Functional Neuroimaging Technology in the Assessment of Loss and Damages in Tort Law}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2007}, pages = {63--65} } @article{Vincent2009-VINNAR, volume = {4}, number = {1}, author = {Nicole A. Vincent}, abstract = {Could neuroimaging evidence help us to assess the degree of a person\textquoteright{}s responsibility for a crime which we know that they committed? This essay defends an affirmative answer to this question. A range of standard objections to this high-tech approach to assessing people\textquoteright{}s responsibility is considered and then set aside, but I also bring to light and then reject a novel objection---{}an objection which is only encountered when functional (rather than structural) neuroimaging is used to assess people\textquoteright{}s responsibility.}, title = {Neuroimaging and Responsibility Assessments}, journal = {Neuroethics}, year = {2009}, pages = {35--49} } @article{Weed2008-WEELFB, volume = {45}, number = {1}, author = {Ethan Weed}, abstract = {The emerging research area of neuroaesthetics has provoked a good deal of discussion. Although it seems reasonable to describe the experience of aesthetic enjoyment as a mental event, and it also seems reasonable to claim that mental states must be related to brain states, the search for specific brain states that correlate with aesthetic enjoyment is tricky, despite the many recent advances in brain-imaging technology. Correlating the aesthetic experience with specific brain states involves defining the aesthetic experience. By applying a model from the world of empirical consciousness research to three neuroaesthetic experiments, I show that each of these studies approaches the object of study, the aesthetic experience, from a different perspective. By employing a framework to make explicit the sometimes implicit assumptions involved in neuroaesthetic research, I hope to open a new avenue for the continuation of an already fascinating discussion.}, title = {Looking for Beauty in the Brain}, journal = {Estetika}, year = {2008} } @article{Wilkinson2009-WILFNA, volume = {35}, number = {8}, author = {D. J. Wilkinson and G. Kahane and M. Horne and J. Savulescu}, title = {Functional Neuroimaging and Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment From Vegetative Patients}, journal = {Journal of Medical Ethics}, year = {2009}, pages = {508--511} } @article{Wu2008-WUSIN, volume = {8}, number = {9}, author = {Kevin Chien-Chang Wu}, title = {Soul-Making in Neuroimaging?}, journal = {American Journal of Bioethics}, year = {2008}, pages = {21--2013} } @article{WuForthcoming-WUBIT, author = {Wayne Wu}, abstract = {This is a comment on Peter Carruthers' "On Central Cognition", both originally presented at the 2011 Oberlin Colloquium in Philosophy. The comment discusses working memory, attention and the global workspace, and empirical evidence from neuroscience that Carruthers' adduces to argue for the claim that central cognition is sensory based because only sensory systems have direct access to working memory and the global workspace. I raise some questions about the empirical evidence for this claim.}, title = {Being in the Workspace, From a Neural Point of View}, journal = {Philosophical Studies}, year = {forthcoming} } @article{Zaidel1999-ZAINCR, volume = {22}, number = {5}, author = {Dahlia W. Zaidel}, abstract = {When circumscribed brain regions are damaged in humans, highly specific iimpairments in language, memory, problem solving, and cognition are observed. Neurosurgery such as "split brain" or hemispherectomy, for example has shown that encompassing regions, the left and right cerebral hemispheres each control human behavior in unique ways. Observations stretching over 100 years of patients with unilateral focal brain damage have revealed, withouth the theoretical benefits of "cognitive neuroscience" or "cognitive psychology," that human behavior is indeed controlled by the brain and its neurons.}, title = {Neuronal Connectivity, Regional Differentiation, and Brain Damage in Humans}, year = {1999}, pages = {854--855} } @incollection{Zawidski2004-ZAWGLR, author = {Tadeusz Zawidski and William P. Bechtel}, booktitle = {Mind As a Scientific Object}, title = {Gall's Legacy Revisited: Decomposition and Localization in Cognitive Neuroscience}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {2004} } @article{Zielasek2008-ZIEMIP, volume = {6}, number = {1-2}, author = {J\"u{}rgen Zielasek and Wolfgang Gaebel}, abstract = {The neurosciences are generating new findings regarding genetic and neurobiological aspects of the pathophysiology of mental disorders. Especially, certain genetic risk factors like neuregulin-1 seem to predispose individuals to a psychotic phenotype beyond the limits of traditional classificatory boundaries between organic psychoses in Alzheimer\^a€{}s disease, bipolar affective disorder and schizophrenia. Little, however, is known about how such genetic risk factors actually confer an increased risk for psychosis in an individual patient. A gap between neuroscientific findings and psychopathological phenomena exists. The main hypothesis how this gap may be bridged is that mental disorders arise as a consequence of dysfunctions of normal mental functions. Modularity may provide a useful conceptual framework in that temporally and/or spatially stable neural circuits subserve certain physiological functions of the human brain, which become the target of pathophysiological effectors. The idea of a modular construction of the human brain is based on neurobiological evidence regarding the columnar architecture of the cerebral cortex, which provides certain elementary analytical functions. Modular dysfunctions may be assessed with methods of experimental psychopathology, in which subsystems of brain functions are tested with standardized experimental psychological techniques (functional psychopathology). The main questions here are how to define a module, and whether the classical neuroscientific definitions can be used to characterize higher integrative functions of the human brain}, title = {Modularity in Philosophy, the Neurosciences, and Psychiatry}, publisher = {Springer Berlin / Heidelberg}, journal = {Poiesis and Praxis}, year = {2008}, pages = {93--108} }