@incollection{Andrade2011-ANDI-5, author = {Gabriel Andrade}, booktitle = {Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, abstract = {Immortality is the indefinite continuation of a person\textquoteright{}s existence, even after death. In common parlance, immortality is virtually indistinguishable from afterlife, but philosophically speaking, they are not identical. Afterlife is the continuation of existence after death, regardless of whether or not that continuation is indefinite. Immortality implies a never-ending existence, regardless of whether or not the body dies (as a matter of fact, some hypothetical medical technologies offer the prospect of a bodily immortality, but not an afterlife). Immortality has been one of mankind\textquoteright{}s major concerns, and even though it has been traditionally mainly confined to religious traditions, it is also important to philosophy. Although a wide variety of cultures have believed in some sort of immortality, such beliefs may be reduced to basically three non-exclusive models: (1) the survival of the astral body resembling the physical body; (2) the immortality of the immaterial soul (that is an incorporeal existence); (3) resurrection of the body (or re-embodiment, in case the resurrected person does not keep the same body as at the moment of death). This article examines philosophical arguments for and against the prospect of immortality. A substantial part of the discussion on immortality touches upon the fundamental question in the philosophy of mind: do souls exist? Dualists believe souls do exist and survive the death of the body; materialists believe mental activity is nothing but cerebral activity and thus death brings the total end of a person\textquoteright{}s existence. However, some immortalists believe that, even if immortal souls do not exist, immortality may still be achieved through resurrection. Discussions on immortality are also intimately related to discussions of personal identity because any account of immortality must address how the dead person could be identical to the original person that once lived. Traditionally, philosophers have considered three main criteria for personal identity: the soul criterion , the body criterion and the psychological criterion. Although empirical science has little to offer here, the field of parapsychology has attempted to offer empirical evidence in favor of an afterlife. More recently, secular futurists envision technologies that may suspend death indefinitely (such as Strategies for Engineered Negligible Senescence, and mind uploading), thus offering a prospect for a sort of bodily immortality. }, title = {Immortality}, year = {2011} } @article{Baker2007-BAKPAT-3, volume = {43}, number = {3}, author = {Lynne Rudder Baker}, abstract = {Theories of the human person differ greatly in their ability to underwrite a metaphysics of resurrection. This paper compares and contrasts a number of such views in light of the Christian doctrine of resurrection. In a Christian framework, resurrection requires that the same person who exists on earth also exists in an afterlife, that a postmortem person be embodied, and that the existence of a postmortem person is brought about by a miracle. According to my view of persons (the Constitution View), a human person is constituted by---{}but not identical to---{}a human organism. A person has a first-person perspective essentially, and an organism has interrelated biological functions essentially. I shall argue for the superiority the Constitution View as a metaphysical basis for resurrection}, title = {Persons and the Metaphysics of Resurrection}, journal = {Religious Studies}, year = {2007}, pages = {333--348} } @book{BradleyForthcoming-BRATOH-3, author = {Ben Bradley and Jens Johansson and Fred Feldman}, title = {The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Death}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, year = {forthcoming} } @article{Brill2009-BRITGO-2, volume = {49}, number = {1}, author = {Sara Brill}, abstract = {Plato\textquoteright{}s use of afterlife myths is often viewed as an abandonment of rational discourse for a coercive practice designed to persuade citizens to be concerned about the condition of their souls by appealing to their worst fears about the afterlife. But such interpretations overlook the frequently critical tenor of Plato\textquoteright{}s myths. In this paper I develop the claim that Plato appeals to muthos as a means of critiquing various specific logoi by focusing upon the relationship between the myth of the earth in the Phaedo and the four logoi about immortality that precede it. I argue that these logoi fail to be persuasive because they rely upon a construal of the relationship between body and soul that denies them meaningful reference to the lives and deaths of embodied beings. The myth of the earth provides a critical engagement with the perspective from which Socrates and his interlocutors have produced these logoi}, title = {The Geography of Finitude}, journal = {International Philosophical Quarterly}, year = {2009}, pages = {5--23} } @article{Buckareff2010-BUCSR, volume = {67}, number = {3}, author = {Andrei A. Buckareff and Joel S. Van Wagenen}, abstract = {In this paper we examine and critique the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection developed and defended by Lynne Rudder Baker. Baker identifies three conditions for an adequate metaphysics of resurrection. We argue that one of these, the identity condition, cannot be met on the constitution view given the account of personal identity it assumes. We discuss some problems with the constitution theory of personal identity Baker develops in her book, Persons and Bodies . We argue that these problems render the constitution theory of personal identity as stated by Baker untenable. The upshot for the debate over the metaphysics of resurrection is that the constitution view of the metaphysics of resurrection must either be rejected or modified.}, title = {Surviving Resurrection}, journal = {International Journal for Philosophy of Religion}, year = {2010}, pages = {123--139} } @incollection{Corcoran2001-CORPPA, author = {Kevin J. Corcoran}, booktitle = {Soul, Body, and Survival}, title = {Physical Persons and Postmortem Survival Without Temporal Gaps}, publisher = {Ithaca: Cornell University Press}, year = {2001} } @article{Dyck2010-DYCTAA, volume = {2}, author = {Corey W. Dyck}, abstract = {In this paper, I challenge the assumption that Kant\textquoteright{}s Third Paralogism has to do, first and foremost, with the question of personal identity.}, title = {The Aeneas Argument: Personality and Immortality in Kant's Third Paralogism}, journal = {Kant Yearbook}, year = {2010}, pages = {95--122} } @article{Fischer2005-JOHFWD, volume = {34}, number = {3}, author = {John Martin Fischer}, abstract = {Abstract In this paper I explore in a preliminary way the interconnections among narrative explanation, narrative value, free will, an immortality. I build on the fascinating an suggestive work of David Velleman. I offer the hypothesis that our acting freely is what gives our lives a istinctive kin of value?narrative value. Free Will, then, is connected to the capacity to lead a meaningful life in a quite specific way: it is the ingredient which, when aded to others, enows us with a meaning over an above the cumulative value erived from ading together levels of momentary welfare. In acting freely, we are writing a sentence in the story of our lives, and the value of acting freely is thus a species of the value of artistic creativity or self-expression (understood appropriately). Finally, I contend that the fact that our lives are stories need not entail that they have endings, or that immortality would necessarily be unimaginable or essentially different from ordinary, finite human life. Yes, a certain sort of narrative understanding of our lives as a whole would be impossible in the context of immortality; but much of what we care about, and value, in our stories might remain}, title = {Free Will, Death, and Immortality: The Role of Narrative}, journal = {Philosophical Papers}, year = {2005}, pages = {379--403} } @book{Forstrom2010-FORJLA, author = {Joanna K. Forstrom}, abstract = {Introduction -- John Locke and the problem of personal identity : the principium individuationis, personal immortality, and bodily resurrection -- On separation and immortality : Descartes and the nature of the soul -- On materialism and immortality or Hobbes' rejection of the natural argument for the immortality of the soul -- Henry More and John Locke on the dangers of materialism : immateriality, immortality, immorality, and identity -- Robert Boyle : on seeds, cannibalism, and the resurrection of the body -- Locke's theory of personal identity in its context : a reassessment of classic objections.}, title = {John Locke and Personal Identity: Immortality and Bodily Resurrection in 17th-Century Philosophy}, publisher = {Continuum}, year = {2010} } @incollection{Hasker2010-HASA, author = {WIlliam Hasker}, booktitle = {The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy}, abstract = {Human beings, like all other organic creatures, die and their bodies decay. Nevertheless, there is a widespread and long-standing belief that in some way death is survivable, that there is \textquotedblleft{}life after death.\textquotedblright The focus in this article is on the possibility that the individual who dies will somehow continue to live, or will resume life at a later time, and not on the specific forms such an afterlife might take. We begin by considering the logical possibility of survival, given different metaphysical views concerning the nature of the mind/soul, and then move on to consider possible arguments for and against the belief in survival.}, title = {Afterlife}, year = {2010} } @article{Langley2001-LANARA, volume = {75}, author = {Silas Langley}, abstract = {Aquinas\textquoteright{}s understanding of bodily resurrection can take two different directions. Either continuity of the soul alone is sufficient to reconstitute the same body as the pre-mortem body at the resurrection, or continuity of the matter of the pre-mortem body is also required. After arguing that Aquinas\textquoteright{}s account of personal identity over time requires sameness of soul and sameness of body, I suggest that Aquinas\textquoteright{}s two possible views on bodily resurrection are consistent with this account of personal identity and are both plausible views for Aquinas to take. I then defend the possibility of the view that requires material continuity against certain objections which come from within Aquinas\textquoteright{}s own philosophies of form, matter, and the elements. But the result is that Aquinas cannot consistently hold that material continuity hinges on the preservation of numerically the same material elements as the pre-mortem body}, title = {Aquinas, Resurrection, and Material Continuity}, journal = {Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association}, year = {2001}, pages = {135--147} } @book{Lewis1978-LEWPAL, author = {Hywel David Lewis}, abstract = {Realism and metaphysics.--Ultimates and a way of looking.--Religion and the paranormal.--Quinton, A., Lewis, H. D., Williams, B. Life after death.--Lewis, H. D., Flew, A. Survival.--Shoemaker, S., Lewis, H. D. Immortality and dualism.--The belief in life after death.--The person of Christ.}, title = {Persons and Life After Death: Essays}, publisher = {Barnes \& Noble}, year = {1978} } @article{Oaklander2001-OAKPII, volume = {4}, number = {2}, author = {L. Nathan Oaklander}, abstract = {The soul has played many different roles in philosophy and religion. Two of the primary functions of the soul are the bearer of personal identity and the foundation of immortality. In this paper I shall consider different interpretations of what the soul has been taken to be and argue that however we interpret the soul we cannot consistently maintain the soul is both what we are and what continues after our bodily death}, title = {Personal Identity, Immortality, and the Soul}, journal = {Philo}, year = {2001}, pages = {185--194} } @article{Ruetenik2006-RUEDAC, volume = {42}, number = {3}, author = {Tadd Ruetenik}, abstract = {: William James' investigation of religious experience neglected consideration of immortality. This was likely because, as James saw it, belief in personal immortality often engenders what can be called spiritual provincialism. In Human Immortality: Two Supposed Objections to the Doctrine (1897/1979), James brings up the phenomenon of psychological overload that occurs when an individual considers the immense numbers of humans who would inhabit Heaven if spiritual merit were determined democratically. Consideration of James' example shows the beginnings of his pragmatic notion of immortality, one that is influenced by the religious philosophy of Henry James, Sr., and which focuses on the undeniable connections among people on earth rather than the immutable persistence of individual souls in Heaven. Those who have considered the implications of James' notion of immortality as it relates to the notion of worldly embeddedness include French writer Romain Rolland, who, inspired in part by the work of James, advocates a socialistic religious philosophy. With reference to Rolland and the elder James, as well as contemporary Christian pragmatist Cornel West, James' view can be more clearly understood.}, title = {Does a 'Cosmic Consciousness' Exist? Immortality and Ethics in James' Religious Pragmatism}, journal = {Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society}, year = {2006}, pages = {417--430} } @unpublished{Schmutz2012-SCHPIP-4, author = {Catherine J. Schmutz}, abstract = {In this thesis, I argue that in order to coherently hold a belief about what happens to people when they die, one's theory of personal identity must be carefully chosen. I examine belief in immortality of the soul, annihilation of the person, and resurrection of the body. I maintain that for each view, at least one theory of personal identity conflicts with that view and, therefore, cannot be consistently held with that view. I argue that a psychological-continuity theory of personal identity is consistent with each of these beliefs about death. Some, but not all, physical-continuity theories of personal identity are consistent with annihilation of the person. I further argue that even on a psychological-continuity theory of personal identity, the soul's immortality is questionable. In light of the conditions that are necessary for a soul to be a person, we should not expect such a soul to be immortal (even if it outlives the body for some time). I also argue that resurrection of the body on a materialist's model is more parsimonious than resurrection on a dualist's model}, title = {Personal Identity Postmortem}, year = {2012} } @incollection{Shoemaker1976-SHOIAD, author = {Sydney Shoemaker}, booktitle = {Reason and Religion}, title = {Immortality and Dualism}, year = {1976} } @article{Zimmerman1999-ZIMTCO-4, volume = {16}, number = {2}, author = {Dean W. Zimmerman}, abstract = {It is not easy to be a materialist and yet believe that there is a way for human beings to survive death. Peter van Inwagen identifies the central obstacle the materialist faces: Namely, the need to posit appropriate \textquotedblleft{}immanent-causal\textquotedblright connections between my body as it is at death and some living body elsewhere or elsewhen. I offer a proposal, consistent with van Inwagen\textquoteright{}s own materialist metaphysics, for making materialism compatible with the possibility of survival}, title = {The Compatibility of Materialism and Survival}, journal = {Faith and Philosophy}, year = {1999}, pages = {194--212} }