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  1. Theodore Bach (2012). Analogical Cognition: Applications in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Mind and Language. Philosophy Compass 7 (5):348-360.
    Analogical cognition refers to the ability to detect, process, and learn from relational similarities. The study of analogical and similarity cognition is widely considered one of the ‘success stories’ of cognitive science, exhibiting convergence across many disciplines on foundational questions. Given the centrality of analogy to mind and knowledge, it would benefit philosophers investigating topics in epistemology and the philosophies of mind and language to become familiar with empirical models of analogical cognition. The goal of this essay is to describe (...)
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  2. Alex Barber (1999). Individuals, Properties, and the Explicitness Hierarchy. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):756-757.
    The scenario used by Dienes & Perner to show that individual representation can be implicit when property representation is explicit can be adapted to show that property representation can be implicit when individual representation is explicit. So there is no hierarchy of explicitness, contrary to their claim. There is a reading of the “implicit/explicit” distinction that does appear to exhibit an asymmetry parallel to that alleged to hold between individual and property. But this is not a distinction Dienes & Perner (...)
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  3. William Bechtel (2009). Explanation: Mechanism, Modularity, and Situated Cognition. In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge. 155--170.
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  4. Istvan S. Berkeley (2008). What the <0.70, 1.17, 0.99, 1.07> is a Symbol? Minds and Machines 18 (1):93-105.
    The notion of a ‘symbol’ plays an important role in the disciplines of Philosophy, Psychology, Computer Science, and Cognitive Science. However, there is comparatively little agreement on how this notion is to be understood, either between disciplines, or even within particular disciplines. This paper does not attempt to defend some putatively ‘correct’ version of the concept of a ‘symbol.’ Rather, some terminological conventions are suggested, some constraints are proposed and a taxonomy of the kinds of issue that give rise to (...)
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  5. Myles Brand (ed.) (1986). The Representation Of Knowledge And Belief. Tucson: University Of Arizona Press.
  6. Richard A. Carlson (1999). Implicit Representation, Mental States, and Mental Processes. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):761-762.
    Dienes & Perner's target article constitutes a significant advance in thinking about implicit knowledge. However, it largely neglects processing details and thus the time scale of mental states realizing propositional attitudes. Considering real-time processing raises questions about the possible brevity of implicit representation, the nature of processes that generate explicit knowledge, and the points of view from which knowledge may be represented. Understanding the propositional attitude analysis in terms of momentary mental states points the way toward answering these questions.
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  7. Andrew Carstairs-McCarthy (1999). Explicitness and Predication: A Risky Linkage. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):762-763.
  8. Andy Clark (1991). In Defense of Explicit Rules. In William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. Rumelhart (eds.), Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum.
  9. Robert C. Cummins (1986). Inexplicit Information. In Myles Brand & Robert M. Harnish (eds.), The Representation of Knowledge and Belief. University of Arizona Press.
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  10. Eddy J. Davelaar (2011). Processes Versus Representations: Cognitive Control as Emergent, Yet Componential. Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):247-252.
    In this commentary, I focus on the difference between processes and representations and how this distinction relates to the question of what is controlled. Despite some views that task switching is a prototypical control process, the analysis concludes that task switching depends on the task goal representation and that control processes are there to prevent goal representations from disintegrating. Over time, these processes become obsolete, leaving behind a representation that automatically controls task performance. The distinction between processes and representations relates (...)
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  11. Martin Davies (1995). Two Notions of Implicit Rules. Philosophical Perspectives 9:153-83.
  12. Daniel C. Dennett (1993). Review of F. Varela, E. Thompson and E. Rosch, The Embodied Mind. [REVIEW] American Journal of Psychology 106:121-126.
    Cognitive science, as an interdisciplinary school of thought, may have recently moved beyond the bandwagon stage onto the throne of orthodoxy, but it does not make a favorable first impression on many people. Familiar reactions on first encounters range from revulsion to condescending dismissal--very few faces in the crowd light up with the sense of "Aha! So that's how the mind works! Of course!" Cognitive science leaves something out, it seems; moreover, what it apparently leaves out is important, even precious. (...)
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  13. Joseph S. Fulda (1993). Computer-Generated Art, Music, and Literature: Philosophical Conundrums. SIGART Bulletin 4 (1):6-7.
    Considers the question of the authorship of the works in the title from a /philosophical/, as opposed to legal, standpoint, using the sense-reference dichotomy, intension-extension dichotomy, and procedural knowledge-declarative knowledge dichotomy. Reaches no conclusion.
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  14. Joseph S. Fulda (1988). The Logic of Expert Judging Systems and the Rights of the Accused. AI and Society 2 (3):266-269.
    Deals with the problem of enthymemes in expert systems designed to model legal reasoning; suggests that interactivity is crucial.
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  15. Stephen Gaukroger, John Andrew Schuster & John Sutton (eds.) (2000). Descartes' Natural Philosophy. Routledge.
    Possibly the most comprehensive collection of essays on Descartes' scientific writings ever published, this volume offers a detailed reassessment of his scientific work and its bearing on his philosophy. The 35 essays, written by some of the world's leading scholars, cover topics as diverse as optics, cosmology and medicine. The collection looks at Descartes' work in the sciences as an aspect of his natural-philosophical agenda and discusses: the central place of medicine in Descartes' overall project; the connections between his investigations (...)
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  16. Robert F. Hadley (1995). The 'Explicit-Implicit' Distinction. Minds and Machines 5 (2):219-42.
    Much of traditional AI exemplifies the explicit representation paradigm, and during the late 1980''s a heated debate arose between the classical and connectionist camps as to whether beliefs and rules receive an explicit or implicit representation in human cognition. In a recent paper, Kirsh (1990) questions the coherence of the fundamental distinction underlying this debate. He argues that our basic intuitions concerning explicit and implicit representations are not only confused but inconsistent. Ultimately, Kirsh proposes a new formulation of the distinction, (...)
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  17. Robert F. Hadley (1993). Connectionism, Explicit Rules, and Symbolic Manipulation. Minds and Machines 3 (2):183-200.
    At present, the prevailing Connectionist methodology forrepresenting rules is toimplicitly embody rules in neurally-wired networks. That is, the methodology adopts the stance that rules must either be hard-wired or trained into neural structures, rather than represented via explicit symbolic structures. Even recent attempts to implementproduction systems within connectionist networks have assumed that condition-action rules (or rule schema) are to be embodied in thestructure of individual networks. Such networks must be grown or trained over a significant span of time. However, arguments (...)
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  18. Robert F. Hadley (1990). Connectionism, Rule-Following, and Symbolic Manipulation. Proc AAAI 3 (2):183-200.
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  19. Philip P. Hanson (ed.) (1990). Information, Language and Cognition. University of British Columbia Press.
  20. David Kirsh (2003). Implicit and Explicit Representation. In L. Nadel (ed.), Implicit and Explicit Representation. Nature Publishing Group.
    The degree to which information is encoded explicitly in a representation is related to the computational cost of recovering or using the information. Knowledge that is implicit in a system need not be represented at all, even implicitly, if the cost of recovering it is prohibitive.
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  21. David Kirsh (2003). Implicit and Explicit Representation. Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science 2:478–481.
    The degree to which information is encoded explicitly in a representation is related to the computational cost of recovering or using the information. Knowledge that is implicit in a system need not be represented at all, even implicitly, if the cost of recurring it is prohibitive.
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  22. David Kirsh (1990). When is Information Explicitly Represented? In Philip P. Hanson (ed.), Information, Language and Cognition. University of British Columbia Press.
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  23. R. P. Loui & Jeff Norman (1995). Rationales and Argument Moves. Artificial Intelligence and Law 3 (3):159-189.
    We discuss five kinds of representations of rationales and provide a formal account of how they can alter disputation. The formal model of disputation is derived from recent work in argument. The five kinds of rationales are compilation rationales, which can be represented without assuming domain-knowledge (such as utilities) beyond that normally required for argument. The principal thesis is that such rationales can be analyzed in a framework of argument not too different from what AI already has. The result is (...)
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  24. Fernando Martínez & Jesús Ezquerro Martínez (1998). Explicitness with Psychological Ground. Minds and Machines 8 (3):353-374.
    Explicitness has usually been approached from two points of view, labelled by Kirsh the structural and the process view, that hold opposite assumptions to determine when information is explicit. In this paper, we offer an intermediate view that retains intuitions from both of them. We establish three conditions for explicit information that preserve a structural requirement, and a notion of explicitness as a continuous dimension. A problem with the former accounts was their disconnection with psychological work on the issue. We (...)
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  25. Christopher Menzel, Basic Semantic Integration. Semantic Interoperability and Integration, Proceedings of Dagstuhl Seminar 04391.
    The use of highly abstract mathematical frameworks is essential for building the sort of theoretical foundation for semantic integration needed to bring it to the level of a genuine engineering discipline. At the same time, much of the work that has been done by means of these frameworks assumes a certain amount of background knowledge in mathematics that a lot of people working in ontology, even at a fairly high theoretical level, lack. The major purpose of this short paper is (...)
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  26. Hugo Mercier (2012). The Social Functions of Explicit Coherence Evaluation. Mind and Society 11 (1):81-92.
    Coherence plays an important role in psychology. In this article, I suggest that coherence takes two main forms in humans’ cognitive system. The first belong to ‘system 1’. It relies on the degree of coherence between different representations to regulate them, without coherence being represented. By contrast other mechanisms, belonging to system 2, allow humans to represent the degree of coherence between different representations and to draw inferences from it. It is suggested that the mechanisms of explicit coherence evaluation have (...)
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  27. Josef Perner & Zoltan Dienes (1999). Deconstructing RTK: How to Explicate a Theory of Implicit Knowledge. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):790-801.
    In this response, we start from first principles, building up our theory to show more precisely what assumptions we do and do not make about the representational nature of implicit and explicit knowledge (in contrast to the target article, where we started our exposition with a description of a fully fledged representational theory of knowledge (RTK). Along the way, we indicate how our analysis does not rely on linguistic representations but it implies that implicit knowledge is causally efficacious; we discuss (...)
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  28. William Ramsey, Stephen P. Stich & D. M. Rumelhart (eds.) (1991). Philosophy and Connectionist Theory. Lawrence Erlbaum.
    The philosophy of cognitive science has recently become one of the most exciting and fastest growing domains of philosophical inquiry and analysis. Until the early 1980s, nearly all of the models developed treated cognitive processes -- like problem solving, language comprehension, memory, and higher visual processing -- as rule-governed symbol manipulation. However, this situation has changed dramatically over the last half dozen years. In that period there has been an enormous shift of attention toward connectionist models of cognition that are (...)
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  29. Lawrence A. Shapiro, The Embodied Cognition Research Program.
    Unifying traditional cognitive science is the idea that thinking is a process of symbol manipulation, where symbols lead both a syntactic and a semantic life. The syntax of a symbol comprises those properties in virtue of which the symbol undergoes rule-dictated transformations. The semantics of a symbol constitute the symbolsÕ meaning or representational content. Thought consists in the syntactically determined manipulation of symbols, but in a way that respects their semantics. Thus, for instance, a calculating computer sensitive only to the (...)
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  30. Susanna Siegel (forthcoming). Rational Evaluability and Perceptual Farce. In A. Raftopoulos (ed.), Cognitive Effects on Perception: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford.
  31. Paul G. Skokowski (1994). Can Computers Carry Content "Inexplicitly&Quot;? Minds and Machines 4 (3):333-44.
    I examine whether it is possible for content relevant to a computer''s behavior to be carried without an explicit internal representation. I consider three approaches. First, an example of a chess playing computer carrying emergent content is offered from Dennett. Next I examine Cummins response to this example. Cummins says Dennett''s computer executes a rule which is inexplicitly represented. Cummins describes a process wherein a computer interprets explicit rules in its program, implements them to form a chess-playing device, then this (...)
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  32. Peter Slezak (1999). Situated Cognition. Perspectives on Cognitive Science.
    The self-advertising, at least, suggests that 'situated cognition' involves the most fundamental conceptual re-organization in AI and cognitive science, even appearing to deny that cognition is to be explained by mental representations. In their defence of the orthodox symbolic representational theory, A. Vera and H. Simon (1993) have rebutted many of these claims, but they overlook an important reading of situated arguments which may, after all, involve a revolutionary insight. I show that the whole debate turns on puzzles familiar (...)
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  33. David G. Stern (2000). Practices, Practical Holism, and Background Practices. In Mark Wrathall & Jeff Malpas (eds.), Heidegger, Coping, and Cognitive Science: Essays in Honor of Hubert L. Dreyfus, Volume 2. MIT Press.
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  34. Ron Sun & Xi Zhang, Accessibility Versus Action-Centeredness in the Representation of Cognitive Skills.
    We believe that the distinction between procedural and declarative knowledge unnecessarily confounds two issues: action-centeredness and accessibility, and can be made clearer through separating the two aspects. The work presents an integrated model of skill learning that takes into account both implicit and explicit processes and both action-centered and non-action-centered knowledge. We examine and simulate human data in the Letter Counting task. The work shows how the data may be captured using either the action-centered knowledge alone or the combined action-centered (...)
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  35. John Sutton (2000). The Body and the Brain. In S. Gaukroger, J. Schuster & J. Sutton (eds.), Descartes' Natural Philosophy. Routledge. 697--722.
    Does self?knowledge help? A rationalist, presumably, thinks that it does: both that self?knowledge is possible and that, if gained through appropriate channels, it is desirable. Descartes notoriously claimed that, with appropriate methods of enquiry, each of his readers could become an expert on herself or himself. As well as the direct, first?person knowledge of self to which we are led in the Meditationes , we can also seek knowledge of our own bodies, and of the union of our minds and (...)
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  36. Tim van Gelder (1998). Review: Being There: Body and World Together Again, by Andy Clark. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 107 (4):647-650.
    Are any nonhuman animals rational? What issues are we raising when we ask this question? Are there different kinds or levels of rationality, some of which fall short of full human rationality? Should any behaviour by nonhuman animals be regarded as rational? What kinds of tasks can animals successfully perform? What kinds of processes control their performance at these tasks, and do they count as rational processes? Is it useful or theoretically justified to raise questions about the rationality of animals (...)
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