This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
55 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Order:
1 — 50 / 55
  1. Brad Armendt (2014). Pragmatic Interests and Imprecise Belief. Philosophy of Science 80 (5):758-768.
    Does the strength of a particular belief depend upon the significance we attach to it? Do we move from one context to another, remaining in the same doxastic state concerning p yet holding a stronger belief that p in one context than in the other? For that to be so, a doxastic state must have a certain sort of context-sensitive complexity. So the question is about the nature of belief states, as we understand them, or as we think a theory (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Yann Benétreau-Dupin (2015). Blurring Out Cosmic Puzzles. Philosophy of Science 82 (5):879–891.
    The Doomsday argument and anthropic reasoning are two puzzling examples of probabilistic confirmation. In both cases, a lack of knowledge apparently yields surprising conclusions. Since they are formulated within a Bayesian framework, they constitute a challenge to Bayesianism. Several attempts, some successful, have been made to avoid these conclusions, but some versions of these arguments cannot be dissolved within the framework of orthodox Bayesianism. I show that adopting an imprecise framework of probabilistic reasoning allows for a more adequate representation of (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  3. Yann Benétreau-Dupin (2015). Probabilistic Reasoning in Cosmology. Dissertation, The University of Western Ontario
    Cosmology raises novel philosophical questions regarding the use of probabilities in inference. This work aims at identifying and assessing lines of arguments and problematic principles in probabilistic reasoning in cosmology. -/- The first, second, and third papers deal with the intersection of two distinct problems: accounting for selection effects, and representing ignorance or indifference in probabilistic inferences. These two problems meet in the cosmology literature when anthropic considerations are used to predict cosmological parameters by conditionalizing the distribution of, e.g., the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Yann Benétreau-Dupin (2015). The Bayesian Who Knew Too Much. Synthese 192 (5):1527-1542.
    In several papers, John Norton has argued that Bayesianism cannot handle ignorance adequately due to its inability to distinguish between neutral and disconfirming evidence. He argued that this inability sows confusion in, e.g., anthropic reasoning in cosmology or the Doomsday argument, by allowing one to draw unwarranted conclusions from a lack of knowledge. Norton has suggested criteria for a candidate for representation of neutral support. Imprecise credences (families of credal probability functions) constitute a Bayesian-friendly framework that allows us to avoid (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  5. Seamus Bradley (2012). Dutch Book Arguments and Imprecise Probabilities. In Dennis Dieks, Stephan Hartmann, Michael Stoeltzner & Marcel Weber (eds.), Probabilities, Laws and Structures. Springer
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Seamus Bradley & Katie Steele (2014). Should Subjective Probabilities Be Sharp? Episteme 11 (3):277-289.
    There has been much recent interest in imprecise probabilities, models of belief that allow unsharp or fuzzy credence. There have also been some influential criticisms of this position. Here we argue, chiefly against Elga , that subjective probabilities need not be sharp. The key question is whether the imprecise probabilist can make reasonable sequences of decisions. We argue that she can. We outline Elga's argument and clarify the assumptions he makes and the principles of rationality he is implicitly committed to. (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  7. Jake Chandler (2014). Subjective Probabilities Need Not Be Sharp. Erkenntnis 79 (6):1273-1286.
    It is well known that classical, aka ‘sharp’, Bayesian decision theory, which models belief states as single probability functions, faces a number of serious difficulties with respect to its handling of agnosticism. These difficulties have led to the increasing popularity of so-called ‘imprecise’ models of decision-making, which represent belief states as sets of probability functions. In a recent paper, however, Adam Elga has argued in favour of a putative normative principle of sequential choice that he claims to be borne out (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   5 citations  
  8. Horacio Arlo Costa & Jeffrey Helzner, Iterated Random Selection as Intermediate Between Risk and Uncertainty. ISIPTA'09 ELECTRONIC PROCEEDINGS.
  9. Eleonora Cresto (2010). Belief and Contextual Acceptance. Synthese 177 (1):41-66.
    I develop a strategy for representing epistemic states and epistemic changes that seeks to be sensitive to the difference between voluntary and involuntary aspects of our epistemic life, as well as to the role of pragmatic factors in epistemology. The model relies on a particular understanding of the distinction between full belief and acceptance , which makes room for the idea that our reasoning on both practical and theoretical matters typically proceeds in a contextual way. Within this framework, I discuss (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  10. John Earman (ed.) (1984). Testing Scientific Theories. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
    Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Adam Elga (2010). Subjective Probabilities Should Be Sharp. Philosophers' Imprint 10 (05).
    Many have claimed that unspecific evidence sometimes demands unsharp, indeterminate, imprecise, vague, or interval-valued probabilities. Against this, a variant of the diachronic Dutch Book argument shows that perfectly rational agents always have perfectly sharp probabilities.
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   26 citations  
  12. Peter Gärdenfors (1979). Forecasts, Decisions and Uncertain Probabilities. Erkenntnis 14 (2):159 - 181.
    In the traditional decision theories the role of forecasts is to a large extent swept under the carpet. I believe that a recognition of the connections between forecasts and decisions will be of benefit both for decision theory and for the art of forecasting.In this paper I have tried to analyse which factors, apart from the utilities of the outcomes of the decision alternatives, determine the value of a decision. I have outlined two answers to the question why a decision (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  13. Angelo Gilio (2005). Probabilistic Logic Under Coherence, Conditional Interpretations, and Default Reasoning. Synthese 146 (1-2):139 - 152.
    We study a probabilistic logic based on the coherence principle of de Finetti and a related notion of generalized coherence (g-coherence). We examine probabilistic conditional knowledge bases associated with imprecise probability assessments defined on arbitrary families of conditional events. We introduce a notion of conditional interpretation defined directly in terms of precise probability assessments. We also examine a property of strong satisfiability which is related to the notion of toleration well known in default reasoning. In our framework we give more (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  14. Rolf Haenni, Jan-Willem Romeijn, Gregory Wheeler & Jon Williamson (2011). Probabilistic Logics and Probabilistic Networks. Synthese Library.
    Additionally, the text shows how to develop computationally feasible methods to mesh with this framework.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  15. Alan Hájek & Michael Smithson (2012). Rationality and Indeterminate Probabilities. Synthese 187 (1):33-48.
    We argue that indeterminate probabilities are not only rationally permissible for a Bayesian agent, but they may even be rationally required . Our first argument begins by assuming a version of interpretivism: your mental state is the set of probability and utility functions that rationalize your behavioral dispositions as well as possible. This set may consist of multiple probability functions. Then according to interpretivism, this makes it the case that your credal state is indeterminate. Our second argument begins with our (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  16. Matthew Harrison-Trainor, Wesley H. Holliday & Thomas F. Icard (2016). A Note on Cancellation Axioms for Comparative Probability. Theory and Decision 80 (1):159-166.
    We prove that the generalized cancellation axiom for incomplete comparative probability relations introduced by Rios Insua and Alon and Lehrer is stronger than the standard cancellation axiom for complete comparative probability relations introduced by Scott, relative to their other axioms for comparative probability in both the finite and infinite cases. This result has been suggested but not proved in the previous literature.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. James Hawthorne (2009). The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief. In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Synthese Library: Springer 49--74.
    In a penetrating investigation of the relationship between belief and quantitative degrees of confidence (or degrees of belief) Richard Foley (1992) suggests the following thesis: ... it is epistemically rational for us to believe a proposition just in case it is epistemically rational for us to have a sufficiently high degree of confidence in it, sufficiently high to make our attitude towards it one of belief. Foley goes on to suggest that rational belief may be just rational degree of confidence (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  18. Colin Howson & Peter Urbach (1993). Scientific Reasoning: The Bayesian Approach. Open Court.
  19. Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.) (2009). Degrees of Belief. Springer.
    Various theories try to give accounts of how measures of this confidence do or ought to behave, both as far as the internal mental consistency of the agent as ...
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   6 citations  
  20. J. Y. Jaffray (1994). Decision Making with Belief Functions. In R. Yager, M. Fedrizzi & J. Kacprzyk (eds.), Advances in the Dempster- Shafer Theory of Evidence. John Wiley 331-352.
  21. Richard C. Jeffrey (1983). Bayesianism With A Human Face. In John Earman (ed.), Testing Scientific Theories. University of Minnesota Press 133--156.
  22. James M. Joyce (2010). A Defense of Imprecise Credences in Inference and Decision Making1. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):281-323.
  23. James M. Joyce (2000). Why We Still Need the Logic of Decision. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):13.
    In The Logic of Decision Richard Jeffrey defends a version of expected utility theory that advises agents to choose acts with an eye to securing evidence for thinking that desirable results will ensue. Proponents of "causal" decision theory have argued that Jeffrey's account is inadequate because it fails to properly discriminate the causal features of acts from their merely evidential properties. Jeffrey's approach has also been criticized on the grounds that it makes it impossible to extract a unique probability/utility representation (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  24. Henry E. Kyburg Jr (2001). Probability as a Guide in Life. The Monist 84 (2):135 - 152.
    Bishop Butler, [Butler, 1736], said that probability was the very guide of life. But what interpretations of probability can serve this function? It isn't hard to see that empirical (frequency) views won't do, and many recent writers—for example John Earman, who has said that Bayesianism is "the only game in town"—have been persuaded by various dutch book arguments that only subjective probability will perform the function required. We will defend the thesis that probability construed in this way offers very little (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. Mark Kaplan (2010). In Defense of Modest Probabilism. Synthese 176 (1):41 - 55.
    Orthodox Probabilists hold that an inquirer ought to harbor a precise degree of confidence in each hypothesis about which she is concerned. Modest Probabilism is one of a family doctrines inspired by the thought that Orthodox Probabilists are thereby demanding that an inquirer effect a precision that is often unwarranted by her evidence. The purpose of this essay is (i) to explain the particular way in which Modest Probabilism answers to this thought, and (ii) to address an alleged counterexample to (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  26. Henry E. Kyburg Jr (2001). Probability as a Guide in Life. The Monist 84 (2):135-152.
    Bishop Butler, [Butler, 1736], said that probability was the very guide of life. But what interpretations of probability can serve this function? It isn’t hard to see that empirical (frequency) views won’t do, and many recent writers-for example John Earman, who has said that Bayesianism is “the only game in town”-have been persuaded by various dutch book arguments that only subjective probability will perform the function required. We will defend the thesis that probability construed in this way offers very little (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Henry E. Kyburg (1992). Getting Fancy with Probability. Synthese 90 (2):189-203.
    There are a number of reasons for being interested in uncertainty, and there are also a number of uncertainty formalisms. These formalisms are not unrelated. It is argued that they can all be reflected as special cases of the approach of taking probabilities to be determined by sets of probability functions defined on an algebra of statements. Thus, interval probabilities should be construed as maximum and minimum probabilities within a set of distributions, Glenn Shafer's belief functions should be construed as (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  28. Isaac Levi (1980). The Enterprise of Knowledge: An Essay on Knowledge, Credal Probability, and Chance. The MIT Press.
    This major work challenges some widely held positions in epistemology - those of Peirce and Popper on the one hand and those of Quine and Kuhn on the other.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   229 citations  
  29. Isaac Levi (1974). On Indeterminate Probabilities. Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   102 citations  
  30. Shivaram Lingamneni, Against the Possibility of a Formal Account of Rationality.
    I analyze a recent exchange between Adam Elga and Julian Jonker concerning unsharp (or imprecise) credences and decision-making over them. Elga holds that unsharp credences are necessarily irrational; I agree with Jonker's reply that they can be rational as long as the agent switches to a nonlinear valuation. Through the lens of computational complexity theory, I then argue that even though nonlinear valuations can be rational, they come in general at the price of computational intractability, and that this problematizes their (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. Thomas Lukasiewicz (2005). Nonmonotonic Probabilistic Reasoning Under Variable-Strength Inheritance with Overriding. Synthese 146 (1-2):153 - 169.
    We present new probabilistic generalizations of Pearl’s entailment in System Z and Lehmann’s lexicographic entailment, called Zλ- and lexλ-entailment, which are parameterized through a value λ ∈ [0,1] that describes the strength of the inheritance of purely probabilistic knowledge. In the special cases of λ = 0 and λ = 1, the notions of Zλ- and lexλ-entailment coincide with probabilistic generalizations of Pearl’s entailment in System Z and Lehmann’s lexicographic entailment that have been recently introduced by the author. We show (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  32. Conor Mayo‐Wilson & Gregory Wheeler (2016). Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1).
    Jim Joyce argues for two amendments to probabilism. The first is the doctrine that credences are rational, or not, in virtue of their accuracy or “closeness to the truth” (1998). The second is a shift from a numerically precise model of belief to an imprecise model represented by a set of probability functions (2010). We argue that both amendments cannot be satisfied simultaneously. To do so, we employ a (slightly-generalized) impossibility theorem of Seidenfeld, Schervish, and Kadane (2012), who show that (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  33. Daniel J. Mckaughan & John M. Drake (2012). Representing Vague Opinion. Principia 16 (2):341-344.
    http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p341 Current supervaluation models of opinion, notably van Fraassen’s (1984; 1989; 1990; 1998; 2005; 2006) use of intervals to characterize vague opinion, capture nuances of ordinary reflection which are overlooked by classic measure theoretic models of subjective probability. However, after briefly explaining van Fraassen’s approach, we present two limitations in his current framework which provide clear empirical reasons for seeking a refinement. Any empirically adequate account of our actual judgments must reckon with the fact that these are typically neither uniform (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Cesaltina Pacheco Pires (2002). A Rule For Updating Ambiguous Beliefs. Theory and Decision 53 (2):137-152.
    When preferences are such that there is no unique additive prior, the issue of which updating rule to use is of extreme importance. This paper presents an axiomatization of the rule which requires updating of all the priors by Bayes rule. The decision maker has conditional preferences over acts. It is assumed that preferences over acts conditional on event E happening, do not depend on lotteries received on Ec, obey axioms which lead to maxmin expected utility representation with multiple priors, (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  35. Thorn Paul D. (2007). Three Problems of Direct Inference. Dissertation, University of Arizona
    Remove from this list  
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. Arthur Paul Pedersen & Gregory Wheeler (2015). Dilation, Disintegrations, and Delayed Decisions. In Thomas Augistin, Serena Dora, Enrique Miranda & Erik Quaeghebeur (eds.), Proceedings of the 9th International Symposium on Imprecise Probability: Theories and Applications (ISIPTA 2015). Aracne Editrice 227–236.
    Both dilation and non-conglomerability have been alleged to conflict with a fundamental principle of Bayesian methodology that we call \textit{Good's Principle}: one should always delay making a terminal decision between alternative courses of action if given the opportunity to first learn, at zero cost, the outcome of an experiment relevant to the decision. In particular, both dilation and non-conglomerability have been alleged to permit or even mandate choosing to make a terminal decision in deliberate ignorance of relevant, cost-free information. Although (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Arthur Paul Pedersen & Gregory Wheeler (2014). Demystifying Dilation. Erkenntnis 79 (6):1305-1342.
    Dilation occurs when an interval probability estimate of some event E is properly included in the interval probability estimate of E conditional on every event F of some partition, which means that one’s initial estimate of E becomes less precise no matter how an experiment turns out. Critics maintain that dilation is a pathological feature of imprecise probability models, while others have thought the problem is with Bayesian updating. However, two points are often overlooked: (1) knowing that E is stochastically (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  38. Anthony F. Peressini (forthcoming). Causation, Probability, and the Continuity Bind. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Analyses of singular (token-level) causation often make use of the idea that a cause in- creases the probability of its effect. Of particular salience in such accounts are the values of the probability function of the effect, conditional on the presence and absence of the putative cause, analyzed around the times of the events in question: causes are characterized by the effect’s probability function being greater when conditionalized upon them. Put this way it becomes clearer that the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. Susanna Rinard (2015). A Decision Theory for Imprecise Probabilities. Philosophers' Imprint 15 (7).
    Those who model doxastic states with a set of probability functions, rather than a single function, face a pressing challenge: can they provide a plausible decision theory compatible with their view? Adam Elga and others claim that they cannot, and that the set of functions model should be rejected for this reason. This paper aims to answer this challenge. The key insight is that the set of functions model can be seen as an instance of the supervaluationist approach to vagueness (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  40. Susanna Rinard (2014). The Principle of Indifference and Imprecise Probability. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):110-114.
    Sometimes different partitions of the same space each seem to divide that space into propositions that call for equal epistemic treatment. Famously, equal treatment in the form of equal point-valued credence leads to incoherence. Some have argued that equal treatment in the form of equal interval-valued credence solves the puzzle. This paper shows that, once we rule out intervals with extreme endpoints, this proposal also leads to incoherence.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  41. Susanna Rinard (2013). Against Radical Credal Imprecision. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):157-165.
    A number of Bayesians claim that, if one has no evidence relevant to a proposition P, then one's credence in P should be spread over the interval [0, 1]. Against this, I argue: first, that it is inconsistent with plausible claims about comparative levels of confidence; second, that it precludes inductive learning in certain cases. Two motivations for the view are considered and rejected. A discussion of alternatives leads to the conjecture that there is an in-principle limitation on formal representations (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   4 citations  
  42. Daniel Rothschild (2012). Expressing Credences. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):99-114.
    After presenting a simple expressivist account of reports of probabilistic judgements, I explore a classic problem for it, namely the Frege-Geach problem. I argue that it is a problem not just for expressivism but for any reasonable account of ascriptions of graded judgements. I suggest that the problem can be resolved by appropriately modelling imprecise credences.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   7 citations  
  43. Miriam Schoenfield (2015). The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences. Noûs 50 (1).
    It has been claimed that, in response to certain kinds of evidence, agents ought to adopt imprecise credences: doxastic states that are represented by sets of credence functions rather than single ones. In this paper I argue that, given some plausible constraints on accuracy measures, accuracy-centered epistemologists must reject the requirement to adopt imprecise credences. I then show that even the claim that imprecise credences are permitted is problematic for accuracy-centered epistemology. It follows that if imprecise credal states are permitted (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44. Miriam Schoenfield (2012). Chilling Out on Epistemic Rationality. Philosophical Studies 158 (2):197-219.
    A defense of imprecise credences (and other imprecise doxastic attitudes).
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   8 citations  
  45. Gerhard Schurz & Paul D. Thorn (2012). REWARD VERSUS RISK IN UNCERTAIN INFERENCE: THEOREMS AND SIMULATIONS. Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):574-612.
    Systems of logico-probabilistic (LP) reasoning characterize inference from conditional assertions that express high conditional probabilities. In this paper we investigate four prominent LP systems, the systems O, P, Z, and QC. These systems differ in the number of inferences they licence (O ⊂ P ⊂ Z ⊂ QC). LP systems that license more inferences enjoy the possible reward of deriving more true and informative conclusions, but with this possible reward comes the risk of drawing more false or uninformative conclusions. In (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  46. Martin Smith (2015). Evidential Incomparability and the Principle of Indifference. Erkenntnis 80 (3):605-616.
    The _Principle of Indifference_ was once regarded as a linchpin of probabilistic reasoning, but has now fallen into disrepute as a result of the so-called _problem of multiple of partitions_. In ‘Evidential symmetry and mushy credence’ Roger White suggests that we have been too quick to jettison this principle and argues that the problem of multiple partitions rests on a mistake. In this paper I will criticise White’s attempt to revive POI. In so doing, I will argue that what underlies (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. Paul D. Thorn (2014). Defeasible Conditionalization. Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (2-3):283-302.
    The applicability of Bayesian conditionalization in setting one’s posterior probability for a proposition, α, is limited to cases where the value of a corresponding prior probability, PPRI(α|∧E), is available, where ∧E represents one’s complete body of evidence. In order to extend probability updating to cases where the prior probabilities needed for Bayesian conditionalization are unavailable, I introduce an inference schema, defeasible conditionalization, which allows one to update one’s personal probability in a proposition by conditioning on a proposition that represents a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Paul D. Thorn (2013). Cognitivist Probabilism. In Vit Punochar & Petr Svarny (eds.), The Logica Yearbook 2012. College Publications 201-213.
    In this article, I introduce the term “cognitivism” as a name for the thesis that degrees of belief are equivalent to full beliefs about truth-valued propositions. The thesis (of cognitivism) that degrees of belief are equivalent to full beliefs is equivocal, inasmuch as different sorts of equivalence may be postulated between degrees of belief and full beliefs. The simplest sort of equivalence (and the sort of equivalence that I discuss here) identifies having a given degree of belief with having a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. Paul D. Thorn (2012). Two Problems of Direct Inference. Erkenntnis 76 (3):299-318.
    The article begins by describing two longstanding problems associated with direct inference. One problem concerns the role of uninformative frequency statements in inferring probabilities by direct inference. A second problem concerns the role of frequency statements with gerrymandered reference classes. I show that past approaches to the problem associated with uninformative frequency statements yield the wrong conclusions in some cases. I propose a modification of Kyburg’s approach to the problem that yields the right conclusions. Past theories of direct inference have (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  50. Paul D. Thorn (2007). Three Problems of Direct Inference. Dissertation, University of Arizona
1 — 50 / 55