This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
15 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
  1. Michael Bratman (1999). I Intend That We J. In Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency. Cambridge University Press. 142–161.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Randolph Clarke (2012). Responsibility, Mechanisms, and Capacities. Modern Schoolman 88 (1/2):161-169.
    Frankfurt-style cases are supposed to show that an agent can be responsible for doing something even though the agent wasn’t able to do otherwise. Neil Levy has argued that the cases fail. Agents in such cases, he says, lack a capacity that they’d have to have in order to be responsible for doing what they do. Here it’s argued that Levy is mistaken. Although it may be that agents in Frankfurt-style cases lack some kind of capability, what they lack isn’t (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Randolph Clarke (2012). What is an Omission? Philosophical Issues 22 (1):127-143.
    This paper examines three views of what an omission or an instance of refraining is. The view advanced is that in many cases, an omission is simply an absence of an action of some type. However, generally one’s not doing a certain thing counts as an omission only if there is some norm, standard, or ideal that calls for one’s doing that thing.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Randolph Clarke (2012). Absence of Action. Philosophical Studies 158 (2):361-376.
    Often when one omits to do a certain thing, there's no action that is one's omission; one's omission, it seems, is an absence of any action of some type. This paper advances the view that an absence of an action--and, in general, any absence--is nothing at all: there is nothing that is an absence. Nevertheless, it can result from prior events that one omits to do a certain thing, and there can be results of the fact that one omits to (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Randolph Clarke (2011). Omissions, Responsibility, and Symmetry. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):594-624.
    It is widely held that one can be responsible for doing something that one was unable to avoid doing. This paper focuses primarily on the question of whether one can be responsible for not doing something that one was unable to do. The paper begins with an examination of the account of responsibility for omissions offered by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza, arguing that in many cases it yields mistaken verdicts. An alternative account is sketched that jibes with and (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Randolph Clarke (2010). Intentional Omissions. Noûs 44 (1):158-177.
    It is argued that intentionally omitting requires having an intention with relevant content. And the intention must play a causal role with respect to one’s subsequent thought and conduct. Even if omissions cannot be caused, an account of intentional omission must be causal. There is a causal role for one’s reasons as well when one intentionally omits to do something.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Randolph Clarke, Joshua Shepherd, John Stigall, Robyn Repko Waller & Chris Zarpentine (forthcoming). Causation, Norms, and Omissions: A Study of Causal Judgments. Philosophical Psychology:1-15.
    Causation, norms, and omissions: A study of causal judgments. . ???aop.label???. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2013.815099.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Peter Hacker (2009). Agential Reasons and the Explanation of Human Behaviour. In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave Macmillan. 75--93.
  9. J. Hintikka & R. Tuomela (eds.) (1997). Contemporary Action Theory. Kluwer.
  10. Ernest LePore & Brian P. McLaughlin (eds.) (1985). Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. B. Blackwell.
  11. Alfred R. Mele (2000). Review: Reactive Attitudes, Reactivity, and Omissions. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):447 - 452.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Constantine Sandis & Timothy O'Connor (eds.) (2010). A Companion to the Philosophy of Action. Blackwell.
  13. Joshua Shepherd (2014). Causalism and Intentional Omission. American Philosophical Quarterly 51:15-26.
    It is natural to think that at root, agents are beings that act. Agents do more than this, however – agents omit to act. Sometimes agents do so intentionally. How should we understand intentional omission? Recent accounts of intentional omission have given causation a central theoretical role. The move is well-motivated. If some form of causalism about intentional omission can successfully exploit similarities between action and omission, it might inherit the broad support causalism about intentional action enjoys. In this paper (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Matthew Talbert (2012). Praise and Prevention. Philosophical Explorations 15 (1):47-61.
    I argue that it is possible to prevent (and to be praiseworthy for preventing) an unwelcome outcome that had no chance of occurring. I motivate this position by constructing examples in which it makes sense to explain the non-occurrence of a certain outcome by referring to a particular agent's intentional and willing behavior, and yet the non-occurrence of the outcome in question was ensured by factors external to the agent. I conclude that even if the non-occurrence of an unwelcome outcome (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Bruce Vermazen & Merrill B. Hintikka (eds.) (1985). Essays on Davidson. Oxford University Press.
    This collection brings together previously unpublished works by well-known philosophers on the philosophy of action, the metaphysics of causality, and the philosophy of psychology. Nine of the essays directly discuss Donald Davidson's work on these topics, while three others challenge a Davidsonian approach through discussion of independent but related issues. These essays are followed by replies from Davidson, including a previously unpublished essay, "Adverbs of Action.".
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation