About this topic
Summary Incompatibilism is the thesis that free will is incompatible with the truth of determinism. Incompatibilists divide into libertarianians, who deny that determinism is true and hard determinists who deny that we have free will. The compatibility question is for many philosophers the heart of the free will debate: the question concerning the existence of free will arises from contemplation of the fact that if the laws of nature are deterministic, then our actions and choices were inevitable even prior to our birth.
Key works Incompatibilist intuitions seem to have deep roots: the claim that indeterminsim is necessary for freedom is already well developed in Stoic times Lucretius unknown. The mechanism of 17th century science seemed to make the threat especially powerful, though, prompting both early compatibilist responses and the development of hard determinism by D'Holbach unknown and Spinoza 1677. Recent debate has focused on a number of powerful arguments for incompatibilism, such as the consequence argument (Inwagen 1986) and the manipulation argument Pereboom 2005
Introductions Vihvelin 2008
  Show all references
Related categories
Siblings:See also:History/traditions: Incompatibilism
298 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 298
  1. A. Ahmed (2013). Causal Decision Theory: A Counterexample. Philosophical Review 122 (2):289-306.
    The essay presents a novel counterexample to Causal Decision Theory (CDT). Its interest is that it generates a case in which CDT violates the very principles that motivated it in the first place. The essay argues that the objection applies to all extant formulations of CDT and that the only way out for that theory is a modification of it that entails incompatibilism. The essay invites the reader to find this consequence of CDT a reason to reject it.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Andrew M. Bailey (2012). Incompatibilism and the Past. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):351-376.
    There is a new objection to the Consequence Argument for incompatibilism. I argue that the objection is more wide-ranging than originally thought. In particular: if it tells against the Consequence Argument, it tells against other arguments for incompatibilism too. I survey a few ways of dealing with this objection and show the costs of each. I then present an argument for incompatibilism that is immune to the objection and that enjoys other advantages.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Lynne Rudder Baker (2008). The Irrelevance of the Consequence Argument. Analysis 68 (297):13–22.
    Peter van Inwagen has offered two versions of an influential argument that has come to be called ‘the Consequence Argument’. The Consequence Argument purports to demonstrate that determinism is incompatible with free will.1 It aims to show that, if we assume determinism, we are committed to the claim that, for all propositions p, no one has or ever had any choice about p. Unfortunately, the original Consequence Argument employed an inference rule (the β-rule) that was shown to be invalid. (McKay (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Helen Beebee (2002). Reply to Huemer on the Consequence Argument. Philosophical Review 111 (2):235-241.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Bernard Berofsky (2006). The Myth of Source. Acta Analytica 21 (4):3 - 18.
    If determinism is a threat to freedom, that threat derives solely from its alleged eradication of power. The source incompatibilist mistakenly supposes that special views about the self are required to insure that we are the ultimate source of and in control of our decisions and actions. Source incompatibilism fails whether it takes the form of Robert Kane’s event-causal libertarianism or the various agent-causal varieties defended by Derk Pereboom and Randolph Clarke. It is argued that the sort of control free (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Gunnar Björnsson (forthcoming). Incompatibilism and "Bypassed" Agency. In Alfred R. Mele (ed.), Surrounding Free Will. Oxford University Press.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Alex Blum (2003). The Core of the Consequence Argument. Dialectica 57 (4):423-429.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Alex Blum (2000). N. Analysis 60 (3):284-286.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. William Boardman, Discussion of Peter Van Inwagen's "the Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism".
    I think that van Inwagen's argument is invalid because it equivocates on the modal auxiliaries. To give a quick idea of what I think has gone wrong, consider for comparison two arguments which are transparently invalid, though they superficially resemble Modus Tollens arguments: (a) If Lincoln was honest, he couldn't have pocketed the penny (such taking being dishonest). (b) But it is false that Lincoln could not have pocketed the penny: after all, he was not paralyzed and did not fail (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Susanne Bobzien (1998). The Inadvertent Conception and Late Birth of the Free-Will Problem. Phronesis 43 (2):133-175.
    ABSTRACT: In this paper I argue that the ‘discovery’ of the problem of causal determinism and freedom of decision in Greek philosophy is the result of a combination and mix-up of Aristotelian and Stoic thought in later antiquity; more precisely, a (mis-)interpretation of Aristotle’s philosophy of deliberate choice and action in the light of Stoic theory of determinism and moral responsibility. The (con-)fusion originates with the beginnings of Aristotle scholarship, at the latest in the early 2nd century AD. It undergoes (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. M. C. Bradley (1974). Kenny on Hard Determinism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (December):202-211.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Raymond Bradley, The Meaning of Life Reflections on God, Immortality, and Free Will.
    Philosophers, and other thinking people, have long pondered three grand questions about the nature of reality and our status and significance within it.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Alan Brunton (1993). A Definitive Non-Solution of the Free-Will Problem. Philosophical Investigations 16 (3):231-242.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Lara Buchak (2013). Free Acts and Chance: Why The Rollback Argument Fails. Philosophical Quarterly 63 (250):20-28.
    The ‘rollback argument,’ pioneered by Peter van Inwagen, purports to show that indeterminism in any form is incompatible with free will. The argument has two major premises: the first claims that certain facts about chances obtain in a certain kind of hypothetical situation, and the second that these facts entail that some actual act is not free. Since the publication of the rollback argument, the second claim has been vehemently debated, but everyone seems to have taken the first claim for (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Jeremy Byrd (2014). The Dialectical Advantage of the Direct Argument. Erkenntnis 79 (2):431-444.
    Traditionally, incompatibilists about moral responsibility and determinism claim that we cannot be morally responsible unless we could have done otherwise and that we cannot do otherwise if we are determined. The Direct Argument for incompatibilism supposedly offers its defenders a dialectical advantage over this traditional approach insofar as it does not appear to rely on either of these controversial claims. Recently, though, David Widerker has argued against this supposition and urged that it is time to say farewell to the Direct (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Jeremy Byrd (2010). Agnosticism About Moral Responsibility. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):411-432.
    Traditionally, incompatibilism has rested on two theses. First, the familiar Principle of Alternative Possibilities says that we cannot be morally responsible for what we do unless we could have done otherwise. Accepting this principle, incompatibilists have then argued that there is no room for such alternative possibilities in a deterministic world. Recently, however, a number of philosophers have argued that incompatibilism about moral responsibility can be defended independently of these traditional theses (Ginet 2005: 604-8; McKenna 2001; Stump 1999: 322-4, 2000 (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. James Cain (forthcoming). The Kane-Widerker Objection to Frankfurt Examples. Philosophia:1-9.
    I will argue that the Kane-Widerker objection to Frankfurt examples is much weaker than is generally recognized. The Kane-Widerker objection holds that proponents of Frankfurt examples beg the question against incompatibilist accounts of free and responsible action by constructing examples that tacitly assume a compatibilist account of moral responsibility; that is, they assume that one can have non-derivative responsibility for choices that were not undetermined prior to their occurrence. The notion of an event, E, being ‘undetermined prior to its occurrence’ (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. C. A. Campbell (1963). Professor Smart on Free-Will, Praise and Blame; a Reply. Mind 72 (287):400-405.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Joseph K. Campbell (2010). Incompatibilism and Fatalism: Reply to Loss. Analysis 70 (1):71-76.
    (No abstract is available for this citation).
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Joseph Keim Campbell (2011). Free Will. Polity Press.
    Free will -- Moral responsibility -- The problem of free will -- Moral responsibility : incompatibilism and skepticism -- Free will theories.
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Joseph Keim Campbell (2006). Farewell to Direct Source Incompatibilism. Acta Analytica 21 (4):36 - 49.
    Traditional theorists about free will and moral responsibility endorse the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP): an agent is morally responsible for an action that she performs only if she can do or could have done otherwise. According to source theorists, PAP is false and an agent is morally responsible for her action only if she is the source of that action. Source incompatibilists accept the source theory but also endorse INC: if determinism is true, then no one is morally responsible (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. John V. Canfield (1963). Free Will and Determinism: A Reply. Philosophical Review 72 (October):502-504.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. John V. Canfield (1961). Determinism, Free Will and the Ace Predictor. Mind 70 (July):412-416.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Erik Carlson (2003). Counterexamples to Principle Beta: A Response to Crisp and Warfield. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):730-737.
    The well-known "Consequence Argument" for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism relies on a certain rule of inference; "Principle Beta". Thomas Crisp and Ted Warfield have recently argued that all hitherto suggested counterexamples to Beta can be easily circumvented by proponents of the Consequence Argument. I present a new counterexample which, I argue, is free from the flaws Crisp and Warfield detect in earlier examples.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Erik Carlson (2003). On a New Argument for Incompatibilism. Philosophia 31 (1-2):159-164.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Erik Carlson (2000). Incompatibilism and the Transfer of Power Necessity. Noûs 34 (2):277-290.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Evgenia V. Cherkasova (2004). Kant on Free Will and Arbitrariness: A View From Dostoevsky's Underground. Philosophy and Literature 28 (2):367-378.
    Are freedom, rationality, and morality intrinsically connected? Or perhaps freedom's very nature is transgression, going beyond rationality and ethics? These questions are the center of my discussion of free will and arbitrariness in Kant's late writings. Kant's interlocutor here is Dostoevsky's underground man, a passionate proponent of the Russian _volia--("freedom," "unfettered, arbitrary will"). The underground man questions freedom's relationship to rationality and moral law and insists that free will, arbitrariness and even tyranny are inseparable. Finally, in its attack on rational (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Randolph Clarke (1996). Contrastive Rational Explanation of Free Choice. Philosophical Quarterly 46 (183):185-201.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Randolph Clarke, Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    To have free will is to have what it takes to act freely. When an agent acts freely—when she exercises her free will—what she does is up to her. A plurality of alternatives is open to her, and she determines which she pursues. When she does, she is an ultimate source or origin of her action. So runs a familiar conception of free will.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. E. J. Coffman & Ted A. Warfield (2005). Deliberation and Metaphysical Freedom. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):25-44.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (12 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Thomas M. Crisp & Ted A. Warfield (2000). The Irrelevance of Indeterministic Counterexamples to Principle Beta. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (1):173-185.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Stefaan E. Cuypers (2013). Moral Shallowness, Metaphysical Megalomania, and Compatibilist-Fatalism. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):173-188.
    In the debate on free will and moral responsibility, Saul Smilansky is a hard source-incompatibilist who objects to source-compatibilism for being morally shallow. After criticizing John Martin Fischer’s too optimistic response to this objection, this paper dissipates the charge that compatibilist accounts of ultimate origination are morally shallow by appealing to the seriousness of contingency in the framework of, what Paul Russell calls, compatibilist-fatalism. Responding to the objection from moral shallowness thus drives a wedge between optimists and fatalists within the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Arthur C. Danto & Sidney Morgenbesser (1957). Character and Free Will. Journal of Philosophy 54 (16):493-505.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Mario de Caro (2004). Is Freedom Really a Mystery? In David Macarthur (ed.), Naturalism in Question. Harvard University Press.
    In this paper the problem of free will is examined.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  35. Nicholas Denyer (1981). Time, Action & Necessity: A Proof of Free Will. Duckworth.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Richard Double (1999). In Defense of the Smart Aleck: A Reply to Ted Honderich. Journal of Philosophical Research 24 (January):305-9.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Richard Double (1991). Determinism and the Experience of Freedom. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 72 (March):1-8.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Richard Double (1988). Fear of Sphexishness. Analysis 48 (January):20-26.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Chauncey Downes (1969). Can a Determinist Deliberate? Mind 78 (312):588-590.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. John Earman (ed.) (1993). Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External World. University of Pittsburgh Press.
    Now, considering the determinism or indeterminism of the world, ... The question of free will, and the mind-body problem, are two that come to mind. ...
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Ralph D. Ellis (1991). Ethical Consequences of Recent Work on Incompatibilism. Philosophical Inquiry 13 (3-4):22-42.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. N. Elzein, Freedom of the Will: A Possible Alternative.
    This thesis is an investigation into free will, and the role of alternative possibilities. I defend an incompatibilist notion of freedom, but argue that such freedom is not exercised in all cases of decision-making. I begin by considering the debate surrounding Harry Frankfurt’s famous argument that alternative possibilities are irrelevant to freedom. I argue that the main disagreement can be best understood by considering the dispute surrounding the 'Flicker-of-Freedom' objection, which contends that there are still alternatives left open in (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Nadine Elzein (2013). Pereboom's Frankfurt Case and Derivative Culpability. Philosophical Studies 166 (3):553-573.
    Pereboom has formulated a Frankfurt-style counterexample in which an agent is alleged to be responsible despite the fact that there are only non-robust alternatives present (Pereboom, Moral responsibility and alternative possibilities: essays on the importance of alternative possibilities, 2003; Phil Explor 12(2):109–118, 2009). I support Widerker’s objection to Pereboom’s Tax Evasion 2 example (Widerker, J Phil 103(4):163–187, 2006) (which rests on the worry that the agent in this example is derivatively culpable as opposed to directly responsible) against Pereboom’s recent counterarguments (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Adam Feltz (2012). Pereboom and Premises: Asking the Right Questions in the Experimental Philosophy of Free Will. Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):53-63.
    Sommers (2010) argues that experimental philosophers of free will have largely been asking the wrong question – the question whether philosophically naïve individuals think that free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism. The present studies begin to alleviate this concern by testing the intuitive plausibility of Pereboom’s (2001) four case argument. The general pattern of responses from two experiments does not support Pereboom’s predictions. Moreover, those who were high in the personality trait emotional stability tended to judge that (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely (2009). Do Judgments About Freedom and Responsibility Depend on Who You Are? Personality Differences in Intuitions About Compatibilism and Incompatibilism. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):342-350.
    Recently, there has been an increased interest in folk intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility from both philosophers and psychologists. We aim to extend our understanding of folk intuitions about freedom and moral responsibility using an individual differences approach. Building off previous research suggesting that there are systematic differences in folks’ philosophically relevant intuitions, we present new data indicating that the personality trait extraversion predicts, to a significant extent, those who have compatibilist versus incompatibilist intuitions. We argue that identifying groups (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Adam Feltz, Edward T. Cokely & Thomas Nadelhoffer (2009). Natural Compatibilism Versus Natural Incompatibilism: Back to the Drawing Board. Mind and Language 24 (1):1-23.
    In the free will literature, some compatibilists and some incompatibilists claim that their views best capture ordinary intuitions concerning free will and moral responsibility. One goal of researchers working in the field of experimental philosophy has been to probe ordinary intuitions in a controlled and systematic way to help resolve these kinds of intuitional stalemates. We contribute to this debate by presenting new data about folk intuitions concerning freedom and responsibility that correct for some of the shortcomings of previous studies. (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. J. M. Ficsher (1983). Incompatibilism. Philosophical Studies 43 (January):127-37.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Alicia Finch (2013). On Behalf of the Consequence Argument: Time, Modality, and the Nature of Free Action. Philosophical Studies 163 (1):151-170.
    The consequence argument for the incompatibility of free action and determinism has long been under attack, but two important objections have only recently emerged: Warfield’s modal fallacy objection and Campbell’s no past objection. In this paper, I explain the significance of these objections and defend the consequence argument against them. First, I present a novel formulation of the argument that withstands their force. Next, I argue for the one controversial claim on which this formulation relies: the trans-temporality thesis. This thesis (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Alicia Finch & Ted A. Warfield (1998). The Mind Argument and Libertarianism. Mind 107 (427):515-28.
    Many critics of libertarian freedom have charged that freedom is incompatible with indeterminism. We show that the strongest argument that has been provided for this claim is invalid. The invalidity of the argument in question, however, implies the invalidity of the standard Consequence argument for the incompatibility of freedom and determinism. We show how to repair the Consequence argument and argue that no similar improvement will revive the worry about the compatibility of indeterminism and freedom.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. A. Fine (1993). Indeterminism and the Freedom of the Will. In John Earman (ed.), Philosophical Problems of the Internal and External World. University of Pittsburgh Press.
    Remove from this list |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 298