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  1. Ian Carlo Dapalla Benitez (2015). A Critique of Critical Legal Studies' Claim of Legal Indeterminacy. Lambert Academic Publishing.
    This paper challenges the Critical Legal Studies (CLS) claims of legal indeterminacy. It shall use a legal formalist logic and language as its main assertion, further maintaining that the CLS claims is only grounded in ambiguity and confusion. CLS is a legal theory that challenges and overturns accepted norms and standards in legal theory and practice. They maintained that law in the historical and contemporary society has an alleged impartiality, and it is used as a tool of privilege and power (...)
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  2. Sara Bernstein (forthcoming). Causal and Moral Indeterminacy. Ratio.
    This paper argues that several sorts of metaphysical and semantic indeterminacy afflict the causal relation. If, as it is plausible to hold, there is a relationship between causation and moral responsibility, then indeterminacy in the causal relation results in indeterminacy of moral responsibility more generally.
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  3. Brian Bix (1993). Law, Language, and Legal Determinacy. Oxford University Press.
    This book discusses one of the central problems in the philosophy of law--the question of legal determinacy. Is the law a seamless web or are there gaps? Bix argues that the major re-thinking of the common and "common sense" views about law that have been proposed by various recent legal theories is unnecessary. He offers a reconsideration of the role of language in the law, and the way ideas about language have been used and misused in recent legal theory. He (...)
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  4. Kathleen Freeman & Arthur M. Farley (1996). A Model of Argumentation and its Application to Legal Reasoning. Artificial Intelligence and Law 4 (3-4):163-197.
    We present a computational model of dialectical argumentation that could serve as a basis for legal reasoning. The legal domain is an instance of a domain in which knowledge is incomplete, uncertain, and inconsistent. Argumentation is well suited for reasoning in such weak theory domains. We model argument both as information structure, i.e., argument units connecting claims with supporting data, and as dialectical process, i.e., an alternating series of moves by opposing sides. Our model includes burden of proof as a (...)
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  5. Jaap C. Hage, Ronald Leenes & Arno R. Lodder (1993). Hard Cases: A Procedural Approach. [REVIEW] Artificial Intelligence and Law 2 (2):113-167.
    Much work on legal knowledge systems treats legal reasoning as arguments that lead from a description of the law and the facts of a case, to the legal conclusion for the case. The reasoning steps of the inference engine parallel the logical steps by means of which the legal conclusion is derived from the factual and legal premises. In short, the relation between the input and the output of a legal inference engine is a logical one. The truth of the (...)
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  6. Andreas Hamfelt (1995). Formalizing Multiple Interpretation of Legal Knowledge. Artificial Intelligence and Law 3 (4):221-265.
    A representation methodology for knowledge allowing multiple interpretations is described. It is based on the following conception of legal knowledge and its open texture. Since indeterminate, legal knowledge must be adapted to fit the circumstances of the cases to which it is applied. Whether a certain adaptation is lawful or not is measured by metaknowledge. But as this too is indeterminate, its adaptation to the case must be measured by metametaknowledge, etc. This hierarchical model of law is quite well-established and (...)
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  7. Graham Hubbs & Douglas Lind (eds.) (2014). Pragmatism, Law, and Language. Routledge.
    This volume puts leading pragmatists in the philosophy of language, including Robert Brandom, in contact with scholars concerned with what pragmatism has come to mean for the law. Each contribution uses the resources of pragmatism to tackle fundamental problems in the philosophy of language, the philosophy of law, and social and political philosophy. In many chapters, the version of pragmatism deployed proves a fruitful approach to its subject matter; in others, shortcomings of the specific brand of pragmatism are revealed. The (...)
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  8. Andrew J. I. Jones & Xavier Parent (2008). Normative-Informational Positions: A Modal-Logical Approach. [REVIEW] Artificial Intelligence and Law 16 (1):7-23.
    This paper is a preliminary investigation into the application of the formal-logical theory of normative positions to the characterisation of normative-informational positions, pertaining to rules that are meant to regulate the supply of information. First, we present the proposed framework. Next, we identify the kinds of nuances and distinctions that can be articulated in such a logical framework. Finally, we show how such nuances can arise in specific regulations. Reference is made to Data Protection Law and Contract Law, among others. (...)
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  9. David Rondel (2014). Review of Pragmatism, Law, and Language. [REVIEW] Law and Philosophy 33 (5):683-688.
  10. Jan-R. Sieckmann (2003). Why Non-Monotonic Logic is Inadequate to Represent Balancing Arguments. Artificial Intelligence and Law 11 (2-3):211-219.
    This paper analyses the logical structure of the balancing of conflicting normative arguments, and asks whether non-monotonic logic is adequate to represent this type of legal or practical reasoning. Norm conflicts are often regarded as a field of application for non-monotonic logics. This paper argues, however, that the balancing of normative arguments consists of an act of judgement, not a logical inference, and that models of deductive as well as of defeasible reasoning do not give an adequate account of its (...)
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  11. Lawrence B. Solum (1987). On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma. University of Chicago Law Review 54:462.
    This essay investigates the indeterminacy thesis - roughly the claim that the content of authoritative legal materials (such as the texts of constitutions, statutes, cases, rules, and regulations) does not determine the outcome of particular legal disputes. The indeterminacy thesis can be formulated as either "strong" or weak." The strong version of the indeterminacy thesis is demonstrably false, but several weak versions of the thesis are true but lack the radical implications of strong indeterminacy.The strong indeterminacy thesis is the claim (...)
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  12. Kevin Walton (1999). A Realistic Vision? Roberto Unger on Law and Politics. Res Publica 5 (2):139-159.
    This paper considers Roberto Unger's views on legal reasoning. His account is defended against two misplaced attacks. The first critique is by Emilios Christodoulidis. Using the language of systems theory, Christodoulidis contends that Unger's programme of democratic experimentalism cannot be achieved through law, as the constitutive structure of the legal system is immune to politics. Christodoulidis accuses Unger of attempting to reduce law to politics. It will be argued, however, that Unger does no such thing. The second attack holds that (...)
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  13. Radosław Zyzik, Wokół Intuicyjnych Decyzji Prawniczych [Few Remarks on Intuitive Legal Decisions].
    W artykule analizowane jest zagadnienie wiarygodności decyzji intuicyjnych w procesie stosowania prawa. Analizy prowadzone są z perspektywy psychologii poznawczej, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem prac nad intuicją ekspercką. Celem prowadzonych analiz jest odpowiedź na pytanie, czy można mówić o wiarygodnych prawniczych decyzjach intuicyjnych. Zestawione zostają badania amerykańskich realistów prawniczych i psychologów poznawczych w celu ich konfrotancji i ustalenia warunków wpływających na proces podejmowania decyzji i wydawania ocen intuicyjnych. Artykuł kończy się przedstawieniem modelu podejmowania decyzji intuicyjnych w naukach psychologicznych i naukach prawnych. -/- (...)
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