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  1. Daniel Altshuler (2007). WCO, ACD and What They Reveal About Complex Demonstratives. Natural Language Semantics 15 (3):265-277.
    This squib presents a rebuttal to two of King’s (Complex demonstratives: A quantificational account. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001) arguments that complex demonstratives are quantifier phrases like every man. The first is in response to King’s argument that because complex demonstratives induce weak crossover effects, they are quantifier phrases. I argue that unlike quantifier phrases and like other definite determiner phrases, complex demonstratives in object position can corefer with singular pronouns contained in the subject DP. Although complex demonstratives could undergo (...)
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  2. Lynne Rudder Baker (1981). On Making and Attributing Demonstrative Reference. Synthese 49 (2):245 - 273.
  3. Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (1963). Can Indexical Sentences Stand in Logical Relations? Philosophical Studies 14 (6):87 - 90.
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  4. Paul Berckmans (1990). Demonstrative Utterances. Philosophical Studies 60 (3):281 - 295.
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  5. Paul R. Berckmans (1990). In Defense of the Demonstrative/Indexical Distinction. Logique Et Analyse 33 (132):191-201.
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  6. José Luis Bermúdez (2008). Self-Knowledge and the Sense of "I". In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
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  7. Joao Branquinho (2008). On the Persistence of Indexical Belief. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:21-30.
    This paper is devoted to an examination of the topic of cognitive dynamics as introduced by David Kaplan in his essay ‘Demonstratives’. I discuss two approaches to cognitive dynamics: the directly referential approach, which I take as best represented in Kaplan’s views, and the neo-Fregean approach, which I take as best represented in Gareth Evans’s views. The upshot of my discussion is twofold. On the one hand, I argue that both Kaplan’s account and Evans’s account are on the whole defective (...)
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  8. Christopher Buford (2013). Centering on Demonstrative Thought. Philosophia 41 (4):1135-1147.
    The nature of perceptual demonstratives, the ‘that F’ component of judgments of the form ‘that F is G’ based on perceptual input, has been a topic of interest for many philosophers. Another related, though distinct, question concerns the nature of demonstrative judgments based not on current perceptual input, but instead derived from memory. I argue that the account put forward by John Campbell fails to adequately account for memory-based demonstrative thought.
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  9. Hector-Neri Castañeda (1981). The Semiotic Profile of Indexical (Experiential) Reference. Synthese 49 (2):275 - 316.
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  10. Jonathan Cohen & Eliot Michaelson (2013). Indexicality and The Answering Machine Paradox. Philosophy Compass 8 (6):580-592.
    Answering machines and other types of recording devices present prima facie problems for traditional theories of the meaning of indexicals. The present essay explores a range of semantic and pragmatic responses to these issues. Careful attention to the difficulties posed by recordings promises to help enlighten the boundaries between semantics and pragmatics more broadly.
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  11. Maximilian de Gaynesford (2006). I: The Meaning of the First Person Term. Clarendon Press.
    I is perhaps the most important and the least understood of our everyday expressions. This is a constant source of philosophical confusion. Max de Gaynesford offers a remedy: he explains what this expression means, its logical form and its inferential role. He thereby shows the way to an understanding of how we express first-personal thinking. He dissolves various myths about how I refers, to the effect that it is a pure indexical. His central claim is that the key to understanding (...)
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  12. Imogen Dickie (2014). The Sortal Dependence of Demonstrative Reference. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):34-60.
    : ‘Sortalism about demonstrative reference’ is the view that the capacity to refer to things demonstratively rests on the capacity to classify them according to their kinds. This paper argues for one form of sortalism. Section 1 distinguishes two sortalist views. Section 2 argues that one of them is false. Section 3 argues that the other is true. Section 4 uses the argument from Section 3 to develop a new response to the objection to sortalism from examples where we seem (...)
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  13. Julian Dodd (1997). Indirect Speech, Parataxis and the Nature of Things Said. Journal of Philosophical Research 22:211-227.
    This paper makes the following recommendation when it comes to the IogicaI form of sentences in indirect speech. Davidson’s paratactic account shouId stand, but with one emendation: the demonstrative ‘that’ should be taken to refer to the Fregean Thought expressed by the utterance of the content-sentence, rather than to that utterance itseIf. The argument for this emendation is that it is the onIy way of repIying to the objections to Davidson’s account raised by Schiffer, McFetridge and McDowell.Towards the end of (...)
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  14. Stefano Pred Elli (2001). You Just Can't Tell: An Analysis of the Non-Specific Use of Indexicals. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (2):103-118.
    In this paper I provide a semantic analysis of non-specific uses of indexical expressions, such as "you" in typical utterances of "you just can't tell". My treatment employs independently motivated conceptual tools, such as the treatment of generics within Discourse Representation Theory, and the distinction between context of utterance and context of interpretation.
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  15. Manuel Garc'ıa-Carpintero (1998). Indexicals as Token-Reflexives. Mind 107 (427):529--563.
    Reichenbachian approaches to indexicality contend that indexicals are "token-reflexives": semantic rules associated with any given indexical-type determine the truth-conditional import of properly produced tokens of that type relative to certain relational properties of those tokens. Such a view may be understood as sharing the main tenets of Kaplan's well-known theory regarding content, or truth-conditions, but differs from it regarding the nature of the linguistic meaning of indexicals and also regarding the bearers of truth-conditional import and truth-conditions. Kaplan has criticized these (...)
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  16. Manuel García-Carpintero (2005). The Real Distinction Between Descriptions and Indexicals. Teorema: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 24 (3):49-74.
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  17. Richard Heck (2002). Do Demonstratives Have Senses? Philosophers' Imprint 2 (2):1-33.
    Frege held that referring expressions in general, and demonstratives and indexicals in particular, contribute more than just their reference to what is expressed by utterances of sentences containing them. Heck first attempts to get clear about what the essence of the Fregean view is, arguing that it rests upon a certain conception of linguistic communication that is ultimately indefensible. On the other hand, however, he argues that understanding a demonstrative (or indexical) utterance requires one to think of the object denoted (...)
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  18. James Higginbotham (2002). Competence with Demonstratives. Philosophical Perspectives 16 (s16):1-16.
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  19. Harold T. Hodes (1984). Axioms for Actuality. Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (1):27 - 34.
  20. J. Hunter (2013). Presuppositional Indexicals. Journal of Semantics 30 (3):381-421.
    Kaplanian, two-dimensional theories secure rigidity for indexicals by positing special contexts and semantic mechanisms reserved only for indexicals. The result is a deep and unexplained chasm between expressions that depend on the extra-linguistic context and expressions that depend on the discourse context. Theories that treat indexicals as anaphoric, presuppositional expressions (e.g., Zeevat 1999; Roberts 2002; Hunter & Asher 2005; Maier 2006, 2009) have the potential to be more minimal and general than Kaplanian, two-dimensional theories—the mechanism of presupposition, unlike that of (...)
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  21. Brendan Lalor (1997). Rethinking Kaplan's ''Afterthoughts'' About 'That': An Exorcism of Semantical Demons. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 47 (1):67-87.
    Kaplan (1977) proposes a neo-Fregean theory of demonstratives which, despite its departure from a certain problematic Fregean thesis, I argue, ultimately founders on account of its failure to give up the Fregean desideratum of a semantic theory that it provide an account of cognitive significance. I explain why Kaplan's (1989) afterthoughts don't remedy this defect. Finally, I sketch an alternative nonsolipsistic picture of demonstrative reference which idealizes away from an agent's narrowly characterizable psychological state, and instead relies on the robust (...)
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  22. Emar Maier (2014). Mixed Quotation: The Grammar of Apparently Transparent Opacity. Semantics and Pragmatics 7 (7):1--67.
    The phenomenon of mixed quotation exhibits clear signs of both the apparent transparency of compositional language use and the opacity of pure quotation. I argue that the interpretation of a mixed quotation in- volves the resolution of a metalinguistic presupposition. The leading idea behind my proposal is that a mixed-quoted expression, say, “has an anomalous feature”, means what x referred to with the words ‘has an anomalous feature’. To understand how this solves the paradox, I set up a precise grammatical (...)
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  23. David B. Martens (1994). Demonstratives, Descriptions, and Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4):947-963.
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  24. Ari Maunu (2000). A Simple Solution to the Problem of De Se Belief Ascriptions. Communication and Cognition 33 (3-4):199-226.
    I show how a de se belief ascription such as "Privatus believes that he himself is rich" may be dealt with by means of a scope distinction over and above that one separating de dicto and de re ascriptions. The idea is, roughly, that 'Privatus...himself' forms in this statement a unity, a single "spread" sign that is at the same time in a de re and de dicto position. If so, H-N. Castañeda's contention that the "quasi-indicator" 'he himself' ('she herself', (...)
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  25. Ruth Garrett Millikan (2012). Are There Mental Indexicals and Demonstratives? Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):217-234.
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  26. Allyson Mount (2008). Intentions, Gestures, and Salience in Ordinary and Deferred Demonstrative Reference. Mind and Language 23 (2):145–164.
    In debates about the proper analysis of demonstrative expressions, ostensive gestures and speaker intentions are often seen as competing for primary importance in securing reference. Underlying some of these debates is the mistaken assumption that ostensive gestures always make the demonstrated object maximally salient to interlocutors. When we abandon this assumption and focus on an object’s mutually-recognized salience itself, rather than on how the object came to be salient, we can work towards a more promising analysis with a uniform treatment (...)
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  27. Geoffrey Nunberg (2004). Descriptive Indexicals and Indexical Descriptions. In Anne Bezuidenhout & Marga Reimer (eds.), Descriptions and Beyond. Oxford University Press. 261--279.
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  28. Gilbert Plumer (1993). A Here-Now Theory of Indexicality. Journal of Philosophical Research 18:193-211.
    This paper attempts to define indexicality so as to semantically distinguish indexicals from proper names and definite descriptions. The widely-accepted approach that says that indexical reference is distinctive in being dependent on context of use is criticized. A reductive approach is proposed and defended that takes an indexical to be (roughly) an expression that either is or is equivalent to ‘here’ or ‘now’, or is such that a tokening of it refers by relating something to the place and/or time that (...)
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  29. Gilbert Plumer (1980). Hegel on Singular Demonstrative Reference. Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):71-94.
    The initial one-third of the paper is devoted to exposing the first chapter (“Sense-Certainty”) of Hegel’s PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT as a thesis about reference, viz., that singular demonstrative reference is impossible. In the remainder I basically argue that such a view commits one to radically undermining our conceptions of space, time, and substance (concrete individuality), and rests on the central mistake of construing <this> on the model of a predicable (or property).
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  30. Jean-Yves Pollock & Richard S. Kayne, Notes on French and English Demonstratives.
    (4) Jean apprécie ce livre-là. (‘Jean appreciates ce book-there’) (5) Jean apprécie ce livre-ci. (‘Jean appreciates ce book-here’) in a way that recalls in part non-standard English: (6) John is reading that there book. (7) John is reading this here book. with (6) akin to (4) and with (7) akin to (5). The difference in word order, whereby English has there/here prenominal in (6)/(7) and French has - là/-ci postnominal in (4)/(5), was analyzed by Bernstein (1997) in terms of a (...)
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  31. Stefano Predelli (2012). Bare-Boned Demonstratives. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (3):547-562.
    This essay proposes a novel semantic account of demonstratives, aimed at clarifying the sense in which demonstratives are semantically dependent on demonstrations. Its first two sections summarize the main views currently on the market. Section 3 argues that they are all vitiated by the same shortcomings, and yield incorrect results of ‘truth in virtue of character’ and entailment. Section 4 proposes a different account of the relationships between demonstratives and demonstrations, grounded on the idea of truth-conditionally irrelevant aspects of the (...)
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  32. Stefano Predelli (2004). The Impersonal 'You' and Other Indexicals. Disputatio 16:1 - 23.
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  33. Lawrence D. Roberts (1986). The Figure-Ground Model for the Explanation of the Determination of Indexical Reference. Synthese 68 (3):441 - 486.
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  34. Gillian Russell (2011). Indexicals, Context-Sensitivity and the Failure of Implication. Synthese 183 (2):143 - 160.
    This paper investigates, formulates and proves an indexical barrier theorem, according to which sets of non-indexical sentences do not entail (except under specified special circumstances) indexical sentences. It surveys the usual difficulties for this kind of project, as well some that are specific to the case of indexicals, and adapts the strategy of Restall and Russell's "Barriers to Implication" to overcome these. At the end of the paper a reverse barrier theorem is also proved, according to which an indexical sentence (...)
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  35. Philippe Schlenker (2003). Indexicality, Logophoricity, and Plural Pronouns. In Jacqueline Lecarme (ed.), Afroasiatic Grammar Ii: Selected Papers From the Fifth Conference on Afroasiatic Languages, Paris, 2000. John Benjamins. 409-428.
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  36. B. H. Slater, Motivation by de Se Beliefs.
    I have become more convinced, over the years, by the truth of Wittgenstein’s characterisation of philosophy as arising through misconceptions of grammar. Such a misconception of grammar characterises a very popular approach to indexicality which has been current since the 1970s, stemming from the work of Casteñeda, and Kaplan. Gareth Evans was inclined to allow, for instance, that one could say ‘“To the left (I am hot)” is true, as uttered by x at t iff there is someone moderately near (...)
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  37. J. P. Smit (2012). Why Bare Demonstratives Need Not Semantically Refer. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):43-66.
    I-theories of bare demonstratives take the semantic referent of a demonstrative to be determined by an inner state of the utterer. E-theories take the referent to be determined by factors external to the utterer. I argue that, on the Standard view of communication, neither of these theories can be right. Firstly, both are committed to the existence of conventions with superfluous content. Secondly, any claim to the effect that a speaker employs the conventions associated with these theories cannot have any (...)
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  38. Quentin Smith (1986). The Impossibility of Token-Reflexive Analyses. Dialogue 25 (4):757.
    Reichenbach, for example, believes that "1" has the same extensional meaning as "the person who utters this token", and Smart believes that "now" means the same as is simultaneous with this utterance” (where the italicization of the "is" indicates it is tenseless). But if a tokeri 1 of’ ’I’ , refers to itself, it has a different reference than a token.
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  39. Yannis Stephanou (2010). The Meaning of 'Actually'. Dialectica 64 (2):153-185.
    The paper is an investigation into the concept of actuality from the standpoint of the philosophy of language. It is argued that expressions such as 'actually' and 'in fact' are not indexicals like 'here' and 'now'; when e.g. 'Snow is actually white' is uttered in a world, what proposition is conveyed does not depend on the world. Nor are such expressions ambiguous. The paper makes a suggestion about the role that 'actually' and its cognates do play. It is also argued (...)
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  40. Mark Textor (2009). 'Demonstrative' Colour Concepts: Recognition Versus Preservation. Ratio 22 (2):234-249.
    Arguments for and against the existence of demonstrative concepts of shades and shapes turn on the assumption that demonstrative concepts must be recognitional capacities. The standard argument for this assumption is based on the widely held view that concepts are those constituents of propositional attitudes that account for an attitude's inferential potential. Only if demonstrative concepts of shades are recognitional capacities, the standard argument goes, can they account for the inferential potential of demonstrative judgements about shades. Shades are conceived as (...)
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  41. Savas L. Tsohatzidis (forthcoming). The Distance Between 'Here' and 'Where I Am'. Journal of Philosophical Research.
    This paper argues that Michael Dummett's proposed distinction between a declarative sentence's "assertoric content" and "ingredient sense" is not in fact supported by what Dummett presents as paradigmatic evidence in its support.
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Character and Content
  1. Joseph Almog, John Perry, Howard K. Wettstein & David Kaplan (eds.) (1989). Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press, USA.
    This anthology of essays on the work of David Kaplan, a leading contemporary philosopher of language, sprang from a conference, "Themes from Kaplan," organized by the Center for the Study of Language and Information at Stanford University.
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  2. Louise M. Antony, What Are You Thinking? Character and Content in the Language of Thought.
  3. Nuel Belnap (2005). Under Carnap's Lamp: Flat Pre-Semantics. Studia Logica 80 (1):1 - 28.
    “Flat pre-semantics” lets each parameter of truth (etc.) be considered sepa-rately and equally, and without worrying about grammatical complications. This allows one to become a little clearer on a variety of philosophical-logical points, such as the use fulness of Carnapian tolerance and the deep relativity of truth. A more definite result of thinking in terms of flat pre-semantics lies in the articulation of some instructive ways of categorizing operations on meanings in purely logical terms in relation to various parame- ters (...)
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  4. Michael Bennett (1978). Demonstratives and Indexicals in Montague Grammar. Synthese 39 (1):1--80.
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  5. Anne Bezuidenhout, Context Shifting.
    Tenses as operators on content: ‘PAST’ and ‘FUT’ are circumstance shifters, similar What I hope to do in this talk: to ‘ ’ and ‘◊’, except that they shift the time of the circumstance, as opposed to the My intention is not to prove Kaplan wrong. Even if Kaplan’s remarks about context shifting operators in English turn out to be strictly correct, there is clearly a lot of world of the circumstance.
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  6. David Braun, Indexicals.
    Indexicals are linguistic expressions whose reference shifts from context to context: some paradigm examples are ‘I’, ‘here’, ‘now’, ‘today’,‘he’, ‘she’, and ‘that’. Two speakers who utter a single sentence that contains an indexical may say different things. For instance, Fred and Wilma say different things when they utter the sentence ‘I am female’. Many philosophers (following David Kaplan 1989a) hold that indexicals have two sorts of meaning. The first sort of meaning is often called ‘character’ or ‘linguistic meaning’; the second (...)
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  7. David Braun (1996). Demonstratives and Their Linguistic Meanings. Noûs 30 (2):145-173.
    In this paper, I present a new semantics for demonstratives. Now some may think that David Kaplan (1989a,b) has already given a more than satisfactory semantics for demonstratives, and that there is no need for a new one. But I argue below that Kaplan's theory fails to describe the linguistic meanings of 'that' and other true demonstratives. My argument for this conclusion has nothing to do with cognitive value, belief sentences, or other such contentious matters in semantics and the philosophy (...)
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  8. David Braun (1995). What is Character? Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (3):241--273.
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  9. Ben Caplan (2003). Putting Things in Contexts. Philosophical Review 112 (2):191-214.
    Thanks to David Kaplan (1989a, 1989b), we all know how to handle indexicals like ‘I’. ‘I’ doesn’t refer to an object simpliciter; rather, it refers to an object only relative to a context. In particular, relative to a context C, ‘I’ refers to the agent of C. Since different contexts can have different agents, ‘I’ can refer to different objects relative to different contexts. For example, relative to a context cwhose agent is Gottlob Frege, ‘I’ refers to Frege; relative to (...)
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