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  1. J. Almog (1981). Indexicals, demonstratives and the modality dynamics. Logique Et Analyse 24 (95):331.
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  2. Jej Altham (2004). Reporting Indexicals. In T. J. Smiley & Thomas Baldwin (eds.), Studies in the Philosophy of Logic and Knowledge. Published for the British Academy by Oxford University Press 235.
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  3. Daniel Altshuler (2007). WCO, ACD and What They Reveal About Complex Demonstratives. Natural Language Semantics 15 (3):265-277.
    This squib presents a rebuttal to two of King’s (Complex demonstratives: A quantificational account. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001) arguments that complex demonstratives are quantifier phrases like every man. The first is in response to King’s argument that because complex demonstratives induce weak crossover effects, they are quantifier phrases. I argue that unlike quantifier phrases and like other definite determiner phrases, complex demonstratives in object position can corefer with singular pronouns contained in the subject DP. Although complex demonstratives could undergo (...)
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  4. Peter Alward (2009). The Inessential Quasi-Indexical. Philosophical Studies 145 (2):235 - 255.
    In this paper, I argue, contra Perry, that the existence of locating beliefs does not require the abandonment of the analysis of belief as a relation between subjects and propositions. I argue that what the "problem of the essential indexical" reveals is that a complete explanation of behaviour requires both an explanation of the type of behaviour the agent engaged in and an explanation of why she engaged in it in the circumstances that she did. And I develop an (...)
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  5. Michael Anderson (1992). Making Sense of Indexicals. Lyceum 4:39-82.
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  6. Stefano Predelli Andlsidora Stojanovic (2008). Semantic Relativism and the Logic of Indexicals. In G. Carpintero & M. Koelbel (eds.), Relative Truth. Oxford University Press
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  7. Lynne Rudder Baker (1981). On Making and Attributing Demonstrative Reference. Synthese 49 (2):245 - 273.
  8. Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (1963). Can Indexical Sentences Stand in Logical Relations? Philosophical Studies 14 (6):87 - 90.
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  9. Barry Barnes & John Law (1976). Whatever Should Be Done with Indexical Expressions? Theory and Society 3 (2):223-237.
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  10. Paul Berckmans (1990). Demonstrative Utterances. Philosophical Studies 60 (3):281 - 295.
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  11. Paul R. Berckmans (1990). In Defense of the Demonstrative/Indexical Distinction. Logique Et Analyse 33 (132):191-201.
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  12. José Luis Bermúdez (2008). Self-Knowledge and the Sense of "I". In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press
    What does an understanding of the first person pronoun “I” contribute to the understanding of a sentence involving “I”? This paper emphasizes that the first person pronoun is typically used as a tool of communication. We need to think not just about what it is to use the first person pronoun with understanding, but also what it is to understand someone else’s use of the first person pronoun. A plausible principle governing linguistic understanding via the conditions of adequacy upon reporting (...)
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  13. Emma Borg (2002). Deferred Demonstratives. In Joseph K. Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Meaning and Truth - Investigations in Philosophical Semantics. Seven Bridges Press 214--230.
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  14. João Branquinho (2008). On the Persistence of Indexical Belief. Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 39:21-30.
    This paper is devoted to an examination of the topic of cognitive dynamics as introduced by David Kaplan in his essay ‘Demonstratives’. I discuss two approaches to cognitive dynamics: the directly referential approach, which I take as best represented in Kaplan’s views, and the neo-Fregean approach, which I take as best represented in Gareth Evans’s views. The upshot of my discussion is twofold. On the one hand, I argue that both Kaplan’s account and Evans’s account are on the whole defective (...)
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  15. Ingar Brinck (1997). The Indexical 'I' the First Person in Thought and Language.
    The subjct of this book is the first person in thought and language. The main question is what we mean when we say 'I'. Related to it are questions about what kinds of self-consciousness and self-knowledge are needed in order for us to have the capacity to talk about ourselves. The emphasis is on theories of meaning and reference for 'I', but a fair amount of space is devoted to 'I'-thoughts and the role of the concept of the self in (...)
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  16. Christopher Buford (2013). Centering on Demonstrative Thought. Philosophia 41 (4):1135-1147.
    The nature of perceptual demonstratives, the ‘that F’ component of judgments of the form ‘that F is G’ based on perceptual input, has been a topic of interest for many philosophers. Another related, though distinct, question concerns the nature of demonstrative judgments based not on current perceptual input, but instead derived from memory. I argue that the account put forward by John Campbell fails to adequately account for memory-based demonstrative thought.
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  17. John Campbell (2003). The Role of Demonstratives in Action-Explanation. In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Clarendon Press
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  18. Hector-Neri Castañeda (1981). The Semiotic Profile of Indexical (Experiential) Reference. Synthese 49 (2):275 - 316.
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  19. Eros Corazza (2011). Lndexicals and Demonstratives. In Marina Sbisà, Jan-Ola Östman & Jef Verschueren (eds.), Philosophical Perspectives for Pragmatics. John Benjamins Pub. Co. 10--131.
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  20. Eros Corazza (2006). Indexicals: Philosophical Aspect. In Keith Brown (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Elsevier
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  21. Eros Corazza (2003). Demonstratives Qua Singular Terms. Erkenntnis 59:263-283.
    In a recent book, Jeffrey King argues that complex demonstratives, i.e., noun phrases of the form 'this/that _F', are not singular terms. As such, they are not devices of direct reference contributing the referent to the proposition expressed. In this essay I challenge King's position and show how a direct reference view can handle the data he proposes in favor of the quantificational account. I argue that when a complex demonstrative cannot be interpreted as a singular term, it is best (...)
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  22. Eros Corazza, William Fish & Jonathan Gorvett (2004). Who Is I? Philosophical Studies 107 (1):1-21.
    Whilst it may seem strange to ask to whom "I" refers, we show that there are occasions when it is not always obvious. In demonstrating this we challenge Kaplan's assumption that the utterer, agent and referent of "I" are always the same person. We begin by presenting what we regard to be the received view about indexical reference popularized by David Kaplan in his influential 1972 "Demonstratives" before going on, in section 2, to discuss Sidelle's answering machine paradox which may (...)
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  23. Wayne Davis (2013). Indexicals and 'de Se'attitudes. In A. Capone & N. Feit (eds.), Attitudes de Se. University of Chicago 29--58.
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  24. Maximilian de Gaynesford (2006). I: The Meaning of the First Person Term. Clarendon Press.
    I is perhaps the most important and the least understood of our everyday expressions. This is a constant source of philosophical confusion. Max de Gaynesford offers a remedy: he explains what this expression means. He thereby shows the way to an understanding of how we express first-personal thinking. The book thus not only resolves a key issue in philosophy of language, but promises to be of great use to people working on problems in other areas of philosophy.
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  25. Richard Charles Devidi (1996). Frege on Indexicals: Sense and Context Sensitivity. Dissertation, The University of Western Ontario (Canada)
    Indexical expressions--e.g., 'I', 'here', 'yesterday', 'this', etc.--pose a serious challenge for a Fregean theory of meaning. A Fregean theory holds that the meaning of an expression is its sense, and that this sense determines the reference of the expression independently of context. The most notable feature of indexicals, however, is their sensitivity to context. David Kaplan and John Perry argue that there can be no Fregean solution to this issue. They assume that the Fregean sense of a singular term is (...)
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  26. Philip E. Devine (1990). What's the Meaning of "This"? Review of Metaphysics 44 (1):131-132.
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  27. Imogen Dickie (2014). The Sortal Dependence of Demonstrative Reference. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (1):34-60.
    : ‘Sortalism about demonstrative reference’ is the view that the capacity to refer to things demonstratively rests on the capacity to classify them according to their kinds. This paper argues for one form of sortalism. Section 1 distinguishes two sortalist views. Section 2 argues that one of them is false. Section 3 argues that the other is true. Section 4 uses the argument from Section 3 to develop a new response to the objection to sortalism from examples where we seem (...)
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  28. H. Diesse (2006). Demonstratives. In Keith Brown (ed.), Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Elsevier
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  29. Julian Dodd (1997). Indirect Speech, Parataxis and the Nature of Things Said. Journal of Philosophical Research 22:211-227.
    This paper makes the following recommendation when it comes to the IogicaI form of sentences in indirect speech. Davidson’s paratactic account shouId stand, but with one emendation: the demonstrative ‘that’ should be taken to refer to the Fregean Thought expressed by the utterance of the content-sentence, rather than to that utterance itseIf. The argument for this emendation is that it is the onIy way of repIying to the objections to Davidson’s account raised by Schiffer, McFetridge and McDowell.Towards the end of (...)
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  30. Stefano Pred Elli (2001). You Just Can't Tell: An Analysis of the Non-Specific Use of Indexicals. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 6 (2):103-118.
    In this paper I provide a semantic analysis of non-specific uses of indexical expressions, such as "you" in typical utterances of "you just can't tell". My treatment employs independently motivated conceptual tools, such as the treatment of generics within Discourse Representation Theory, and the distinction between context of utterance and context of interpretation.
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  31. Mark Whitsey Eros Corazza (2003). Indexicals, Fictions, and Ficta. Dialectica 57 (2):121-136.
    We defend the view that an indexical uttered by an actor works on the model of deferred reference. If it defers to a character which does not exist, it is an empty term, just as‘Hamlet’and‘Ophelia’are. The utterance in which it appears does not express a proposition and thus lacks a truth value. We advocate an ontologically parsimonious, anti‐realist, position. We show how the notion of truth in our use and understanding of indexicals as they appear within a fiction is not (...)
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  32. Achim Eschbach (1984). Bühler-Studien.
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  33. Maite Ezcurdia (2002). Indexicals and Demonstratives. In Lynn Nadel (ed.), The Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan
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  34. Graeme Forbes (2003). Indexicals. In D. Gabbay & F. Guenther (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic Vol. 10. Kluwer 101--134.
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  35. Graeme Forbes (1989). Indexicals. In Dov Gabbay & Franz Guenthner (eds.), Handbook of Philosophical Logic. Kluwer 463--490.
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  36. Manuel Garc'ıa-Carpintero (1998). Indexicals as Token-Reflexives. Mind 107 (427):529--563.
    Reichenbachian approaches to indexicality contend that indexicals are "token-reflexives": semantic rules associated with any given indexical-type determine the truth-conditional import of properly produced tokens of that type relative to certain relational properties of those tokens. Such a view may be understood as sharing the main tenets of Kaplan's well-known theory regarding content, or truth-conditions, but differs from it regarding the nature of the linguistic meaning of indexicals and also regarding the bearers of truth-conditional import and truth-conditions. Kaplan has criticized these (...)
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  37. M. García-Carpintero (1998). Indexicals as Token-Reflexives. Mind 107 (427):529-564.
    Reichenbachian approaches to indexicality contend that indexicals are "token-reflexives": semantic rules associated with any given indexical-type determine the truth-conditional import of properly produced tokens of that type relative to certain relational properties of those tokens. Such a view may be understood as sharing the main tenets of Kaplan's well-known theory regarding content, or truth-conditions, but differs from it regarding the nature of the linguistic meaning of indexicals and also regarding the bearers of truth-conditional import and truth-conditions. Kaplan has criticized these (...)
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  38. Manuel García-Carpintero (2005). The Real Distinction Between Descriptions and Indexicals. Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 24 (3):49-74.
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  39. Geoff Georgi, Demonstratives and Indexicals. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Demonstratives and Indexicals In the philosophy of language, an indexical is any expression whose content varies from one context of use to another. The standard list of indexicals includes pronouns such as “I”, “you”, “he”, “she”, “it”, “this”, “that”, plus adverbs such as “now”, “then”, “today”, “yesterday”, “here”, and “actually”. Other candidates include the tenses … Continue reading Demonstratives and Indexicals →.
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  40. Rebecca Hasselbach (2007). Demonstratives in Semitic. Journal of the American Oriental Society 127 (1):1-27.
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  41. D. H. Heidemann (2004). Indexicality and Linguistic Self-Reference in Hegel. Hegel-Studien 39:9-24.
  42. James Higginbotham (2002). Competence with Demonstratives. Philosophical Perspectives 16 (s16):1-16.
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  43. Harold T. Hodes (1984). Axioms for Actuality. Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (1):27 - 34.
  44. J. Hunter (2013). Presuppositional Indexicals. Journal of Semantics 30 (3):381-421.
    Kaplanian, two-dimensional theories secure rigidity for indexicals by positing special contexts and semantic mechanisms reserved only for indexicals. The result is a deep and unexplained chasm between expressions that depend on the extra-linguistic context and expressions that depend on the discourse context. Theories that treat indexicals as anaphoric, presuppositional expressions (e.g., Zeevat 1999; Roberts 2002; Hunter & Asher 2005; Maier 2006, 2009) have the potential to be more minimal and general than Kaplanian, two-dimensional theories—the mechanism of presupposition, unlike that of (...)
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  45. Peter Van Inwagen (1980). Indexicality and Actuality. Philosophical Review 89 (3):403 - 426.
  46. Dale Jacquette (1999). Demonstratives and the Logic of the Self. Philosophical Papers 28 (1):1-23.
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  47. H. Kamp & A. Roßdeutscher (2004). Comments on Kaplan's “Demonstratives” and Zimmermann's “Tertiumne Datur? Possessive Pronouns and the Bipartition of the Lexicon”. In Hans Kamp & Barbara Hall Partee (eds.), Context-Dependence in the Analysis of Linguistic Meaning. Elsevier 431--458.
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  48. David Kaplan (1990). Thoughts on Demonstratives. In Palle Yourgrau (ed.), Demonstratives. Oxford University Press 34-49.
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  49. David Kaplani (2013). 6. Demonstratives. In Maite Ezcurdia & Robert J. Stainton (eds.), The Semantics-Pragmatics Boundary in Philosophy. Broadview Press 83.
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  50. Brendan Lalor (1997). Rethinking Kaplan's ''Afterthoughts'' About 'That': An Exorcism of Semantical Demons. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 47 (1):67-87.
    Kaplan (1977) proposes a neo-Fregean theory of demonstratives which, despite its departure from a certain problematic Fregean thesis, I argue, ultimately founders on account of its failure to give up the Fregean desideratum of a semantic theory that it provide an account of cognitive significance. I explain why Kaplan's (1989) afterthoughts don't remedy this defect. Finally, I sketch an alternative nonsolipsistic picture of demonstrative reference which idealizes away from an agent's narrowly characterizable psychological state, and instead relies on the robust (...)
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