This category needs an editor. We encourage you to help if you are qualified.
Volunteer, or read more about what this involves.
Related categories
Siblings:
97 found
Search inside:
(import / add options)   Sort by:
1 — 50 / 97
  1. Barbara Abbott, Some Remarks on Indicative Conditionals.
    We will look at several theories of indicative conditionals grouped into three categories: those that base its semantics on its logical counterpart (the material conditional); intensional analyses, which bring in alternative possible worlds; and a third subgroup which denies that indicative conditionals express propositions at all. We will also look at some problems for each kind of approach.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Ernest Adams (1966). ``Probability and the Logic of Conditionals&Quot. In Jaakko Hintikka & Patrick Suppes (eds.), Aspects of Inductive Logic. Amsterdam: North-Holland. 165-316.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Ernest W. Adams (1981). Transmissible Improbabilities and Marginal Essentialness of Premises in Inferences Involving Indicative Conditionals. Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (2):149 - 177.
  4. Ernest W. Adams (1977). A Note on Comparing Probabilistic and Modal Logics of Conditionals. Theoria 43 (3):186-194.
  5. Ernest W. Adams (1975). The Logic of Conditionals: An Application of Probability to Deductive Logic. D. Reidel Pub. Co..
    THE INDICATIVE CONDITIONAL. A PROBABILISTIC CRITERION OF SOUNDNESS FOR DEDUCTIVE INFERENCES Our objective in this section is to establish a prima facie case ...
    Remove from this list | Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Rani Lill Anjum (2012). What's Wrong with Logic? Argumentos 4 (8).
    The truth functional account of conditional statements ‘if A then B’ is not only inadequate; it eliminates the very conditionality expressed by ‘if’. Focusing only on the truth-values of the statements ‘A’ and ‘B’ and different combinations of these, one is bound to miss out on the conditional relation expressed between them. All approaches that treat conditionals as functions of their antecedents and consequents will end up in some sort of logical atomism where causal matters simply are reduced to the (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. Anthony Appiah (1984). Generalising the Probabilistic Semantics of Conditionals. Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (4):351 - 372.
    If assertibility rules are to be important in semantic theory, hypotheses such as this one will need to beiinvestigated. And Slote's observation (see note 12) that what matters for assertibility is not belief but knowledge will turn out to have powerful consequences.Adams' rule is the first well understood assertibility rule in philosophical semantics. I think we should be led by its successes to look for more. In this paper, I have built on his assertibility rule and offered two more. But (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Horacio Arlo-Costa, Belief Revision Conditionals: Models of Suppositional.
    It is now well known that, on pain of triviality, the probability of a conditional cannot be identified with the corresponding conditional probability [27]. This surprising impossibility result has a qualitative counterpart. In fact, Peter Gardenfors showed in [13] that believing 'If A then B' cannot be equated with the act of believing B on the supposition that A.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Horacio Arlo-Costa, Belief Revision Conditionals: Basic Iterated.
    Recent work has shown that in spite of these negative results, the question 'how to accept a conditional?' has a clear answer. Even if conditionals are not truth-carriers, they do have precise acceptability conditions. Nevertheless most epistemic models of conditionals do not provide acceptance conditions for iterated conditionals. One of the main goals of this essay is to provide a comprehensive account of the notion of epistemic conditionality covering all forms of iteration.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Horacio Arlo-Costa, Belief Revision Conditionals: Basic Iterated Systems.
    It is now well known that, on pain of triviality, the probability of a conditional cannot be identified with the corresponding conditional probability [25]. This surprising impossibility result has a qualitative counterpart. In fact, Peter Gärdenfors showed in [13] that believing ‘If A then B’ cannot be equated with the act of believing B on the supposition that A — as long as supposing obeys minimal Bayesian constraints. Recent work has shown that in spite of these negative results, the question (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Horacio Arlo-Costa, Belief Revision Conditionals: Models of Suppositional Reasoning.
  12. Andrew Bacon, In Defence of a Naïve Conditional Epistemology.
    Numerous triviality results have been directed at a collection of views that tie the probability of a conditional sentence to the conditional probability of the consequent on its antecedent. -/- In this paper I argue that this identification makes little sense if conditional sentences are context sensitive. The best alternative, I argue, is a version of the thesis which states that if your total evidence is E then the evidential probability of a conditional evaluated in a context where E is (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Andrew Bacon (forthcoming). Stalnaker's Thesis in Context. Review of Symbolic Logic.
    In this paper I present a precise version of Stalnaker's thesis and show that it is both consistent and predicts our intuitive judgments about the probabilities of conditionals. The thesis states that someone whose total evidence is E should have the same credence in the proposition expressed by 'if A then B' in a context where E is salient as they have conditional credence in the proposition B expresses given the proposition A expresses in that context. The thesis is formalised (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Helen Beebee (1998). Review of Skyrms & Eells (Eds.), Probabilities & Conditionals. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1).
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Craig Boutilier (1996). Iterated Revision and Minimal Change of Conditional Beliefs. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):263 - 305.
    We describe a model of iterated belief revision that extends the AGM theory of revision to account for the effect of a revision on the conditional beliefs of an agent. In particular, this model ensures that an agent makes as few changes as possible to the conditional component of its belief set. Adopting the Ramsey test, minimal conditional revision provides acceptance conditions for arbitrary right-nested conditionals. We show that problem of determining acceptance of any such nested conditional can be reduced (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. R. Bradley (2012). Multidimensional Possible-World Semantics for Conditionals. Philosophical Review 121 (4):539-571.
    Adams’s Thesis, the claim that the probabilities of indicative conditionals equal the conditional probabilities of their consequents given their antecedents, has proven impossible to accommodate within orthodox possible-world semantics. This essay proposes a modification to the orthodoxy that removes this impossibility. The starting point is a proposal by Jeffrey and Stalnaker that conditionals take semantic values in the unit interval, interpreting these (à la McGee) as their expected truth-values at a world. Their theories imply a false principle, namely, that the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Richard Bradley (2006). Adams Conditionals and Non-Monotonic Probabilities. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 15 (1-2):65-81.
    Adams' famous thesis that the probabilities of conditionals are conditional probabilities is incompatible with standard probability theory. Indeed it is incompatible with any system of monotonic conditional probability satisfying the usual multiplication rule for conditional probabilities. This paper explores the possibility of accommodating Adams' thesis in systems of non-monotonic probability of varying strength. It shows that such systems impose many familiar lattice theoretic properties on their models as well as yielding interesting logics of conditionals, but that a standard complementation operation (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Richard Bradley (2002). Indicative Conditionals. Erkenntnis 56 (3):345-378.
    Adams Thesis has much evidence in its favour, but David Lewis famously showed that it cannot be true, in all but the most trivial of cases, if conditionals are proprositions and their probabilities are classical probabilities of truth. In this paper I show thatsimilar results can be constructed for a much wider class of conditionals. The fact that these results presuppose that the logic of conditionals is Boolean motivates a search for a non-Boolean alternative. It is argued that the exact (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Richard Bradley (2000). A Preservation Condition for Conditionals. Analysis 60 (3):219–222.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (11 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Richard Bradley (2000). Conditionals and the Logic of Decision. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):32.
    In this paper Richard Jeffrey's 'Logic of Decision' is extended by examination of agents' attitudes to the sorts of possibilities identified by indicative conditional sentences. An expression for the desirability of conditionals is proposed and, along with Adams' thesis that the probability of a conditional equals the conditional probability of its antecedent given its consequent, is defended by informally deriving it from Jeffrey's notion of desirability and some weak constraints on rational preference for conditional possibilities. Finally a statement is given (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Richard Bradley (1999). More Triviality. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (2):129-139.
    This paper uses the framework of Popper and Miller's work on axiom systems for conditional probabilities to explore Adams' thesis concerning the probabilities of conditionals. It is shown that even very weak axiom systems have only a very restricted set of models satisfying a natural generalisation of Adams' thesis, thereby casting severe doubt on the possibility of developing a non-Boolean semantics for conditionals consistent with it.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Ian F. Carlstrom & Christopher S. Hill (1978). Book Review:The Logic of Conditionals Ernest W. Adams. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 45 (1):155-.
  23. Daniel Dohrn, DeRose on the Conditionals of Deliberation.
    I take issue with two claims of DeRose: Conditionals of deliberation must not depend on backtracking grounds. ‘Were’ed-up conditionals coincide with future-directed indicative conditionals; the only difference in their meaning is that they must not depend on backtracking grounds. I use Egan’s counterexamples to causal decision theory to contest the first and an example of backtracking reasoning by David Lewis to contest the second claim. I tentatively outline a rivaling account of ‘were’ed-up conditionals which combines features of the standard analysis (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Daniel Dohrn, What Zif.
    In a series of articles, David Barnett (2006, 2009, 2010) has developed a general theory of conditionals. The grand aim is to reconcile the two main rivals: a suppositional and a truth-conditional view (Barnett 2006, 521). While I confine my critical discussion to counterfactuals, I will give some hints how they might spell trouble for his suppositional view in general.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Frank Döring (1996). On the Probabilities of Conditionals. Philosophical Review 105 (2):231-231.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Frank Doring (1996). Correction: On the Probabilities of Conditionals. Philosophical Review 105 (2):231.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Frank Doring (1994). On the Probabilities of Conditionals. Philosophical Review 103 (4):689-700.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Igor Douven (2010). Ramsey's Test, Adams' Thesis, and Left-Nested Conditionals. Review of Symbolic Logic 3 (3):467-484.
    Adams famously suggested that the acceptability of any indicative conditional whose antecedent and consequent are both factive sentences amounts to the subjective conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. The received view has it that this thesis offers an adequate partial explication of Ramseys test is extendible to left-nested conditionals, that is, conditionals whose antecedent is itself conditional in form. We argue that this interpretation of van Fraassen thesis for left-nested conditionals.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Igor Douven (2008). Kaufmann on the Probabilities of Conditionals. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (3):259 - 266.
    Kaufmann has recently argued that the thesis according to which the probability of an indicative conditional equals the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent under certain specifiable circumstances deviates from intuition. He presents a method for calculating the probability of a conditional that does seem to give the intuitively correct result under those circumstances. However, the present paper shows that Kaufmann’s method is inconsistent in that it may lead one to assign different probabilities to a single conditional at (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Igor Douven (2007). On Bradley's Preservation Condition for Conditionals. Erkenntnis 67 (1):111 - 118.
    Bradley has argued that a truth-conditional semantics for conditionals is incompatible with an allegedly very weak and intuitively compelling constraint on the interpretation of conditionals. I argue that the example Bradley offers to motivate this constraint can be explained along pragmatic lines that are compatible with the correctness of at least one popular truth-conditional semantics for conditionals.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Igor Douven & Sara Verbrugge (2013). The Probabilities of Conditionals Revisited. Cognitive Science 37 (4):711-730.
    According to what is now commonly referred to as “the Equation” in the literature on indicative conditionals, the probability of any indicative conditional equals the probability of its consequent of the conditional given the antecedent of the conditional. Philosophers widely agree in their assessment that the triviality arguments of Lewis and others have conclusively shown the Equation to be tenable only at the expense of the view that indicative conditionals express propositions. This study challenges the correctness of that assessment by (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Simone Duca (2011). Introduction to the Special Issue: Ramsey Test, Conditionals and Choices. Topoi.
    Test for the rational acceptance of conditionals and it still incites much of the interest in conditional reasoning. For instance, the test has been considered as a good starting point for several formal semantics for conditionals. Furthermore, its ramifications have important implications for several disciplines, from logic and artificial intelligence to decision theory and psychology. This volume presents a small but fine sample of the state of the art of such multifarious area of research.
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Dorothy Edgington (1996). Lowe on Conditional Probability. Mind 105 (420):617-630.
  34. Dorothy Edgington (1995). On Conditionals. Mind 104 (414):235-329.
  35. Dorothy Edgington (1986). Do Conditionals Have Truth-Conditions. Cr'itica 18 (52):3-30.
  36. Ellery Eells, Brian Skyrms & Ernest W. Adams (eds.) (1994). Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. Cambridge University Press.
    This is a 'state of the art' collection of essays on the relation between probabilities, especially conditional probabilities, and conditionals. It provides new negative results which sharply limit the ways conditionals can be related to conditional probabilities. There are also positive ideas and results which will open up new areas of research. The collection is intended to honour Ernest W. Adams, whose seminal work is largely responsible for creating this area of inquiry. As well as describing, evaluating, and applying Adams' (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. David Etlin (2009). The Problem of Noncounterfactual Conditionals. Philosophy of Science 76 (5):676-688.
    I defend a formulation of the Ramsey Test with a condition for accepting negations of conditionals. It is implicit in the assumptions of the triviality theorems of Gärdenfors, Harper, and Lewis; and it allows for a unified proof of those theorems, from weaker assumptions about belief revision. This leads to a proof of McGee’s thesis that iterated conditionals do not obey modus ponens. †To contact the author, please write to: Institute of Philosophy, University of Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, B‐3000 Leuven, (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. Bas C. Fraassen (1976). Representational of Conditional Probabilities. Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (3):417 - 430.
  39. A. J. B. Fugard, Niki Pfeifer & B. Mayerhofer (2011). Probabilistic Theories of Reasoning Need Pragmatics Too: Modulating Relevance in Uncertain Conditionals. Journal of Pragmatics 43:2034–2042.
    According to probabilistic theories of reasoning in psychology, people's degree of belief in an indicative conditional `if A, then B' is given by the conditional probability, P(B|A). The role of language pragmatics is relatively unexplored in the new probabilistic paradigm. We investigated how consequent relevance a ects participants' degrees of belief in conditionals about a randomly chosen card. The set of events referred to by the consequent was either a strict superset or a strict subset of the set of events referred (...)
    Remove from this list |
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. A. J. B. Fugard, Niki Pfeifer, B. Mayerhofer & G. D. Kleiter (2011). How People Interpret Conditionals: Shifts Towards the Conditional Event. Journal of Experimental Psychology 37 (3):635-648.
    We investigated how people interpret conditionals and how stable their interpretation is over a long series of trials. Participants were shown the colored patterns on each side of a six-sided die, and were asked how sure they were that a conditional holds of the side landing upwards when the die is randomly thrown. Participants were presented with 71 trials consisting of all combinations of binary dimensions of shape (e.g., circles and squares) and color (e.g., blue and red) painted onto the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. A. J. B. Fugard, Niki Pfeifer, B. Mayerhofer & G. D. Kleiter (2009). How People Interpret an Uncertain If. In T. Kroupa & J. Vejnarova (eds.), Proceedings of the 8th Workshop on Uncertainty Processing. 80-91.
    Conditionals are central to inference. Before people can draw inferences about a natural language conditional, they must interpret its meaning. We investigated interpretation of uncertain conditionals using a probabilistic truth table task, focussing on (i) conditional event, (ii) material conditional, and (iii) conjunction interpretations. The order of object (shape) and feature (color) in each conditional's antecedent and consequent was varied between participants. The conditional event was the dominant interpretation, followed by conjunction, and took longer to process than conjunction (mean di erence (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. A. J. B. Fugard, Niki Pfeifer, B. Mayerhofer & Gernot D. Kleiter (2011). How People Interpret Conditionals: Shifts Towards the Conditional Event. Journal of Experimental Psychology 37 (3):635-648.
    We investigated how people interpret conditionals and how stable their interpretation is over a long series of trials. Participants were shown the colored patterns on each side of a six-sided die, and were asked how sure they were that a conditional holds of the side landing upwards when the die is randomly thrown. Participants were presented with 71 trials consisting of all combinations of binary dimensions of shape (e.g., circles and squares) and color (e.g., blue and red) painted onto the (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Alan Hájek (2012). The Fall of “Adams' Thesis”? Journal of Logic, Language and Information 21 (2):145-161.
    The so-called ‘Adams’ Thesis’ is often understood as the claim that the assertibility of an indicative conditional equals the corresponding conditional probability—schematically: $${({\rm AT})}\qquad\qquad\quad As(A\rightarrow B)=P({B|A}),{\rm provided}\quad P(A)\neq 0.$$ The Thesis is taken by many to be a touchstone of any theorizing about indicative conditionals. Yet it is unclear exactly what the Thesis is . I suggest some precise statements of it. I then rebut a number of arguments that have been given in its favor. Finally, I offer a new (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Alan Hájek (1989). Probabilities of Conditionals — Revisited. Journal of Philosophical Logic 18 (4):423 - 428.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. J. Y. Halpern (2000). Probability and Conditionals: Belief Revision and Rational Decision. Philosophical Review 109 (2):277-281.
  46. B. Hill (2012). Defending the Ramsey Test: What is Wrong with Preservation? Mind 121 (481):131-146.
    In ‘A Defence of the Ramsey Test’, Richard Bradley makes a case for not concluding from the famous impossibility results regarding the Ramsey Test — the thesis that a rational agent believes a conditional if he would believe the consequent upon learning the antecedent — that the thesis is false. He lays the blame instead on one of the other premisses in these results, namely the Preservation condition. In this paper, we explore how this condition can be weakened by strengthening (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. K. Hutchison (1999). What Are Conditional Probabilities Conditional Upon? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (4):665-695.
    This paper rejects a traditional epistemic interpretation of conditional probability. Suppose some chance process produces outcomes X, Y,..., with probabilities P(X), P(Y),... If later observation reveals that outcome Y has in fact been achieved, then the probability of outcome X cannot normally be revised to P(X|Y) ['P&Y)/P(Y)]. This can only be done in exceptional circumstances - when more than just knowledge of Y-ness has been attained. The primary reason for this is that the weight of a piece of evidence varies (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. Frank Jackson (1987). Conditionals. Blackwell.
  49. Frank Jackson (1979). On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals. Philosophical Review 88 (4):565-589.
    I defend the view that the truth conditions of the ordinary indicative conditional are those of the material conditional. This is done via a discussion of assertability and by appeal to conventional implicature rather than conversational implicature.
    Remove from this list | Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Matthew P. Johnson & Rohit Parikh (2008). Probabilistic Conditionals Are Almost Monotonic. Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (1):73-80.
    One interpretation of the conditional If P then Q is as saying that the probability of Q given P is high. This is an interpretation suggested by Adams (1966) and pursued more recently by Edgington (1995). Of course, this probabilistic conditional is nonmonotonic, that is, if the probability of Q given P is high, and R implies P, it need not follow that the probability of Q given R is high. If we were confident of concluding Q from the fact (...)
    Remove from this list | Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
1 — 50 / 97