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  1. R. B. Angell (1962). A Propositional Logic with Subjunctive Conditionals. Journal of Symbolic Logic 27 (3):327-343.
  2. Diane Barense (1988). On the Tense Structure of Conditionals. Philosophy Research Archives 14:539-566.
    When philosophers and linguists theorize about the nature of conditionals, they tend to make a number of assumptions about the linguistic structure of these sentences. For example, they almost invariably assume that conditionals have “antecedents” and “consequents” and that these have the structure of independent clauses. With a few exceptions, they assume that conditionals are categorized according to whether they are in the “indicative” or the “subjunctive” “mood”. However, rarely do they formulate criteria for identifying these moods, or for distinguishing (...)
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  3. David Barnett (2012). Future Conditionals and DeRose's Thesis. Mind 121 (482):407-442.
    In deciding whether to read this paper, it might seem reasonable for you to base your decision on your confidence (i) that, if you read this paper, you will become a better person. It might also seem reasonable for you to base your decision on your confidence (ii) that, if you were to read this paper, you would become a better person. Is there a difference between (i) and (ii)? If so, are you rationally required to base your decision on (...)
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  4. Jonathan Bennett (1995). Classifying Conditionals: The Traditional Way is Right. Mind 104 (414):331-354.
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  5. Jonathan Bennett (1988). Farewell to the Phlogiston Theory of Conditionals. Mind 97 (388):509-527.
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  6. Ross Cogan (1996). Opting Out: Bennett on Classifying Conditionals. Analysis 56 (3):142–145.
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  7. Charles B. Cross (2002). Doesn't-Will and Didn't-Did. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1):101 – 106.
    In "Against the Indicative," AUSTRALASIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 72 (1994): 17-26, and more recently in "Classifying `Conditionals': the Traditional Way is Wrong", ANALYSIS 60 (2000): 147, V.H. Dudman argues that (a) `If Oswald didn't shoot Kennedy then someone else did' and (b) `If Oswald doesn't shoot Kennedy then someone else will' should not be classified together as "indicative conditionals." Dudman relies on the assumption that (a) is entailed by (c) `Someone shot Kennedy', whereas (b) is not entailed by (d) `Someone (...)
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  8. A. J. Dale & A. Tanesini (1989). Why Are Italians More Reasonable Than Australians? Analysis 49 (4):189 - 194.
  9. Wayne A. Davis (1980). Lowe on Indicative and Counterfactual Conditionals. Analysis 40 (4):184 - 186.
    Lowe claims that "if oswald did not kill kennedy, someone else did" is a material conditional. he also claims that the difference in truth-value between this indicative conditional and the subjunctive "if oswald had not killed kennedy, someone else would have" does not support the conclusion of lewis and others that corresponding indicative and subjunctive conditionals are not always equivalent. i dispute both claims.
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  10. Wayne A. Davis (1979). Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals. Philosophical Review 88 (4):544-564.
    The idea that english has more than one declarative "mood" has been dismissed as superstitious by empirically-minded grammarians of english for centuries--with such spectacular unsuccess, however, that the indicative/subjunctive dichotomy stands today as a cornerstone for philosophical and logical speculation about "conditionals." let me be next into the breach. i shall urge that there is no grammatical basis for any such distinction. and as for the particular adjudications of mood logicians and philosophers actually propose, there is neither rhyme nor reason (...)
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  11. K. DeRose (2012). Conditionals, Literal Content, and 'DeRose's Thesis': A Reply to Barnett. Mind 121 (482):443-455.
    Against Barnett (2012), I argue that the theory I advance in DeRose 2010 is best construed as one on which ‘"were"ed-up’ future-directed conditionals like ‘If the house were not to be painted, it would soon look quite shabby’ are, in ways important to how they function in deliberation, different in literal content from their ‘straightforward’ counterparts like ‘If the house is not painted, it will soon look quite shabby’. I also defend my way of classifying future-directed conditionals against an attack (...)
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  12. Keith DeRose, The Conditionals of Deliberation + Whither Middle Knowledge?
    Work in progress. Will probably split into two papers, and then, perhaps, later, will be brought back together, along with other material, into something larger. (All this only if it works out OK!).
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  13. Keith DeRose (2010). The Conditionals of Deliberation. Mind 119 (473):1 - 42.
    Practical deliberation often involves conditional judgements about what will (likely) happen if certain alternatives are pursued. It is widely assumed that the conditionals useful in deliberation are counterfactual or subjunctive conditionals. Against this, I argue that the conditionals of deliberation are indicatives. Key to the argument is an account of the relation between 'straightforward' future-directed conditionals like ' If the house is not painted, it will soon look quite shabby' and * "w e r e ' ' e d F (...)
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  14. Keith DeRose (2010). ``The Conditionals of Deliberation&Quot. Mind 119:1-42.
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  15. Daniel Dohrn, DeRose on the Conditionals of Deliberation.
    I take issue with two claims of DeRose: Conditionals of deliberation must not depend on backtracking grounds. ‘Were’ed-up conditionals coincide with future-directed indicative conditionals; the only difference in their meaning is that they must not depend on backtracking grounds. I use Egan’s counterexamples to causal decision theory to contest the first and an example of backtracking reasoning by David Lewis to contest the second claim. I tentatively outline a rivaling account of ‘were’ed-up conditionals which combines features of the standard analysis (...)
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  16. V. H. Dudman (2001). Three Twentieth-Century Commonplaces About 'If'. History and Philosophy of Logic 22 (3):119-127.
    The commonplaces, all grammatically confused, are that ?conditionals? are ternary in structure, have ?antecedents? and conform to the traditional taxonomy. It is maintained en route that ?The bough will not break? is consistent with ?If the bough breaks ??, that there is no logical difference between ?future indicatives? and ?subjunctives?, and that there is a difference between the logic of propositions (e.g. ?The bough broke?) and that of judgments (?The bough will/might/could/should/must/needn't break?).
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  17. V. H. Dudman (2000). Classifying ‘Conditionals’: The Traditional Way is Wrong. Analysis 60 (266):147–147.
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  18. V. H. Dudman (1998). On the Grammar of Conditionals: Reply to Barker. Analysis 58 (4):277–285.
    Received doctrine has an 'antecedent' message encoded within a conditional clause, such as the string comprising the first five words of the sentence 'If the bough had broken the cradle would have fallen'. Criticisms of mine of this tenet were recently challenged by Stephen Barker. In the course of responding to his examination, I venture a snappy demonstration that the 'conditionals' such sentences encode can have neither 'antecedents' nor 'consequents'. Also, less happily, I urge a binary outermost structure for these (...)
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  19. V. H. Dudman (1994). Against the Indicative. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (1):17 – 26.
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  20. V. H. Dudman (1994). On Conditionals. Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):113-128.
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  21. V. H. Dudman (1992). A Popular Presumption Refuted. Journal of Philosophy 89 (8):431-432.
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  22. V. H. Dudman (1989). Vive la Revolution! Mind 98 (392):591-603.
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  23. Robert J. Fogelin (1998). David Lewis on Indicative and Counterfactual Conditionals. Analysis 58 (4):286–289.
    David Lewis has argued that there must be a difference between indicative and counterfactual conditionals beyond an indication of truth-value commitments. He cites the following contrast to show this: If Oswald did not shoot Kennedy, then someone else did. If Oswald had not shot Kennedy, then someone else would have. In response, it is shown that this difference is better explained by shifts in context. Keep context fixed, the contrast disappears. EG: If Oswald was not the one who shot Kennedy, (...)
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  24. Frank Jackson (1990). Classifying Conditionals. Analysis 50 (2):134-147.
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  25. E. J. Lowe (1979). Indicative and Counterfactual Conditionals. Analysis 39 (3):139 - 141.
  26. Adam Morton (2004). Indicative Versus Subjunctive in Future Conditionals. Analysis 64 (4):289–293.
    I present examples of future tense Adams pairs, pairs of conditionals relating the same antecedents and consequents which differ in truth value because one is an indicative conditional and one a subjunctive (counterfactual) conditional. This contradicts claims of Jonathan Bennett and others. I argue that the pairs do differ in that one is indicative and the other subjunctive, by appealing to several ways of marking this distinction.
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  27. Niki Pfeifer & G. D. Kleiter (2006). Is Human Reasoning About Nonmonotonic Conditionals Probabilistically Coherent? In Proceedings of the 7 T H Workshop on Uncertainty Processing. 138--150.
    Nonmonotonic conditionals (A |∼ B) are formalizations of common sense expressions of the form “if A, normally B”. The nonmonotonic conditional is interpreted by a “high” coherent conditional probability, P(B|A) > .5. Two important properties are closely related to the nonmonotonic conditional: First, A |∼ B allows for exceptions. Second, the rules of the nonmonotonic system p guiding A |∼ B allow for withdrawing conclusions in the light of new premises. This study reports a series of three experiments on reasoning (...)
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  28. William B. Starr (2013). A Uniform Theory of Conditionals. Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-46.
    A uniform theory of conditionals is one which compositionally captures the behavior of both indicative and subjunctive conditionals without positing ambiguities. This paper raises new problems for the closest thing to a uniform analysis in the literature (Stalnaker, Philosophia, 5, 269–286 (1975)) and develops a new theory which solves them. I also show that this new analysis provides an improved treatment of three phenomena (the import-export equivalence, reverse Sobel-sequences and disjunctive antecedents). While these results concern central issues in the study (...)
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  29. Eric Swanson (2013). Subjunctive Biscuit and Stand-Off Conditionals. Philosophical Studies 163 (3):637-648.
    Conventional wisdom has it that many intriguing features of indicative conditionals aren’t shared by subjunctive conditionals. Subjunctive morphology is common in discussions of wishes and wants, however, and conditionals are commonly used in such discussions as well. As a result such discussions are a good place to look for subjunctive conditionals that exhibit features usually associated with indicatives alone. Here I offer subjunctive versions of J. L. Austin’s ‘biscuit’ conditionals—e.g., “There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them”—and subjunctive (...)
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  30. Kai von Fintel, The Presupposition of Subjunctive Conditionals.
    Why are some conditionals subjunctive? It is often assumed that at least one crucial difference is that subjunctive conditionals presuppose that their antecedent is false, that they are counterfactual (Lakoff 1970). The traditional theory has apparently been refuted. Perhaps the clearest counter-example is one given by Alan Anderson (1951: 37): If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown just exactly those symptoms which he does in fact show. A typical place to use such a subjunctive conditional would be in (...)
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  31. Brian Weatherson (2001). Indicatives and Subjunctives. Philosophical Quarterly 51:200--216.
    This paper presents a new theory of the truth conditions for indicative conditionals. The theory allows us to give a fairly unified account of the semantics for indicative and subjunctive conditionals, though there remains a distinction between the two classes. Put simply, the idea behind the theory is that the distinction between the indicative and the subjunctive parallels the distinction between the necessary and the a priori. Since that distinction is best understood formally using the resources of two-dimensional modal logic, (...)
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  32. Brian Weatherson (2001). Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):200-216.
    This paper presents a new theory of the truth conditions for indicative conditionals. The theory allows us to give a fairly unified account of the semantics for indicative and subjunctive conditionals, though there remains a distinction between the two classes. Put simply, the idea behind the theory is that the distinction between the indicative and the subjunctive parallels the distinction between the necessary and the a priori. Since that distinction is best understood formally using the resources of two-dimensional modal logic, (...)
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  33. Timothy Williamson (2009). Conditionals and Actuality. Erkenntnis 70 (2):135 - 150.
    It is known that indicative and subjunctive conditionals interact differently with a rigidifying "actually" operator. The paper studies this difference in an abstract setting. It does not assume the framework of possible world semantics, characterizing "actually" instead by the type of logically valid formulas to which it gives rise. It is proved that in a language with such features all sentential contexts that are congruential (in the sense that they preserve logical equivalence) are extensional (in the sense that they preserve (...)
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  34. Timothy Williamson (2006). Indicative Versus Subjunctive Conditionals, Congruential Versus Non-Hyperintensional Contexts. Philosophical Issues 16 (1):310–333.
    §0. A familiar if obscure idea: an indicative conditional presents its consequent as holding in the actual world on the supposition that its antecedent so holds, whereas a subjunctive conditional merely presents its consequent as holding in a world, typically counterfactual, in which its antecedent holds. Consider this pair.
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