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Subcategories:History/traditions: Induction
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  1. Peter Achinstein (2010). The War on Induction: Whewell Takes On Newton and Mill (Norton Takes On Everyone). Philosophy of Science 77 (5):728-739.
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  2. Robert Ackermann (1961). Inductive Simplicity. Philosophy of Science 28 (2):152-161.
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  3. Jonathan E. Adler (1977). Book Review:Local Induction Radu J. Bogdan. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 44 (1):173-.
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  4. Joseph Agassi (1990). Induction and Stochastic Independence. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (1):141-142.
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  5. Joseph Agassi (1959). Corroboration Versus Induction. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 9 (36):311-317.
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  6. E. M. Barth (1992). From an Empirical Point of View: The Empirical Turn in Logic. Communication & Cognition.
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  7. Diderik Batens (1975). Studies in the Logic of Induction and in the Logic of Explanation: Containing a New Theory of Meaning Relations. De Tempel.
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  8. Alexander Bird, (For Routledge Companion to Epistemology).
    In this article I take a loose, functional approach to defining induction: Inductive forms of reasoning include those prima facie reasonable inference patterns that one finds in science and elsewhere that are not clearly deductive. Inductive inference is often taken to be reasoning from the observed to the unobserved. But that is incorrect, since the premises of inductive inferences may themselves be the results of prior inductions. A broader conception of inductive inference regards any ampliative inference as inductive, where an (...)
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  9. Alexander Bird (2010). Eliminative Abduction: Examples From Medicine. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):345-352.
    Peter Lipton argues that inference to the best explanation involves the selection of a hypothesis on the basis of its loveliness. I argue that in optimal cases, a form of eliminative induction takes place, which I call ‘Holmesian inference’. I illustrate Holmesian inference by reference to examples from the history of medicine.
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  10. Ingo Brigandt (2010). Scientific Reasoning Is Material Inference: Combining Confirmation, Discovery, and Explanation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24 (1):31-43.
    Whereas an inference (deductive as well as inductive) is usually viewed as being valid in virtue of its argument form, the present paper argues that scientific reasoning is material inference, i.e., justified in virtue of its content. A material inference is licensed by the empirical content embodied in the concepts contained in the premises and conclusion. Understanding scientific reasoning as material inference has the advantage of combining different aspects of scientific reasoning, such as confirmation, discovery, and explanation. This approach explains (...)
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  11. Samir Chopra & Eric Martin (2002). Generalized Logical Consequence: Making Room for Induction in the Logic of Science. [REVIEW] Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (3):245-280.
    We present a framework that provides a logic for science by generalizing the notion of logical (Tarskian) consequence. This framework will introduce hierarchies of logical consequences, the first level of each of which is identified with deduction. We argue for identification of the second level of the hierarchies with inductive inference. The notion of induction presented here has some resonance with Popper's notion of scientific discovery by refutation. Our framework rests on the assumption of a restricted class of structures in (...)
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  12. F. John Clendinnen (1977). Inference, Practice and Theory. Synthese 34 (1):89 - 132.
    Reichenbach held that all scientific inference reduces, via probability calculus, to induction, and he held that induction can be justified. He sees scientific knowledge in a practical context and insists that any rational assessment of actions requires a justification of induction. Gaps remain in his justifying argument; for we can not hope to prove that induction will succeed if success is possible. However, there are good prospects for completing a justification of essentially the kind he sought by showing that while (...)
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  13. Aaron D. Cobb (2012). Inductivism in Practice: Experiment in John Herschel's Philosophy of Science. Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 2 (1):21-54.
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  14. L. Jonathan Cohen (1989). An Introduction to the Philosophy of Induction and Probability. Oxford University Press.
    Two new philosophical problems surrounding the gradation of certainty began to emerge in the 17th century and are still very much alive today. One is concerned with the evaluation of inductive reasoning, whether in science, jurisprudence, or elsewhere; the other with the interpretation of the mathematical calculus of change. This book, aimed at non-specialists, investigates both problems and the extent to which they are connected. Cohen demonstrates the diversity of logical structures that are available for judgements of probability, and explores (...)
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  15. L. Jonathan Cohen (1970). The Implications of Induction. London,Methuen.
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  16. David Danks, Equilibria of the Rescorla-Wagner Model.
    The Rescorla–Wagner model has been a leading theory of animal causal induction for nearly 30 years, and human causal induction for the past 15 years. Recent theories (especially Psychol. Rev. 104 (1997) 367) have provided alternative explanations of how people draw causal conclusions from covariational data. However, theoretical attempts to compare the Rescorla–Wagner model with more recent models have been hampered by the fact that the Rescorla–Wagner model is an algorithmic theory, while the more recent theories are all computational. This (...)
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  17. Georg J. W. Dorn (2002). Induktion und Wahrscheinlichkeit. Ein Gedankenaustausch mit Karl Popper. In Edgar Morscher (ed.), Was wir Karl R. Popper und seiner Philosophie verdanken. Zu seinem 100. Geburtstag. Academia Verlag.
    Zwischen 1987 und 1994 sandte ich 20 Briefe an Karl Popper. Die meisten betrafen Fragen bezüglich seiner Antiinduktionsbeweise und seiner Wahrscheinlichkeitstheorie, einige die organisatorische und inhaltliche Vorbereitung eines Fachgesprächs mit ihm in Kenly am 22. März 1989 (worauf hier nicht eingegangen werden soll), einige schließlich ganz oder in Teilen nicht-fachliche Angelegenheiten (die im vorliegenden Bericht ebenfalls unberücksichtigt bleiben). Von Karl Popper erhielt ich in diesem Zeitraum 10 Briefe. Der bedeutendste ist sein siebter, bestehend aus drei Teilen, geschrieben am 21., 22. (...)
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  18. Georg J. W. Dorn (1997). Deductive, Probabilistic and Inductive Dependence. An Axiomatic Study in Probability Semantics. Verlag Peter Lang.
    This work is in two parts. The main aim of part 1 is a systematic examination of deductive, probabilistic, inductive and purely inductive dependence relations within the framework of Kolmogorov probability semantics. The main aim of part 2 is a systematic comparison of (in all) 20 different relations of probabilistic (in)dependence within the framework of Popper probability semantics (for Kolmogorov probability semantics does not allow such a comparison). Added to this comparison is an examination of (in all) 15 purely inductive (...)
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  19. Georg J. W. Dorn (1995). Inductive Countersupport. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 26 (1):187 - 189.
    The basic idea by means of which Popper and Miller proved the non-existence of inductive probabilistic support in 1983/1985/1987, is used to prove that inductive probabilistic countersupport does exist. So it seems that after falsification has won over verification on the deductive side of science, countersupport wins over support on the inductive side.
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  20. Georg J. W. Dorn (1991). Inductive Support. In Gerhard Schurz & Georg J. W. Dorn (eds.), Advances in Scientific Philosophy. Essays in Honour of Paul Weingartner on the Occasion of the 60th Anniversary of his Birthday. Rodopi. 345.
    I set up two axiomatic theories of inductive support within the framework of Kolmogorovian probability theory. I call these theories ‘Popperian theories of inductive support’ because I think that their specific axioms express the core meaning of the word ‘inductive support’ as used by Popper (and, presumably, by many others, including some inductivists). As is to be expected from Popperian theories of inductive support, the main theorem of each of them is an anti-induction theorem, the stronger one of them saying, (...)
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  21. Steffen Ducheyne (2010). Whewell's Tidal Researches: Scientific Practice and Philosophical Methodology. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (1):26-40.
    Primarily between 1833 and 1840, Whewell attempted to accomplish what natural philosophers and scientists since at least Galileo had failed to do: to provide a systematic and broad-ranged study of the tides and to attempt to establish a general scientific theory of tidal phenomena. In the essay at hand, I document the close interaction between Whewell’s philosophy of science (especially his methodological views) and his scientific practice as a tidologist. I claim that the intertwinement between Whewell’s methodology and his tidology (...)
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  22. Steffen Ducheyne (2008). J.S. Mill's Canons of Induction: From True Causes to Provisional Ones. History and Philosophy of Logic 29 (4):361-376.
    In this essay, my aim is twofold: to clarify how the late Mill conceived of the certainty of inductive generalizations and to offer a systematic clarification of the limited domain of application of the Mill’s Canons of Induction. I shall argue that Mill’s views on the certainty of knowledge changed overtime and that this change was accompanied by a new view on the certainty of the inductive results yielded by the Canons of Induction. The key message of the later editions (...)
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  23. Roberto Festa (2003). Induction, Probability, and Bayesian Epistemology. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 80 (1):251-284.
    Finland is internationally known as one of the leading centers of twentieth century analytic philosophy. This volume offers for the first time an overall survey of the Finnish analytic school. The rise of this trend is illustrated by original articles of Edward Westermarck, Eino Kaila, Georg Henrik von Wright, and Jaakko Hintikka. Contributions of Finnish philosophers are then systematically discussed in the fields of logic, philosophy of language, philosophy of science, history of philosophy, ethics and social philosophy. Metaphilosophical reflections on (...)
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  24. Kenneth S. Friedman (1990). Predictive Simplicity: Induction Exhum'd. Pergamon Press.
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  25. Maria Carla Galavotti (2011). On Hans Reichenbach's Inductivism. Synthese 181 (1):95 - 111.
    One of the first to criticize the verifiability theory of meaning embraced by logical empiricists, Reichenbach ties the significance of scientific statements to their predictive character, which offers the condition for their testability. While identifying prediction as the task of scientific knowledge, Reichenbach assigns induction a pivotal role, and regards the theory of knowledge as a theory of prediction based on induction. Reichenbach's inductivism is grounded on the frequency notion of probability, of which he prompts a more flexible version than (...)
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  26. Ken Gemes (1987). The World in Itself: Neither Uniform nor Physical. Synthese 73 (2):301 - 318.
    Since Hume, philosophers of induction have debated the question of whether we have any reason for assuming that nature is uniform. This debate has always presumed that the uniformity hypothesis is itself coherent. In Part 1 of the following I argue that a proper appreciation of Nelson Goodman's so-called grue-green problem1 should lead us to the conclusion that the uniformity hypothesis, under its usual interpretation as a strictly ontological thesis, is incoherent. In Part 2 I argue that further consideration of (...)
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  27. T. R. Girill (1979). On the Comparison of Inductive Support with Deontic Requirement. Grazer Philosophische Studien 9:145-159.
    That the concepts of confirmation and requirement are very similar has recently been suggested by the discovery of four analogies between them. This conjecture is tested by comparing examples of each relation. I show that both of these relations can be "defeated" in two similar ways. But I also argue for two important dissimilarities between them: 1) when faced with certain inconsistencies, requirement suffers much more drastically than confirmation, and 2) confirmation is partiresultant in a sense in which requirement is (...)
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  28. Nelson Goodman (1983). Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Harvard University Press.
    In his new foreword to this edition, Hilary Putnam forcefully rejects these nativist claims.
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  29. Gilbert H. Harman (1968). Enumerative Induction as Inference to the Best Explanation. Journal of Philosophy 65 (18):529-533.
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  30. Gilbert H. Harman (1965). The Inference to the Best Explanation. Philosophical Review 74 (1):88-95.
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  31. David Harriman (2010). The Logical Leap: Induction in Physics. New American Library.
    The nature of concepts -- Generalizations as hierarchical -- Perceiving first-level causal connections -- Conceptualizing first-level causal connections -- The structure of inductive reasoning -- Galileo's kinematics -- Newton's optics -- The methods of difference and agreement -- Induction as inherent in conceptualization -- The birth of celestial physics -- Mathematics and causality -- The power of mathematics -- Proof of Kepler's theory -- The development of dynamics -- The discovery of universal gravitation -- Discovery is proof -- Chemical elements (...)
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  32. Stephen Hetherington (2001). Why There Need Not Be Any Grue Problem About Inductive Inference as Such. Philosophy 76 (1):127-136.
    I argue that Goodman's puzzle of grue at least poses no real challenge about inductive inference. By drawing on Stove's characterisation of Hume's characterisation of inductive inference, we see that the premises in an inductive inference report experienced impressions; and Goodman can be interpreted as posing a real challenge about inductive inference only if we treat an epistemic subject's observations more as logical contents and less as experienced impressions. So, even though the grue puzzle was effective against its stated logicist (...)
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  33. Hugues Leblanc (1962/2006). Statistical and Inductive Probabilities. Dover Publications.
    This evenhanded treatment addresses the decades-old dispute among probability theorists, asserting that both statistical and inductive probabilities may be treated as sentence-theoretic measurements, and that the latter qualify as estimates of the former. Beginning with a survey of the essentials of sentence theory and of set theory, the author examines statistical probabilities, showing that statistical probabilities may be passed on to sentences, and thereby qualify as truth-values. An exploration of inductive probabilities follows, demonstrating their reinterpretation as estimates of truth-values. Each (...)
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  34. Wang-Yen Lee (2013). Akaike's Theorem and Weak Predictivism in Science. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (4):594-599.
  35. Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger (1994). Induction as a Connection Between Philosophy, Psychology and Economics. Grazer Philosophische Studien 49:175-188.
    It is the aim of this paper to find a systematic approach to the study of induction by integrating the ideas of several disciplines to have a successful instrument for analyzing processes of inference, learning and discovery. On the way to generalities which enable sensible forecasts the social and economic sciences use empirical work and nowadays we are encouraged to use more and more experimental access to investigate analogous situations. Induction is used as a fundamental concept and experimental work has (...)
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  36. Peter Lipton (2003). Is Explanation a Guide to Inference? A Reply to Wesley Salmon. In G. Hon & Sam S. Rakover (eds.), Explanation: Theoretical Approaches and Applications. Springer.
    Earlier in this volume, Wesley Salmon has given a characteristically clear and trenchant critique of the account of non-demonstrative reasoning known by the slogan `Inference to the Best Explanation'. As a long-time fan of the idea that explanatory considerations are a guide to inference, I was delighted by the suggestion that Wes and I might work together on a discussion of the issues. In the event, this project has exceeded my high expectations, for in addition to the intellectual gain that (...)
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  37. Peter Lipton (2000). Tracking Track Records, I. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 74 (1):179-205.
    From a reliabilist point of view, our inferential practices make us into instruments for determining the truth value of hypotheses where, like all instruments, reliability is a central virtue. I apply this perspective to second-order inductions, the inductive assessments of inductive practices. Such assessments are extremely common, for example whenever we test the reliability of our instruments or our informants. Nevertheless, the inductive assessment of induction has had a bad name ever since David Hume maintained that any attempt to justify (...)
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  38. P. D. Magnus (2006). What's New About the New Induction? Synthese 148 (2):295 - 301.
    The problem of underdetermination is thought to hold important lessons for philosophy of science. Yet, as Kyle Stanford has recently argued, typical treatments of it offer only restatements of familiar philosophical problems. Following suggestions in Duhem and Sklar, Stanford calls for a New Induction from the history of science. It will provide proof, he thinks, of “the kind of underdetermination that the history of science reveals to be a distinctive and genuine threat to even our best scientific theories” (Stanford 2001, (...)
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  39. Eric Martin & Daniel Osherson (2002). Scientific Discovery From the Perspective of Hypothesis Acceptance. Philosophy of Science 69 (S3):S331-S341.
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  40. Robert McLaughlin (1982). Invention and Induction Laudan, Simon and the Logic of Discovery. Philosophy of Science 49 (2):198-211.
    Although on opposite sides of the logic of discovery debate, Laudan and Simon share a thesis of divorce between discovery (invention) and justification (appraisal); but unlike some other authors, they do not base their respective versions of the divorce-thesis on the empirical/logical distinction. Laudan argues that, in contemporary science, invention is irrelevant to appraisal, and that this irrelevance renders epistemically pointless the inventionist program. Simon uses his divorce-thesis to defend his account of invention, which he claims to be non-inductive--so evading (...)
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  41. Halina Mortimer (1988). The Logic of Induction. Halsted Press.
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  42. Alan Musgrave (1993). Popper on Induction. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 23 (4):516-527.
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  43. Ilkka Niiniluoto (1994). Hintikka and Whewell on Aristotelian Induction. Grazer Philosophische Studien 49:49-61.
    According to the standard interpretation, Aristotle has two accounts of induction (epagoge): intuitive induction (which is not an inference) and complete induction (which is not a kind of non-demonstrative inference). Hintikka has challenged the usual interpretation of Aristotle's "official account" in Analytica Priora II, 23. In this paper, Hintikka's view is compared with a similar, but in some respects perhaps even more plausible, interpretation that William Whewell gave already in 1850. Both Hintikka and Whewell argue convincingly that Aristotelean induction is (...)
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  44. Ilkka Niiniluoto (1973). Conceptual Enrichment, Theories and Inductive Systematization. Distributor, the Academic Bookstore.
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  45. Ilkka Niiniluoto (1973). Theoretical Concepts and Hypothetico-Inductive Inference. Boston,D. Reidel Pub. Co..
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  46. Ilkka Niiniluoto (1972). Inductive Systematization: Definition and a Critical Survey. Synthese 25 (1-2):25 - 81.
    In 1958, to refute the argument known as the theoretician's dilemma, Hempel suggested that theoretical terms might be logically indispensable for inductive systematization of observational statements. This thesis, in some form or another, has later been supported by Scheffler, Lehrer, and Tuomela, and opposed by Bohnert, Hooker, Stegmüller, and Cornman. In this paper, a critical survey of this discussion is given. Several different putative definitions of the crucial notion inductive systematization achieved by a theory are discussed by reference to the (...)
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  47. John D. Norton, The Inductive Significance of Observationally Indistinguishable Spacetimes: (Peter Achinstein has the Last Laugh).
    For several years, through the “material theory of induction,” I have urged that inductive inferences are not licensed by universal schemas, but by material facts that hold only locally (Norton, 2003, 2005). My goal has been to defend inductive inference against inductive skeptics by demonstrating when and how inductive inferences are properly made. Since I have always admired Peter Achinstein as a staunch defender of induction, it was a surprise when Peter..
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  48. John D. Norton (2010). Cosmic Confusions: Not Supporting Versus Supporting Not. Philosophy of Science 77 (4):501-523.
    Bayesian probabilistic explication of inductive inference conflates neutrality of supporting evidence for some hypothesis H (“not supporting H”) with disfavoring evidence (“supporting not-H”). This expressive inadequacy leads to spurious results that are artifacts of a poor choice of inductive logic. I illustrate how such artifacts have arisen in simple inductive inferences in cosmology. In the inductive disjunctive fallacy, neutral support for many possibilities is spuriously converted into strong support for their disjunction. The Bayesian “doomsday argument” is shown to rely entirely (...)
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  49. Len O'Neill (1996). Indifference and Induction. In P. Riggs (ed.), Natural Kinds, Laws of Nature and Scientific Methodology. Kluwer Academic Publishers. 93--102.
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  50. Rama Chandra Pal (2000). Studies in the Fundamentals of Induction. Rabindra Bharati University.
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