Related

Contents
20 found
Order:
  1. Perception, Evidence, and our Expressive Knowledge of Others' Minds.Anil Gomes - 2019 - In Matthew Parrott & Anita Avramides (eds.), Knowing Other Minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    ‘How, then, she had asked herself, did one know one thing or another thing about people, sealed as they were?’ So asks Lily Briscoe in To the Lighthouse. It is this question, rather than any concern about pretence or deception, which forms the basis for the philosophical problem of other minds. Responses to this problem have tended to cluster around two solutions: either we know others’ minds through perception; or we know others’ minds through a form of inference. In the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  2. The Look of Another Mind.Matthew Parrott - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1023-1061.
    According to the perceptual model, our knowledge of others' minds is a form of perceptual knowledge. We know, for example, that Jones is angry because we can literally see that he is. In this essay, I argue that mental states do not have the kind of distinctive looks that could sufficiently justify perceptual knowledge of others’ mentality. I present a puzzle that can arise with respect to mental states that I claim does not arise for non-mental properties like being an (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  3. Testimony and Other Minds.Anil Gomes - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):173-183.
    In this paper I defend the claim that testimony can serve as a basic source of knowledge of other people’s mental lives against the objection that testimonial knowledge presupposes knowledge of other people’s mental lives and therefore can’t be used to explain it.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  4. « Dousir » et « plaileur » l'énigme de l'attribution d'expériences.Alexandre Billon - 2010 - Philosophie 105 (2):64-90.
    Cet article aborde le problème de la justification des attributions d'expérience à autrui (problem of other minds). Je compare ce problème à d'autres problèmes sceptiques contemporains dus à Nelson Goodman et Saoül Kripke et je montre qu'il constitue un défi plus pressant et auquel il est plus difficile de répondre de manière modeste. Je propose une solution radicale à ce problème, qui repose sur l'idée, avérée empiriquement, selon laquelle nous disposons de deux formes d'empathie distinctes pour accéder à autrui. Très (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Other minds and perceived identity.Anil Gomes - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (2):219-230.
    Quassim Cassam has recently defended a perceptual model of knowledge of other minds: one on which we can see and thereby know that another thinks and feels. In the course of defending this model, he addresses issues about our ability to think about other minds. I argue that his solution to this 'conceptual problem' does not work. A solution to the conceptual problem is necessary if we wish to explain knowledge of other minds.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  6. Hume’s Discussion on the Personal Identity.Desh Raj Sirswal - 2005 - Bihar Jounal of Philosophical Research (00):189-197.
    ‘What am I’ is the question which is generally asked and answered differently , since the history of thought. It is related to one’s identity, so everyone gives different answer according to their personal history, physical features and circumstances. For Hume self is neither a body, nor a mind, nor a combination of both, nor an unknown substance as some thinkers generally say and defend. It is only a series of experiences, a strew of feelings, sensations, desires, thoughts, beliefs etc (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic Desk Examination Edition.Ian Hacking - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    This is an introductory textbook on probability and induction written by one of the world's foremost philosophers of science. The book has been designed to offer maximal accessibility to the widest range of students and assumes no formal training in elementary symbolic logic. It offers a comprehensive course covering all basic definitions of induction and probability, and it considers such topics as decision theory, Bayesianism, frequency ideas, and the philosophical problem of induction. The key features of the book are a (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Our understanding of other minds: theory of mind and the intentional stance.Kristin Andrews - 2000 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):12-24.
    Psychologists distinguish between intentional systems which have beliefs and those which are also able to attribute beliefs to others. The ability to do the latter is called having a 'theory of mind', and many cognitive ethologists are hoping to find evidence for this ability in animal behaviour. I argue that Dennett's theory entails that any intentional system that interacts with another intentional system (such as vervet monkeys and chess-playing computers) has a theory of mind, which would make the distinction all (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  9. Other voices, other minds.Theodore J. Everett - 2000 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):213-222.
    Solipsism can be refuted along fairly traditional, internalist lines, by means of a second-order induction. We are justified in believing in other minds, because other people tell us that they have minds, and we have good inductive reason to believe that whatever certain others say is likely to be true. This simple argument is sound, the author argues, even though we are in no prior position to believe that other thinking people exist as such, or that the sounds they make (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  10. An inductive argument for other minds.Peter Ray - 1976 - Philosophical Studies 29 (February):129-139.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  11. Analogy, induction and other minds.Theodore W. Budlong - 1975 - Analysis 35 (January):111-112.
    Alvin plantinga and michael slote, Following ayer, Have attempted to formulate the argument from analogy for the existence of other minds as an enumerative induction. Their way of avoiding the 'generalizing from a single case' objection is shown to be fallacious.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  12. Inductive evidence for other minds.Jerome I. Gellman - 1974 - Philosophical Studies 25 (July):323-336.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. Induction and other minds.George N. Schlesinger - 1974 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):3-21.
    Plantinga's attempts generally to undermine inductive-Analogical arguments for the other minds are criticized, And an attempt is made to present a sound analogical argument for other minds that can withstand plantinga's and other sceptical criticisms. It is then argued that a similar demonstration of the reasonableness of believing in objects when we are not observing them is also possible.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. Induction and other minds II.Alvin Plantinga - 1968 - Review of Metaphysics 21 (3):524-533.
    The analogical position, as traditionally understood, is the claim that a person can inductively infer the existence of other minds from what he knows about his own mind and about physical objects. Of course this body of knowledge must not include such propositions about physical objects as "that human body over there is animated by a human mind," or "this automobile was designed by a human mind"; nor could my evidence for the existence of other minds be that I have (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Induction and other minds.Alvin Plantinga - 1966 - Review of Metaphysics 19 (3):441-61.
    But here a preliminary difficulty must be dealt with: can't we sometimes see that a man is in pain? Can't we sometimes see that someone is thinking, depressed, or exuberant? And if anything would be "determining by observation" that another is in pain, surely seeing that he is would be: so why is a tenuous analogical inference necessary?
    Remove from this list   Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  16. Induction and other minds.Michael Anthony Slote - 1966 - Review of Metaphysics 20 (2):341-60.
    In "Induction and Other Minds," Plantinga casts the Argument from Analogy in the form of an inductive argument in the following way.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  17. The philosophical concept of a human body.Douglas C. Long - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (July):321-337.
    I argue in this paper that philosophers have not clearly introduced the concept of a body in terms of which the problem of other minds and its solutions have been traditionally stated; that one can raise fatal objections to attempts to introduce this concept; and that the particular form of the problem of other minds which is stated in terms of the concept is confused and requires no solution. The concept of a "body" which may or may not be the (...)
    Remove from this list   Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  18. Three problems about other minds.W. W. Mellor - 1956 - Mind 65 (April):200-217.
  19. One's knowledge of other minds.A. J. Ayer - 1953 - Theoria 13 (September):35-52.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  20. Our knowledge of other minds.C. D. Hardie - 1939 - Philosophy of Science 6 (3):309-317.
    I give some reason for accepting a form of the view that there is some logical, And not just contingent, Connection between publicly observable behavior and a person's psychological states. If my contentions are sound, They open the way to the enterprise of delineating a stratification of psychological state concepts. This involves determining which mental concepts are logically connected to observable behavior and how the other categories of mental states are specified on the basis of these.
    Remove from this list   Direct download (12 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation