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  1. Kristin Andrews (2000). Our Understanding of Other Minds: Theory of Mind and the Intentional Stance. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):12-24.
    Psychologists distinguish between intentional systems which have beliefs and those which are also able to attribute beliefs to others. The ability to do the latter is called having a `theory of mind', and many cognitive ethologists are hoping to find evidence for this ability in animal behaviour. I argue that Dennett's theory entails that any intentional system that interacts with another intentional system (such as vervet monkeys and chess-playing computers) has a theory of mind, which would make the distinction all (...)
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  2. Kristin Andrews (2000). Our Understanding of Other Minds: Theory of Mind and the Intentional Stance. Journal of Consciousness Studies 7 (7):12-24.
    Psychologists distinguish between intentional systems which have beliefs and those which are also able to attribute beliefs to others. The ability to do the latter is called having a 'theory of mind', and many cognitive ethologists are hoping to find evidence for this ability in animal behaviour. I argue that Dennett's theory entails that any intentional system that interacts with another intentional system (such as vervet monkeys and chess-playing computers) has a theory of mind, which would make the distinction all (...)
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  3. A. J. Ayer (1953). One's Knowledge of Other Minds. Theoria 13 (September):35-52.
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  4. Theodore W. Budlong (1975). Analogy, Induction and Other Minds. Analysis 35 (January):111-112.
    Alvin plantinga and michael slote, Following ayer, Have attempted to formulate the argument from analogy for the existence of other minds as an enumerative induction. Their way of avoiding the 'generalizing from a single case' objection is shown to be fallacious.
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  5. Theodore J. Everett (2000). Other Voices, Other Minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):213-222.
    Solipsism can be refuted along fairly traditional, internalist lines, by means of a second-order induction. We are justified in believing in other minds, because other people tell us that they have minds, and we have good inductive reason to believe that whatever certain others say is likely to be true. This simple argument is sound, the author argues, even though we are in no prior position to believe that other thinking people exist as such, or that the sounds they make (...)
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  6. Jerome I. Gellman (1974). Inductive Evidence for Other Minds. Philosophical Studies 25 (July):323-336.
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  7. Anil Gomes (forthcoming). Testimony and Other Minds. Erkenntnis:1-11.
    In this paper I defend the claim that testimony can serve as a basic source of knowledge of other people’s mental lives against the objection that testimonial knowledge presupposes knowledge of other people’s mental lives and therefore can’t be used to explain it.
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  8. C. D. Hardie (1939). Our Knowledge of Other Minds. Philosophy of Science 6 (3):309-317.
    I give some reason for accepting a form of the view that there is some logical, And not just contingent, Connection between publicly observable behavior and a person's psychological states. If my contentions are sound, They open the way to the enterprise of delineating a stratification of psychological state concepts. This involves determining which mental concepts are logically connected to observable behavior and how the other categories of mental states are specified on the basis of these.
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  9. W. W. Mellor (1956). Three Problems About Other Minds. Mind 65 (April):200-217.
  10. Alvin Plantinga (1968). Induction and Other Minds II. Review of Metaphysics 12 (March):524-33.
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  11. Alvin Plantinga (1966). Induction and Other Minds. Review of Metaphysics 19 (March):441-61.
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  12. Peter Ray (1976). An Inductive Argument for Other Minds. Philosophical Studies 29 (February):129-139.
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  13. George N. Schlesinger (1974). Induction and Other Minds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52 (May):3-21.
    Plantinga's attempts generally to undermine inductive-Analogical arguments for the other minds are criticized, And an attempt is made to present a sound analogical argument for other minds that can withstand plantinga's and other sceptical criticisms. It is then argued that a similar demonstration of the reasonableness of believing in objects when we are not observing them is also possible.
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  14. Michael A. Slote (1966). Induction and Other Minds. Review of Metaphysics 20 (December):341-60.
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