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  1. Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.) (forthcoming). Philosophy of Statistics, Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume 7. Elsevier.
  2. Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (1964). On an Alleged Contradiction in Carnap's Theory of Inductive Logic. Mind 73 (290):265-267.
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  3. Yehoshua Bar-Hillel (1953). A Note on Comparative Inductive Logic. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 3 (12):308-310.
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  4. Johan Van Benthem (2011). Logic in a Social Setting. Episteme 8 (3):227-247.
    Taking Backward Induction as its running example, this paper explores avenues for a logic of information-driven social action. We use recent results on limit phenomena in knowledge updating and belief revision, procedural rationality, and a ‘Theory of Play’ analyzing how games are played by different agents.
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  5. Ken Binmore (2011). Interpreting Knowledge in the Backward Induction Problem. Episteme 8 (3):248-261.
    Robert Aumann argues that common knowledge of rationality implies backward induction in finite games of perfect information. I have argued that it does not. A literature now exists in which various formal arguments are offered in support of both positions. This paper argues that Aumann's claim can be justified if knowledge is suitably reinterpreted.
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  6. R. Carnap & R. Jeffrey (eds.) (1971). Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability. University of California Press.
    Introduction Much delayed, here is the second, final volume of Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability. Carnap projected the series ca. as a ...
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  7. Rudolf Carnap (1963). Variety, Analogy, and Periodicity in Inductive Logic. Philosophy of Science 30 (3):222-227.
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  8. Rudolf Carnap (1951). The Nature and Application of Inductive Logic. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
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  9. Rudolf Carnap (1951). The Problem of Relations in Inductive Logic. Philosophical Studies 2 (5):75 - 80.
  10. Rudolf Carnap (1947). On the Application of Inductive Logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 8 (1):133-148.
  11. Rudolf Carnap (1945). On Inductive Logic. Philosophy of Science 12 (2):72-97.
  12. C. West Churchman (1946). Carnap's "on Inductive Logic". Philosophy of Science 13 (4):339-342.
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  13. L. J. Cohen & Mary Hesse (eds.) (1983). Aspects of Inductive Logic. Oxford Up.
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  14. L. Jonathan Cohen (1973). A Note on Inductive Logic. Journal of Philosophy 70 (2):27-40.
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  15. L. Jonathan Cohen & Mary B. Hesse (eds.) (1980). Applications of Inductive Logic: Proceedings of a Conference at the Queen's College, Oxford 21-24, August 1978. Oxford University Press.
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  16. Wilhelm K. Essler (1986). How to Apply and Justify Inductive Logic. Erkenntnis 24 (1):47 - 55.
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  17. Ian Hacking (2001). An Introduction to Probability and Inductive Logic. Cambridge University Press.
    This is an introductory textbook on probability and induction written by one of the world's foremost philosophers of science. The book has been designed to offer maximal accessibility to the widest range of students (not only those majoring in philosophy) and assumes no formal training in elementary symbolic logic. It offers a comprehensive course covering all basic definitions of induction and probability, and considers such topics as decision theory, Bayesianism, frequency ideas, and the philosophical problem of induction. The key features (...)
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  18. Ian Hacking (1971). The Leibniz-Carnap Program for Inductive Logic. Journal of Philosophy 68 (19):597-610.
  19. Ian Hacking (1969). Linguistically Invariant Inductive Logic. Synthese 20 (1):25 - 47.
    Carnap's early system of inductive logic make degrees of confirmation depend on the languages in which they are expressed. They are sensitive to which predicates are, in the language, taken as primitive. Hence they fail to be ‘linguistically invariant’. His later systems, in which prior probabilities are assigned to elements of a model rather than sentences of a language, are sensitive to which properties in the model are called primitive. Critics have often protested against these features of his work. This (...)
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  20. D. W. Hamlyn (1958). Foundations of Inductive Logic. By R. F. Harrod. (London: Macmillan. 1956. Pp. Xviii + 290. Price 24s.). Philosophy 33 (127):369-.
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  21. Roy Forbes Harrod (1974/1957). Foundations of Inductive Logic. Macmillan.
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  22. James Hawthorne (2011). Confirmation Theory. In Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Malcolm Forster (eds.), Philosophy of Statistics, Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Volume 7. Elsevier.
    Confirmation theory is the study of the logic by which scientific hypotheses may be confirmed or disconfirmed, or even refuted by evidence. A specific theory of confirmation is a proposal for such a logic. Presumably the epistemic evaluation of scientific hypotheses should largely depend on their empirical content – on what they say the evidentially accessible parts of the world are like, and on the extent to which they turn out to be right about that. Thus, all theories of confirmation (...)
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  23. James Hawthorne, Inductive Logic. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Sections 1 through 3 present all of the main ideas behind the probabilistic logic of evidential support. For most readers these three sections will suffice to provide an adequate understanding of the subject. Those readers who want to know more about how the logic applies when the implications of hypotheses about evidence claims (called likelihoods) are vague or imprecise may, after reading sections 1-3, skip to section 6. Sections 4 and 5 are for the more advanced reader who wants a (...)
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  24. James Hawthorne (2011). Bayesian Confirmation Theory. In S. French & J. Saatsi (eds.), Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Continuum Press.
    Scientifi c theories and hypotheses make claims that go well beyond what we can immediately observe. How can we come to know whether such claims are true? The obvious approach is to see what a hypothesis says about the observationally accessible parts of the world. If it gets that wrong, then it must be false; if it gets that right, then it may have some claim to being true. Any sensible a empt to construct a logic that captures how we (...)
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  25. James Hawthorne (1994). On the Nature of Bayesian Convergence. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:241 - 249.
    The objectivity of Bayesian induction relies on the ability of evidence to produce a convergence to agreement among agents who initially disagree about the plausibilities of hypotheses. I will describe three sorts of Bayesian convergence. The first reduces the objectivity of inductions about simple "occurrent events" to the objectivity of posterior probabilities for theoretical hypotheses. The second reveals that evidence will generally induce converge to agreement among agents on the posterior probabilities of theories only if the convergence is 0 or (...)
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  26. James Hawthorne (1993). Bayesian Induction IS Eliminative Induction. Philosophical Topics 21 (1):99-138.
    Eliminative induction is a method for finding the truth by using evidence to eliminate false competitors. It is often characterized as "induction by means of deduction"; the accumulating evidence eliminates false hypotheses by logically contradicting them, while the true hypothesis logically entails the evidence, or at least remains logically consistent with it. If enough evidence is available to eliminate all but the most implausible competitors of a hypothesis, then (and only then) will the hypothesis become highly confirmed. I will argue (...)
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  27. Risto Hilpinen (1973). Carnap's New System of Inductive Logic. Synthese 25 (3-4):307 - 333.
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  28. Risto Hilpinen (1968). Rules of Acceptance and Inductive Logic. Amsterdam, North-Holland Pub. Co..
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  29. Jaakko Hintikka (1967). Aspects of Inductive Logic. Amsterdam, North Holland Pub. Co..
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  30. Paul Horwich (1983). Book Review:Applications of Inductive Logic L. Jonathan Cohen, Mary Hesse. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 50 (1):167-.
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  31. Colin Howson (1975). The Rule of Succession, Inductive Logic, and Probability Logic. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (3):187-198.
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  32. Colin Howson (1975). The End of the Road for Inductive Logic? [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (2):143-149.
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  33. Michael Huemer (2009). Explanationist Aid for the Theory of Inductive Logic. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):345-375.
    A central problem facing a probabilistic approach to the problem of induction is the difficulty of sufficiently constraining prior probabilities so as to yield the conclusion that induction is cogent. The Principle of Indifference, according to which alternatives are equiprobable when one has no grounds for preferring one over another, represents one way of addressing this problem; however, the Principle faces the well-known problem that multiple interpretations of it are possible, leading to incompatible conclusions. I propose a partial solution to (...)
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  34. Jürgen Humburg (1986). The Solution of Hempel's Raven Paradox in Rudolf Carnap's System of Inductive Logic. Erkenntnis 24 (1):57 - 72.
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  35. Richard C. Jeffrey (ed.) (1980). Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability. Berkeley: University of California Press.
    Then, in 1960, Carnap drew up a plan of articles for Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability — a surrogate for Volume II of the ...
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  36. Richard C. Jeffrey (1973). Carnap's Inductive Logic. Synthese 25 (3-4):299 - 306.
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  37. John G. Kemeny (1953). A Contribution to Inductive Logic. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 13 (3):371-374.
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  38. John G. Kemeny (1952). Extension of the Methods of Inductive Logic. Philosophical Studies 3 (3):38 - 42.
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  39. Gert König (1972). Inductive Logic. Foundations and Assumptions. Philosophy and History 5 (2):137-138.
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  40. Theo A. F. Kuipers (2005). A Brand New Type of Inductive Logic: Reply to Diderik Batens. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 83 (1):248-252.
    In section I the notions of logical and inductive probability will be discussed as well as two explicanda, viz. degree of confirmation, the base for inductive probability, and degree of evidential support, Popper's favourite explicandum. In section II it will be argued that Popper's paradox of ideal evidence is no paradox at all; however, it will also be shown that Popper's way out has its own merits.
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  41. Theo A. F. Kuipers (1973). A Generalization of Carnap's Inductive Logic. Synthese 25 (3-4):334 - 336.
    In section I the notions of logical and inductive probability will be discussed as well as two explicanda, viz. degree of confirmation, the base for inductive probability, and degree of evidential support, Popper's favourite explicandum. In section II it will be argued that Popper's paradox of ideal evidence is no paradox at all; however, it will also be shown that Popper's way out has its own merits.
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  42. Kyburg Jr (1972). Book Review:Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability Rudolf Carnap, Richard C. Jeffrey. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 39 (4):549-.
  43. Kyburg Jr (1972). Book Review:Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability Rudolf Carnap, Richard C. Jeffrey. [REVIEW] Philosophy of Science 39 (4):549-.
  44. Henry Ely Kyburg (1970). Probability and Inductive Logic. [New York]Macmillan.
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  45. Imre Lakatos (ed.) (1968). The Problem of Inductive Logic. Amsterdam, North Holland Pub. Co..
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  46. J. Landes, J. B. Paris & A. Vencovská (2011). A Survey of Some Recent Results on Spectrum Exchangeability in Polyadic Inductive Logic. Synthese 181 (1):19 - 47.
    We give a unified account of some results in the development of Polyadic Inductive Logic in the last decade with particular reference to the Principle of Spectrum Exchangeability, its consequences for Instantial Relevance, Language Invariance and Johnson's Sufficientness Principle, and the corresponding de Finetti style representation theorems.
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  47. Jürgen Landes, Jeff Paris & Alena Vencovská (2008). Some Aspects of Polyadic Inductive Logic. Studia Logica 90 (1):3 - 16.
    We give a brief account of some de Finetti style representation theorems for probability functions satisfying Spectrum Exchangeability in Polyadic Inductive Logic, together with applications to Non-splitting, Language Invariance, extensions with Equality and Instantial Relevance.
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  48. David K. Lewis (1969). Policing the Aufbau. Philosophical Studies 20 (1-2):13-17.
  49. Ko Li (1979). Bacon's Inductive Logic. Contemporary Chinese Thought 10 (3):76-93.
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  50. Patrick Maher (2006). A Conception of Inductive Logic. Philosophy of Science 73 (5):513-523.
    I conceive of inductive logic as a project of explication. The explicandum is one of the meanings of the word `probability' in ordinary language; I call it inductive probability and argue that it is logical, in a certain sense. The explicatum is a conditional probability function that is specified by stipulative definition. This conception of inductive logic is close to Carnap's, but common objections to Carnapian inductive logic (the probabilities don't exist, are arbitrary, etc.) do not apply to this conception.
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